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“Coal in truth, stands not beside, but entirely above all other commodities.
It is the material energy of the country and commands this age -
The Age of Coal.”
W.S Jevons
The Coal question (1865)
Summary
During the nineteenth century the British coal industry fuelled industrial growth to 
such an extent that Great Britain was acknowledged as the most powerful 
industrial country in the world. Although the coal industry was dominated by the 
larger regional coalfields, e.g. south Wales, the smaller coalfields also made an 
important, albeit largely local, contribution. This contribution has, however, often 
been ignored; most histories either concentrate on the larger coalfields or, if 
examining small coalfields, they have centred on a particular event or town rather 
than on examining the contribution of each coalfield as a whole. This thesis will 
partly redress this imbalance by undertaking a ‘case study’ of a small, county 
coalfield, Denbighshire. For official purposes, Denbighshire was never 
considered a coalfield in its own right, it was merely recognised as part of the 
north Wales ‘coalfield’. It is, however, argued in this thesis that geological factors 
and its significance within the north Wales coalfield, mean that Denbighshire 
warrants consideration as a small coalfield in its own right.
This thesis attempts to develop, for the first time, a definitive history of the 
coal industry in Denbighshire, 1850-1914, through the use of an archival 
approach. Source material, including company records, newspapers, personal 
letters and official statistics, was examined. The thesis considers not only the 
performance of the coalfield in terms of productivity and profitability but also the 
various stakeholders in the coalfield, i.e. those people who, either directly or 
indirectly, influenced, or were influenced by, the development of the 
Denbighshire coal industry.
Apart from establishing that Denbighshire should be treated as a small 
coalfield in its own right, it is concluded that the performance of Denbighshire 
was comparable to that of other ‘small’ coalfields and that, although affected by 
similar influences to other coalfields, the extent of their impact could be different.
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Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the economic history of the 
Denbighshire coalfield between 1850 and 1914 with a view to providing as 
comprehensive a picture as possible of the coalfield’s development over this 
period, in particular, establishing how and why the coal industry was able to 
develop in the county and examining some of the problems that had to be faced 
along the way. This thesis will establish the economic conditions which prevailed 
in the region in the period up to 1850 before carrying out a detailed examination 
of the people and events which allowed the coal industry to become the most 
important industrial employer in Denbighshire in 1914, employing 12,982 men 
working in 26 collieries (British Library, hereafter BL, BL/BS/27/1). The vast 
majority of these collieries were located in Wrexham and its immediate environs, 
and the growth of the coal industry had an enormous impact on the town. 
Between 1841 and 1911 the population of Wrexham grew from 5,854 to 18,377, 
an increase of 214 per cent (WA Williams, 2002) and, according to Dodd (1957: 
145), it was the expansion of the coal industry that was chiefly responsible for the 
growth of the town.
Rationale
When one thinks of the coal industry in the United Kingdom the areas that are 
automatically associated with this industry are probably south Wales, Yorkshire 
and the north east of England. Smaller coalmining regions, such as north Wales, 
are not, generally, considered as being of any significance in the national 
context, though, within their own own regions/localities, the coal industry could be 
a major ‘player’ in the industrialisation process. This was the case in north Wales 
where the coal reserves are concentrated in the north east of Wales, in Flintshire 
and in Denbighshire. However, the coal reserves of north Wales are not shared 
equally by both counties, the ‘Bala fault’ acting as a major geological barrier
l
between them and, in effect, creating two coalfields completely independent of 
each other (see Chapter 1, page 27 for further details).
From 1850, the growth of the coal industry in north Wales is essentially a 
story of the growth of the Denbighshire coalfield. Hence this thesis focuses on 
developments in Denbighshire where coalfield activity centred around the towns 
of Wrexham and Ruabon. It is important, at this point, to recognise that, for 
official, statistical, purposes the ‘Denbighshire coalfield’ was never considered a 
coalfield in its own right, it was simply a region within the north Wales ‘coalfield’. 
It is the contention of this thesis that the term ‘the north Wales coalfield’ does not 
reflect the ‘reality’ of the coal industry in north Wales, it was simply a convenient 
‘badge’ for the region and it is more ‘useful’ to discuss the individual coalfields, 
Denbighshire and Flintshire, as distinct entities that come within the ‘north Wales’ 
umbrella. As a consequence this thesis will only use the term north Wales 
‘coalfield’ when it is impossible to break down official statistics into their 
‘component parts’ because of the way the statistics were compiled.
In 'coal' terms north Wales has always been a "minor region" (Church, 
1986), barely worth a mention in the many books written on the UK coal industry. 
Indeed, for statistical purposes, compilers often included the north Wales figures 
with those of ‘Lancashire and Cheshire’, which illustrates the ‘unimportance’ of 
the region on a national level. It therefore follows that, being only part of an 
already marginal region, Denbighshire has received little or no detailed attention 
by previous historians. Given the importance of the coalfield to Denbighshire’s 
industrial past, however, it is surprising that very little has been written 
specifically on the Denbighshire coalfield. Although north Wales-wide studies 
have been carried out by Rogers (1928) and Gildart (2001), the only major study 
of the Denbighshire coalfield conducted to date is that carried out by the locally 
acclaimed historian GG Lerry in the 1950s. However, despite its importance in 
recording the various mines, their history and chronology, he did not attempt to 
explain why the Denbighshire coalfield was able to expand as it did, neither does 
his work consider who invested in the coalfield, who were the other major 
stakeholders or how the coal companies that were founded actually performed.
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This thesis is an attempt to redress this imbalance and seeks to provide the most 
comprehensive study of the Denbighshire coalfield to date.
As mentioned above, smaller coalfields have tended to be ignored by 
writers and historians of economic and industrial history. However, it is the 
contention of this thesis that a detailed study of a small coalfield allows insights 
to be made into issues that might not be apparent in a broader study. For 
example, it can illustrate how specific events, such as strikes, or problems with 
sinking, impact on the profitability of particular companies within the coalfield. In 
addition, such a focused study will allow comparisons to be made with larger 
coalfields which will demonstrate whether issues that were important in these 
regions were of the same significance in smaller coalfields, or whether 
completely different, localised issues dominated.
Aims
The main questions that this thesis will attempt to throw light upon are:-
• Can Denbighshire be considered a coalfield in its own right?
• What were the obstacles to economic and industrial development that faced 
the Denbighshire coalfield in the early nineteenth century and how were these 
overcome?
• Who were the coalowners and shareholders who invested in the coalfield and 
were they similar in background to shareholders in coal companies 
elsewhere?
• Who were the other major stakeholders in the coal industry in Denbighshire 
and what was the nature of the relationships between these stakeholders and 
the coal companies?
• How did the coal companies of Denbighshire perform? In this context we will 
look at two measures of performance, productivity and profitability, to 
determine how Denbighshire ‘performed’ in comparison with other coalfields.
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• Does examining a small coalfield offer insights into issues that might not be 
revealed by studying a larger coalfield and were these issues different from 
those being raised in larger coalfields?
Methodology
Approach
Before outlining the methods used to achieve the aims of this thesis, it is 
necessary to establish what ‘type’ of research has been undertaken. Research 
has many connotations, not least the belief that it means that something new will 
be ‘discovered’, such as a new planet or a new miracle drug, or that surveys and 
questionnaires need to be completed to allow new conclusions to be drawn. 
However as Jordanova (2006: 23) explains, ‘research’ “is rather loose and under­
determined in its meaning”. To some, research, even historical research, is not 
research unless it is ‘scientific’, or ‘positivist’, and involves empirical methods 
which test one hypothesis or another. Essentially it is about facts and figures 
which should not be ‘coloured’ by the preconceptions of the author (Tosh, 1991:
131). To others, historical research is equally valid when it is ‘idealistic’, i.e. 
‘interpreted’ by authors who have an “imaginative identification with the peoples 
of the past” (Tosh, 1991: 132). However, research methods are not always 
mutually exclusive and it is often difficult to allocate research simply to one 
category or another. Consequently, as with this thesis, a ‘mixed’ approach has to 
be taken. While a wholly scientific approach has not been possible, due to the 
limited data available and hence the need to interpret certain data, some 
quantitiative data has been extracted which has allowed the author to ‘measure’ 
Denbighshire’s performance against hypotheses produced by other historians, to 
establish whether Denbighshire accords with ‘accepted’ views. However, as 
Jordanova (2006: 51) explains “it is unfortunate to isolate quantitative from 
qualitative work; they are best seen as complementary”. As a result, the author 
has had to, in some cases, interpret facts or events and make suppositions that
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can in no way be seen as definitive conclusions, but are acceptable if using an 
idealistic approach.
According to Marwick (1989: 199) historical research involves “diligent and
systematic investigation  to address precise problems and extend human
knowledge in a particular area”. This thesis, by means of such investigation, will 
attempt to determine the factors that help explain the development of the 
Denbighshire coalfield which, it is hoped, will add to the body of knowledge of 
small coalfields by providing a comprehensive study of an, hitherto, un­
researched area, namely, Denbighshire.
Having established that the research undertaken to achieve the aims of 
this thesis falls into the ‘mixed’ category, we can now turn to the sources and 
methods used.
Sources
According to Jordanova (2006: 32) “when we talk about sources it is conventional 
to divide written ones into ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’”. Primary sources are usually 
considered to be sources that “came into existence during the actual period of
the past which the historian is studying while secondary sources are those
accounts written later by historians looking back upon a period in the past” 
(Marwick, 1989: 199). However this distinction is not always clear cut and “what 
is a primary source for one project might be a secondary one for another, and 
vice versa” (Jordanova , 2006: 101). Jordanova (2006: 101) cites journalism as 
an example: she explains that newspapers can be seen as secondary 
commentary for historians, but to historians of journalism they would be primary 
sources. This view, however, does not coincide with that of Tosh (1991: 37) who 
considers the press to be “the most important published primary source for the 
historian”. According to Tosh (199: 37-38) “newspapers have a threefold value”; 
they “record the political and social views which made most impact at the time”, 
they “provide a day to day record of events” and they “from time to time present
5
the results of more thorough enquiries into issues which lie beyond the scope of 
routine news-reporting”.
An additional source that can be disputed as primary or secondary is what 
Saunders et al. (1997: 160) describe as “documentary secondary data”. This 
includes “notices, correspondence, minutes of meetings [and] reports to 
shareholders” (Saunders et al., 1997: 160). For a student studying a business 
issue, for example, human resource practices, such documents might indeed be 
considered a secondary source, but for the historian studying the business itself, 
then these documents would be seen as primary sources rather than secondary.
For the purposes of this thesis, newspapers have been treated as a very 
valuable primary source, as have company archives consisting of minute books, 
financial statements, official government returns, correspondence etc. Additional 
archival material treated as primary sources includes the minutes, reports and 
correspondence of various Denbighshire mining unions, the autobiographical 
notes of Edward Hughes, union leader, various Acts of Parliament and official 
returns such as the List of Mines. Much of the archival material relating to the 
coal companies and the unions is available at the Denbighshire and Flintshire 
County Archives at Ruthin and Hawarden respectively, however some of the 
archival material relating to the coal companies is also held at the National 
Library of Wales, Aberystwyth. The official returns to the Board of Trade can be 
found at the National Archives, Kew, while the List of Mines are housed at the 
British Library.
These sources provide a mixture of qualitative and quantitative data. The 
quantitative data, for example, such as figures relating to turnover, employment 
or Output per Man Year (OMY), allows various performance trends to be 
analysed. These have then been underpinned by the qualitative primary 
information that was available or by the secondary sources which has included 
books, journal articles and web-based sources.
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Comparators
Throughout this thesis comparisons will be made with other UK coalfields that 
are considered ‘small’ which, for the purpose of this thesis, are those that contain 
fewer than three per cent of the total number of collieries in the UK (see page 51 
below). In addition, south Wales will be used as a major comparator throughout 
the thesis; not only is there an abundance of literature on south Wales but both 
coalfields began to develop at about the same time, faced many of the same 
problems throughout the period under review, and were subject to certain, 
common ‘Welsh’ influences, such as ‘non-conformism’.
Caveats
One of the main ‘stumbling blocks’ to studying a coalfield such as Denbighshire 
is that, as outlined above, it was never considered, for official returns purposes, a 
‘coalfield’ in its own right, it was only part of another insignificant coalfield. Output 
and employment figures were compiled for north Wales, from 1874, in Hunt’s 
Mineral Statistics, however, statistics relating simply to Denbighshire are often 
more difficult to come by. From 1894 employment figures for individual collieries 
are available from the annual List of Mines and from this it has been possible to 
calculate annual totals for the coalfield itself. Although Hunt presented OMY 
figures for Denbighshire, these were calculated using the output and employment 
figures given in his Mineral Statistics, and the employment figures sometimes 
differ from those extracted from data in the List of Mines. Consequently, the OMY 
figures for Denbighshire that are included within this thesis are those calculated 
by the author from the employment figures given by the List of Mines.
Another problem relates to the availability of archival material. As Tosh 
(1991: 134) explains, “the primary sources available to the historian are an
incomplete record... [either by]  accident or design”. When the original
proposal for this thesis was put forward the intention was to develop ‘case 
studies’ of the major coal companies in Denbighshire to illustrate the issues
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raised throughout the thesis. It had been hoped that financial and other archival 
records would provide sufficient evidence to allow ‘company histories’ covering 
20-40 years to be written. However, despite extensive investigation, only one 
coal company’s records survive to this extent (and even then with gaps), while 
records for other companies are intermittent and limited to say the least. This 
means that these archival records will be ‘pooled’ on a company by company 
basis in order to provide evidence relating to specific issues, and to inform the 
analysis as and when they are relevant, rather than trying to cover all issues for 
each company.
An additional consequence of the limited nature of the archival sources is 
that this thesis cannot cover developments in all the areas that might be 
expected to be considered in the history of a coalfield. While the thesis attempts 
to be as comprehensive as possible from an economic perspective, some issues, 
for example, changes in technology are not considered in detail due to the dearth 
of relevant material. Furthermore, although social issues are touched upon within 
this thesis, they are only discussed if they arose as a consequence of an 
economic issue since this thesis is an attempt to examine the economic, rather 
than the social history, of the Denbighshire coalfield.
Structure
Chapter 1 begins by providing an insight into the coal industry in Great Britain in 
the period up to 1850. Attention is then turned to Wales, both north and south, 
before finally looking at the economic conditions in Denbighshire prior to 1850. 
This provides the context for Chapter 2 which presents evidence relating to the 
overall development of the Denbighshire coalfield in the period 1850-1914. In this 
chapter we examine changes over the period in the number of mines in 
Denbighshire, their size, output and employment. This allows us to place 
Denbighshire into its context within north Wales and the UK as whole. Against 
this background Chapter 3 examines how this expansion was financed, looking in
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particular at the capital needs of coal companies and how Denbighshire coal 
companies raised and spent capital.
Chapters 4 to 7 look in detail at the ‘stakeholders’ in Denbighshire coal 
companies; the owners and shareholders, the mineral owners, the employees 
and finally the customers. In Chapter 4 profiles of the major coalowners and 
shareholders are provided, as are analyses of shareholder occupations and 
locations. Chapter 5 then turns its attention to the mineral owners and examines, 
in detail, relations between the landowners and coal companies in Denbighshire. 
Possibly the most important stakeholder in any coal company was the miner 
himself, and Chapter 6 provides a detailed examination of relations between 
miners and owners, looking especially at the development of trade unions, both 
national and local. Chapter 7 then looks at the markets available to the coal 
companies of Denbighshire, the methods they used to sell their coal and the 
people who bought it.
Finally, Chapter 8 attempts to measure the performance of Denbighshire 
coal companies. Performance can be measured either in terms of productivity or 
profitability and therefore this chapter considers both. First the chapter looks at 
productivity; how it can be measured and the factors affecting it, before 
examining the productivity of Denbighshire as a whole and that of individual 
companies in the coalfield. The chapter then turns its attention to profitability; it 
looks at the income of coal companies and the factors affecting the price of coal 
before considering the main cost elements and the various methods used by 
companies to control these costs as a means of improving profitability.
Conclusions
The detailed conclusions to this thesis can be found in the final chapter but a 
brief summary of the main findings is presented below:
i. We show in Chapter 2 that Denbighshire was a coalfield in its own 
right;
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ii. The history of the north Wales ‘coalfield’ between 1850 and 1914 is, to 
all intents and purposes, the history of the Denbighshire coalfield. The 
Denbighshire coalfield was found to be a distinct geographical ‘entity’ 
separated from Flintshire by the ‘Bala’ fault and between 1875 and 
1914 Denbighshire’s share of north Wales’ output increased from 60 
per cent to 80 per cent. More significantly, over this period, while the 
output of Denbighshire more or less doubled from 1.38 million tons to 
2.64 million tons, the output of the rest of north Wales fell from 0.97 to 
0.67 million tons.
iii. It would appear, from this study of the Denbighshire coalfield, that the 
issues that dominated the coalfield, for example, wage rates and 
royalty rates, were not specific to the region. Indeed, this study has not 
been able to establish, in any major way, that the Denbighshire 
coalfield was ‘different’ to other coalfields. What it has made possible is 
an in-depth study of how the universal issues affecting the coal 
industry impacted on a single small coalfield. Treating the 
Denbighshire coalfield as a ‘case study’ of a small coalfield, has 
allowed the national issues to be put into a local context.
Summary
For a thesis to be successful it must add to the body of knowledge currently 
existing, in other words it must find things out that were not known before. This 
thesis has brought together archival and other material that has allowed the 
development of the Denbighshire coalfield to be chronicled in a way that has 
never before been undertaken; this in itself constitutes an addition to knowledge. 
While this thesis has not been able to establish that Denbighshire was different to 
other small coalfields in any significant sense, it has allowed us to gain an insight 
into how various issues, applicable across the UK coal industry as a whole, 
affected individual companies on a coalfield level, an approach that has been
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applied by historians such as Wale (1990). This approach has allowed us to 
determine whether issues which were considered important on a national level 
were given the same emphasis at a local level and vice versa.
If we consider the specific conclusions of this thesis, some of the more 
interesting findings, which enhance our current knowledge of small coalfields in 
the nineteenth century include the following:
• Without the railways, Denbighshire would not have developed as it did, 
but this, given that Denbighshire was not the only ‘landlocked’ coalfield in 
the UK, does not make Denbighshire unique.
• ‘Immigrant’ coalowners were far more important to the development of the 
coalfield than ‘indigenous’ coalowners. This, again, is not particularly 
unusual. For example, in south Wales ‘outsiders’ were important, though 
there were some important local ‘players’. In Denbighshire, on the other 
hand, there is no evidence to show that there was any significant local 
involvement in the coal industry which may have been because the 
coalfield was never large enough to generate an indigenous pool of 
entrepreneurial talent.
• While ‘gentlemen’ made up the majority of shareholders, women 
constituted a significant proportion of shareholders in some Denbighshire 
coal companies. This latter fact might, initially, appear to be surprising. 
However, recent research undertaken by, for example, Freeman et al 
(2006), suggests that women took a more active role in share-owning in 
the nineteenth century than has hitherto been thought.
• Performance-wise, OMY in Denbighshire was not out of line with that of 
other small coalfields and Denbighshire was able to more or less maintain 
its contribution to the overall UK output. However, profits in Denbighshire 
were found to be volatile and, even during relatively good times, marginal. 
The volatility of profits is not unusual, it was a feature of the coal industry 
as a whole but, it would appear, from the evidence available, that even 
the large coal companies in Denbighshire never made significant profits, 
unlike the larger companies in, for example, south Wales.
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This research allows us to conclude that a study of a small coalfield, such as 
Denbighshire can offer an in-depth insight into how a coalfield develops, the 
obstacles it had to overcome and the stakeholders that combined to ‘back’ its 
development. This, when combined with national studies of the coal industry 
and studies of the larger coalfields, enhances our understanding of the 
issues that faced those involved in the nineteenth century coal industry.
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Chapter 1
THE COAL INDUSTRY IN BRITAIN, WALES AND DENBIGHSHIRE TO 1850 
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to put into context the subsequent study of the 
Denbighshire coal industry from 1850. Denbighshire was a small, and 
insignificant coalfield in the context of late nineteenth century British coal industry 
but, in the context of north Wales, in the period after 1850, it developed 
significantly, employing large numbers of men. This chapter will therefore briefly 
examine developments in the coal industry up to 1850. We examine first the 
British coal industry as a whole, then Wales, both north and south, before finally 
looking in detail at developments in Denbighshire.
Britain
In the nineteenth century, ’’the British coal industry came to be regarded as one 
of the three or four staple industries of the country” (Mitchell, 1984: 1), but before 
1800 it had played only a minor role in the industrial history, to the extent that 
there was an industrial history, of Britain.
On the whole, until the seventeenth century, any coal that was mined was 
usually dug from surface deposits (Griffin, 1977: 16), and any ‘coal industry’ that 
existed was centred on the north east, where the Tyne Valley had a “virtual 
monopoly of the coal trade” (Buxton, 1979: 3). The reason for this predominance 
was the relative ease with which the coal could be transported to its main market, 
London and the south, by sea. Buxton (1979: 3-4) claims that 40 per cent of the 
British output in 1700 was carried by water (sea and/or river), and it was not until 
the means of transportation began to improve in the mid to late eighteenth 
century, that the “overwhelming dominance” of the north east region began to 
weaken.
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By 1700, “England had almost certainly become the largest coal producing 
and consuming country in Europe” (Buxton, 1979: 6), Mitchell (1984:1) believing 
that this had little to do with developments in the coal industry itself, but 
everything to do with technological changes in other industries, which 
increasingly needed coal as a source of power. This view is upheld by Buxton 
(1979: i) who asserts that the coal industry did not suddenly make the Industrial 
Revolution start, but “facilitated and speeded up the growth process”.
A big impetus in the increasing demand for coal came in 1709 when a new 
method of smelting iron, using coal rather than charcoal, was developed at the 
Coalbrookdale furnace, Shropshire, by Abraham Darby. However, the use of this 
method was very slow to spread, and even in the early 1750s “knowledge of his 
invention was still confined to Shropshire and Denbighshire” (Lewis, 1971: 16). 
Buxton (1979: 9) believes that this was largely due to the old method of using 
charcoal in the smelting process being cheaper than Darby’s innovation, but 
ultimately “by the late 1750s the superiority of mineral fuel smelting was 
established and iron masters rapidly effected the changeover” (Buxton, 1979: 9).
Another technical innovation that not only helped to increase the demand 
for coal, but also made getting the coal easier, was the development of the first 
steam engine by Thomas Newcomen in 1705. This was not only powered by 
coal, but helped overcome one of the main problems of sinking mines to any 
depth: drainage. Until the introduction of the steam pump, hand pumps and 
horse-gins were widespread, and although the take-up in the use of engines was 
slow, due to their cost and relative inefficiency, as other industries developed and 
needed coal, they became increasingly necessary as pits got deeper (Buxton, 
1979: 17).
As the Industrial Revolution progressed, the coal industry was in a position 
to capitalise on the new opportunities, and was soon to become “the lifeblood of 
British industry” (Buxton, 1979: 58). Table 1.1 illustrates how the output of coal 
increased in the period 1750-1850 but the expansion, according to Buxton (1979: 
59), was “evolutionary, rather than revolutionary” and it was to be a long time 
before coal used for domestic purposes stopped being the biggest consumer of
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coal; indeed, as can be seen from Table 1.2, domestic coal accounted for the 
biggest share of UK output until the 1850s.
Table 1.1: Annual average tonnage, by decades, of coal output in Britain
Decade Averaae % increase
(000 tons) on Drevious 
decade
1750-1760 4,356
1760-1770 5,235 20
1770-1780 6,435 23
1780-1790 8,059 25
1790-1800 9,980 24
1800-1810 13,927 39
1810-1820 17,563 26
1820-1830 22,659 29
1830-1840 32,379 42
1840-1850 46,337 43
(Source: Pollard, 1964: 229)
Table 1.2: Estimated consumption of the output of the main British coalfields bv uses. 1816-1855
(in million tons)
1816 1830 1840 1855
Exports 0.3 0.3. 1.6 4.4
Coastwise 3.5 4.8 6.7 8.3
Ironworks 2.8 4.8 7.3 15.7
General
manufacturing 3.5 5.2 7.9 15.0
Domestic 5.4 7.2 8.2 10.4
Manufacturing & 
domestic railed 
south 1.4
Railways 0.1 1.2
Steamships 0.6 1.7
Collieries 0.9 1.3 2.2 3.8
(Source: calculated from figures in Mitchell, 1984: 16)
Table 1.2 also illustrates how the iron industry’s consumption of coal 
increased between 1816 and 1855, a development which Buxton (1979: 63) 
believes to be “the most important single factor in the expanding demand for 
coal”; as technological changes occurred in the iron industry, not only did this
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mean that the demand for coal increased, but it also meant that the iron industry 
relocated to areas where coal was plentiful, and the history of the two industries 
became inextricably ‘entwined’. The needs of these two industries also helped to 
spur on further technological changes; as the demand for coal and iron grew, so 
did the necessity to transport the commodities further afield. This helped 
stimulate road development schemes, the development of canals and, ultimately, 
of railways, as industry demanded an increasingly sophisticated infrastructure to 
meet its demands.
By the start of the nineteenth century, industrialisation had transformed 
the structure of the British economy (Buxton, 1979: 69), and the coal industry 
was an increasingly important foundation block for further developments. 
However, “when one talks about the British coal industry in the nineteenth 
century in the singular, it is often straining reality, for there was, in fact, a large 
number of British coal industries in separate districts, more or less loosely 
connected” (Mitchell, 1984: 10). The main reason for this is that coal is not a 
“homogenous product” (Benson, 1980: 7); different regions have different types 
of coal with different markets and geological conditions etc. According to Benson 
(1980: 9), Great Britain’s coalfields can be split into three main categories:-
i) the major coalfields of the north east, Lancashire, Yorkshire, the Midlands and 
south Wales;
ii) the smaller fields of the west Midlands and east and west Scotland;
iii) the minor fields of Cumberland, Kent, the south west, north Wales and 
Northern Ireland.
The coalfields developed at different speeds according to local conditions 
and especially the ease with which their mineral wealth could be transported 
around the country. According to Church (1986: 17) the changes in the relative 
importance of the various coal regions of the UK throughout the nineteenth 
century was determined not only by the quality of the coal, but by the state of 
communications. The dominance of the north east coalfield until well into the
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nineteenth century was due to the fact that it had three navigable rivers, the 
Tyne, Wear and Tees, which enabled the coal to be carried by sea to London 
(Church, 1986: 37). It was only when inland communications improved that the 
inland coalfields would be able to expand, and only then if communications 
extended to London and the south east, because this market was “crucial to the 
expansion of the inland coal fields” (Church, 1986: 38).
Methods of transporting coal
Improvements to road transport brought about by the Turnpike Trusts went some 
way to enabling coal to be carried further afield, but it was only with the advent of 
canals that inland coalfields were able to open up to non-local markets. Until the 
development of canals, the sites of industries had been dictated by nature, 
especially the presence of raw materials; canals now meant that transport could 
dictate these sites, because “their [the canals] technology freed them [industries] 
from the tyranny of natural hydrology.” (Turnbull, 1987: 539). Canals meant that 
resources could be carried further and more cheaply and, according to Griffin 
(1977: 131), “the central importance of the canal system to the expansion of the 
mining industry in the period 1770-1830 cannot be overstated”.
The coal industry in the late eighteenth/early nineteenth century was still 
to a large extent dominated by iron-masters who were either simply exploiting 
coal for use in their own industry, or had recently recognised the merits of 
developing the industry in its own right; for this reason “colliery and mineral 
owners were prominent among the canal promoters and investors”. Indeed, most 
of the canal bills between 1770 and 1800 related to mining districts (Griffin, 1977:
132). This benefited areas where the iron and coal industries were working ‘hand 
in hand’. However, those regions that either had no iron industry, or where 
natural conditions made it impossible for canals to reach the centres of coal 
production or other industries, remained ‘isolated’ from potential markets and 
would remain so until the coming of the railways.
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Turnbull (1987: 537-40) recognises this when he says that, although 
“canals played a central role in Britain’s industrialisation, [their] impact was 
heavily local and regional”. The network took a long time to build, there being 
“100 years between the first and last constructions of the ‘canal age’ - and there 
was no country-wide network in any sense until 1810” (Turnbull, 1987: 543). This 
meant that canal transport was confined to a limited number of areas and routes; 
these were built and operated primarily by local enterprises, therefore a coherent, 
national infrastructure was never achieved. Most canal companies remained 
parochial, the bulk of the traffic was local, and although coal was usually the 
most important cargo, it was not carried any great distance, perhaps 10-20 miles 
(Turnbull, 1987: 543). Turnbull (1987: 544), further asserts that being even only a 
short distance away from a canal prevented an industry or locality from taking 
advantage of its benefits: “the path of a canal would create a narrow corridor of 
superior locational space, yet impart little benefit to sites only a short distance 
away”. However, despite these shortcomings transport became cheaper, new 
sources of raw material became accessible, labour and products could move 
cheaply and further afield which meant that “the ties of location, which had 
previously bound the economy [were] broken down” (Turnbull, 1987: 544).
According to Pollard (1964, cited in Turnbull, 1987: 549), the coalfields 
that were most influenced by the ‘canal age’ were those of south Wales, the east 
Midlands and Lancashire. However, although the canals “did materially alter the 
geography of industrial growth” by helping inland coalfields to be opened up, it 
was only with the development of the railways that other areas, including north 
Wales, were able to take advantage of the transport revolution. Griffin (1977: 
137) believes that “the railway made it possible for the inland coalfield to 
challenge the monopoly of the London market previously enjoyed by the sea­
borne coal of the North East”. However, this development took time; canals were 
still able to compete successfully until the 1840s (Buxton, 1979: 76), and it was 
not until 1845 that the first rail-borne coal reached London (Mitchell, 1964: 329). 
During the 1840s “the railway began to revolutionise the fabric of the coal
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industry”, and by the 1850s it was dominating the transport industry (Buxton, 
1979: 39).
According to Mitchell (1964: 315) the railways made an impact in three 
significant areas:-
i) they lowered transport costs and brought new areas and products into the 
market;
ii) they helped develop a new export sector; and
iii) they led to the development of modern coal, iron and engineering industries.
In terms of the coal industry, it was not so much that the rail industry was a big 
consumer of coal, only a small percentage of production was actually used by 
trains (see Table 1.2 above), but that they made transporting coal much easier 
and more efficient. It was in this provision “that railways exerted their most 
profound influence on the coal industry” (Buxton, 1979: 76). According to Mitchell 
(1964: 316), the “industry which stood to gain most from the diffusion of cheaper 
transport services” was the coal industry, and the main beneficiaries within the 
industry itself were the inland coalfields. Where previously coal pits tended to be 
sunk in areas of iron production or where access to water transport was easy, 
they were now sunk to take advantage of proposed new lines which promised to 
open up markets which would never previously have been available, so making 
the sinking potentially worthwhile. One of these regions, the growth of which 
became synonymous with the success of the British coal industry in the second 
half of the nineteenth century, was south Wales.
Wales
When one talks of the ‘Welsh’ coal industry, it is automatically assumed that it is 
south Wales that is being discussed; because of that region’s domination of the 
industrial ‘face’ of Wales, coal mining and the south Wales ‘Valleys’ are almost 
synonymous when discussing the industrialisation of Wales, with north Wales
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almost always ignored. Authors tend to dismiss north Wales as a “minor region” 
(Church, 1986: 11), but this is hardly surprising given that “of all the success 
stories of nineteenth century Wales, none could compare with the dramatic 
expansion of coal” in south Wales (Jenkins, 1992: 233). Yet, in the eighteenth 
century, in coal producing terms, “the North [was] considerably in advance of the 
South” (Jenkins, 1992: 233), but geography and geology conspired to ensure that 
the latter region was to achieve unprecedented success and leave its northern 
neighbour languishing in obscurity throughout the nineteenth century.
In the eighteenth century, Wales, both north and south, “was essentially a 
peasant economy” (John, 1995: 4); any coal that was worked, because it 
outcropped, was worked by farmers for their own agricultural and domestic 
needs, and it was only when the metallurgical industries began to develop that 
coal began to be worked for ‘industrial’ use. The fledgling industries that did exist 
in Wales tended to be localised along the coasts of Carmarthen and Swansea 
Bay in the south, and Flintshire in the north. It was their very proximity to the sea 
that allowed the industries to start developing, because any trade that did exist 
had to be sea-borne owing to the appalling state of internal communications 
within Wales (John, 1995: 7). This meant not only poor trading links but also that 
Wales was ‘insulated’ from the industrial changes taking place in England. As 
John (1995: 2) observes, to the Englishman of the eighteenth century, Wales 
“was a remote part of the Kingdom in which he had little interest”. However, this 
situation was to change dramatically over the next century, especially in south 
Wales.
South Wales
“A country of barren upland and bleak moor, interspersed with deep and narrow 
valleys”, is how Phillips (1925: 112) describes eighteenth century south Wales; 
an area where “the fingers of industry have as yet touched lightly on the 
landscape” (Minchinton, 1969: ix), and there was little sign that the region was to 
develop into a major industrial centre. It was, however, the topography of the
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land, and the riches it bore below the surface, that was to make the region its 
fortune in the nineteenth century. Hull (1897: 62) explains that “the coal basin of 
south Wales is, with the exception of that of the Clyde valley, the largest in Great 
Britain”; it stretches for approximately 90 miles and has a width varying from 2 to 
20 miles (North, 1931: 159) (See Map 1.1, page 28). Its geology and geography 
has also been kind; the coal measures are crossed by what Hull (1897: 62) 
describes as a “remarkable anticlinal axis”, the effect of which is to bring much of 
the lower coals to within an easy working distance of the surface. Coal working 
was further facilitated by the terrain of the region; the deep, narrow valleys made 
accessing the coal seams much easier than in other regions, and their proximity 
to the sea, once decent transport links had been developed, enabled these 
resources to be exploited quickly and efficiently (John, 1995: 1).
According to Minchinton (1969: xi), and John (1995: 163), the pre-1914 
economic history of south Wales can be broadly split into two phases, 1750-1850 
and 1850-1914. In the first phase the metal industries dominated the industrial 
face of the region, but they were overtaken by coal in the second phase and, 
according to John (1995: 23), “it was not until the remarkable growth of the coal 
trade that industrialisation embraced the entire [region]”. This view is upheld by N 
Evans (1989: 215), who ascertains that the industrial development of south 
Wales is “largely the story of the shift from one staple (iron) to another (coal)”.
1750-1850
At the start of this period, industry in south Wales was localised into ‘pockets’ 
that, due to the paucity of transport facilities, were of necessity located along the 
coast of the region. The most important industries were copper and iron works, 
with the former, based mainly in the Swansea-Neath area, initially being the more 
significant; some works were of a considerable size, and employed between 30 - 
70 people (John, 1995: 7). Coal was exploited by these industrialists, and other 
individuals, but it was only on a very small scale, and any trade that did exist was 
either land-based or sea-borne via Swansea (John, 1995: 14).
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A big impetus to both the iron and coal industries of south Wales was the 
adoption of Darby’s method of smelting, which was increasingly used after 1780 
(Jones, 1984: 163). This meant that the iron industry, boosted by the demand 
generated by an almost continuous thirty year period of war, required increasing 
amounts of coal. It was thus that the iron masters of south Wales became 
increasingly involved in the development of the coal industry.
The increase in demand, along with technical changes, starting with the 
Coalbrookdale method of smelting, and the development of steam engines, 
provided two of the three factors that Minchinton (1969: xi) asserts were required 
to effect the transformation of south Wales. The third factor was transport: 
markets could only be opened up if there were effective means of transport for 
the products of the iron industry. However, at this time the only method of 
transport was either via mule or packhorse, or coast-wise; both were very slow 
and subject to the vagaries of the weather and Welsh geography.
The initial impetus for the development of an effective and efficient 
transport infrastructure came from those entrepreneurs involved in the copper 
and, increasingly, the iron industries. But who were these men? A number of 
authors (Minchinton, 1969: xvii; N Evans, 1989: 201) have theorised that, when 
looking at the economic development of south Wales, the region should be 
viewed as ‘semi-colonial’ because it developed only as a result of outside, 
English investment. Indeed, N Evans cites Harold Perkin as describing the region 
as being “handicapped ... by [a] lack of capital, [a] lack of entrepreneurs, and [a] 
lack of a potential proletariat” to the extent that “industrialism had to be induced 
from outside” (1989: 201). While to a great extent Minchinton’s view (1969: xvii) 
that “the initial source of finance was largely external”, is true of the early 
beginnings of industry in south Wales, as industrialisation continued apace, more 
‘indigenous’ entrepreneurs became involved, especially in the coal industry. 
Indeed, Morris & Williams (1958: 138) assert that, after 1840, investors were 
mainly drawn from within the coalfield itself, partly because local knowledge was 
very important, and partly because the industrialisation that had already taken 
place gave newcomers the impetus to ‘have a go’.
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The early need for ‘external’ finance had much to do with the ‘remoteness’ 
of the region and the fact that, due to poor communications, it was a ‘late 
developer’ in industrial terms, compared to some of the English regions. In 
addition to this, although there were entrepreneurs in south Wales, they were 
usually ‘small-time’, their sources of funds restricted to what could be raised 
either from their own resources, or by approaching their acquaintances among 
“the only monied classes on the coalfield, the larger yeomen and the landowners” 
(John, 1995: 7).
However, as opportunities for expansion began to increase, these 
relatively restricted sources of capital became insufficient, and external sources 
were required. According to John (1995: 23), this local inability to provide capital 
“made its immigration into the area a pre-requisite of industrial expansion” and 
much of the capital required was introduced by “English businessmen ...who saw 
the possibility of exploiting the natural resources” of the region (Chambers Jones, 
1978: 17). Englishmen such as Anthony Bacon and Richard Crawshay, both 
London merchants, were important in the initial development of the iron industry. 
In 1765, Bacon and William Brownrigg set up the Cyfarthfa furnace in Merthyr 
Tydfil, and other furnaces in 1777 and 1780. In 1776, Bacon joined forces with 
Richard Crawshay, whose family was to play an extremely important role in the 
future industrialisation of the region (John, 1995: 24).
As the pace of industrialisation increased, local capital became more 
involved: the costs of developing iron works were considerable, and many of the 
opportunities available within that industry had already been grasped, so it was to 
coal that aspiring entrepreneurs turned to make their fortune. Among such men 
were “mineral agents and mining engineers, who were very prominent amongst 
the pioneers of the steam coal industry” (Walters, 1977: 51). One such engineer 
was Thomas William Lewis, engineer at the Plymouth Works, Merthyr Tydfil, 
whose son, William Thomas Lewis (1837-1914) became the 1st Baron Merthyr of 
Senghenydd. This development did not, however, mean that south Wales 
became ‘self-sufficient’ in producing its own entrepreneurs: it still attracted 
Englishmen, for example, John Nixon and George Elliot, the latter of whom
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formed the Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Company in 1864, from the traditional 
‘coal’ areas of England: Durham and Northumberland. Such men were attracted 
by the potential riches to be made from the, as yet, unexploited coalfield; a 
coalfield that could not be fully developed until an effective transport 
infrastructure was in place.
Methods of transporting coal in south Wales
Throughout Great Britain, as has already been explained, the main means of 
transportation in the eighteenth century were either coastal waterways or the 
road network. Discussing the situation in the UK as a whole, Dodd (1925: 121), 
commented on “the deplorable states of the roads in general” adding that, “those 
of Wales fell below the in-exacting standards of the time”. This, according to 
Jones (1984: 178), was mainly due to the geography of Wales which meant that 
the roads that did exist were often simple rights of way and, even if on an 
important route, were often so churned up by the mules and pack horses as to be 
virtually impassable.
This situation made coastwise traffic all the more important, but this too 
was an unreliable method, reliant as it was on the tides and the Welsh weather. 
“Such primitive communications were an obvious deterrent to industrial 
expansion” (Jones, 1984: 177), and the industrial ‘pioneers’ of south Wales 
became enthusiastic sponsors of a canal network in the region. A group of iron 
masters including Crawshay and Guest applied, in 1784, to build a canal from 
Merthyr to Cardiff. An Act of Parliament was secured in 1790, and the 
Glamorganshire canal was completed in 1798. This canal was very successful 
and “gave the first great impetus to the rise of Cardiff as a sea port” (Phillips, 
1925: 113). Another three major canals, the Monmouthshire, the Swansea and 
the Neath canals, were built in south Wales, and these enabled areas that had 
hitherto struggled to open up markets for their industrial output to be exploited. 
According to DG Evans (1989: 36), “the main contribution of canals to the
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economic development of south Wales was that they released the iron-smelting 
industry from the constraint of its location”.
All four canals had been built to connect the northern parts of the coalfield 
with the coast, “thus enabling the mineral resources of the upland districts to be 
effectively exploited” (DG Evans, 1989: 37). One of the main results of the 
development of a canal infrastructure was that the cost of transporting heavy, 
bulk products was reduced: this acted as an impetus for the local coal trade and, 
according to DG Evans (1989: 37-8), “initiated a vibrant coal trade” which helped 
“usher in the Industrial Revolution in south Wales”. However, the coal industry 
was still “the handmaid to iron” (Jones, 1984: 161), in that rather than being an 
important industry in its own right, the coal industry played ‘second fiddle’ to the 
iron industry and was heavily reliant upon it for its own development. This meant 
that throughout the early decades of the nineteenth century, the coal and iron 
industries developed ‘in tandem’, because wherever ironworks had been 
established, there was a “corresponding stimulus to the development of coal 
mining” (Morris & Williams, 1958: 10). This was largely due to the fact that “the 
prosperity of the iron industry was dependent upon an abundant supply of cheap 
coal” which meant that the iron masters had to open new levels and pits (D 
Williams, 1977: 215). This trend continued, especially during the 1830s, when it 
was discovered that anthracite coal could be used in the smelting of iron ore (D 
Williams, 1977: 214), which led to the development of an iron making industry in 
west Glamorgan. At the same time there was a rapid expansion in ironworks 
around Merthyr, for example, at works such as Dowlais and Cyfarthfa, and in 
Monmouthshire, where there were significant iron works at, for example, Ebbw 
Vale, Tredegar and Rhymney. However, Merthyr was the leading ‘iron town’, and 
was so “phenomenally successful” that, by 1840, Dowlais was the largest iron 
works in the world (N Evans, 1989: 215).
As the industrial demand for coal in the region increased, so did the 
demand for ‘sale-coal’: coal used for other purposes. In 1830 the first Welsh coal 
(from Merthyr via Cardiff) was sold in London (D Williams, 1977: 216) but still, as 
Morris & Williams (1958: 2) point out, “in the great market of London, Welsh
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supplies played little part....the north of England reign[ed] supreme”. However 
the sale of Welsh coal in London “did mark a crucial expansion in the horizon of 
the Cardiff coal trade” (Morris & Williams, 1958: 20). Despite this increasing 
importance, the resources of south Wales could still not be properly exploited 
until the region had an efficient means of transporting the coal to its potential 
markets. This arrived in 1839 when the West Bute Dock was opened in Cardiff, 
and was further boosted by the completion of the Taff Vale railway in 1841 
(Morris & Williams, 1958: 20). This railway had been promoted by Merthyr’s iron 
masters, especially John Guest of Dowlais, to reduce congestion on the canals 
(DG Evans, 1989: 39). The railway gave the coal of the valleys access to the sea 
and the facilities of the new docks at Cardiff, an event which “many would 
argue... was the great turning point in Cardiffs modern history” (DG Evans, 
1989: 39).
According to Morris & Williams (1958: 1), 1840 was a “definite turning 
point in the economic development of south Wales”. The development of good 
transport links enabled the region to exploit its natural advantages; it had a large 
coalfield, with abundant seams, which “made its resources seem almost 
boundless”; no coal for shipment had to travel more than 30 miles to reach the 
nearest port and the lie of the land made the sinking of pits and construction of 
railways easier than in other regions (Morris & Williams, 1958: 15). Once the 
infrastructure was in place, not only was it easier for the goods to flow out of the 
region, but it also made the region more attractive to inward investment, and the 
1840s saw the pace of the influx of capital start to quicken (John, 1995: 40).
According to Minchinton (1969: xvii), by 1850, the dominance of iron in 
south Wales was fast coming to an end, and it was soon to be overtaken by coal 
as the “driving force of industrialisation” in the region (Jones, 1984: 171). Within 
the south Wales coal industry it was the demand for steam coal that provided the 
main impetus for this expansion. Morris & Williams (1958: 18) explain that “the 
outstanding development in the ....decades after 1840 was the growth in the 
shipments of coal, particularly of steam coal”. It was the increased demand for 
steam coal, and the impact that this had on the whole economy of the region,
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that dominated south Wales in the decades after 1850 and, by the end of the 
nineteenth century, the south Wales coalfield was the most significant coalfield in 
Britain.
North Wales
Writing in the late nineteenth century, JE Thomas (1889: 11) opined that “the 
north Wales coalfield is not to be compared with the south Wales field as regards 
area or capacity. Still, it is an important area, situated as it is so near to the 
estuaries of the Dee and Mersey”. This statement highlights the fact that, when 
discussing the north Wales coal industry, the region under discussion is actually 
concentrated in north east Wales. Although there are coal deposits in Anglesey 
(see Map 1.1) which form a small, separate, coalfield in north west Wales, these 
had been mined extensively in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and had 
become of negligible importance by the nineteenth century (North, 1931: 195).
In the north east Wales coalfield, “the coal measures extend in an 
uninterrupted tract from the slopes of the Severn Valley, south of Oswestry to the 
Point of Ayr at the mouth of the Dee”, a total length of 45 miles (W Gibson, 1927: 
240). The coal measures of the region fall into three broad subdivisions: the 
Lower, Middle and Upper measures. The Lower measures, which attain 
maximum development in Flintshire, “contain no coal seams of commercial 
importance” (Flintshire Record Office, hereafter D, D/DM/996/12). The Upper 
measures, which are “more conspicuously developed in Denbighshire are 
likewise devoid of commercially important seams” (D/DM/996/12). The chief of 
the region’s seams, which can be found in the Middle measures, is the Main 
seam, also known as the Five Yard or Six Foot seam (D/DM 996/12). However, 
the coalfield is not shared by both counties as the ‘Great Bala fault’, “produces a 
complete break between the Carboniferous strata of Denbighshire and Flintshire” 
(Hull, 1897: 68), forming two distinct coalfields, those of Denbighshire and 
Flintshire, each of which has different characteristics, and can be discussed 
separately. As a result of the faults in the region, the coal deposits “are very
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fvariable [and the faults] completely sever and change the dip and quality of the 
seams of coal" (Nixon, 1865: 46). The commercially important seams are 
generally thinner than those in south Wales and not as easily accessible (North, 
1931: 193).
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Notwithstanding this, the Flintshire coalfield, with its easy access to the 
sea, was able to exploit its coal resources, and the first evidence of coal working 
at Ewloe was as early as 1322 (D/DM/996/12). In the seventeenth century much 
of the production in Flintshire was directed at the export market to Ireland, and 
especially Dublin. “By 1638-9 [Flintshire] had emerged as the major west coast 
exporter”, with 4,355 chaldrons being shipped across the Irish Sea; an amount 
that was twice that exported from Liverpool, and four times that from south Wales 
ports (Lloyd Gruffydd, 1996: 55-59). At this time Denbighshire “lagged far behind 
its precocious neighbour [its] remoteness from the sea, combined with the 
deplorable state of the roads, cut it off from those populous markets which had 
fostered the early developments of districts like Hawarden and Mostyn [and] the 
only demand [that] it could serve was highly localised” (Dodd, 1929: 200). In 
much of Denbighshire, outside the immediate vicinity of the coal producing 
villages, the main source of domestic fuel was peat, and even “in manufactures 
the demand [for coal] was negligible” (Dodd, 1929: 201).
Flintshire could not sustain its competitiveness in the export market, but 
the smelting of lead using coal became increasingly important after 1692, and 
this gave the coal industry of the county an important fillip (Dodd, 1929: 202). 
Other industrial developments in the metallurgical sector and other industries 
also boosted coal production in Flintshire; iron works, copper works, brick works 
and potteries were established throughout the county in the latter half of the 
eighteenth century, and “the proprietors of the new undertakings soon found it 
convenient to ensure their supply of fuel by sinking new coal pits or buying old 
ones” (Dodd, 1929: 205), and thus the coal industry flourished. However, by the 
1820s many of Flintshire’s mines were showing signs of exhaustion. This, 
coupled with an economic slump, and the fact that at 10 shillings per ton, the 
county’s coal was “the most expensive fuel in north east Wales” (Pryce, 1971: 
49), meant that many concerns ‘went to the wall’, and the county began to be 
eclipsed by its neighbour, Denbighshire.
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Denbighshire
Background
The original ‘industry’ in Denbighshire was lead mining and smelting; the 
Romans had mined for lead in the hills behind Minera and, by the late eighteenth 
century, a small but fairly vigorous industry existed to the north west of Wrexham. 
However, “the Denbighshire coal field owes more to iron than lead” (Dodd, 1929: 
203) because, as Pryce (1971: 46) explains, “the expansion in coal mining [in the 
region] was intimately related to and largely dependent on developments in 
[ferrous] metallurgy”. According to Dodd (1971: 24), it was not until “the 
development... and the reorganisation of the Bersham ironworks [in the mid 
eighteenth century].... [that] the real Industrial Revolution [began] in the mining 
and metal industries of North Wales”. Until this date industry had been held back 
by a number of factors, the most important being that the topography of the 
region meant that transporting goods was extremely difficult and therefore any 
markets were restricted to the local area. This isolation hindered not only the 
demand for products that might be manufactured, but more importantly 
discouraged inward investment; capital was required if industrialisation was to 
take off, but this commodity was scarce in eighteenth century north east Wales.
To attract industry “it was necessary to have capital, raw materials, [a] 
means of power, labour and communications” (Chambers Jones, 1978: 17) and 
although north Wales possessed some of these in plenty, namely raw materials, 
power and labour, it lacked the means by which to exploit them: capital and 
communications. According to Dodd (1971: 305), in England, the move toward 
capitalism and entrepreneurship had started long before the Industrial Revolution 
began, so the foundations for further development had already been laid. “North 
Wales had been disqualified by its history from participating in these earlier steps 
toward capitalism” (Dodd, 1971: 306) and was thus severely disadvantaged. 
Dodd (1926: 16) argues that one of the reasons for this was that historically, 
going back to the wars of Independence, the ‘Welshry’ were excluded from
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skilled trades and municipal positions, and even when ‘allowed’ to become 
involved, it was to England that any ambitious Welshman turned to make his 
fortune. It was not that there was no capital in north Wales, there was, but it was 
in the hands of landowners and agriculturalists who often had little interest in
expanding into industry, “largely because o f   their reluctance to incur risks”
(DG Evans, 1989: 32).
The merchants of the region were often unable to exploit any industrial 
opportunities that they might come across, largely because the lack of an 
entrepreneurial tradition in Wales meant that the merchants often lacked the 
requisite skills to pursue potential opportunities, even if they had access to 
capital. These factors meant that when industrialisation did come to north Wales, 
“the capitalists who financed the bigger undertakings were almost all 
Englishmen” (Dodd, 1971: 30).
Lead and Iron
Two Englishmen who recognised the potential in Denbighshire were Isaac 
Wilkinson, and Richard Kirk (later Kyrke), both from Derbyshire. Wilkinson 
purchased the Bersham ironworks in 1753, and Kirk moved to Denbighshire in 
1775 from Chapel en le Frith (Ellis Hughes, 1946: 85) to “seek his fortune in lead 
mining at Minera” (Dodd, 1929: 203). Wilkinson purchased an ironworks that, 
since 1721, had been smelting iron using coal rather than charcoal. The pioneer 
of the Coalbrookdale method in Wrexham was Charles Lloyd who, AH Dodd 
asserts (1971: 23), was actually taught the methods by Abraham Darby, “his 
friend and co-religionist” (Dodd, 1929: 203), “for there were no other works 
outside Shropshire, where coke-smelting came in until another generation had 
passed” (Dodd, 1971: 23).
Isaac Wilkinson did not make a success of the ironworks and, in 1761, it 
was taken over by his sons John and William; John Wilkinson “was to make it 
one of the most famous [iron works] in the land” (Dodd, 1971: 23). John 
Wilkinson took over Bersham “just in time for the great Industrial boom of George
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Ill’s early years” (Dodd, 1989: 215) and, by 1813, in his Cambrian Travellers 
Guide, Nicholson (cited by Palmer, 1899: 14) described it as “among the finest in 
the kingdom”. This success was largely down to the opportunities opened up by 
war; Wilkinson was able to expand the munitions side of his business, and they 
“were turned out in unheard of quantities” (Dodd, 1971: 135). He took advantage 
of the seemingly unceasing wars of the late eighteenth century, especially the 
Napoleonic wars; indeed, he was suspected of supplying ordnance to both the 
British and French armies! Such was his success that “before long the Wrexham 
district became known through the land as a centre for the manufacture of 
ordnance” (Dodd, 1989: 215). In addition to munitions, in 1775, Bersham began 
to produce cylinders for the steam engines of James Watt and Mathew Boulton, 
and “for twenty years all but three or four of the engines had their cylinders made 
at one or other of Wilkinson’s works” (Dodd, 1971: 137). This relationship, 
however, broke down in the mid-1790s due to the fact that Wilkinson was found 
to be infringing Boulton & Watt’s patent by manufacturing his own engines.
By 1795, John Wilkinson had split acrimoniously from his brother and was 
running the ironworks alone. He died in 1808, having “extended [his] financial 
activities far beyond the [industry] with which [he] was directly concerned and
[had] amassed [a] great fortune” (Dodd, 1971: 133). He died leaving no direct
heir to take over, and “his estates melted away in litigation” until they were 
eventually sold by the Chancery in 1812. Despite this sale, “sixteen years later 
[the Bersham ironworks] lay in ruins” and the village of Bersham had reverted to 
its original rural state (Dodd, 1971: 141). However, despite this ignominious 
ending to his story, according to Buxton (1979: 68), “Wilkinson was....the pioneer 
who confirmed the relationship between steam power (and hence coal) 
ironmaking and engineering”. He was the first to blow the blast at Bersham in 
1776, the first to use steam to power a forge-hammer in 1776, and the first to use 
steam in a rolling mill in 1784 (Buxton, 1979: 68).
When Bersham began using coal rather than charcoal to smelt iron in 
1721 the production of iron was approximately 5 tons per week or 250 tons per 
year; by 1806, the combined annual production of the 3 furnaces in Wrexham
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was 2,075 tons and there had been little improvement in the figures since 1795/6 
(Dodd, 1971: 141-3). The Napoleonic Wars helped maintain the demand for iron 
but, once it was over, there was a long depression in the industry. This was 
followed by the “great boom of 1824-5” (Dodd, 1971: 141-3) and “east 
Denbighshire, with its rich deposits of coal and iron was well blessed” (DG 
Evans, 1989: 28). However, despite this, in 1826 north Wales produced only
16.000 tons of pig iron per annum from seven furnaces (I Edwards, 1965: 151). 
Although the number of furnaces had increased to twelve and production to
24.000 tons by 1828, the iron produced by north Wales accounted for only 3.5 
per cent of the total output for England and Wales (DG Evans, 1989: 28) and 
north Wales was far outstripped by other iron producing regions: for example, in 
1828 Shropshire produced over 81,000 tons while south Wales produced a 
phenomenal 280,000 tons (I Edwards, 1965: 151).
An upsurge in the demand for iron was created by the railway boom of the 
1840s, but the north Wales iron works were unable to capitalise to any great 
extent. In 1848 the output from the five furnaces in existence in Denbighshire 
was less than that of 1827, while in south Wales between 1830 and 1845 
production increased by 150 per cent (Dodd, 1971: 152). One of the reasons for 
this, according to Dodd (1971: 152), was that the region was the least productive 
of all the iron manufacturing districts, and “the old difficulties - lack of capital and 
the awkward lie of country prevented North Wales, at the critical moment from 
devising a railway system suited to her needs”. So, by 1850, the iron industry, 
which had played so important a role in developing industry in the Wrexham 
area, had dwindled to such an extent that it played only a negligible role in the 
continuing industrial development of the region. Iron had, however, played an 
important part in creating a demand for coal in Wrexham, and it was the coal 
industry, along with, later, the steel industry at Brymbo, which would drive 
industrialisation in the region throughout the rest of the nineteenth century.
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Coal
“The story of coal mining in Denbighshire goes back more than five hundred 
years” (Lerry, 1958: 41), but “mining in those days meant little more than surface 
digging for coal” (Lerry, 1968: 9). It was only in the eighteenth century that the 
Denbighshire coal industry began to develop, and this happened only because 
the iron industry provided an impetus. Despite this, “the method of raising coal 
was primitive and the means of communication to centres was so poor that in 
winter, owing to the bad state of the roads the coal was stacked in the field and 
carted away in the summer” (Dodd, 1971: 42-3).
The county’s access to the sea was also restricted which, when combined 
with the dreadful roads, meant that the market for coal was largely for domestic 
consumption (Dodd, 1929: 200), and it was only when “immigrant iron masters 
[were] attracted to the region by its wealth of ironstone and coal” (Dodd, 1971: 
190), that the mineral began to be exploited for industrial purposes. This 
development was initiated by ironmasters such as John Wilkinson; he was 
unhappy that he had to purchase the coal to smelt his iron from others, “so he 
gradually acquired various estates in iron and coal” (Palmer, 1899: 18). For 
example, he purchased Brymbo Hall in 1793; here “he would have coal 
resources, almost untapped, at his command” (Dodd, 1971: 137), and by 1829 
there were 41 pits sunk on the estate (Palmer, 1899: 20). Dodd (1929: 210) 
explains that it is difficult to actually assess the growth of the coal industry in 
terms of output in this early period; according to Wilkinson (cited in Palmer, 1899: 
32), in 1799 one of his pits was producing 200 tons per week; but truly reliable 
figures of production for the region are not available until the second half of the 
nineteenth century.
The 1820s saw coal mining become an increasingly popular venture in 
north Wales, and speculators began to “brood over the unchartered waters of the 
Welsh mountains” (Dodd, 1971: 131), but many of these ventures were “too 
much tainted with the prevailing policy of ‘get-rich-quick’ with all its recklessness 
and extravagance” (Dodd, 1929: 216). This meant that “the most accessible
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seams were worked at a furious pace and then abandoned” (Dodd, 1929: 216), 
and many ventures failed, mostly through a lack of expertise and capital. By 1830 
there was a general trade depression and, one after another, the industries within 
the region that required coal, moved to other parts of the country, especially 
south Wales, “with the result that North Wales fell behind in the race” (Lerry, 
1968: 21). This view of there being a race between regions is reinforced by Dodd 
(1971: ix), who explains that “there were still those who believed on the eve of 
the repeal of the coal tax in 1831, that with this obstacle removed, the industries 
of the North Wales coalfield could hold their own” with other regions. However, 
such hopes were elusive because “the leeway to be made up was abnormally 
heavy” (Dodd, 1971: vii).
The inherent problems of the region and competition from other areas 
“seemed to indicate that the coal and iron industry of Denbighshire... might soon 
be a thing of the past” (Lerry, 1968: 21) but those involved persevered 
throughout the 1830s, and were reinforced by an influx of ‘immigrants’ such as 
Robert Roy (1795-1873) and Henry Robertson (1816-1888) who arrived in the 
late 1830s and early 1840s. The influence of such men meant that “a new 
chapter in the history of the Denbighshire coalfield was opened” (Lerry, 1958: 
46), but their contribution would have been made a great deal more difficult had 
not improvements in the methods of communication given the coal industry an 
additional and extremely significant impetus.
Methods of transporting coal in Denbighshire
Roads
Many areas that possessed plentiful raw materials, such as Denbighshire, were 
hampered by being landbound; this meant that markets for any industrial output 
in the region were of necessity local, and reliant on the road network, which was 
generally in a deplorable state. According to Copeland (1968: 1), “complaints 
about their [the roads] shocking condition were frequently made, particularly 
during the winter months when the highways became impassable in a sea of
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mud”. As Dodd (1925: 122) remarks, “such conditions did not foster traffic”, 
indeed, a comment that was included in an Act for widening and repairing the 
road from Pool, in Montgomeryshire, to Wrexham (via Chirk and Ruabon) in 1755 
states that “by reason of the many heavy carriages passing thereon [the roads] 
are become too deep and [so] ruinous that travellers cannot pass without great 
danger” (D/DM/101). Dodd (1925: 124), further observes that the Denbighshire 
coalfield, because it was dependent on land transport, “was a full century later in 
developing than its Flintshire neighbour” which had access to the Dee Estuary 
and, therefore, coastal markets.
Nationally, very little was done to improve roads, and it was left very much 
to the locality, i.e the parish, to maintain them. This parochial view meant that no 
thought was given to ‘through’ routes. Travel was not a necessity or priority for 
many, and it was only when demands for improvement were made by those who 
wanted to travel further afield in comfort, and those who wished to exploit the 
industrial potential of their land, that improvements occurred (Dodd, 1971: 125). 
However, according to Copeland (1968: 28), the turnpikes occasionally faced 
opposition in areas where industry had begun to develop “because of fears that 
better roads would bring increased competition from other areas”.
After 1750 new roads were built by both private enterprise and by public 
subscription, and “finally these methods were merged in the work of the Turnpike 
Trusts” (Dodd, 1971: 126). It was in this period that Trusts began to appear in 
north Wales; the first, in 1752, managed the road between Wrexham and 
Shrewsbury, and communications from Wrexham were further improved by the 
creation of a Trust to cover the route to Chester in 1756. By 1800, “North Wales 
could boast a thousand miles of turnpike road” (Dodd, 1971: 133), but this did not 
effect an “immediate and magical improvement in the state of the roads” (Dodd, 
1971: 93). Mismanagement, the cost of tolls and a reluctance to change were 
some of the main defects, but the main problem was that parochialism continued; 
this meant that long journeys were difficult to co-ordinate, for example, there 
were twenty three trusts involved in the journey from London to Holyhead (Dodd,
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1971: 94), and in Denbighshire and Flintshire alone, there were eighteen trusts 
responsible for almost 300 miles of road (Dodd, 1925: 137).
Yet, despite this, communications were much improved and regular coach 
and postal routes were established; road building in the mining region around 
Wrexham eased transportation problems, and trade was stimulated. Goods could 
now be transported further, and more quickly, which helped open up hitherto 
isolated regions, but journey times were still very slow; and although 
communications had improved there was still a long way to go before the 
Denbighshire coalfield could be fully accessible; an important development in this 
process was the development of a national canal system.
Canals
A major reason for the development of the canal system was the need to be able 
to transport bulky materials, such as coal and iron, further afield; and iron 
masters and, to a lesser extent, coalowners, were important “pioneers of the 
canal network” (DG Evans, 1989: 32). In Flintshire, a canal was dug as early as 
1768 with the express intention of carrying coal from Hawarden to the Dee but 
this proved a failure, and no other attempts were made in that county (Dodd, 
1971: 101). In Denbighshire, two canals, the Ellesmere and the Montgomery 
canals, helped link the coalfield to important markets in England and elsewhere 
in Wales.
When the idea of a canal to link Chester with Liverpool, which would give 
Chester access to Lancashire coal was first mooted, the pioneer industrialists of 
North Wales decided to form the Ellesmere Canal Company to promote a route 
that was more beneficial to their interests. The shareholders included the Earl of 
Bridgewater, a prominent backer of canals, John Wilkinson and Richard Kirk. 
Wilkinson and Kirk wanted to open up additional markets for their iron and coal,
and were described as “assiduous attendants on our early labours who not
infrequently gave us their aid and countenance” (Dodd, 1971: 102-3). Indeed, 
Wilkinson was one of the earliest subscribers in 1792, and was appointed to the 
Committee of directors of the company in 1805 (D/DM/101).
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There was a great deal of debate about the route, (see Map 1.2 for the 
various alternatives), but they finally settled on “the making and maintaining [of] a 
navigable canal from the River Severn at Shrewsbury ...to the River Mersey at or 
near Netherpool ... through, by or near the towns of Ellesmere and Wrexham”. 
The importance of the industrialists to the project is underlined by the Act itself, 
which states that the canal “will open a communication for the cheap and easy 
conveyance of goods, wares, provisions and merchandise, and all heavy 
commodities [which] will greatly promote and facilitate the intercourse of trade 
and commerce between the several places...[and] will tend very much to reduce 
the price of coals in the neighbourhood thereof (Denbighshire Record Office, 
hereafter DD, DD/PP/600).
The Act was passed in 1793 (33 Geo.3, Cap XCI) and, with a capital of 
£400,000 raised from 1,238 shareholders, building began. By 1805 most of the 
work of constructing the canal was complete; it was at that date 83 miles long 
and linked “Liverpool, Manchester and the whole of the extensive country 
through which the canal passes” (DD/PP/600). This did not mean that the project 
had proceeded as planned; as a report to the Ellesmere Directors states in 
November 1805: “it was originally intended that the main line of [the] canal 
should be carried from Wrexham to Ruabon and Pontcysyllte, but upon mature 
consideration, the great quantity of lockage which would have been required 
upon this part, and the difficulty and expense....made it evident that ...canal 
navigations through the district would be perfectly unadvisable” (D/DM/101). This 
was obviously unfortunate for the industrialists around Wrexham, as was the fact
that the canal “for some, undetermined, reason, was cut short rather less than
halfway between Ellesmere and Shrewsbury” (Wilson, 1975: 9) and was never 
extended as far as the latter (See Map 1.2). Given the latter’s potential, not only 
as a market itself, but as a ‘gateway’ into new markets in mid-Wales and the 
Midlands, this was a bitter blow to the industrialists of Wrexham.
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Map 1.2: Ellesmere Cgnal showing actual and proposed, routes
(Source: Wilson, 1975: 4)
A further blow to the interests of Wrexham occurred when a start was 
made on a branch of the Ellesmere canal which would connect the collieries and 
ironworks of Kirk and Wilkinson in Ruabon to the canal; it was found that water 
would not stay in the canal and, after many failed attempts, “the whole of the 
Chester-Ruabon section was given up as hopeless” (Dodd, 1971: 104). It was 
unfortunate that the geography of the region made road building, and later canal 
and railway building much more difficult than in other regions. The topography of 
the region is described as “horrendous” by Jones (1984: 178) and, unlike in south 
Wales, where the topography actually facilitated the construction of an effective 
communications infrastructure, in north Wales, it was always an obstacle that 
had to be overcome.
However, despite this, the canal opened up new markets for the 
Denbighshire coalfield. Coalowners now had access to markets which were 
much further afield than those previously available and, according to Dodd (1971: 
109), “it would be difficult to overestimate the effect on North Wales of the 
improved communications brought about by canals and turnpike roads”. One of 
the most important effects was to make the area more attractive to outside 
capital; this helped attract new industrialists, which gave a further boost to the 
development of the area, which in turn attracted more inward investment.
Railways
Wales, both north and south, was a ‘late starter’ in terms of building railways, and 
the rail infrastructure in Denbighshire was still in the developmental stage in the 
late 1840s. Prior to this, any railways in the county had been simple tram roads 
that carried goods to the canals to await distribution; for example, since 1757 a 
three and a half mile ‘railway’ linked the Ellesmere canal to Trevor, which gave 
the Ruabon collieries limited access to markets further afield (DD/NTD/144 aa). 
However, the “failure to construct the Ellesmere canal along its intended line 
through the coalfield, effectively ruled out that waterway as an outlet for the raw
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materials and finished goods of the Bersham, Ffrwd, Ponciau and Ruabon 
industrial areas” (DD/NTD/142).
There was therefore, in industrial terms, an “urgent need” (DD/NTD/142) 
for railways if the potential of the region was to be exploited but, according to 
Lerry, in some unpublished notes, “when railway enterprise was first undertaken 
in the Wrexham district ... there was considerable opposition to the initial 
schemes, especially [from] landowners” (DD/NTD/144ab1). In 1839, George 
Stephenson was engaged as the engineer on a proposed line from Wrexham to 
Chester, a project promoted by “the gentlemen of Chester”, who “saw the 
immense advantages to be derived from opening up the rich coal fields of 
Wrexham and Ruabon”. These initial plans, however, came to nothing due to the 
“commercial depression which soon commenced”. Various attempts were made 
to revive the scheme; for example, the idea was resurrected in 1842 but, “owing 
to opposition and apathy, the scheme had to be abandoned”. After his arrival in 
Wrexham, the Scottish railway engineer, Henry Robertson, became involved in 
the project but, in 1843, he and his colleagues again met failure, “through the 
opposition of rival mineral proprietors”. Finally, in 1844, Robertson and his fellow 
promoters succeeded in getting the agreement of all parties involved, and the 
North Wales Mineral Railway Act was passed, which provided for a line from 
Wrexham to Chester, with a branch from Wrexham to Brymbo, and then an 
extension south to Ruabon (DD/NTD/142). In 1846 the North Wales Mineral 
Railway Company amalgamated with the Shrewsbury, Oswestry and Chester 
Junction Railway to create the Shrewsbury & Chester Railway Company (Boyd, 
1991: 218).
When the main London-Holyhead route was being planned, it was decided 
that the easiest route would be via Chester and along the North Wales coast 
rather than via Shrewsbury. This latter route had been favoured by the principal 
owners of mines and ironworks in Wrexham and, from 1836, they had been 
petitioning strongly for this route, but “the lie of the country prescribed to the main
1 A ll further quotes in this paragraph, unless otherwise stated, are taken from DD/NTD/144ab
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railway lines a course which precluded them from serving the chief ....
industries” of the region (Dodd, 1971: ix).
By 1848, the line from Chester to Shrewsbury, via Wrexham and Ruabon, 
was opened and this, especially when branch lines were laid to specific mines, 
made North Wales coal available to areas which hitherto it had been impossible 
to supply (Lerry, 1949). The Shrewsbury to Wrexham section of the Shrewsbury 
and Chester Railway was opened on 12 October 1848, after three years of work, 
(the Chester, Wrexham, Ruabon section had opened on 4 November 1846). 
According to an article in the Wrexham Recorder (no date), “we are now within 
easy access of the two largest towns in our neighbourhood... and within a very 
few months, by the opening up of the Shrewsbury and Birmingham Railway to 
Stafford, through Shrewsbury will again be our route to London” (quoted in 
DD/NTD/142). This development of the railway did open up north east Wales to 
industrial expansion, but it arrived here later than in some other regions, and it 
thus meant that “while she [north Wales] was still struggling forward, the 
industrial centres of the North and Midlands were steadily consolidating their 
position” (Dodd, 1971: 119). However, this is not to say that the coal industry did 
not make rapid progress once the railways arrived, and the period 1850-1914 
was to see coal play an increasingly important role in the industrial expansion of 
Denbighshire.
Conclusion
The period 1750 to 1850 saw coal becoming increasingly important to the British 
economy; it helped fuel the technological changes of the Industrial Revolution 
and, with the coming of the railways, allowed areas that hitherto had had little in 
the form of industry, due to the lack of natural resources, to take advantage of 
the new opportunities being opened up. Until the mid-nineteenth century, the 
demand for coal and, therefore, the price, was closely linked with the demand for 
iron, and it was not until the second half of the nineteenth century, when 
domestic and imperial requirements increased significantly, that the coal industry
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became the ‘dominant’ partner; it no longer ‘relied’ on iron to boost demand and 
price because there were sufficient other ‘customers’.
It was the improvements in the transport infrastructure that allowed coal to 
become “all-powerful” (Jevons, 1865: viii). As the demand for coal increased, 
methods had to be found to transport it to the places which needed it; first the 
roads were improved, then the canals were dug and, finally, the railways were 
laid. Jevons (1865: 91) explained that “the rapid extension of railways is mainly 
due to the traffic and wealth occasioned by the use of coal in manufactures” but, 
once the railways had been laid, the engines themselves needed coal as fuel and 
so coal and railways became inextricably linked in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. This close relationship is demonstrated in Denbighshire; 
without the railways Denbighshire, being a land bound coalfield, was heavily 
constrained in its development of an ‘external’ market. All of this changed after 
1850, the coming of railways enabling significant developments to take place.
It is these developments that form the focus of the remainder of this 
thesis. We commence our examination of these developments in the next 
chapter by providing an overview of the Denbighshire coalfield and its 
development after 1850, explaining how it fits into the context of, first, north 
Wales and, secondly, the British coal industry.
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Chapter 2
PROFILE OF THE DENBIGHSHIRE COALFIELD 
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is, first, to explain how the Denbighshire coalfield fits 
into the context of the north Wales coal industry before looking at the coalfield 
within a UK context. A detailed review of the development of the Denbighshire 
coalfield over two periods, 1854-1873 and 1874-1914 will then be carried out. 
This review covers the numbers of mines, their size, their output and the number 
of men they employed; these statistics will then be used to compare and contrast 
Denbighshire with other coalfields in the UK and to provide a backcloth against 
which the developments of the coalfield can be discussed in later chapters.
The Denbighshire coalfield was never designated a ‘coalfield’ in its own 
right when official statistics were gathered; it was always simply a ‘region’ within 
the north Wales ‘coalfield’. This means that much of the official data, on which 
this chapter is based, relates to north Wales, but a number of sources, mainly 
Hunt’s Mineral Statistics, (Mineral Statistics from 1884) and the List of Mines, 
(BL/BS/27/1) do provide statistics relating to Denbighshire which has allowed 
conclusions about this coalfield to be drawn.
The north Wales coal industry
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the north Wales ‘coalfield’ is split between three 
counties: Anglesey, Denbighshire and Flintshire. Anglesey comprised a small, 
geographically isolated field which had been so worked that by the mid­
nineteenth century it was of little significance; in 1854, it had only 5 mines 
(Dickinson, 1854: 72), and its contribution in terms of the output of north Wales 
was also negligible (approximately 1 per cent). As for Denbighshire and 
Flintshire, W Gibson (1927: 240) explained that “the Western rim of the crescent
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of coalfields surrounding the Cheshire Triassic and Drift filled plain is occupied by 
[the] coalfields of Denbighshire and Flintshire". Geologically, the coal measures 
of north east Wales are traversed by the “the great Bala fracture" (FA Gibson, 
1922: 241) which runs north east to south west from Caergwrle to Minera (North, 
1931: 189), creating two distinct coalfields which can be studied separately (see 
Map 2.1). The Denbighshire coalfield is centred on the towns of Wrexham and 
Ruabon and, to a lesser extent, Chirk; whereas the Flintshire coalfield is located 
mainly around Mold, Hawarden and Buckley, but extending to the coast at Point 
of Ayr.
Map 2.1: The geology of north-east_Wales..showing the main centres of the Denbighshire and 
Flintshire coalfields
(Source: Kelly, 1990)
Prestatyn
Millstone Grit
Silurian
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In the eighteenth century, as was noted in Chapter 1, it was the Flintshire 
coalfield that dominated the output of the north Wales ‘coalfield’; the proximity of 
coastal ports such as Mostyn (see Map 2.1), and therefore the coastal trade to 
Ireland, meant that coal was exploited for commercial reasons from a much 
earlier date here than in Denbighshire. Denbighshire was a land-locked county, 
but “with the aid of the new markets provided by industry and agriculture, and the 
cheaper and speedier means of reaching them afforded by turnpike roads, canals 
and mineral railway, coal mining made rapid progress” in the second half of the 
nineteenth century (Dodd, 1971: 195).
The north Wales ‘coalfield’ in the context of the UK
In this section, and the subsequent one on Denbighshire, which look at the profile 
of north Wales and Denbighshire within a UK context, we will split the period 
between the middle of the nineteenth century and the First World War into two:
i) 1854-1875
ii) 1875-1914.
The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, the accuracy of the figures in the first 
period is in doubt; the main source for this period is the statistics compiled by 
Hunt from the returns voluntarily made by mine owners. However, many of these 
figures are likely to be estimates and, since the accuracy of figures for individual 
years can be questioned, any calculations based thereon can only be used to 
establish trends. According to Taylor (1955: 48) “these statistics [Hunt 1854- 
1873] are of dubious value” and it is only from 1874 that the official, published 
statistics for a region’s output can be used with confidence. The reason for this is 
that there was no compulsion on colliery owners to make returns until after the 
implementation of the 1872 Mines Act and consequently, until this date, the data 
produced was incomplete. However, for the purpose of this thesis they are useful 
as a starting point because they are the only figures available for this period. The 
second reason for the chronological split in our analysis is that the main collieries 
that were to ‘power’ the Denbighshire coalfield in the late nineteenth century were
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not sunk until the late 1860s/early 1870s and so their impact was only felt in the 
period 1875 -1914.
1854-1875
In relation to the UK as a whole it is obvious that north Wales was an insignificant 
region in terms of output and numbers employed (see Table 2.1). In 1854 the 
output of north Wales was approximately 1.8 per cent of the total for the UK, and 
the percentage of workers employed in north Wales was 2.1 per cent.
T a b le  2.1: Statistics re the UK and north Wales 1854-1875
1854 1860 1865 1870 1875
UK
Output- ‘000 tons 64,661 84,042 98,151 110,431 133,306
No. of collieries 2,397 3,009 3,256 2.851(b) 4.445(b)
% increase in output 24.3 16.8 12.5 20.7
Numbers employed 217,356 (a) (a) (a) 510,523
North W ales
Output - ‘000 tons 1,143 1,750 1,983 2,329 2,349
No. of collieries 60 84 84 53(b) 124(b)
Amount carried by 
rail - ‘000 tons 122 930 1,023 1,227
Numbers employed 4,623 (a) (a) (a) 13,593
% Increase in output 53.1 13.3 17.4 0.9
NW output as % of 
UK 1.8 2.1 2.0 2.1 1.8
NW employees as % 
of UK employees 2.1 2.7
(Sources: 1854-1870: Hunt’s Mineral Statistics: D /GR/1545-1570; 1875: Gibson (1922): 11 and 
29-30)
Notes:
(a) no figures are available for these years;
(b) the fluctuations in the number of collieries between 1870 and 1875 are likely to be due to 
changes in the way in which collieries were classified. It would appear that, in 1875, collieries 
which had, for example, No. 1 & No. 2 pits, may have been counted as two separate collieries, 
whereas they had only been included as one colliery in 1870. If the comprehensive list of 
collieries for Denbighshire (Appendix A) is studied, this would indeed appear to be the case - only 
a handful of collieries being opened between 1870 and 1875.
By 1860 the output of north Wales accounted for 2 per cent of the UK total 
output which was slightly higher than its neighbours, Cheshire and Shropshire
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see Table 2.2), two other coalfields that are generally classified as small. 
However, while the share of UK output produced by both Cheshire and 
Shropshire fell greatly between 1854 and 1875, that of north Wales remained 
roughly constant, being 1.8 per cent in both 1854 and 1875. In terms of 
employment, by 1875, north Wales was employing a higher proportion of the 
UK’s colliers in its collieries, the proportion having increased to 2.7 per cent (see 
Table 2.1).
Table 2.2: Number of collieries and output. Cheshire & Shropshire 1854-1875
Cheshire Shropshire
Year No. of 
collieries
Output- 
‘000 tons
Output as 
% of UK
No. of 
collieries
Output- 
‘000 tons
Output as 
% of UK
1854 30 786 1.2 48 1,080 1.7
1860 35 750 0.9 68 850 1.0
1865 39 850 0.9 69 1,135 1.2
1870 29 929 0.8 59 1,343 1.2
1875 37 659 0.5 64 1,230 0.9
(Sources: Hunt’s Mineral Statistics: D /GR/1545-1570)
1875-1914
In the years 1875-1914 the coal output of the UK increased from 133.3 million 
tons to 265.6 million tons, an increase of almost 100 per cent (output had peaked 
at 287.4 million tons in 1913, see Table 2.3), and there was a corresponding rise 
in the numbers employed (above and below ground) from 510,523 to 1,124,301, 
an increase of 120 per cent (see Table 2.3). According to Kirby (1971: 5), much 
of this increase was due to the expansion of the export market, but Buxton (1979: 
7) points out that domestic consumption also increased considerably in this 
period.
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Table 2.3: UK and north Wales (NW) output (to nearest million tons) and employment figures 
1875-1914
Output Employment
Year UK NW UK NW
Million
tons
Million
tons
1875 133.3 2.3 510,523 13,593
1876 134.1 2.4 489,100 11,981
1877 134.2 2.5 469,954 10,796
1878 132.6 2.2 453,833 9,644
1879 133.7 2.2 455,345 10,142
1880 147.0 2.4 461,774 10,208
1881 154.1 2.7 471,733 10,176
1882 156.5 2.4 481,087 10,098
1883 163.7 2.7 492,422 10,095
1884 160.8 2.6 499,595 10,175
1885 159.3 2.3 500,369 9,314
1886 157.5 2.6 503,868 9,305
1887 162.1 2.7 510,284 9,780
1888 169.9 2.7 518,797 10,151
1889 176.9 2.9 552,855 10,759
1890 181.6 3.0 606,509 12,274
1891 185.5 3.2 642,210 12,789
1892 181.8 3.0 658,676 12,728
1893 164.3 2.2 663,385 12,649
1894 188.3 3.2 693,467 -(a )
1895 189.7 2.8 693,935 -(a )
1896 195.4 2.9 685,881 11,536
1897 202.1 2.9 688,102 11,664
1898 202.0 3.2 699,724 11,533
1899 220.1 3.2 721,624 12,008
1900 225.2 3.1 772,759 12,629
1901 219.0 3.1 800,035 13,377
1902 227.0 3.2 835,743 13,342
1903 230.3 3.2 834,766 13,248
1904 232.4 3.0 839,821 12,949
1905 236.1 2.9 850,390 12,743
1906 251.0 3.2 874,161 12,970
1907 267.8 3.5 932,104 14,370
1908 261.5 3.4 979,026 14,863
1909 363.8 3.3 1,004,945 14,908
1910 264.4 3.4 1,039,986 15,171
1911 271.9 3.4 1,057,699 15,424
1912 260.4 3.3 1,079,926 15,699
1913 287.4 3.5 1,118,453 15,948
1914 265.6 3.3 1,124,301 16,257
(Source: Gibson (1922): 11 and 29-30).
Note
(a) No separate figures given for these years
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Buxton (1979: 7), claims that in 1900 consumption per head of population in the 
UK was 4.05 tons, “higher than in any other country of the world”. However, it 
was the export industry that made the UK coal industry pre-eminent for much of 
the period under review; in 1870 the UK exported only 14.3 million tons, which 
constituted 13 per cent of its total output; this had risen to 58.4 million tons or 26 
per cent of total output by 1900 (Buxton, 1979: 97), and “by 1910, Britain was still 
by far the largest coal-exporting nation in the world”. Indeed, by 1913, 34 per cent 
of the total UK output was exported (Asteris, 1986: 38).
During the period 1875-1914, in absolute terms, the output of north Wales 
increased from 2.349 million tons in 1875 to 3.315 million tons in 1914, an 
increase of 41 per cent (see Table 2.3); within this period, 1893, a year when a 
significant strike took place, constituted the ‘low’ point (2.206 million tons), and 
1913 the high point (3.505 million tons). However, with UK output more than 
doubling between 1875 and 1914, north Wales’ output as a proportion of UK 
output fell from 1.7 per cent in 1875 to 1.2 per cent in 1914, which represented a 
30 per cent decline in north Wales’ contribution to UK output as a whole. The 
north Wales coalfield was therefore less significant in UK terms in 1914 than it 
had been in 1875.
In terms of employment, Table 2.4 below demonstrates that, as for 
output, north Wales’ importance to the UK as a whole, in terms of the proportion 
of men employed, also declined. By 1885, the proportion of UK colliers employed 
in north Wales had fallen to 1.9 per cent, and in the years to 1914, after a slight 
recovery in 1890 (no employment figures are available for north Wales for 1895), 
the proportion continued to fall, reaching 1.4 per cent in 1914.
Table 2.4: North Wales employment as a proportion of UK total. 1875-1914.
Year Percentage Year Percentage
1880 2.2 1900 1.6
1885 1.9 1905 1.5
1890 2.0 1910 1.5
1895 - 1914 1.4
(Source: calculated from data in Gibson (1922): 11 and 29-30)
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C o m p a r i s o n s  w i t h  o t h e r  ‘s m a l l ’ c o a l f i e l d s
It is clear, when assessing north Wales’ contribution to the UK coal industry, that 
the north Wales ‘coalfield’ was a small coalfield which, for comparative purposes, 
should be compared with other ‘small’ coalfields. For the purpose of this thesis a 
‘small coalfield’ has been defined as one which contained less than 3 per cent of 
the total number of collieries in the UK in 1913. Using this criterion, it is found 
that the following coalfields can be categorised as small (see Table 2.5): 
Nottinghamshire; Leicestershire; Warwickshire; Cumberland; Cheshire, 
Shropshire; and Gloucestershire; for consistency with recent studies of the British 
coal industry, Ireland has not been included in our detailed analysis since it does 
not constitute a part of Great Britain.
Table 2.5: Number of collieries in the coalfields of the UK in 1913
Coalfield Number of 
collieries
Proportion of UK 
total
%
Scotland 551 16.1
Northumberland 134 3.9
Durham 305 8.9
Yorkshire 444 13.0
Derbyshire 162 4.7
Nottingham shire 58 1.7
Leicestershire 30 0.9
W arwickshire 29 0.8
South Wales and 
Monmouthshire
621 18.2
North Wales 44 1.3
Cumberland 39 1.1
Staffordshire & Worcestershire 452 13.2
Lancashire 348 10.2
Cheshire 20 0.6
Shropshire 67 2.0
Ireland 27 0.8
Gloucestershire, Som erset 
& Devon
89 2.6
UK total 3420 100.0
(Source: Boyns, 1982: 135)
In the years 1875-1914, north Wales’ contribution to UK output fell from 
1.7 to 1.2 per cent but if the coalfield is compared with the new small coalfields
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(see Table 2.6), it can be seen that its contribution was more significant than that 
of Leicestershire and, until the 1890s, it contributed a similar proportion to the 
UK’s output as Warwickshire. Of the older smaller coalfields it maintained a 
similar share of output as Cumberland and Gloucestershire, while the coalfields 
of Cheshire and Shropshire became increasingly insignificant. Nottinghamshire, 
however, another new coalfield, grew very rapidly throughout this period and its 
contribution towards the UK’s output increased from 2.4 per cent in 1875 to 4.3 
per cent in 1914.
Table 2.6: Output of ‘small’ coalfields as % of UK output
Notts Leics Warw Cumb Chesh Shrop Gloc North
Wales
% % % % % % % %
1875 2.4 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.9 1.4 1.7
1880 3.0 0.7 0.7 1.1 0.5 0.6 1.3 1.6
1885 3.3 0.7 0.8 1.1 0.4 0.5 1.4 1.4
1890 3.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.4 0.4 1.3 1.6
1895 3.5 0.8 1.1 1.0 0.4 0.4 1.1 1.4
1900 3.8 0.9 1.3 0.9 0.3 0.3 1.2 1.4
1905 3.9 1.0 1.6 0.9 0.2 0.3 1.0 1.3
1910 4.3 1.0 1.7 0.8 0.1 0.3 1.0 1.3
1914 4.3 1.1 1.9 0.9 0.1 0.3 1.0 1.2
Key: Notts - Nottinghamshire; Leics - Leicestershire; Warw -  Warwickshire; Cumb -  Cumberland; 
Chesh -  Cheshire; Shrop -  Shropshire; Gloc -  Gloucestershire
(Source: Gibson, 1922).
If north Wales’ employment figures are compared with those for the other 
small coalfields (see Table 2.7), we can see that the comments made regarding 
output apply equally to employment. Warwickshire was growing steadily; it 
employed an increasing number of the UK’s colliers and, by 1914, was employing 
more men than north Wales. Cheshire and Shropshire became increasingly 
insignificant in terms of the numbers employed while Leicestershire and 
Cumberland’s share of total employment remained below that of north Wales 
throughout the period. Gloucestershire, like north Wales, saw a fairly significant 
drop in the proportion employed; between 1875 and 1914 the numbers employed 
as a proportion of the UK total fell from 2.5 per cent to 1.4 per cent, which put
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Gloucestershire and north Wales on an equal footing. It can therefore be 
concluded that, in terms of the numbers employed, as was the case with output, 
north Wales was as important to the UK coal industry as Leicestershire and 
Gloucestershire and was only slightly less important than Warwickshire.
Table 2.7: Employment of ‘small’ coalfields as a % of UK employment.
Leics Warw Cumb Chesh Shrop Gloc N. W
Year % % % % % % %
1875 0.99 0.90 1.27 0.54 1.51 2.50 2.70
1880 0.92 0.91 1.29 0.54 1.03 2.39 2.20
1885 0.98 0.87 1.36 0.47 0.79 2.40 1.90
1890 0.88 0.92 1.18 1.18 0.59 2.12 2.00
1895 1.29 1.55 1.54 0.52 0.79 2.46 -
1900 0.92 1.23 1.11 0.34 0.48 1.69 1.60
1905 0.97 1.44 1.06 0.15 0.44 1.54 1.50
1910 1.01 1.51 1.01 0.11 0.35 1.42 1.50
1914 0.91 1.70 1.02 0.12 0.33 1.40 1.40
Key: Leics - Leicestershire; Warw -  Warwickshire; Cumb -  Cumberland; Chesh -  Cheshire; 
Shrop -  Shropshire; Gloc -  Gloucestershire
Note: Nottinghamshire has been excluded because, in terms of output it was so much larger than 
the other small coalfields.
(Source: Gibson, 1922)
Having examined north Wales and its place within the British coal industry 
we will now turn our attention to Denbighshire. Thus, in the next section, we will 
consider Denbighshire’s position within north Wales and attempt to assess its 
position relative to the UK coal industry as a whole.
The Denbighshire coalfield
The Denbighshire coalfield had two main centres: Wrexham and Ruabon. 
According to a report by the surveyor, William Lowe, in 1862, “the coal of these 
districts although one and the same field [are]... perfectly distinct” (National 
Library of Wales, hereafter NLW, NLW/HR/76/117). Three of the main seams 
in Denbighshire are the Main, Two Yard and Brassey. These are described in 
turn by Lowe, as follows (NLW/HR/76/117):
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• “the Main coal seam is the principal and most valuable seam in the district, 
most valuable steam coal, excellent household, good gas, good coking”;
• Two Yard - “excellent fuel burning quick steam coal, an inferior house coal, 
soft”;
• “Brassey (also known as Quaker) - first rate smelting coal, very hot, part of 
the seam a good household coal, part an excellent gas coal and very good steam 
coal - this seam would be most valuable but it has a vein of black and yellow 
sulphury particles running through it and its from this it derives its name of 
Brassey”.
Additional types of coal were described by Wedd as follows (D/DM/996/10, 
and 1928:41):
• Crank - very good house coal (possibly named after a ‘crank’ fitting that John 
Wilkinson developed for Watt’s engines (DD/NTD/155))
• Cannel - good house coal
• Powell - very good steam coal (named after a local family involved in coal in 
the seventeenth century (DD/NTD/155))
• Lower Yard or Ruabon - the best house coal but very bituminous
• Wall & Bench or Queen - very good gas coal.
The depth at which these seams were found depended on the location of 
the colliery on the coalfield and its proximity to the various faults; an example of 
the depths of various coal seams is illustrated in Table 2.8, and the locations of 
the main collieries and faults can be seen on Map 2.2. Map 2.2 shows that there 
are several faults crossing the coalfield, the most significant being the one 
labelled ‘the Wrexham fault’ which runs through the middle of Wrexham and to 
the east of Ruabon. The Wrexham fault has a downthrow (J,) of approximately 
300 metres to the east which means that the Main coal measures are much 
deeper to the east of this fault. Thus, for example, at the Gresford and Llay Main 
collieries, the Main coal seam was struck 833 yards below the surface 
(DD/NTD/155) whereas at Llay Hall, which lies to the west of the Wrexham fault, 
the Main coal was only 245 yards from the surface (see Table 2.8).
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2.2: The main collieries and faults of the Denbighshire coalfield
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Map 2.2 also shows, in the west, the Minera fault with a downthrow, to the east, 
of approximately 370 metres. It was the area between this fault and the Wrexham 
fault that saw most of the coal mining activity in the Denbighshire coalfield. As a 
general rule, as one travels from west to east between these faults the coal 
measures are found further from the surface. Hence, in most cases, the collieries 
further to the east were sunk at a later date to those to the west. For example, of 
the collieries highlighted on Map 2.2, Plas Kynaston was in existence before 
1854, while sinking began at Wynnstay in 1856, Vauxhall in 1857 and Hafod in 
1863. As one travels north and the distance between the Minera and Wrexham 
faults widens, the coal measures become deeper and the collieries become 
‘newer’. An additional fault, the Brymbo fault, which is found south of the Bala 
fault and between the Minera and Wrexham faults, adds to the geological ‘mix’ of 
the coalfield as it provides a 60 metre downthrow to the west. In the Vron and 
Plas Power collieries, which are situated to the west of the Brymbo fault, the Main 
coal was found at greater depths than in those collieries to the east of the fault. 
At Vron, the Main coal was found at a depth of 240 yards (NLW/HR/76/117) while 
at Westminster it was 168 yards and at Llay Hall, 87 yards (see Table 2.8).
The most significant fault to traverse the Denbighshire coalfield is the East 
fault which lies to the east of the Wrexham fault and can be seen as a ‘boundary’ 
to the coalfield. It is interesting to note that there are only two collieries lying 
between the Wrexham and East faults, Llay Main and Gresford. As was 
explained earlier, the coal is at much greater depths on this side of the Wrexham 
fault and it is no coincidence that these were the last collieries to be sunk in 
Denbighshire, Gresford in 1908 and Llay Main in 1914. Once the coal in the area 
between the Minera and Wrexham faults had been ‘claimed’ by the existing coal 
companies, any new ventures had to ‘prospect’ outside this ‘channel’ which made 
finding and getting the coal an infinitely more expensive business. Indeed a 
report on the prospects of the Llay Main colliery, prepared in 1911, estimated that 
£250,000 initial capital would be required because the colliery was situated “on 
the deep end of the Northern Denbighshire coalfield” (DD/LH/263).
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Table 2.8 further illustrates the varying thickness of the seams at the 
various collieries; the seams of Main coal varied in thickness from 6’ 2” in the 
Vauxhall colliery to 10’ 6” in Llay Hall, while the Drowsall seam was only 3’ 0” in 
Westminster but 7’ 6” in Llay Hall. Such variations obviously had an impact on 
the working of the mines as it can be assumed that, ceteris paribus, the thicker 
the seam, the easier, and cheaper, it was to get the coal.
Table 2.8: Depth and thickness of various seams at the Bersham. Westminster. Llav Hall and 
Vauxhall collieries on the Denbighshire coalfield
Depth from surface (yards) Seam Thickness
Colliery Bersham West­
minster
Llay Hall Vauxhall Bersham West­
minster
Llay Hall Vauxhall
Coal seam
Cannel 344 87 4 ’ 8” 2 ' 6”
Drowsall 97 159 3’ 0” 7' 6"
Powell 107 167 4’ 4” 3’ 3”
Two Yard 365 115 182 2’ 6” 5’ 0” 6’ 0”
Crank 365 124 186 2> 4” 2’ 8” 4’ 8”
Quaker/
Brassey
384 135 209 6 ' 0” 5’ 6” 5’ 6”
Main 423 168 245 472 9’ 0” 9’ 9” 10’ 6” 6 ’ 2”
Nant 485 7' 7”
Yard 499 3’ 0”
Wall & Bench/ 
Queen
Upper Queen 344 2 ’ 3”
Queen 369 515 2’ 10” 3’ 3”
Lower Queen 396 1' 9”
(Source: Bales Gregory & Price, The North W ales Coalfield -m ap I, no date).
1854-1875
While it is difficult to establish Denbighshire’s relative position re. output in north 
Wales before 1860 due to the lack of information, figures are available for the 
number of collieries and the men employed therein, which allows us to assess its 
importance. According to Hunt (Mineral Statistics) there were 60 collieries in 
north Wales in 1854, 25 of them in Denbighshire, 30 in Flintshire and 5 in 
Anglesey. These figures would seem to imply that Flintshire was the dominant
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area within the region in terms of output, but when the employment figures are 
examined and average employment per colliery is calculated, it is clear that the 
collieries in Flintshire were, on average, much smaller than those in 
Denbighshire. The numbers employed, both above and below ground, were as 
follows (Hunt’s Mineral Statistics):
Total
Denbighshire 3,017
Flintshire 1,555
Anglesey __51
4.623
The average number of employees per colliery in Denbighshire was 
approximately 121, while in Flintshire and Anglesey the averages were 52 and 10 
respectively. Given the high correlation coefficient between output and 
employment in the coal industry at the time (Boyns, 1982), the relative 
contribution of Denbighshire to the output of north Wales as a whole is likely to 
reflect its importance in terms of the numbers employed. This dominance was 
largely due to the fact that many of the collieries in Flintshire had worked the 
readily accessible coal and the remaining coal was affected by many faults that 
made extraction difficult (W Gibson, 1927: 245).
During the third quarter of the nineteenth century, the Denbighshire 
coalfield came to dominate the north Wales ‘coalfield’ to such an extent that, by 
1865, Denbighshire coal accounted for over 70 per cent of the coal output of 
north Wales (see Table 2.9). Table 2.9 also shows that, although this proportion 
had fallen to less than 60 per cent of total output by 1875, Denbighshire was very 
much the dominant region within north Wales at this date, indeed, by 1875, 
Denbighshire accounted for 65 per cent of all the coal carried by rail from north 
Wales.
What of Denbighshire’s position in relation to the UK coal industry? As has 
already been explained above, for official, statistical purposes, north Wales was 
the designated coalfield and Denbighshire was simply a ‘region’ within this 
coalfield. However, it has been contended, on geological grounds that
As % of total 
65.3 
33.6 
1.1
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Denbighshire should be considered a coalfield in its own right and, if one looks at 
Denbighshire’s output as a proportion of the UK’s output, as outlined in Table 2.9, 
we can see that Denbighshire, between 1854 and 1875, contributed at least 1 per 
cent of the UK’s total output throughout the period. This constituted a higher 
proportion than that contributed by either the Cheshire or Shropshire coalfields 
(see Table 2.2 above).
Table 2.9: Statistics re. Denbighshire 1854-1875
1854 1860 1865 1870 1875
Output- ‘000 tons 1,139 1,395 1,380
No of collieries 30 39 36 29 50
Amount carried by 
rail -‘000 tons 803
Amount carried by 
rail as % of total 
carried from NW 65.4
% increase in output 22.5
Denbs output as % of 
UK output 1.4 1.4 1.0
Denbs output as % of 
NW output 65.1 70.3 59.0
(Source: Hunt’s Mineral Statistics D/GR/1545-1570; figures re north Wales extracted from data in 
Table 2.1 above).
1875-1914
Denbighshire’s dominance of the north Wales ‘coalfield’ increased throughout 
much of the 1875-1914 period. Between 1875 and 1914, Denbighshire’s output 
increased by 91 per cent and, by 1914, Denbighshire was producing 80 per cent 
of the coal raised in north Wales (see Table 2.10). In relation to the UK as a 
whole, Denbighshire’s output as a proportion of the UK’s output can be seen in 
Table 2.11. These figures reveal that, in the period 1875-1914, there was very 
little fluctuation in Denbighshire’s contribution to the UK’s coal output. In a period 
which saw UK coal production double, the fact that the Denbighshire coalfield
59
was able to ‘keep up’ with national growth demonstrates the extent of the region’s 
expansion in this period.
Table 2.10: Denbighshire’s output as a percentage of north Wales output. 1875-1914
Denbiah-
shire
north Wales Denb as % of 
NW
1875 1,379,560 2,349,118 59
1880 1,555,238 2,429,315 64
1885 1,710,276 2,312,391 74
1890 2,221,497 2,975,046 75
1895 2,206,993 2,848,072 77
1900 2,447,092 3,109,615 79
1905 2,368,259 2,901,998 82
1910 2,598,370 3,410,876 76
1914 2,644,996 3,315,092 80
(Source: FA Gibson, 1922: 11 and 29-30)
Table 2.11: North Wales and Denbighshire output as % of UK output. 1875-1914
NW as 
% of UK
Denbs as 
% of N W
Denbs as 
% of UK
1875 1.7 59 1.0
1880 1.6 64 1.0
1885 1.5 74 1.1
1890 1.6 75 1.2
1895 1.5 77 1.2
1900 1.4 79 1.1
1905 1.2 82 1.0
1910 1.3 76 1.0
1914 1.2 80 1.0
(Source: FA Gibson, 1922: 11 and 29-30)
If Denbighshire’s output as a proportion of the UK’s output is compared 
with that of the small coalfields detailed in Table 2.6 above, we can see that, in its 
own right, the Denbighshire coalfield, although outstripped by the 
Nottinghamshire and Warwickshire coalfields, was more significant than 
Cheshire, Shropshire and Cumberland, and contributed approximately the same
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proportion of coal as did the Leicestershire and Gloucestershire coalfields. 
Taking this evidence, in conjuction with the geological details already presented, 
leads us to conclude that Denbighshire can be deemed worthy of study in its own 
right, as a small coalfield.
Having considered the Denbighshire coalfield in relation to north Wales 
and the UK as a whole, we now turn our attention to the individual collieries 
within the coalfield, with a view to making comparisons with other coalfields as 
regards average colliery size. Ideally, when trying to establish the size of an 
individual colliery, one should examine output figures, however, due to the 
paucity of archival material available, this has not been possible. It has therefore 
been necessary to use employment figures as a ‘measure’ of colliery size but, 
these too have their limitations. Prior to 1894 there was no official collation of 
individual colliery statistics but from this date every colliery had to supply average 
annual employment figures to the Board of Trade. While this means that 
individual collieries can only be ‘monitored’ for twenty years, the period is long 
enough to allow trends to be established and conclusions to be reached.
Colliery size
The output of a region was to a great extent related to the number of pits therein, 
there being a high, positive correlation between the number of pits in a coalfield 
and its output. However, amongst some of the smaller coalfields, this correlation 
was less strong (Boyns, 1982). The figures in Table 2.12 show that the 
percentage of pits in north Wales corresponds very closely to its proportion of UK 
output, but for other, smaller regions such as Gloucestershire and Shropshire, 
they had a far higher proportion of pits than output, whereas Nottinghamshire had 
a higher proportion of output than pits. This implies that there were many small, 
less productive pits in regions such as Cheshire and Shropshire, whereas 
Nottinghamshire had fewer, larger and more productive mines.
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Table 2.12: Percentage of total UK collieries in each region
1894 1899 1913
No. % No. % No. %
Scotland 565 15.6 533 15.7 551 17.0
Northumberland 121 3.4 123 3.6 134 4.1
Durham 275 7.6 285 8.4 304 9.4
Yorkshire 423 11.7 432 12.7 379 11.7
Derbyshire 195 5.4 187 5.5 115 3.6
Nottinghamshire 55 1.5 56 1.7 35 1.1
Leicestershire 33 0.9 35 1.0 30 0.9
Warwickshire 30 0.8 36 1.1 29 0.9
South Wales & 
Monmouthshire 627 17.4 551 16.3 621 19.2
North Wales 68
1.9
61 1.8 44 1.2
Cumberland 40 1.1 42 1.2 39 1.2
Staffordshire and 
Worcestershire 460 12.7 383 11.2 452 14.0
Lancashire 457 12.6 423 12.5 303 9.4
Cheshire 22 0.6 23 0.7 15 0.5
Shropshire 96 2.7 109 3.2 67 2.2
Ireland 20 0.6 27 0.8 27 0.8
Gloucestershire 125 3.5 88 2.6 89 2.8
Total 3612 100.0 3394 100 3234 100.0
(Source: Boyns, 1982: 194)
In his study of the British coalfield, Boyns (1982: 153) concluded that the 
average colliery size, measured by the numbers employed, “significantly 
increased” between 1894 and 1913, although he also concluded that “whilst 
average colliery size did increase over this period, the most numerous colliery 
size group in 1913 was still the same as it had been in 1894, i.e. the 10-99 size 
group”. To see whether Denbighshire fits into this pattern, an analysis of the 
numbers employed and the size of collieries has been carried out for 1894, 1900, 
1907 and 1914. All the statistics have been extracted from the annual List of 
Mines which, from 1894, gives details of numbers employed in the individual pits 
of a region, and details relating to those who owned the pits. The main problem 
when using the List of Mines, as highlighted by Boyns (1982: 132), is the way the 
list defined a colliery; for example, from 1894 to 1902 the Bersham colliery was
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listed as two pits - Bersham 1 and 2, even though only one set of employment 
figures was given, and despite the fact that the pits were run as a single concern; 
from 1903 it was listed as a single colliery. This problem of categorisation also 
applies to the Hafod, Wrexham, Westminster and Wynnstay collieries; the 
Wynnstay colliery was categorised as a single colliery from 1907 while it was not 
until 1913 that Hafod, Wrexhan and Westminster were listed as single collieries 
rather than two or three separate pits. Treating them as one concern is consistent 
with surviving records which reveal that, as far as the companies running these 
collieries were concerned, they were running a single operation, even though 
several collieries may have been involved.
For the purpose of the initial analysis, however, the collieries have been 
treated as they were given in the List of Mines, and therefore if two separate 
collieries were listed, but only one employment figure was given, the employment 
figure has been split equally2. In other cases where three separate underground 
figures have been given, but only a single figure for above ground employment 
(because the collieries were run by a single company) for example, Gwersyllt and 
Westminster 4 & 5, the above ground figure has been split in the same proportion 
as reflected in the figures of those working underground. This approach is 
consistent with that advocated by Boyns (1982: 133), and allows the total number 
of collieries to agree with that given by the List of Mines; this prevents confusion 
and the necessity for reconciliations to the List of Mines figures. Using this 
approach the size distribution for the selected years is as presented in Table
2.13.
The analysis presented in Table 2.13 shows that, in Denbighshire, the 
proportion of collieries employing 500 or more persons grew slightly from 14 per 
cent in 1894 to 16 per cent in 1900, rose rapidly to 37 per cent in 1907 and to 42 
per cent in 1914. The higher figures in 1907 and 1914 partly reflect the fact that, 
in 1907, the Bersham and Wynnstay collieries are each listed as single collieries 
rather than as two separate collieries (each less than 500 persons), and by 1914 
all linked pits are included as single collieries. To overcome this problem, in
2 While this is unlikely to accurately reflect the true position, a lack o f knowledge means that this is the 
only logical approach that can be taken if  conclusions are to be drawn.
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Table 2.14 we present the same data, but after treating all the collieries as single 
entities for each of the years under review. Using this method it can be seen that 
while there is a significant increase in the size of collieries, it is not so dramatic, 
the increase in collieries employing 500 or more persons being from 24 per cent 
in 1894 to 33.5 per cent in 1907 and 42 per cent in 1914.
Table 2.13: The size distribution of collieries in Denbighshire-1894. 1900.1907 & 1914
Size 1894 1900 1907 1914
No. % No. % No. % No. %
0 - - 1 3 - - -
1-9 4 12 3 8 4 12 2 8
10-99 7 21 11 30 11 33 7 24
100-249 7 21 4 11 3 9 2 8
250-499 11 32 12 32 3 9 4 15
500-999 5 14 5 13 10 30 8 31
1000-1499 - - 1 3 2 7 2 8
1500> - - - - - - 1 3
Total 34 100 37 100 r 33 100 26 100
(Source: List o f Mines BL/BS/27/1).
Despite this increase in the larger collieries, it was the small colliery, 
employing less than 100 persons, that remained the largest group (see Table 
2.14); 38 per cent of the collieries in Denbighshire fell into this category in 1894, 
this figure rising slightly to 43 per cent in 1900 and 50 per cent in 1907, before 
falling to 35 per cent in 1914. However, although this size category may have 
been the largest in terms of the number of collieries, it was insignificant when the 
numbers employed by the collieries falling into this category are studied. A study 
of the numbers employed by the various sized collieries reveals that throughout 
the four sample years the collieries employing less than 100 persons consistently 
employed only about 3 per cent of those employed in the coalfield as a whole 
(see Table 2.15).
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Table 2.14: The size distribution of collieries in Denbighshire treating all collieries as single
entities
No. of employees 1894 1900 1907 1914
No. % No. % No. % No. %
0-99 11 38 13 43 15 50 9 35
100-249 6 21 4 13.5 4 13.5 2 8
250-499 5 17 6 20 1 3 4 15
500-999 6 21 4 13.5 6 20 8 31
1000-1499 1 3 3 10 4 13.5 2 8
1500> - - 1 3
Total 29 100 30 100 30 100 26 100
(Source: List o f Mines, BL/BS/27/1).
Table 2.15: Numbers employed in the various sized collieries of Denbighshire
1894 1900 1907 1914
Numbers employed No. % No. % No. % No. %
0-99 238 3 286 3 303 3 347 3
100-249 1375 15 690 7 834 8 291 2
250-499 5097 54 4724 48 1311 12 1469 11
500-999 2647 28 3037 31 5814 56 6528 50
1000-1499 - - 1048 11 2262 21 2425 19
1500> - - - - - - 1922 15
Total 9347 100 9785 100 10524 100 12982 100
(Source: List o f Mines, BL/BS/27/1).
Table 2.15 is calculated using the same basis as for Table 2.13, i.e, 
treating collieries such as Hafod and Wrexham as two separate collieries in 1894, 
1900 and 1907. Table 2.15 reveals that the most important category in terms of 
the numbers employed in 1894 and 1900 was that of the collieries employing 
250-499 persons. By 1907 and 1914 it was those collieries employing between 
500 and 999 persons that was the most important size group, though collieries 
employing 1000 or more had increased their ‘share’ most significantly from 11 
per cent in 1900 to 21 per cent in 1907 and 34 per cent in 1914. Recalculating 
the figures on the basis of single collieries throughout, i.e, consistent with Table
2.14, gives the results presented in Table 2.16. This provides a very different 
picture.
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Table 2.16: Numbers employed in Denbighshire treating all collieries as single entities
1894 1900 1907 1914
Numbers employed No. % No. % No. % No. %
0-99 238 3 286 3 303 3 347 3
100-249 1375 15 690 7 834 8 291 2
250-499 1882 19 2297 24 480 4 1469 11
500-999 4585 49 3101 32 4070 39 6531 50
1000-1499 1267 14 3411 35 3325 32 2425 19
1500> - - - - a1512 14 1922 15
Total 9347 100 9785 100 10524 100 12982 100
(Source: List o f Mines, BL/BS/27/1).
Note
(a) In the 1907 List o f Mines (Table 2.14), the Hafod colliery was treated as two separate 
collieries with the total number of employees falling into the 500-999 category, however, when 
treated as a single entity, the combined employment figure was over 1500.
Given that the companies owning the collieries treated them as single 
entities, this revised approach would appear more realistic than trying to make 
the employment figures ‘fit’ into the List of Mines approach. Recalculating the 
figures reveals that, whereas only 28 per cent of those employed in Denbighshire 
in 1894 under the initial analysis were employed by collieries employing 500 or 
more, under the revised analysis, the figure is 63 per cent. The revised figure for 
the other sample years also reveals much higher proportions of employment in 
the larger collieries (those employing 500 or more), 67 per cent, 85 per cent and 
84 per cent for 1900, 1907, and 1914 respectively. Table 2.16 also reveals that 
collieries employing over 1500 men emerged in Denbighshire in 1907; 1907 was 
a boom year for the coal industry, and that year saw collieries with a workforce of 
1000 or more men employing 46 per cent of the total workforce in Denbighshire. 
Although this had fallen back to 34 per cent by 1914, this was not a ‘typical’ year, 
the outbreak of war having caused many miners to volunteer and thereby reduce 
the workforce available to collieries. Comparison with the 1913 figures (see 
Appendix D, p.363) is likely to be more useful and these reveal that 42 per cent 
of the Denbighshire workforce was employed by collieries employing 1000 or 
more men. It is interesting to note that, in 1913, there were only 4 collieries in 
Denbighshire employing 1000 or more men which, if considered as a proportion
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of all the collieries in that region, accounted for 15 per cent of the total3. This is to 
be contrasted with the picture in the coal industry nationally where these larger 
collieries “only accounted for slightly less than one-tenth of the total number of 
collieries within the industry” (Boyns, 1982: 137). The Denbighshire percentage is 
greater than that for many of the other coalfields of the UK. Table 2.17 shows 
that only four other regions in the UK, namely Northumberland, Durham, 
Nottinghamshire and Warwickshire, had higher proportions of mines employing 
more than 1000 men while the Denbighshire proportion exceeded that for major 
coalfields such as south Wales and Scotland.
Table 2.17: proportion of collieries employing more than 1000 men in 1913
Reqion ProDortion of collieries
emDlovina >1000 men
Scotland 3.3
Northumberland 17.2
Durham 17.0
Yorkshire 11.2
Derbyshire 7.4
Nottinghamshire 22.4
Leicestershire 3.3
Warwickshire 27.6
S. Wales & Mon. 11.6
N. Wales 9.0
Cumberland 5.1
Staffs. & Worcestershire 2.6
Lancashire 3.2
Cheshire 0
Shropshire 0
Ireland 0
Gloucs., Somerset & Devon 0
(Source: Boyns, 1982: 135)
Average colliery size
Rather than looking at the proportion of collieries employing various numbers of 
men, a more meaningful measure of a colliery’s size might be gleaned from 
looking at the average colliery size. Using the data on employment, and number
3 I f  the Wrexham colliery with a workforce o f 998 men is included
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of collieries as presented in the List of Mines (see Table 2.18), the average size 
of colliery (total employees/ number of collieries) in Denbighshire increased from 
274.9 in 1894 to 499.3 in 1914. The figures for 1913 and 1914, however, are so 
much higher than those for any of the other years during the 1894-1914 period, 
due to the practice in those years of treating as a single colliery, pits which were 
previously treated separately. If the figures for 1913 and 1914 are re-calculated 
on the basis used for 1894-1912, then the figures become 419.2 and 447.7 
respectively, a significant increase, but not as marked.
Table 2.18: Average colliery size (workers) in Denbighshire 1894 -1914 per List of Mines, and 
average size excluding clav pits
Per List of Mines Excluding clay pits
Year Workers Collieries Average Workers Collieries Average
1894 9,347 34 274.9 9,245 28 330.2
1895 9,365 33 283.8 9,263 27 343.1
1896 8,900 33 269.7 8,786 27 325.4
1897 9,031 33 269.4 8,913 27 330.1
1898 9,091 33 273.7 8,957 26 344.5
1899 9,521 35 272.0 9,385 28 335.2
1900 9,785 37 264.4 9,614 29 331.5
1901 10,460 38 275.3 10,298 30 343.3
1902 10,805 37 292.0 10,633 29 366.7
1903 10,754 35 307.2 10,602 27 392.7
1904 10,359 35 296.0 10,213 27 378.3
1905 10,006 33 303.2 9,864 25 394.6
1906 10,739 34 315.8 10,610 26 408.1
1907 10,524 33 318.9 10,367 25 415.8
1908 11,300 35 322.9 11,155 27 413.1
1909 11,514 35 329.0 11,378 27 421.4
1910 11,673 35 335.5 11,545 27 427.6
1911 11,934 34 351.0 11,806 27 437.3
1912 12,394 32 387.3 12,276 26 472.1
1913 12,577 26(30) 483.7/
(419.2)
12,466 21 (25) 593.6
/(498.6)
1914 12,982 26(29) 499.3/
(447.7)
12,868 21 (24) 612.8 
/(536.2)
(Source: List of Mines BL/BS/21/1) -  for breakdown see Appendix D.
Note: the figures in brackets for 1913 and 1914 are the recalculated numbers based on the way 
the List o f Mines categorised collieries until 1912.
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It is interesting to note that these average figures are significantly higher 
than the UK averages discussed by Boyns (1982: 140). In his examination of the 
average size of colliery in the UK in 1894 and 1913, Boyns (1982: 140) gives the 
figures of 235.4 and 381.2 respectively for the UK as a whole, and only in 
Northumberland, Durham, Nottinghamshire and Warwickshire were the averages 
in 1913 higher than in Denbighshire (see Table 2.19). A possible explanation for 
this is that the seven largest pits in Denbighshire: Plas Power, Wrexham & Acton, 
Hafod, Bersham, Brynkinallt, Westminster and Wynnstay accounted for 
approximately 76 per cent and 63 per cent of total employment in the coalfield in 
1894 and 1914 respectively, a factor which may bias the average. Another 
problem with the data from the List of Mines is that it includes all mines that were 
covered by the relevant Coal Mines Act, which covered mines that extracted coal, 
even when coal production was not the main occupation, for example, clay pits. 
In Denbighshire, as in most coalfields, such concerns were usually very small 
and were all in the 0-100 employees category. As such, their inclusion in the 
calculation of an average sized colliery may skew the results; to see whether this 
is indeed the case, the average figures have been recalculated excluding the clay 
pits and their employees (see the final three columns of Table 2.18). These 
figures reveal significantly higher averages and show that average employment 
in Denbighshire increased from 330.2 employees per colliery in 1894 to 536.2 in 
1914, an increase of 62 per cent.
It would thus appear that if we measure growth either in terms of average 
colliery size or the number of collieries employing more than 1000 men, growth in 
Denbighshire was significant in the period 1894 to 1914. As will be discussed 
further in Chapter 7, the main impetus behind this growth was the development of 
a comprehensive railway system. In 1854, Wrexham was linked to both Chester 
and Shrewsbury but much remained to be done to further extend the railway 
network. At this date, Denbighshire had 30 relatively small collieries, and it was 
only when the railway system developed that larger pits were built. Indeed, of the 
seven largest pits named above, only one, Westminster was sunk before 1850
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(1846), the others being sunk between 1856 and 1875 as the railway network 
was extended.
Table 2.19: Average colliery size (workers) in the coalfields of the UK. 1913
Reaion Averaae 
collierv size 
(workers)
UK 327.0
Scotland 267.8
Northumberland 455.3
Durham 543.7
Yorkshire 363.1
Derbyshire 372.6
Nottinghamshire 698.0
Leicestershire 348.6
Warwickshire 662.2
S. Wales & Mon. 375.4
N. Wales 362.5
Cumberland 283.0
Staffs. & Worcestershire 139.5
Lancashire 306.8
Cheshire 62.5
Shropshire 55.5
Ireland 28.8
Gloucs., Somerset & Devon 174.6
(Source: Boyns, 1982: 139)
Conclusion
In the period 1850-1914 the Denbighshire coalfield clearly established itself as 
the dominant coalfield within north Wales. By 1880 it accounted for over 60 per 
cent of the total output of north Wales and, by 1905, 82 per cent of the coal 
extracted in north Wales came from Denbighshire. Although never categorised as 
a coalfield in any statistical returns, north Wales being deemed the official 
‘coalfield’, Denbighshire, in its own right was, in terms of output, comparable with 
many of the other small coalfields of the UK. In the period 1875-1914 
Denbighshire maintained its production as a proportion of the UK’s output at 
around 1 per cent, and although this proportion had possibly been higher in the 
1860s, Denbighshire’s growth after 1875 clearly kept pace with that of the
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industry as a whole. When compared with other small coalfields, Denbighshire’s 
output ranked alongside that of Leicestershire, Cumberland and Gloucestershire, 
and above those of Cheshire and Shropshire, coalfields that had virtually 
disappeared by 1914.
If we consider the size of collieries in Denbighshire we see that, treating all 
collieries as single entities, there were only 7 collieries employing 500 or more 
men in Denbighshire in 1894 (see Table 2.14). This had increased to 10 in 1907 
and 11 in 1914. When considered as a proportion of the total number of collieries 
in Denbighshire, treating all collieries as single entities, these larger collieries 
represented only 24 per cent in 1894 and, although this proportion had increased 
to 33.5 per cent in 1907, and 42 per cent in 1914 (see Table 2.14), the coalfield 
was still dominated, numerically, by smaller collieries. This fact clearly influences 
average colliery size which in Denbighshire increased from 274.9 employees per 
colliery in 1894 to 447.7 in 1914 (see Table 2.18). Clearly, the collieries in 
Denbighshire were becoming larger, a fact which is reinforced if we consider the 
proportion of the workforce which worked in the larger collieries employing 500 or 
more men; in 1894 these collieries employed 63 per cent of the workforce, a 
figure which had risen to 85 per cent in 1907 before falling back to 84 per cent in 
1914. Indeed, by 1914 15 per cent of the collieries in Denbighshire employed 
more than 1000 men and only in four other regions of the UK was the proportion 
higher. The collieries involved, Hafod, Wynnstay, Wrexham & Acton and Plas 
Power were sunk in 1856, 1863, 1869 and 1875 respectively. Given the 
geological considerations discussed earlier these collieries were deeper than 
their predecessors and given their relative ‘newness’ were able to take 
advantage of technological innovations which allowed them to access coal on a 
far greater scale than had hitherto been possible. Furthermore, being deeper 
and, consequently, more expensive to operate, it is likely that they had to be of a 
large size in order to operate in a profitable manner.
It would thus appear that if we measure growth either in terms of average 
colliery size or the number of collieries employing more than 1000 men, growth in 
Denbighshire was significant in the period 1894 to 1914. It can thus be concluded
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that by the end of the nineteenth century the Denbighshire coalfield was 
dominated by a few large collieries which were newer and deeper than those 
sunk earlier. The period from 1900 to 1914 saw collieries employing over 1000 
become the most important in terms of the proportion of men employed and also 
saw the emergence of one colliery employing over 1500 men. It was the growth 
of these larger collieries which helped to sustain the growth of output in 
Denbighshire and help maintain the coalfield’s share of British coal output at 
around 1 per cent between 1875 and 1914. Since such large collieries had far 
higher capital requirements than small collieries, the next chapter will consider 
the ways in which colliery companies in Denbighshire financed the development 
of their collieries in the period 1854-1914.
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Chapter 3
FINANCING COAL COMPANIES 
Introduction
In Chapter 2, when discussing the relative size of collieries in Denbighshire, we 
noted that, in 1894, 76 per cent of the total Denbighshire colliery workforce was 
employed by seven collieries, namely, the Plas Power, Wrexham & Acton, Hafod, 
Bersham, Brynkinallt, Westminster and Wynnstay collieries. With the exception of 
Brynkinallt, which was run as a partnership until incorporation in October 1895, 
these collieries were run by limited companies as detailed in Table 3.1. These 
collieries were all sunk after 1850 when technological changes meant that pits 
could be deeper and the coal could be transported further. However, with these 
benefits came additional competition and coal companies were often forced to 
expand in order to maintain their profits. This expansion required finance and 
this chapter will therefore discuss the capital needs of colliery companies and the 
main sources of this capital.
Table 3.1: Details of ownership of the largest Denbighshire collieries in 1894
Name of collierv Name of comoanv
Plas Power Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd.
Wrexham & Acton Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. Ltd.
Hafod Ruabon Coke & Coal Co. Ltd.
Bersham Bersham Colliery Co.Ltd.
Westminster Westminster, Brymbo Coal & Coke Ltd.
Wynnstay Wynnstay Collieries Ltd.
According to Cottrell (1980: 19), “the industrial revolution did not take 
place uniformly either geographically or across the manufacturing sector of the 
economy. It was essentially a process of regional economic growth and of the 
transformation of a limited number of industries”. However, there was one 
common denominator across all the regions and the industries therein: the need
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for coal to fuel production. This meant that coal was an increasingly important 
resource and the industry had to develop methods to ensure that it could meet 
demand.
Once the period when outcropping and more primitive methods to satisfy 
local needs was over, more intensive production methods were required. This 
obviously required innovation and the use of the new techniques being 
developed throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but these 
required far more investment than had hitherto been necessary. This chapter will 
therefore consider what form this investment took. The sources we look at will 
include internally and externally generated sources of finance. For the purposes 
of this thesis internally generated finance is that generated from the sale of 
shares. Share capital is deemed ‘internal’ rather than external because it is 
generated from the owners of the company rather than from banks or other 
external sources. Throughout the period from 1850-1914 most coal companies 
were what we could term ‘private family companies’ which often resembled 
partnerships and saw shares being sold to a small circle of family, friends and 
associates, rather than to the public at large.
Having looked at the sources of finance on which coal companies in 
general relied, we will turn our attention to the coal companies of Denbighshire 
and, using the archival material still extant, try to come to some conclusions as to 
their main methods of raising finance. We will then examine how this finance was 
utilised by analysing the surviving balance sheets of some of the coal companies 
in Denbighshire.
Capital needs
The capital needs of coal companies can be divided into two elements: fixed 
capital and working capital. Fixed capital is the investment in the colliery 
infrastructure and can be defined as “all costs incurred in the sinking, equipping 
and initial opening out of collieries including the value of shafts and all surface 
arrangements that assist in the production, preparation and transport of coal”
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(Church, 1986: 101). On the other hand, working capital is the capital generated 
and expended in the day to day running of the colliery. Due to the nature of a 
colliery, fixed capital makes up the bulk of its total capital simply due to the 
expense involved in sinking and equipping a pit. It is very difficult, if not 
impossible, to say that the parameters for fixed capital should be between 
particular percentage rates, due to the fact that each colliery was unique and 
would encounter different circumstances when sinking; the depth at which the 
coal lay or the specific geological conditions prevalent in a region, would have a 
significant impact on the time and costs involved. According to the Colliery 
Guardian (2 June 1851, cited in Church, 1986: 104) sinking could take 10 to 38 
months if no problems such as water were encountered, and 18 to 48 months if 
they were. These time-scales only cover the actual sinking of the shaft; opening 
the pit out and completing necessary building work on the surface could take an 
additional 12 to 18 months. It was not unusual for 5 to 10 years to have passed 
before full scale production was realised.
The capital required for such undertakings was often far more significant 
than was originally estimated by those involved as conditions were encountered 
that had not been expected. The extent to which this applied to collieries in 
Denbighshire will be discussed later in the chapter, but it is important to note that 
this initial optimism was not restricted to any particular region or period. Walters 
(1977: 240), in his study of the south Wales coal industry, demonstrated that 
between 75 per cent and 89 per cent of a colliery company’s capital was fixed; in 
north Wales an analysis of those balance sheets that are available for coal 
companies shows that for the Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd. the proportion of assets 
that were deemed fixed varied from 87.9 per cent in 1869 to 94.2 per cent in 
1872 to 88.6 per cent in 1876 (D/DM/424/1-2). The fact that the Wrexham 
Colliery Company’s figures are at the top end of, or even exceed Walters’ scale, 
can be explained by the fact that fixed costs were expected to be higher in the 
years of sinking; this colliery started sinking in 1869 and thus the figure for 1876, 
when production was fully underway is probably nearer to a ‘normal’ proportion. 
The United Westminster & Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd. also had extremely high
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proportions of fixed capital in the years when it was sinking the Gresford colliery; 
in 1911, the year sinking was completed, fixed capital constituted 98.2 per cent of 
the balance sheet total, but by 1914 this had fallen to well within Walters’ 
parameters, at 79.2 per cent (National Archives, hereafter NA, NA/37495/85251). 
The Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd.’s balance sheet for 1887 revealed 
that fixed assets made up 85.9 per cent of the company’s total capital; this had 
increased to 87.3 per cent in 1893, but by 1901 it was down to 74.1 per cent and 
had fallen further to 62.1 per cent by 1910 (D/DM/309/3-7).
Such figures might indicate that, after the initial investment in plant, 
workings, etc., a company merely failed to invest the required amounts in its 
collieries, or it might indicate that the company had a ‘flexible’ attitude to the way 
it categorised expenditure, with items going to the profit and loss account which 
perhaps should have been allocated as capital expenditure. It was usual for 
colliery companies to charge what would be categorised, in the twenty first 
century, as capital expenditure to revenue once the capital account had been 
‘closed off 4 This is contrary to modern accounting conventions and it is therefore 
difficult to analyse nineteenth century balance sheets without knowing what was 
the policy of the individual company.
Sources of capital
In the nineteenth century finance for colliery companies generally came from one 
of two sources; it was either raised by the owners themselves, either alone or in 
partnership with others, or it was borrowed from external sources such as banks. 
Even when limited liability companies became the norm in the coal industry in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, they remained, in character, very much like 
partnerships; very few shares were sold to those who had no connection with the 
company or its existing shareholders, and many of what Jeffreys (1946: 346) 
calls the “tradition(s) of partnership” continued long after the partnerships had
4 When a colliery was sinking a pit all the costs associated with that sinking were put to the capital account 
but, once the colliery was in production, the capital account was ‘closed o f f  which meant that from that 
date a separate balance sheet and profit and loss account were prepared and only items of a capital nature 
were posted to the balance sheet via fixed asset accounts.
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been converted into limited liability companies. Even when public limited 
companies5 became more prevalent in the late nineteenth century, they only 
accounted for between 5 and 10 per cent of the total number of business 
organisations in the UK; and only in shipping, iron and steel, and cotton was their 
influence considerable (Payne, 1962: 520).
Internally generated finance - Share capital
Throughout the nineteenth century most businesses, including collieries, were 
small family businesses (Payne, 1962: 252) and in the early part of the century 
their financial needs were often satisfied by “filial and personal connections” 
(Cottrell, 1980: 7). It was only when the railways began to open up the markets in 
the late 1840s, that coalfields such as Denbighshire began any large scale 
colliery developments, and it was only in the 1850s and afterwards, when the 
improvements in communications coincided with a change in the laws of limited 
liability, that the sole trader and small partnership began to be supplanted by the 
limited liability colliery company. Before the 1855 and 1856 Companies Acts, the 
limited liability company had been almost unheard of as a business entity in the 
UK for at least a hundred years. The fiasco of the South Sea Bubble and the 
subsequent Act of 1720 had severely hindered the development of limited liability 
companies because, as Carleton-Hunt (1936: 9) comments, “Parliament 
deliberately placed the corporate form under lock and key”. The fear was that if 
entrepreneurs were using capital other than their own, they would not look after it 
as if it were their own, and in the event of a business’s failure there was “serious 
public concern over the difficulty of fixing the responsibility of shareholders in an 
incorporated company in the event of financial embarrassment” (Carleton-Hunt, 
1936: 27). It was also felt that limiting shareholders’ liability would stifle the 
‘entrepreneurial spirit’; individuals would not strive as hard to succeed if the fear 
of failure was cushioned by limited liability.
5 Technically, the distinction between ‘private’ and ‘public’ companies did not come about until the 1907 
Companies Act. However, many o f the early joint-stock limited companies were essentially private in that 
their shares could not be freely traded, while other companies increasingly relied on public subscription.
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However, this institutionalised fear of limited liability restrictions meant that 
unless an undertaking could obtain a Royal Charter or ensure the passing of an 
Act of Parliament, business entities had of necessity to be sole traders or set up 
partnerships. According to Cottrell (1980: 10), this was “not a major check to 
industrial development” because most businessmen involved in the 
manufacturing and extractive industries could get enough capital from small 
partnerships. However, the need for large amounts of capital to build canals, and 
later railways, helped relax the views of many because “it was cumbrous and 
expensive for such enterprises to obtain incorporation by Act of Parliament” 
(Farrar & Hannigan, 1998: 19). In the early nineteenth century such a 
cumbersome route was obviously unattractive to those who required only 
comparatively modest sums, and entrepreneurs relied on partnerships to finance 
their ventures (Cottrell, 1980: 10). However, by the 1840s, businessmen, 
realising that partnerships might not be able to provide their future financial 
needs, began to pressurise the government into relaxing the law and allowing 
them access to a larger pool of potential investors. The Joint Stock Company 
Registration and Regulation Act of 1844 “marks an epoch in the history of English 
company law” (Carelton-Hunt, 1936: 96) because it brought incorporation a step 
closer. However, “the companies formed under [the Act] ...were unlimited in the 
sense that their shareholders still had unlimited liability for the debts of the 
company”, but the shareholders were able to negotiate, via individual contracts, 
limited liability with their creditors (Farrar & Hannigan, 1998: 20). Thus, limited 
liability companies had become in substance, if not in form, more acceptable to 
those involved in business. However, there were many complexities involved in 
creating such relationships and, increasingly, as businesses required more 
money, and as smaller investors began to explore new avenues for investment, 
pressure for full incorporation was exerted by the business community.
Limited liability was introduced in the Limited Liability Act of 1855; apart 
from the fact that it allowed for a widening of investment opportunities, one of the 
main reasons it was introduced according to Farrar & Hannigan (1998: 20) was 
that “it prevented prudent men from becoming members of companies which
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were  formed by the rash and reckless”, a situation that had arisen in the
1840s with ‘Railwaymania’. The 1855 Act offered limited liability on the proviso 
that certain conditions were met; these were removed by the Joint Stock 
Companies Act, 1856, which “introduced the modern form of constitution 
consisting of Memorandum and Articles of Association and separate winding up 
procedures” (Farrar & Hannigan, 1998: 20). As long as a company could find at 
least seven subscribers they could achieve limited liability but, as will be 
demonstrated, although limited liability companies were created, it was to be a 
long time before the attitudes and principles of partnership receded, and many 
companies remained little more than ‘partnerships cum company’ for many years.
One of the main ways in which companies continued the traditions of 
partnership was in the way shares were issued. According to Jeffreys (1946: 
344), there was a reluctance by many involved to embrace limited liability 
wholeheartedly; the concept that those involved in business could limit their 
liability was an alien one to those “in commercial and industrial circles schooled 
in the concept of partnership liability”. This did not stop a “substantial number of 
limited companies” (Cottrell, 1980: 80) from being formed, but many issued high 
denomination shares which usually had a significant amount uncalled. According 
to Jeffreys (1946: 345), “shares only partly paid up were a feature of the opening 
years of limited company finance”. He then points out that in what can be termed 
the ‘heavy’ industries, i.e iron, coal, shipbuilding etc., high denomination shares 
remained the norm for much of the nineteenth century, even when £1 shares 
were becoming prevalent in other industries. An examination of the denomination 
of shares issued by colliery companies incorporated in Denbighshire between 
1850 and 1900, as detailed in Table 3.2, illustrates Jeffreys’ findings. Indeed, it 
was not until the twentieth century that we see companies being created with 
nominal shares of £1. Jeffreys (1946: 355) believes that the reason for this is that 
“the shares were taken as long term investments and high denominations 
presented no obstacles” to investors, furthermore, despite the boom of 1871- 
1875 leading to the creation of smaller companies with lower share
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denominations, “the large semi-private company continued to dominate these 
[heavy] industries until the late eighties” (Jeffreys, 1954: 355).
Table 3.2: The denomination of shares for colliery companies in Denbighshire 1850-1914
Name of companv Year of incorDoration Denomination of 
shares-£ (a)
Ruabon Coal Co. Ltd. 1856 (b) 50
Westminster, Brymbo Coal & Coke 
Ltd.
1858 25
Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd. / Wrexham 
& Acton Collieries Co. Ltd. (c)
1863 1 0 0 /25(c)
Minera Coal & Iron Co. Ltd. 1865 ?
North Wales Coal, Iron & Firebrick 
Co. Ltd.
1866 ?
Bersham Colliery Co.Ltd. 1868 50
Vauxhall Colliery Co.Ltd. 1871 20
Ruabon Coke & Coal Co. Ltd. 1880 100
Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. 
Ltd.
1881 10
Vron Colliery Ltd. 1887 10
Wynnstay Collieries Ltd. 1889 10
United Westminster & Wrexham  
Collieries Co. Ltd.
1905 1
Black Lane Colliery (Brymbo) Ltd. 1909 1
Llay Main Collieries Ltd. 1913 10
(Source: the individual company records at the National Archives)
Notes
(a) The evidence available suggests that, except where noted, the share denominations 
remained the same from the date of incorporation to 1914.
(b) This company went into liquidation in 1880 having converted the majority of its shares 
into debentures.
(c) In November 1872 the company changed its name to Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. 
Ltd and reorganised its capital into £25 shares.
Why did colliery companies have such high denomination shares, and why 
did they have such a high proportion of their share capital uncalled? According to 
Jeffreys (1946: 347), one of the reasons was that many of the new companies 
were conversions of existing partnerships and “many early joint-stock companies, 
although they had a wider basis than a partnership, were established on similar 
lines and followed similar traditions”. This was often due to the mistrust of limited 
liability that had been inherent in many business circles since the South Sea 
Bubble debacle; many viewed the fact that shareholders could limit their liability
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as an “immoral” concept (Cottrell, 1980: 41). Another factor was the need by 
companies to give the impression that they were financially stable; in the years 
running up to the introduction of limited liability, it was widely felt that it would 
“lead to wild speculation, panics and a decline of commercial morality” (Jeffreys, 
1946: 347). If the shares were of a high value this might deter speculation 
because the investor “incurred a large degree of potential liability as a result of 
the extent of the unpaid capital” (Cottrell, 1980: 84). By having a large reserve of 
uncalled capital, it was hoped that, “the greater a limited company could 
approach to the partnership system of responsibility, the greater would be the 
security, and the higher its standing” (Jeffreys, 1946: 348). Jeffreys further 
asserts (1946: 349) that this view “was due more to the strong insistence” of 
creditors than to any other factor. It was the creditors who wanted uncalled 
capital to be a “reserve which could be drawn on in an emergency” (Jeffreys, 
1946: 349-350), i.e. if the company was on the verge of bankruptcy or in the 
throes of a financial crisis.
As experience of limited liability deepened, and especially after the 
financial crisis of 1866, it was found that “the calling up on unpaid portions of 
shares was a clumsy and disquieting method of obtaining capital at a time of 
emergency” (Jeffreys, 1946: 351). Shareholders began to question their position; 
despite their official limited liability status the existence of a significant uncalled 
element to their shares meant that their liability was not limited simply to what 
they had paid for the shares. If necessary, they would have to find the funds to 
pay for the uncalled portion should the need arise, and this portion could prove to 
be substantial. Indeed in south Wales, the Powell Duffryn company shares were 
£5,000 each with £200 uncalled, the latter amount only to be called up in the 
event of the company being wound up. One consequence of the Overend & 
Gurney-inspired financial crisis of 1866 was that, by the 1870s, there was a 
noticeable move towards lower denomination shares in general, although the 
comments of Jeffreys above re. colliery companies must be borne in mind, and 
many of these shares were fully paid (Cottrell, 1980: 81); this lower denomination
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of shares made it easier for members of the ‘middle classes’ to enter the market 
for shares and increased the amount of capital available to companies.
Another consequence of ‘living’ with limited liability throughout the 1850s 
and 1860s was that “the need to keep part of the shares uncalled in order to 
secure the goodwill of creditors became less imperative as the limited form 
proved its efficiency and stability” (Jeffreys, 1946: 353). Rather than rely solely on 
part-called ordinary shares, companies were now able to issue debenture loans 
and preference shares6 which offered lenders security in a form other than the 
‘uncalled reserve’ and these sources of finance became increasingly popular in 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Another important factor in the 
increased popularity of debentures and preference shares (loan capital), was the 
fact that by issuing such financial instruments, rather than shares, control was not 
diluted; in short, by choosing a financial structure that included loan capital, 
companies “provided themselves with the additional capital that was essential for 
the survival of their business, and yet managed to avoid any substantial change 
in their mode of operation” (Watson, 1996: 66).
External finance
Finance, other than from selling ordinary shares, generally came either from the 
banks, in the form of loans or overdrafts (although it must be noted that banks 
were often reluctant to offer anything other than short term finance), or from 
issuing preference shares or debenture loans. The type of finance sought by 
companies depended on what it was to be used for; as already discussed, the 
initial fixed capital needed to finance the sinking of a mine was generally raised 
by the issue of ordinary shares, as were any major future expansions; once a 
company was up and running internally generated profits could be used, but 
these were often insufficient to finance anything other than short term working 
capital needs. If any additional fixed capital was required, and the company did
6 Preference shares are considered more in the form o f a loan i f  they are redeemable; they offer holders 
‘preference’ in the form o f fixed dividends which are payable before ordinary dividends and rank higher 
than ordinary shares when a company is wound up.
82
not wish (or was unable to) issue additional ordinary shares, it had to raise longer 
term finance in the form of a mortgage, preference shares or debentures. More 
short term needs to meet any shortfalls in working capital, or any unexpected 
expenses, were usually met by arranging an overdraft or short term loan from the 
bank.
Banks
Until the late eighteenth century, Wales was largely an “agricultural economy 
consisting of a few large, almost autonomous country estates, small self- 
supporting farms.... and a craft workforce” (Rhys-Williams, 1990: 94). This 
society was largely self-sufficient and the only people who had any sizeable 
reserves of capital available for spending and [for] investment were “estate 
owners, large farmers and substantial traders” (Roberts, 1993: 291) who would 
occasionally lend capital to fledgling industrialists (Rhys-Williams, 1990: 95). 
However, as industry developed “and the resources of Wales [began] to attract 
adventurers from across the border” (Dodd, 1926: 23), the need for ‘ready’ cash 
increased. This development led to the first private banks being formed. The first 
banks in north Wales were established in the industrial towns of Wrexham, Mold 
and Holywell (Chambers Jones, 1978: 70) but many of these smaller banks failed 
to survive the crisis of 1825-26, and although private banks continued to exist 
until 1850, from this date banking facilities in Denbighshire and north Wales were 
to be provided by the larger, more stable joint stock banks.
By 1850 banks had, therefore, become established in Denbighshire, but 
how useful were these banks to emerging businesses, especially those involved 
in the coal and iron industries? Were loans and overdrafts readily available, or 
were coalowners forced to rely on internally generated funds? In a paper written 
during the First World War, Foxwell (1917: 508-9) asserts that “banks prefer 
financial to industrial banking” because “our great banks are too timid to take 
primary risks” and thus industry in the UK was not well served by the banks 
“which deprive our industrialists and merchants of trade”. He explained that the 
long and large loans that some industrialists wanted were not available from the
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banks, thus “the only alternatives are to resort to the company promoter or the
sale of debentures [which] are mere makeshifts, utterly inadequate”. Foxwell
also believed that as a result industry was under-capitalised and consequently 
less competitive than in countries such as Germany or the USA, where banking 
was much more ‘liberal’ (Foxwell, 1917: 510). More recent research, for example 
that done by Capie and Collins (1996: 26), while not as condemnatory of the 
banks, shows that “there remains a fair degree of suspicion that, in the years 
before 1914, British banks - which were amongst the most stable and richly 
resourced in the world - failed to support adequately the development of British 
industry” (Capie and Collins, 1996: 26).
Cottrell (1980: 210), disagrees with these views; he states that “a 
substantial amount of evidence has now accumulated showing that banks, during
the early phases of the industrial revolution did provide long term loans to
industrial firms which often financed investment in fixed capital”. He cites 
examples of long term loans being extended to colliery companies in south 
Wales in the 1840s and 1850s, and to iron companies in that region in the 1870s. 
He also explains that banks, in the second half of the nineteenth century, were 
more willing to allow overdraft facilities to cover short term shortages (Cottrell, 
1980: 212). Recent research carried out by other authors has suggested that, in 
many instances, such short term overdrafts were often rolled-over, in effect 
making them into longer term loans averaging nineteen months duration (Capie & 
Collins, 1999).
Financing coal companies in Denbighshire
Share capital
The main way in which the companies in Denbighshire raised capital was through 
issuing ordinary shares. It would appear that very few of the companies in 
Denbighshire, in common with many throughout the country, actually made 
realistic estimates of how much capital would be needed to sink and work their
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pits. The initial estimates were invariably over optimistic and there are continual 
references to companies having to increase their share capital. A good example 
to illustrate this is the sinking of the pits by the Bersham Colliery Co. Ltd. The 
company was incorporated with capital of £20,000 (400 shares of £50) in October 
1868, to sink and work pits on land leased from the Plas Grono Estate 
(D/DM/309/1). Work on sinking started in June 1869, but a bore-hole sunk to see 
what conditions might be encountered when sinking proper began, showed that 
“from the bottom of the pit there was 15 to 18 yards of very bad ground consisting 
of sand, sandy loam, sand and gravel and between these, beds of stony clay”; in 
addition there was also a great deal of water (D/DM/309/1, 29 June 1870). Such 
obstacles were obviously expensive to overcome and the accounts for the year to 
June 1872 state that net expenditure to date on pits, plant, buildings, etc., was 
£13,616. It was anticipated that further expenditure of £10,000 would be required 
to complete sinking, open up the underground roadways and erect railway 
sidings (D/DM/309/1, 19 August 1872). The report of the Managing Director to 
the AGM (19 August 1872) stated that “there is yet £4,500 uncalled 
capital ...[but]., as it is not advisable to go into debt or borrow, I (James Barnes) 
suggest that the capital be increased by £10,000 which will more than cover the 
work unless unforeseen difficulties arise” (D/DM/309/1, 19 August 1872). 
Unfortunately, such unforeseen difficulties did arise; in his report to the 
shareholders on 5 October 1874 (D/DM/309/1), James Barnes explained that, 
despite the fact that the company had started working the coal and that the 
railway facilities were almost finished, the company was still encountering 
problems: “the seam of coal has turned out very fiery and the safe ventilation has 
been a cause of much anxiety”. To counter this problem the company invested in 
a Guibal fan which was “very expensive but economical in the long term and the 
safest” (D/DM/309/1, 5 October 1874). Mr Barnes explained that the £12/10/- 
uncalled per share would cover the cost of the fan and an air-compressing 
engine for pumping water out, but still additional capital was required. He 
proposed that the company’s capital be increased from £30,000 to £60,000, and 
the request was duly endorsed (D/DM/309/1, 5 October 1874).
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The Main coal seam was eventually reached in both Bersham pits in 1878, 
but delays in driving, a fire in September 1879 and an explosion in August 1880, 
meant that the pits did not start fully working the coal until late 1880/early 1881, a 
full twelve years after the company had been incorporated. The company was 
forced to increase its capital from £60,000 to £80,000 to deal with a balance 
owed to the Managing Director, James Barnes. At 30 June 1880 (D/DM/309/1, 30 
June 1880) the company owed Barnes £32,042, and in his report to the 
shareholders on 15 November 1880, he explained that “it is very advisable that 
the cash balance (owed to him) should be dealt with and till it is the shareholders 
cannot have a dividend, and to meet this I am willing to convert it into either 
shares or a loan”; the company chose to issue him with 600 fully paid shares 
worth £30,000. The financial difficulties the company encountered due to the 
problems of sinking the pits is further illustrated by the fact that the company had 
to negotiate extensions to the debentures issued in 1876 (D/DM/309/1, 2 
November 1881), and a second debenture issue had to be made to repay the 
first, which in turn had to be extended due the company’s difficulties in meeting 
the repayments of this loan.
Bersham Colliery Co. Ltd. was not alone in needing to increase capital on 
several occasions; the Ruabon Coal & Coke Co. Ltd. was incorporated with 
capital of £30,000 in July 1880, but between this date and 1890 the capital had 
been increased to first £50,000 and then £80,000; it was further increased to 
£120,000 in 1892 and again to £150,000 in 1893 (NA/38192/14301); the exact 
reasons for these increases are not known, but given that the company worked 
Hafod, one of the largest collieries in Denbighshire in terms of the numbers 
employed, it would seem reasonable to assume that the money was needed to 
extend the working of the pit and to finance technological innovations in haulage, 
working, ventilation etc.
The Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd. also experienced great difficulties when 
sinking its pits; it was incorporated in December 1863 with capital of £25,000 
(NA/14345/821C) which had been increased to £60,000 before sinking in 
Rhosddu began in 1869. Initially there were few problems and the Main coal was
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reached in October 1870 (NLW/HR/ 76/79), but when the company began driving 
into the coal, the pit flooded in January 1871 (NLW/HR/76/469), and it was not 
until the end of 1873/start of 1874 that the pits were cleared and working could 
resume (D/DM/424/1). Such were the difficulties encountered that a director, 
John Jones, in a letter to Thomas Brassey, a shareholder, (NLW/HR/76/155, 21 
December 1872) described the operation as “this hitherto unlucky adventure”. To 
meet the costs of sinking and to deal with the problems encountered, the 
company issued £15,000 worth of 10 per cent preference shares in June 1870, 
and in December 1872 it issued a further £30,000 of the same shares. The high 
dividend rate might be indicative of the company’s desperation for additional 
funding; it might have had to make the dividend high to attract the level of finance 
it required, given the obvious problems it had encountered in sinking its pits. The 
high dividend rate may have been offered to make the preference shares more 
attractive to the ordinary shareholders who were given the option to convert their 
ordinary shares into preference shares (NA/14345/821C). This may have been a 
means of ensuring that they received a dividend (they were unlikely to receive 
dividends on their ordinary shares). £7,000 of the preference shares were taken 
up by the Westminster, Brymbo Coal & Coke Co. Ltd, which owned an adjoining 
colliery and was experiencing identical problems with water. This latter company 
also had to increase its share capital to raise additional finance. Incorporated in 
1858 with capital of £30,000, by October 1872 this had increased to £80,000, 
and by October 1875 it had reached £120,000; again the reasons for this appear 
to stem from the need to deepen pits, or to update transport facilities and working 
methods.
Overdrafts
The main problem with trying to establish how reliant companies were on bank 
support “is the lack of the necessary source material” (Cottrell, 1980: 212). This 
problem is highlighted by the records of the coal companies of Denbighshire; 
although the surviving information is very patchy, it would appear that overdrafts
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were available but that they were used only to meet the needs of working capital. 
Any longer term funds required were raised either through increasing share 
capital, or by issuing debentures.
That overdrafts were readily used is evidenced by some of the records 
that are available; a letter from Dixons & Co, Bankers of Chester, to the 
Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd., dated 30 June 1876, states “[we are] willing to allow a 
floating overdraft at anytime of £10,000 or £12,000, and if the present balance 
can be reduced to that amount by the end of present month we shall be glad” 
(NLW/HR/76/182). There is also evidence that the Broughton & Plas Power Coal 
Co. Ltd. relied heavily on its overdraft; throughout the period 1881-1914 the 
company banked with Parr’s Bank, which had its Head Office in Warrington and 
branches throughout Cheshire and some in north east Wales. The minutes of the 
directors’ meetings show that, intermittently, the company put pressure on the 
bank to improve its terms; on 24 February 1892 (D/DM/309/4) the company notes 
the “very heavy charges” made by the bank, and decided to investigate the 
possibility of moving its account. With this in mind it approached the North & 
South Wales Bank which offered a temporary overdraft of up to £3,000 charging 
half a per cent above base, with a minimum of 4 per cent; it also offered other 
terms relating to commission on turnover and interest payable on deposits 
(D/DM/309/4, 23 March 1892). Parr’s countered with their own offer which was 
“deemed excessive” because the minimum rate on the overdraft was to be 5 per 
cent. The company finally agreed terms with Parr’s which gave it an overdraft of 
up to £5,000 without security. If the overdraft was temporary the interest would 
be half a per cent above base with a minimum of 4 per cent; if permanent the 
minimum was to be 5 per cent, any overdraft lasting longer than six months being 
deemed permanent (D/DM/309/4, 30 November 1892).
The extent to which the needs of the coal companies changed over the 
years can be illustrated by the fact that the minutes for Broughton and Plas 
Power Coal Co. Ltd. for 10 June 1914 (D/DM/309/5) state that, in the 
negotiations for an overdraft of £30,000, the bank had asked the company to 
deposit with it as security the share certificates of those companies in which it
had invested. In the event, the company did not have to do this as its overdraft 
was far below this limit, the balance sheet for 31 December 1914 (DD/PP/620) 
showing an overdraft of £17,160. An analysis of the balance sheets of other coal 
companies also shows that many of them had sizeable overdrafts; between 1865 
and 1876 the accounts of the Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd. show that its overdraft 
varied from £5,997 in 1867 (D/DM /424/1) to £17,845 in 1875 (D/DM/424/2), and 
the United Westminster & Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd. had an overdraft of £15,503 
at the end of June 1911 (NA/37495/85251). It would appear that this latter 
company later decided, or was pressurised by its bankers, not to rely on an 
overdraft but rather to pay off the overdraft by issuing debentures. Thus the 
balance sheet for 30 June 1912 shows the company having no overdraft but 
debentures of £42,500, a figure which had risen to £48,750 by June 1914. 
Another reason for this change in financing may have been that the company 
decided that, in the long term, given that debenture interest was at a fixed rate 
while bank rates fluctuated, that debentures offered the more stable option.
The above evidence, although sparse, appears to show that, in 
Denbighshire, companies were able to avail themselves of often significant 
amounts of money from banks which, as Watson (1996: 70) found in her study of 
the brewing industry, were flexible in meeting the needs of individual companies. 
Watson (1996: 71) points out that, in many cases, what started out as short term 
facilities often turned into long term arrangements, as can be seen by the fact 
that the Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd. had a continuous overdraft in the period 1867- 
1876 (NLW/HR/76/1342 & 1346; D/DM/424/1-2). However, more significant, or 
long term finance was usually raised via debentures.
Debentures
It would appear that issuing debentures was a popular source of long term 
finance in Denbighshire. In his work on capital formation in the south Wales coal 
industry, Walters (1980: 252) states that a “significant contribution to the capital 
requirements of coalmining in south Wales came from the issue of mortgage
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debenture stocks which enabled risks to be spread”. The surviving financial 
records in Denbighshire show that this statement could equally have been made 
about this region, which also conforms to the view put forward by Cottrell (1980: 
87-88) that “the practice of issuing debentures...grew steadily from the 1870s”. 
According to Church (1986: 52) this increased popularity was due to the fact that 
debentures “offered greater security at lower interest rates than could be
obtained from the banks [they] also carried the option of liquidation, or
possible renewal on improved terms”. Watson (1996: 64-65) believes that 
debentures were attractive to the issuing company, not simply for their fixed 
interest rates, but because they allowed companies to raise additional fixed 
capital without diluting control. They were also attractive to lenders in that they 
offered guaranteed interest payments, as opposed to dividends which fluctuated 
according to the performance of the company, and also, if secured on specific 
assets, allowed them to recoup the capital invested in the event of a liquidation.
The importance of debentures to coal companies in Denbighshire can be 
determined by looking at a number of the individual companies. Thus, the 
Ruabon Coal Co. Ltd., which was incorporated in July 1856 (NA/BT/31/1/2), 
issued £10,000 worth of debentures in March 1866 and a further £40,000 in 
November 1867. By March 1877 the company had converted share capital of 
£79,150 into debenture stock of the same value; it thus had £129,150 of 
debentures in issue. The reasons for the conversion are not given; it may have 
been done to pacify shareholders who had not received dividends due to the 
poor performance of the company, or, it may have been done to consolidate 
control in the hands of a few shareholders; whatever the reasons, unsurprisingly, 
given the consequent burden of interest payments, the company was wound up 
in July 1878 as a result of its failure to pay debenture interest (NA/BT/32/1/2).
Debentures were important to the Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. 
from its very incorporation in January 1881; as part of the agreement drawn up to 
purchase the two collieries, Plas Power and Gatewen, £30,000 was to be 
borrowed on 5 per cent debentures repayable at five or seven years 
(D/DM/309/3, 10 January 1881). Of these debentures, £16,400 were issued to
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the public, and those not issued by 23 March 1881 were to be taken up by Henry 
Robertson (the founder and major shareholder) or his nominees (D/DM/309/3/ 23 
March 1881). The debentures were secured on a mortgage to Henry Robertson 
and CE Derby of freehold and leasehold property and by a charge on the 
uncalled capital of the company (D/DM/309/3, 17 January 1881). An analysis of 
later balance sheets shows that the company continued to have fairly substantial 
debenture loans, although after 1893 it began to pay them off. When the 
redemption date arrived the company gave the debenture holders the choice of 
redemption or a renewed term; for example, in December 1893, it offered to 
renew the 5 per cent debentures for another 5 years but at a lower rate of per 
cent; of the £5,300 debentures due for redemption, holders of stock worth £4,500 
took up the offer to renew (D/DM/309/4, 20 December 1893).
Most of the other companies for which records survive resorted to issuing 
debentures at one time or another. The Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd. issued 
debentures worth £21,000 in 1876, probably to finance the sinking of a new shaft 
on land at Acton (D/DM/424/2), while the Ruabon Coal & Coke Co. Ltd. issued 
£40,000 worth of 5 per cent debentures in March 1898, to ‘replace’ £25,000 5 per 
cent preference shares issued in February 1894 (NA/38192/14301). In March 
1903 the directors of Wynnstay Collieries Co. Ltd. wanted to increase the 
company’s debentures from £15,400 to £30,000 because “[we] have for a long 
time been endeavouring to prove the existence of coal to be worked.... for the 
purpose of greatly extending the life of the colliery. This area has now been 
proved beyond all reasonable doubt. To open out this coalfield it will be 
necessary to incur considerable outlay” (NA/14998/ 29254). The company issued 
a further £20,000 of debentures in October 1904 because, to access the coal 
discussed above, it required an electric haulage system (NA/14998/ 29254). The 
Bersham Colliery Co. Ltd. had to negotiate the issue of £15,000 51/2 per cent 
debentures in October 1876 to meet the costs of sinking (see page 86 above) 
and the United Westminster & Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd had debentures of 
£48,750 in issue in 1914 (NA/37495/85251).
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Mortgages
Additional long term financing was sometimes accessed via mortgages; for 
example, in September 1895 the Bersham Colliery Co. Ltd. purchased the Plas 
Grono Estate for £12,000 with a mortgage from the Adelphi Bank in Liverpool 
(D/DM/309/1/ 16 October 1895), and the Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd. steadily 
increased its mortgage from £7,500 in 1867 to £12,500 in 1869 and £18,800 in 
1875 (NLW/HR/76/1342 & 1346; D/DM/424/1-2). The Broughton & Plas Power 
Coal Co. Ltd also had a mortgage of £8,200 in 1897 (NLW/HR/10/25-37).
Having looked at the ‘generalities’ of financing coal companies in Denbighshire, 
we can now consider, in more detail two companies, Broughton & Plas Power 
Coal Co. Ltd., and the Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd. to establish how the ‘financing’ 
element of the balance sheet was broken down. We shall then examine how this 
capital was ‘spent’ by examining how the assets of the two companies were 
distributed.
Two case studies: Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. and the Wrexham 
Colliery Co. Ltd.
Sources of finance
If we examine the breakdown of ‘Capital & Reserves’ for the Broughton and Plas 
Power Coal Co. Ltd. for 1887-1914 (see Table 3.3), we can see that although 
share capital was always the most significant element of the finance available to 
the company, reserves, and especially, what we shall call, the Capital Reserve 
(on the company’s balance sheet this is described as ‘amount appropriated from 
profits’), were also important. This reserve was built up between 1891 and 1904 
by transferring various amounts from profits and, by 1904, it amounted to 
£122,300.
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Table 3.3 : Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd.. Breakdown of capital, reserves and liabilities.
1887-1914
Year Share
Capital
Debs Mortg/
Loans
O/D Creds P&L
(1)
Capital
Res
NWCOA
Reserve
Wagon
repairs
reserve
Gen.
reserve
Balance
sheet
total
% % % % % % % % % £
1887 62.7 11.2 1.9 - 11.2 13.0 - - - - 269,016
1891 57.8 9.9 1.1 - 7.0 5.6 18.6 - - - 291,857
1892 59.6 9.5 0.2 - 5.5 4.2 21.0 - - - 283,129
1893 61.5 8.6 0.2 - 5.0 1.0 23.7 - - - 274,540
1894 59.6 7.4 0.2 - 6.6 3.2 23.0 - - - 283,095
1895 58.6 6.2 0.2 - 7.9 3.4 23.7 - - - 288,150
1897 57.5 5.3 2.8 - 5.2 2.6 26.6 - - - 293,639
1901 48.9 - - - 6.3 14.2 30.6 - - - 344,743
1904 49.0 - - - 5.9 7.5 35.5 1.5 0.6 - 344,623
1910 76.7 - - - 9.3 3.5 - 2.4 1.3 6.8 219,946
1913 67.5 6.7 - 5.6 10.0 4.7 - - - 5.5 274,069
1914 68.3 6.9 - 6.2 9.0 4.1 - 5.5 - - 270,672
Notes:
1. There is sufficient information available to reconcile the trading profits and balance sheet 
figure for 1891-1897; but this has proved impossible for the remaining years
Key
Debs - debentures; mortg -  mortgage; O/D - overdraft; Creds -  creditors; P & L -  profit and loss 
account; Res -  reserve; NWCOA - North Wales Coalowners Association; Gen - general
(Source: DD/PP/618-620; D/GR/682; D/BC/2249; D/BC/2289; NLW /HR/10/25-37).
This suggests that the company was generating fairly substantial profits 
which it did not want to distribute to shareholders, but instead wanted to ‘plough 
back’ into the company. Unfortunately there are no balance sheets, profit and 
loss accounts or minutes available for the years 1905-1909 and there is therefore 
no explanation for the disappearance of the capital reserve by 1910. It would 
appear that the remaining balance on this account was ‘converted’ into 
depreciation and deducted from the carrying value of fixed assets. This would 
have the effect of reducing the balance sheet total and also reducing the carrying 
amount of fixed assets, which, if one examines Table 3.5 below, fell, as a 
proportion of total assets, from 77.3 per cent in 1904 to 62.1 per cent in 1910. 
(For further discussion of accounting for depreciation see Chapter 8 below).
The Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. was not particularly 
reliant on ‘external’ funding; although debentures and mortgages were present in
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all but three of the featured years, together they never constituted more than 13.1 
per cent of total capital (see Table 3.3). Throughout most of the period from 
1887, the company did not rely on an overdraft facility, but this position changed 
in 1913, the company recording an overdraft of £15,331, which constituted more 
than 5 per cent of the balance sheet total. In 1911 the company had purchased 
the Bersham Colliery Co. Ltd. for £42,121 and the company may have decided 
that an overdraft, combined with a new share issue of £15,000 and a debenture 
issue for £18,000, was, in the long term, the cheaper option, especially if it was 
able to negotiate the interest rate with the bank, as it had done in the past.
The profile of the Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd. was not dissimilar to that of 
the Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. (see Table 3.4). It too was most reliant 
on ordinary share capital but, unlike the Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd., it 
also issued preference shares which, in 1873, constituted 10.9 per cent of the 
balance sheet total. As discussed above (page 87), these were probably issued 
because of the problems encountered when sinking the pit, and at 10 per cent, 
they were an expensive form of finance, which may explain why the company 
had redeemed all but £1,500 of the £15,000 shares in issue, by the start of 1875. 
During the years under review the company did not generate significant profits, 
indeed no profit and loss figure was recorded on the balance sheet until 1874. 
The reason for this is that, as already discussed, not only did sinking take a long 
time (during which time we would not expect to see a profit figure) but the 
company was plagued by problems with water which prevented it from working 
properly until the beginning of 1874.
The Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd. was more reliant on ‘external’ 
funding than the Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. Classifying preference 
share capital, mortgages, loans and overdrafts as external, in 1869, 41 per cent 
of the company’s capital came from external sources. This was a significant 
proportion but, given the problems encountered, it was understandable, because 
the company was unable to trade properly and generate its own funds. Once the 
company had begun to trade properly, it was able to reduce this reliance on
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external sources and, by 1876, the proportion of external capital had fallen to 23 
per cent.
Table 3.4: Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd.. Breakdown of capital, reserves and liabilities. 1867-1876
Year OSC PSC Mortgage Debs Creds O/D Bank
loan
P&L WMCQR CRR Depn.
Provn
Balance
sheet
total
% % % - % % % % % % £
1867 67.3 - 13.4 - 8.6 10.7 - - 56,105
1869 59.0 - 14.5 - 5.1 18.5 - 2.9 - 86,081
1872 45.2 12.1 13.3 10.9 13.7 2.8 2.0 124,188
1873
(a)
64.1 10.9 10.3 - 7.5 7.2 - - - 150,739
1874 67.5 8.4 7.9 - 6.8 8.6 0.5 0.3 - - 195,768
1875. 74.8 0.7 8.4 - 4.4 8.0 3.2 0.2 - - 0.3 223,348
1876 74.0 0.6 7.9 8.8 3.9 1.8 - 2.2 - 0.3 0.5 237,774
Kev:
OSC = Ordinary Share Capital; PSC = Preference Share Capital; CRR = Capital Redemption 
Reserve for redemption of preference shares; WMCQR = loan from the Wrexham, Mold and 
Connah’s Quay Railway Co. Ltd; Depn Provn = Depreciation Provision; other items as per key to 
Table 3.3.
Note:
(a)The Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd. was reconstituted as the Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. Ltd. 
at the beginning of 1873.
(Sources: NLW/HR/76/1342; D/DM/424/1-2)
Capital utilisation
Having examined the sources of finance for these two companies, we now turn 
our attention to the other side of the balance sheet, to the assets of the 
companies, to see how the capital raised was ’spent’. Table 3.5 gives details of 
the balance sheets of Broughton and Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. for the years 
1887-1914.
Table 3.5: Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd.. Breakdown of assets. 1887-1914
Year Fixed
assets
(a)
Stock Suspense
(b)
Debtors Bank Cash Inv. Shares
in
Bersham
Value
of
assets
% % % % % % % % £
1887 86.00 1.80 2.10 9.96 0.04 0.10 - - 269,016
1891 82.10 2.00 3.10 9.60 0.60 2.60 - - 291,857
1892 84.60 1.90 3.20 8.60 1.67 0.03 - - 283,129
1893 87.40 1.80 2.10 8.49 0.20 0.01 - - 274,540
1894 85.00 2.00 2.00 10.28 0.70 0.02 - - 283,095
1895 84.40 1.00 2.20 10.28 2.10 0.02 - - 288,150
1897 85.10 1.20 0.60 10.50 1.16 0.04 1.40 - 293,639
1901 74.10 1.50 0.30 15.10 3.24 0.06 5.70 - 344,743
1904 77.30 1.40 1.80 11.09 4.20 0.01 4.20 - 344,623
1910 62.10 1.90 2.80 21.00 3.00 0.10 9.10 - 219,946
1913 48.30 1.90 0.60 23.56 - 0.04 10.20 15.40 274,069
1914 49.10 2.20 0.70 21.41 - 0.09 10.90 15.60 270,672
Notes:
(a) The fixed assets figure is after deduction of depreciation. This is negligible until 1913 and 
1914; by this time over 50 per cent of the cost of the assets is being deducted 
as ’appropriation from profits for the purchase of property and plant and for depreciation’.
(b) The suspense account relates to ‘balance of prepaid mineral rents etc’, what we would 
now simply describe as ‘prepayments’.
(Sources: as for Table 3.3)
Table 3.5 shows that, for the years 1887-1904, the breakdown of assets 
remained relatively stable. As we would expect, fixed assets is the most 
significant category and, indeed, until 1910, fixed assets make up more than 70 
per cent of total assets. In 1913 this proportion falls significantly to just under 50 
per cent. The reason for this is that, until 1913, the fixed assets were recorded at 
cost and any depreciation that was provided for was negligible. However, in 1913 
and 1914 the company was deducting from the cost of fixed assets a significant 
amount (in 1913 it was 49.9 per cent of cost and in 1914, 51.7 per cent) to 
cover ’appropriation from profits for the purchase of property and plant and for 
depreciation’. The issue of depreciation and the inconsistencies in its application 
will be discussed further in Chapter 8, but it would appear that, given that the 
company was recording all its assets at historical cost, this adjustment was 
possibly for what modern accountants would call impairment, i.e. a devaluation,
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an adjustment of the carrying amount of an asset to a more realistic estimate of 
its recoverable amount.
Table 3.5 illustrates that, from 1897, the Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. 
Ltd. began to buy investments. These consisted of shares in the Broughton 
Solvay Coke Co. Ltd., India 3% stock and shares in various railway companies. 
In 1911 the company purchased the Bersham Colliery Co. Ltd. and in 1913 and 
1914 this investment accounted for approximately 15 per cent of the company’s 
net assets. Throughout the period under review stocks, prepayments, bank and 
cash did not fluctuate significantly, but debtors increased as a proportion of total 
assets, from 10 per cent in the years to 1897, to 23 per cent in 1913. This 
increase is accounted for by the fact that, in absolute terms, the amounts owed to 
the company increased from around £30,000 in the years up to 1897, to 
approximately £50,000, while in 1913 and 1914 debts ‘due by Bersham company’ 
are also included on the balance sheet.
The balance sheets of the Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd., for the years 1867- 
1876, show that fixed assets account for a very high proportion of total assets 
(see Table 3.6). As the company was in the process of sinking its pits in the 
years 1867-1872, this was to be expected and, it was only when trading began 
properly in 1873-4 that we see fixed assets falling and debtors rising. Until the 
company started trading properly debtors would be negligible because, 
obviously, the company would need to have had coal to sell on credit before it 
could offer its customers credit terms.
Prepayments, or ‘dead rents’ as the balance sheet describes them, are 
more significant for the Wrexham company than for the Broughton & Plas Power 
Coal Co. Ltd. Again this is not unexpected given that the pits were being sunk 
during this period. Chapter 5 explains, in detail, how dead rents work and these 
balance sheet amounts relate to the ‘shorts’ that the company could recoup. Until 
full working was achieved the company was unlikely to pay significant royalties 
and the minimum dead rents would have had to be paid; any shortfall would be 
reclaimed once coal was being produced and sufficient royalties were due to be 
paid. Given that these ‘shorts’ were cumulative we can see that, even by 1876,
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the company had not produced sufficient coal to enable these shorts to be 
recouped.
Table 3.6: Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd./Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. Ltd.(a). Breakdown of 
assets. 1867-1876
Year Fixed
assets
Stock Dead
rents
Debtors Cash Suspense
(b)
Bank
(c)
Value
of
assets
% % % % % % £
1867 96.90 1.40 1.30 0.40 - - 56,105
1869 97.30 1.00 1.62 0.02 0.06 - 86,081
1872 97.10 1.10 1.30 0.50 - - 124,188
1873 94.20 1.30 4.20 0.25 0.05 - 150,739
1874 91.60 1.30 4.40 2.60 0.10 - 195,768
1875 90.45 1.32 4.90 1.90 0.03 1.30 0.10 223,348
1876 89.25 2.40 5.40 2.10 0.05 0.80 - 237,774
Notes:
a) The Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd. was reconstituted as the Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. 
Ltd. at the beginning of 1873.
b) The suspense account relates to ‘Winning coal to be raised in future years’.
c) The bank figure relates to ‘Bankers; redemption of preference shares’
(Sources: as for Table 3.4)
In his study of the British coal industry Church (1986: 112) attempts to give 
a breakdown of ‘typical’ fixed assets. He readily admits that it is a very tentative 
estimate given the disparities between companies but, nevertheless, it does give 
us some indication of what we would expect to see when analysing the fixed
assets of a coal company. Church’s breakdown is as follows (1986: 112):
%
Shafts 40
Plant 35
Railways 11 
Wagons 5
Coke works 4 
Brick works 4 
Horses 1
If we look at the analysis of fixed assets for the Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. 
Ltd. (see Table 3.7) and that for the Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd. (see Table 3.8)
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we can see that if Church’s figures for shafts and plant are combined at 75 per 
cent then the figure for ‘works’ is not too dissimilar to that for Broughton & Plas 
Power Coal Co. Ltd. At the Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd. if the figures for Pits 1, 2 
and 3 are combined, in the years of sinking, 1867 and 1869, they together make 
up a higher proportion of fixed assets than Church’s estimate for shafts. In 1872 
they indeed make up 40 per cent of the total, but this fell to between 30 and 35 
per cent in subsequent years.
Table 3.7: Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd.. Breakdown of fixed assets. 1887-1914
Year Works
(a)
Freehold 
land & 
buildings
Railway
wagons
Locomotive
plant
Horses Total value 
of fixed 
assets (b)
% % % % % £
1887 79.30 6.60 13.20 0.40 0.50 231,624
1891 77.90 6.40 14.70 0.50 0.50 240,346
1892 77.80 6.10 15.00 0.60 0.50 240,356
1893 77.70 6.10 15.10 0.60 0.50 240,757
1894 77.60 6.10 15.30 0.50 0.50 241,933
1895 76.70 6.00 16.40 0.50 0.40 244,186
1897 73.50 10.00 15.60 0.50 0.40 255,022
1901 71.60 8.90 18.60 0.50 0.40 261,208
1904 71.10 8.70 19.30 0.50 0.40 272,806
1910 70.20 9.10 19.80 0.50 0.40 272,793
1913 69.80 9.50 19.80 0.50 0.40 274,337
1914 69.45 9.85 19.80 0.50 0.40 275,613
Note:
(a) Works is ‘pits, buildings, machinery and plant’.
(b) The total value of fixed assets used is before deduction of the provision for depreciation 
because the provision is not allocated to the individual asset categories.
(Sources: as for Table 3.3)
Further analysis of the balance sheets for these two companies reveal that 
railway wagons were more ‘important’ to the Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. 
Ltd. than Church (1986: 112) estimates while they were of negligible importance 
to the Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd., and neither company owned as many horses 
as Church would have expected. Given that the Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd. did 
not come into production until 1873 it is not surprising that it owned few railway 
wagons or horses before this date and once production started we see the 
proportions of both wagons and horses rise. It would appear that the Broughton &
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Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. chose to purchase its own wagons, hence the relatively 
high proportion of wagons within assets, however, other companies often chose 
to keep ownership of wagons to a minimum and used the railway companies’ 
own wagons to transport coal. This might well be a further explanation for the low 
proportion of railway wagons on Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd.’s balance sheet.
Table 3.8: Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd./Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. Ltd.. Breakdown of fixed 
assets 1887-1914
Year L&B Pit
No.1
Pit 
No.2
Pit
No.
3
RWs P&M H R Op
out
W Other RS Value
% % % % % % % % % % % % £
1867 22.0 19.1 24.4 - 0.1 30.0 - 0.4 - - 3.8 0.2 54,362
1869 18.1 20.3 30.0 - 0.3 21.4 - 0.3 - - 9.3 0.2 83,791
1872 13.6 16.6 24.2 - 0.8 18.4 0.3 1.6 3.7 6.4 12.9 1.7 120,611
1873 13.0 14.6 21.2 - 0.8 17.9 0.1 1.4 3.2 10.3 15.2 1.4 142,005
1874 12.8 11.6 16.8 2.9 0.8 20.7 0.5 1.2 2.5 14.8 13.0 1.2 179,299
1875 14.2 10.3 15.4 4.0 1.2 20.1 0.6 1.1 2.2 13.4 15.2 1.1 202,004
1876 15.2 9.8 14.2 4.7 1.8 20.4 0.9 1.0 2.1 12.7 14.4 1.0 212,199
Key:
L&B = freehold land and buildings; RWs = Railway wagons; P&M = plant & machinery; H = 
Horses; R = roads; Op. out = this relates to costs of opening out Main coal; W  = water, this 
relates to the costs relating to two ‘irruptions of water’ in January 1871 and October 1872; Other = 
'preliminary expenses, law charges, general charges, interest and commission and redemption of 
preference shares’; RS = railway sidings.
(Sources: as for Table 3.4)
It would appear that Church expected most companies to lease their land 
because he does not include freehold land as a category, but this was a fairly 
significant element on the balance sheets of both the companies studied. Neither 
does Church (1986: 112) separately categorise buildings, either pit buildings or 
workmens’ cottages. While buildings are not listed separately on the balance 
sheets of Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd., they are separately itemised on 
the balance sheets of the Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd. whose 1876 balance sheet 
reveals that pit buildings accounted for 4.1 per cent of total assets while cottages 
made up 4.6 per cent of the total (D/DM/424/2)
It would be impossible to give a breakdown of assets that would ‘fit’ all 
companies because each company was different and, given that the accounting 
treatment of fixed assets was not standardised at this time, had the freedom to
100
capitalise various costs as it saw fit. This is illustrated by the Wrexham Colliery 
Co. Ltd. which capitalised significant amounts under the headings ‘irruption of 
water’; the company had two major irruptions in 1871 and 1872 and capitalised a 
total of £26,642 on its 1874 balance sheet (D/DM/424/1)7. Another item that the 
company capitalised in 1875 was £8,375 as ‘redemption of preference shares’. 
There are no explanations as to what this represents and it is difficult to see why 
fixed assets have been debited; one would expect a ‘redemption of preference 
shares’ account’, which would be found under ‘capital and reserves’ to be 
debited. This transaction certainly does not appear to meet the modern definition 
of fixed assets which not only requires an entity to own an asset but also to gain 
benefit from it. It may be that the company felt that because it had had to issue 
preference shares to cover the costs of problems encountered while sinking its 
pits that it was justified in capitalising the cost of redeeming those shares.
Conclusion
From the above, albeit limited, analysis, it can be seen that the coal companies in 
Denbighshire, for which records survive, availed themselves of a combination of 
financial resources, but it would appear that the most significant, and the one 
most relied on, was ordinary share capital. The comments made by Walters 
(1977: 257) regarding south Wales, would once more appear to apply equally to 
north Wales; he explains that the south Wales coalfield was “primarily financed 
by partners’ subscriptions, calls on shares and retention of profit”. According to 
Walters (1980: 257) mortgages and debentures were used, but “it was rare for 
whole new pits to be financed in this way”; and while bank credit facilities were 
“undoubtedly important” for working capital purposes, internally generated 
finance or “privately derived” share capital, remained the most important source 
of finance for coal companies throughout the period under review.
When we examine how this capital was ‘spent’ by the coal companies, not 
surprisingly, we find that most of the capital employed was tied up in fixed assets,
7 This can be justified by the fact that these ‘irruptions’ occurred when the company was ‘driving’ into the 
coal face and can thus be deemed part o f the sinking costs allocated to the capital account.
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namely the pit itself and the machinery needed to work it. The companies we 
examined revealed that the proportion of fixed assets fell during the period under 
consideration. This was partly due to the fact that one would expect expenditure 
on fixed assets to fall once the pit was fully working and also to the fact that, at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, the concept of depreciation was becoming 
increasingly important within accounting.
Having examined the types of finance that were used, we now turn our 
attention to the people who actually provided that finance. The next chapter will 
therefore examine the key individuals who invested in the coal companies of 
Denbighshire, namely the coalowners.
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THE COALOWNERS
Chapter 4
Introduction
According to Mitchell (1984: 54), “by far the greater part of capital came from 
sources local to each coalfield”, and the purpose of this chapter is to establish 
whether the pattern of ownership in Denbighshire conformed to this view. Those 
who invested in the coal companies will be examined, concentrating first on those 
we will call the ‘entrepreneurs’ i.e. those who actually set up and/or developed 
the coal companies, before trying to establish whether there were any significant 
trends in the composition of the ‘other’ shareholders. This chapter will also 
consider whether these trends were similar to those highlighted by authors 
looking at the UK as a whole, for example, were the entrepreneurs ‘indigenous’ 
or ‘immigrants’ and to what extent were women involved in shareholding? We 
first consider those individual entrepreneurs who were influential as coalowners 
within the Denbighshire coalfield, before looking at the overall composition of the 
shareholders, both in terms of occupation and where they lived.
Entrepreneurs
Before the 1840s most of the coal mined in Denbighshire was not raised for sale, 
but as a vital ingredient in the iron-making process. Thus, the men who can be 
described as the pioneers of the Industrial Revolution in Denbighshire were not 
coalowners but iron masters, who took advantage of the abundance of coal in the 
Wrexham and Ruabon areas to site their furnaces where supplies of coal were 
plentiful. Into this category can be put Thomas Jones (Ponkey & Llwyneinion), 
Edward Lloyd Rowland (Acrefair), William Hazeldine (Pontcysyllte) and, most 
famously, John Wilkinson (Bersham) (Lerry, 1958: 57). These men all ran 
successful iron foundries in the late eighteenth century but, by 1844, “only five 
blast furnaces were at work instead of fifteen... 3000 were out of work,
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and...taking five persons per family, 15,000 people were deprived of the means 
of subsistence by the stopping of the various works” (Lerry, 1958: 57).
It was the railways that breathed new life into industrial Denbighshire. Not 
only did they open up the coalfield to markets that had previously not existed, but 
they were also the reason why those who can be described as the pioneers of 
the ‘Denbighshire coalfield’ came to the region. Among these men were Robert 
Roy and Henry Robertson, Scotsmen who, according to Lerry (1958: 46), opened 
up a “new chapter in the industry of the Denbighshire coalfield”. Before 
proceeding to a broader analysis of investment in the Denbighshire coalfield, we 
first provide a brief biography of some of the leading pioneers.
Robert Roy (1795- 1873)
Roy was the first of the ‘pioneers’ to set up in Denbighshire when, in 1841, he 
purchased, out of Chancery, the Brymbo Hall Estate. After the death of John 
Wilkinson in 1808, a long and bitter legal dispute between Wilkinson’s nephew, 
Thomas Jones Wilkinson, and his illegitimate family, to whom he had willed his 
estate, saw it deteriorate significantly, such that by the time it was bought by Roy 
it was in a very poor way. In order to buy the estate, Roy, from Fort George in 
Invernesshire (Boyd, 1991: 46), approached the Scottish Bank for a loan (Ellis 
Hughes, 1946: 148). This bank employed a young mining engineer to “survey 
[the] mineral sources and commercial possibilities” of Roy’s venture (Lerry, 1949: 
8). This young engineer was Henry Robertson and so favourable was his 
assessment that the bank offered Robertson himself financial backing to move to 
Denbighshire and exploit the opportunities there (DD/NTD/155).
Henry Robertson (1816- 1888)
Robertson was born in Banff, Scotland, in 1816, the youngest of twelve children, 
and trained first as a mining engineer in the Lanarkshire mines and then as a 
railway engineer; during his career as a railway engineer he worked as assistant
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to Robert Stephenson and Thomas Brassey. An article discussing railway 
building in east Denbighshire (DD/NTD/142) explains that “the designing of 
overbridges on the Glasgow, Paisley and Greenock Railway, one of Brassey’s 
earliest contracts, had been Robertson’s baptism into railway engineering”. Once 
he had moved to north Wales he became a passionate advocate of railway 
building; he had realised that if Denbighshire was to achieve anything like its 
industrial potential, it would have to improve its communications infrastructure, 
because “communication within the Denbighshire coalfield itself and with the 
outside world was confined to road and canal” (Lerry, 1949: 14). Not only did he 
champion the expansion of the railway network into Denbighshire from his 
position as co-owner with Roy, William Betts and Alexander Mackenzie Ross of 
the North Wales Mineral & Railway Co., but he also worked as engineer to 
Edward Betts, the contractor on the Chester-Wrexham section of the Chester to 
Shrewsbury Railway (DD/NTD/142). He also designed what was described by 
the Wrexham Recorder (October 12, 1848, DD/NTD/142) as “the stupendous 
viaduct over the Dee”. Such was his influence over the development of the 
railway in north east Wales that he became known as the ‘Railway King’ in the 
region, who, “by his energy and enterprise over a period of forty years gave a 
new lease of life to the neighbourhood [for which, on his arrival] the commercial 
outlook was black” (Lerry, 1949: 7-9).
Over the 45 years in which he lived in north Wales, Robertson became 
increasingly involved in local industry. His initial relationship with Roy, which saw 
them sink pits and develop the Brymbo ironworks, soured. After prolonged legal 
proceedings, which ended up in the Vice Chancellor’s Court in 1856, the 
business was split: Robertson had the Brymbo collieries while Roy retained the 
Westminster colliery (D/DM/391/1). In 1856 Robertson sold the Ruabon colliery 
to the Ruabon Coal Co. Ltd., but worked the Broughton Hall colliery himself, and 
was later one of the major shareholders in the Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. 
Ltd. which became one of the largest coal companies in Denbighshire. In addition 
to his interests in railway and colliery companies, Robertson was a founding 
partner in the firm Beyer, Peacock & Co., of Gorton Foundry, Manchester which
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built locomotives and, according to the Brymbo Works Magazine (March 1920), 
“this business was successful from the start and soon became the largest 
locomotive firm in England”. Later in his life he entered politics and was elected 
three times as MP for Shrewsbury and once for Meirionydd (Lerry, 1952: 38).
In 1882, after the death of WH Darby (see below), Robertson was keen to 
produce steel at Brymbo using the new techniques being used on the Continent; 
with this in mind he sent JH Darby (1856 - 1919, WH Darby’s son) to the 
Continent to study the new basic open-hearth process. The findings were 
favourable and, in 1883, an experimental steel furnace was set up at Brymbo. 
This was so successful that, in 1884, the Brymbo Steel Works Co. Ltd., the first 
company in the UK to use the Semet Solvay system (Ellis Hughes, 1946: 132), 
was incorporated and production started the following year (DD/NTD/155). At the 
time of Robertson’s death in 1888 a good indication of his widespread interests is 
given by a list of the companies in which he held directorships: Broughton & Plas 
Power Coal Co. Ltd.; Vale of Llangollen Railway; Brymbo Steel Works Co. Ltd.; 
Minera Lime Works; Corwen & Bala Railway; Llangollen & Corwen Railway; and 
Brymbo Water Co.
William Henry Darby (?- 1882)
In 1845 Robertson met William Henry and Charles Edward Darby, who later 
joined Roy and himself in the North Wales Mineral & Railway Co.. William and 
Charles Darby were the sons of Richard Darby and grandsons of Abraham Darby 
III of Coalbrookdale. From 1836 to 1841 William was apprenticed as a ‘broker’ to 
Nicholas Waterhouse & Sons of Liverpool and, after completing his 
apprenticeship, he started trading as a merchant and agent. Once he had met 
Robertson, Darby became increasingly involved, first with the coal industry, but 
more importantly with the iron industry in Denbighshire.
During the dispute with Roy, the Darby brothers sided with Robertson and 
their relationship with him continued until their deaths in the 1880s. They were 
partners with him in the Old Broughton Coal Co., and later were major
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shareholders and directors in the Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd., WH 
Darby being one of the original subscribers. It is interesting to note that the 
occupation given by WH Darby in the company’s Memorandum of Association is 
‘iron master’ rather than coalowner (D/DM/309/3, 1 Jan 1888). As Robertson’s 
interest in politics grew, he relied heavily on the Darbys to help run his interests, 
William Darby taking on the responsibility of the iron foundry at Brymbo, while 
Charles Darby was more involved in the running of the collieries. After the deaths 
of William in 1882, and Charles in 1885, their sons continued, along with 
Robertson’s son, Henry Beyer Robertson, to run the businesses bequeathed to 
them.
If Roy, Robertson and the Darbys were the first wave of immigrant entrepreneurs 
into Denbighshire, perhaps the most significant of the second wave was Henry 
Dennis.
Henry Dennis (1825-1906)
Born in Bodmin, Cornwall in 1825, Dennis trained as a surveyor before joining 
the Cornwall Railway Co. as an engineer. In 1850 he joined John Taylor & Son, 
mining engineers, who sent him to construct a tramway from the Llangollen Slate 
quarries to the Shropshire Union canal (Lerry, 1952 (2): 33-45). Taylor & Son 
owned the Bryn yr Owen colliery in Pentrebychan and appointed Dennis as its 
manager. He left this position in 1857 and he and his partner, William Glennie, 
traded as surveyors and mining engineers (Lerry, 1952 (2): 33-45).
Over the next forty years Dennis bought substantial interests in the 
Westminster, Brymbo Coal & Coke Co. Ltd., the Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. 
Ltd., the Ruabon Coal & Coke Co. Ltd. and the United Westminster & Wrexham 
Colliery Co. Ltd. He became Chairman of the North Wales Coalowners 
Association, represented north Wales on the district’s Coal Conciliation Board 
and, in 1901, was elected President of the Mining Association of Great Britain. 
He died in June 1906, aged 81, and according to Lerry (1952 (2): 33-45) “the
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story of the later development of the mineral resources [of Denbighshire] in the 
second half of the nineteenth century is closely associated with the manifold
activities of Henry Dennis which by the time of his death gave employment to
over 10,000 workmen”.
William Young Craig (1827-1925)
Among the other significant coalowners in Denbighshire in the late nineteenth 
century was William Craig, born in Hoggerston, Northumberland in 1827. After 
managing collieries in Harecastle near Stroke on Trent, in 1870 he bought into 
the Podmore Hall collieries, Staffordshire, and became sole owner in 1880. He 
entered Parliament as an MP for north Staffordshire in 1880 and, in 1893, he 
purchased the Brynkinallt colliery in Chirk, which he ran with his sons until his 
death in 1925 (DD/NTD/155).
James Darlington (1854-1933)
Another immigrant was James Darlington; the son of Ralph Darlington, one-time 
mayor of Wigan, he was apprenticed as a mining engineer to his uncle, Alfred 
Hewlett, at the Wigan Coal & Iron Co. Ltd. Subsequently he became colliery 
manager at Preesgweene, Chirk, and later at Black Park where he was General 
Manager and Secretary from 1877 until 1932 (Lerry, 1949: 27). Lerry also 
comments that Darlington was an important member of the North Wales 
Coalowners Association, and of the North Wales Permanent Relief Society; 
indeed, he was “one of the most highly respected of all the leaders of the local 
coal industry and a prominent figure in the public life of Denbighshire for very 
many years” (Lerry, 1949: 27).
By looking at the backgrounds of these men, who each played a leading role in 
the industrialisation of Denbighshire, we can see that they gained their initial
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experience of mining in major mining regions of the UK. The early pioneers, such 
as Roy and Robertson were not attracted to Denbighshire in any entrepreneurial 
sense until they had been brought to the region as employees, but once there, 
they recognised the area’s potential and were prepared to risk their futures to 
help develop the coalfield.
The experience of north Wales echoes that of south Wales, where the iron 
industry was initially the dominant industry of the region and coal mining “was 
merely a subsidiary section of the iron industry” (Morris & Williams, 1958: 10). 
However, the size of the concerns in south Wales meant that when railways 
opened up new markets for coal, those that were able to take most advantage 
were those already producing coal on a large scale, namely, the iron companies; 
and the “largest of all industrial coalowners were [in the 1840s], if considered as 
a single group the south Wales iron and steel companies” (Walters, 1977: 78). In 
north Wales, although the iron works were important users of coal, their failure to 
keep up with their south Wales counterparts meant that by the 1840s, unlike in 
south Wales, this sector had little influence.
As was mentioned in Chapter 1, Wales, both north and south, had to rely 
heavily on immigrant expertise to kick start their development but, in south Wales 
it appears that once that initial impetus had been given to the region, local, 
indigenous’ businessmen joined in. In Denbighshire, however, throughout the 
nineteenth century the major ‘players’ remained Scotsmen or Englishmen. What 
does link these men with their counterparts in south Wales was that they all had 
experience of the mining industry; as Walters (1977: 51) explains, “mineral 
agents and mining engineers were very prominent amongst the pioneers of the 
steam coal industry” in south Wales. In north Wales the pioneers were mining 
engineers and people connected with the coal and iron industries in other 
regions, but not mineral agents. Such men would not only have had experience 
within the industry, but they would have developed links which would have 
provided access to sources of capital. In north Wales, not only did local people 
lack the necessary mining expertise but, due to the lack of an industrial ‘history’, 
capital would have been more difficult to access.
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Prominent shareholders in Denbighshire coal companies
Even when investment in limited companies became more popular in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century, coal companies never attracted the ‘general’ 
investor in the same way as, for example, the railway companies had in the 
1840s. Payne (1962: 526) explains that many of the businesses in the UK, not 
simply coal companies, were themselves a barrier to ‘widening participation’ in 
share ownership. Many owners who took advantage of limited liability had merely 
transferred the original partnership into a company, and were reluctant to ‘share’ 
ownership with people other than their family and close associates. This was the 
case in the coal industry and, when coupled with the fact that investment in the 
coal industry was not likely to offer significant, or even guaranteed dividends, this 
meant that the ‘new’ middle classes, keen to achieve a regular, additional 
income, were not attracted to the coal industry. Hence, we find what Jeffreys 
(1946: 356) describes as “semi-private” companies dominating the coal industry 
until the twentieth century.
The term ‘semi-private’ is used because “the private company was not 
recognised legally until 1900, and not defined legally until 1907” (Cottrell, 1980: 
80). However, many of the companies that were incorporated were de facto 
private companies in that their shares were not, and were never intended to be, 
offered to anyone other than family and associates. All the companies that were 
incorporated in the period 1850-1914 in Denbighshire conform with this definition 
of semi-private, in that the shareholders were either made up of a small number 
of closely linked individuals, all of whom had links with the coal industry, e.g. 
Bersham Colliery Co. Ltd., or were made up of a larger, more disparate group, 
many of whom had no direct links with the industry, but who were related to, or 
acquaintances of, those who were, e.g. Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. Ltd.
In addition to those described above as ‘entrepreneurs’, there were some 
prominent individual shareholders in Denbighshire companies; these men
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included Thomas Brassey, Sir Daniel Gooch, Richard Peacock and Sir Theodore 
Martin. A brief biography of each of these, and others, will now be presented:
Thomas Brassev (1805-1870) was a significant shareholder in the Wrexham 
Colliery Co. Ltd. and later the Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. Ltd. He was born 
near Audlem, Cheshire, and trained as a surveyor, working mainly on road 
construction, including the London to Holyhead road when he worked under 
Thomas Telford. Later, encouraged by George Stephenson, he turned to railway 
engineering and, by 1841, he had “laid the foundations of his career as a railway 
builder” (Oxford Dictionary of National Biography). This was the beginning of an 
impressive career which saw him engaged in the building of railways not only in 
the UK, but across Europe, north America, south America, India and Australia 
“which made him the greatest international civil engineering contractor of his 
time” (Oxford Dictionary of National Biography). Brassey was also one of the 
original nine shareholders in the Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Co. Ltd. in south 
Wales, formed in 1864, and his family continued to be involved as Powell Duffryn 
grew into the largest colliery company in south Wales and a major force in the 
British coal industry (Boyns, 2003).
Sir Daniel Gooch (1816-1889) was born in Bedlington, Northumberland where his 
father was bookkeeper to the local ironworks. In 1831 his father took up a 
position at the Tredegar iron works in south Wales, where Gooch started his 
working life. He worked in a number of iron works throughout the UK before 
coming to the attention of Isambard Kingdom Brunei. In 1837 he was appointed 
locomotive superintendent to the Great Western Railway Co. (GWR) and, in 
1866, he was made Chairman, a position he held until his death in 1889 (Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography). In 1856 he became chairman and majority 
shareholder of the Ruabon Coal Co. Ltd.; Gooch had wanted the GWR to acquire 
its own collieries in Denbighshire but this was prevented by a group of hostile 
directors within GWR, “who wanted to....[expose the company] to market forces” 
(Oxford Dictionary of National Biography). Gooch then decided to forge closer
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links with suppliers in Denbighshire and was instrumental in creating a company, 
the Ruabon Coal Co. Ltd. which could have close links with the railway and 
ensure supplies (Lerry, 1949: 32-3). Gooch was also a shareholder in the 
Ruabon Coal and Coke Co. Ltd., which bought out the Ruabon Coal Co. Ltd in 
1880.
Richard Peacock (1820-1889) was a shareholder in the Broughton & Plas Power 
Coal Co. Ltd. and a partner, with Henry Robertson and Charles Frederick Beyer, 
in Beyer, Peacock & Co. In 1838, at the very young age of 18, he became the 
superintendent of the Leeds & Selby Railway before working briefly for GWR 
under Daniel Gooch. In 1854, with his father Ralph, and Frederick Beyer, he 
founded Beyer, Peacock & Co.; a couple of years later they were joined by Henry 
Robertson, and “a great engineering centre” was created 
(www. beyerpeacock.co. uk).
Sir Theodore Martin (1816-1907) was an Edinburgh-born solicitor who became 
famous as an author and translator, his most famous work being a five volume 
biography of Albert, Prince Consort (Who Was Who 1897-1916, 1966: 477). He 
was one of the subscribers to the Westminster, Brymbo Coal & Coke Co. Ltd. in 
1858, along with Robert Roy, and he remained a shareholder until his death. He, 
along with Henry Dennis, was also a subscriber and majority shareholder of the 
United Westminster & Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd. which was incorporated in 1905 
with a view to sinking and working the Gresford colliery.
Having examined some of the key entrepreneurs and shareholders in 
Denbighshire coal companies, we now turn our attention, where possible, to a 
more systemic analysis of the subscribers and shareholders in such companies.
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Subscribers and shareholders in Denbighshire coal companies
Subscribers
The purpose of this section is to examine those who actually set up the coal 
companies, the subscribers, in Denbighshire between 1850 and 1914, looking in 
particular at their occupations and their geographical location. It is, however, 
important to note that, as will be discussed at length later in this section, when 
analysing the occupations of subscribers, a certain amout of ‘fluidity’ of 
classification can make comparisons difficult. As people ascended the social 
scale they often changed the classification of their occupation; this means that 
the same person, who may have subscribed to a number of different companies 
over time, may be classified differently over time.
A further problem is that when trying to compare and contrast trends over 
time, one should use, for a number of benchmark years, the shareholder details 
for each company for the various years. However, due to the paucity of the 
underlying records this has proved impossible. Therefore, the data for different 
companies relating to different years has been ‘pooled’, enabling us to construct 
a table of occupations relating to the whole of the period 1856-1913 (see Table
4.1). Even so, within this period, details of subscribers and shareholders could 
only be found for thirteen companies. However, given that the sample includes 
the companies controlling the five largest collieries, in terms of the numbers 
employed, by the end of the nineteenth century, it can be deemed to form a 
representative sample.
Despite these problems the analysis nevertheless offers an insight into 
the people investing in Denbighshire coal companies in the nineteenth century.
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Occupation of subscribers
As has already been explained, the companies of Denbighshire were all de facto 
‘semi-private’ companies, and therefore the vast majority of the sharholders had 
connections, however tenuous, with each other. It is, however, interesting to look 
at the occupations and addresses of subscribers to see whether they differ from 
general patterns. If one first looks at the occupations of the founders of 
companies it comes as no surprise to find that, in his study, Church (1986: 451) 
found that the majority of founders described themselves as coalowners, 
ironmasters or those involved in business. The second most important category 
was described by Church as ‘professional & private’. This included solicitors, 
engineers and ‘others in the coal trade’. His final category of ‘Other’ covered 
landowners, merchants and bankers. If one looks at the occupations of the 
subscribers in Denbighshire coal companies (see Table 4.1), only 15 per cent of 
the population described themselves as belonging to Church’s ‘Business’ 
category, with only 8 per cent describing themselves as coalowners. The biggest 
sector represented in Denbighshire is ‘Professional’ with 40 per cent of all 
subscribers falling into this category. However, the three broad categories used 
by Church were deemed inadequate for the purposes of analysing the 
subscribers of Denbighshire because the main occupation given in Denbighshire 
was ‘gentleman’, which accounts for 29 per cent of the population. Although 
these could have been categorised as ‘Other’, in line with Church, it was 
considered important to create a specific category because ‘gentleman’ was the 
single most important category used by the subscribers to describe themselves.
This self-classification is, according to Cottrell (1980: 95), the biggest 
difficulty when trying to analyse shareholder occupations. Cottrell (1980: 95) 
explains that the classification “has to be treated with some caution. Self­
classification probably introduces an ‘upward’ bias in' the sense that some
significant proportion chose to describe themselves as ‘gentleman’ ....  for
reasons of social prestige”. This is illustrated by the case of Henry Dennis, who, 
in the 1880 return of the Ruabon Coal & Coke Co. Ltd., was described as a 
mining engineer; by 1890, however, when he had amassed some private wealth,
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he was described as a gentleman. In addition to this, there were those who 
described themselves as having ‘no occupation’; due to the fact that these 
obviously lived on private income in much the same way as those who described 
themselves as gentlemen, these have been included under the heading of 
‘gentleman’, as have those described as ‘Sir’ or ‘Knight’. Once again there is a 
problem with ‘progression’. Daniel Gooch, was initially described as a railway 
engineer, then as a gentleman and finally as a Knight, while Henry Robertson 
‘progressed’ over time from coalowner to MP to gentleman. Utilising the 
descriptions given by individuals as separate classifications would therefore 
mean that some shareholders ‘swapped’ categories from one return to another. 
Combining some classifications, as has been done in Table 4.1, avoids some of 
this ‘swapping’.
When the subscribers to Denbighshire coal companies are analysed (see 
Table 4.1), it is interesting to note that women made up 5.8 per cent of the 
subscribers. At a time when “many companies disliked shares passing into the 
hands of women” (Pearson, 2003: 10), two companies in Denbighshire, the 
Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd. and Westminster, Brymbo Coal & Coke Co. Ltd., 
involved women as subscribers. In the former company, there was a single 
female subscriber who owned 5.5 per cent of the subscriber shares 
(NA/14299/1145), whereas, in the latter company, four women owned 47.5 per 
cent of the initial shares issued (NA/14299/1145). Although women were not 
specifically mentioned by Church in his analysis of founders, they may be ‘lost’ 
within his category ‘not gainfully employed’, because women owning shares was 
not particularly unusual in the nineteenth century, despite the misgivings of some 
companies (Freeman et al, 2006; Carlos & Neal, 2003).
115
Table 4.1: Occupation of subscribers in Denbighshire coal companies 1856-1913
OccuDation %
1. Business
Coalowner 8.10
Ironmaster 2.30
Other business 4.65
15.05
2. Professional
Legal 4.65
Other professional 10.50
Mining engineer 2.30
Other engineer 9.30
Shopkeeper/ tradesmen 5.80
Others in coal trade 8.10
40.65
3. Others
Landowners -
Merchants 7.00
Bankers -
4. Gentlemen 29.10
5. Women 5.80
6. Men in armed forces 1.20
7. Churchmen 1.20
100.00
Note: Categories 1-3 are as per Church (1986:451); categories 4-7 are per the author 
(Source: returns for companies from National Archives records, namely:
Ruabon Coal Co. Ltd., 1857, NA/BT31/ 1/2; Westminster, Brymbo Coal & Coke Co.Ltd., 1858, 
NA/14299/1145; Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd., 1863, NA/14345/821C; Minera Coal & Iron Co., 
1864, NA/917/1107C; Vauxhall Colliery Co. Ltd., 1871, NA/14424/5486; Llay Hall Coal, Iron & 
Firebrick Co. Ltd., 1873, D/BC/Clarke (addnl) 1/2; Ruabon Coal & Coke Co. Ltd., 1880, 
NA/38192/14301; Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd., 1881, D/DM/309/3; Vron Colliery Ltd., 
1887, NA/3931/24885; Wynnstay Collieries Ltd., 1889, NA/14998/29254; United Westminster & 
Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd., 1905, NA/37495/85251; Black Lane Colliery (Brymbo) Ltd., 1909, 
NA/128571/104122; Llay Main Collieries Ltd., 1913, NA/38330/130545).
Carlos & Neal (2003: 18), in their study of the Bank of England 
shareholders found that, as early as 1720-1725, women “were clearly present in 
the [stock] market” and owned approximately 20 per cent of the Bank’s stock 
(Carlos & Neal, 2003: 31). Although women were not actively ancouraged into 
share-ownership, according to Newton & Cottrell (2006: 16), women “were
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becoming more prominent as shareholders by the mid [nineteenth] century”. This 
is borne out by Freeman et al (2006: 7) who, in their study of joint-stock 
companies, found that in the sample studied, women constituted 5.4 per cent of 
subscribers, a marginally lower proportion than in Denbighshire. This would 
appear to show that Denbighshire was not alone in having female shareholders, 
and the role of women as shareholders within individual coal companies in 
Denbighshire will be discussed more fully in the section examining shareholder 
occupations.
Geographical location of subscribers
It is equally important to examine where the subscribers came from if one is to 
establish whether the main impetus for setting up coal companies came from 
local or external sources. For the Denbighshire coal companies for which 
information survives, the addresses given by the subscribers to the various 
Memoranda of Association of the companies are summarised in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Analysis of subscribers’ addresses in Denbighshire 1856-1913
Address aiven %
Wrexham/ Ruabon 15.10
Other Denbighshire 1.20
Other north Wales 4.65
20.95
Cheshire 3.50
Shropshire 8.10
Lancashire (inc. 
Merseyside)
8.10
Herefordshire 7.00
26.70
London 40.70
Other England 7.00
Scotland 4.65
52.35
100.00
(Sources: as for Table 4.1).
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The most frequent address given by subscribers was London, which 
accounted for 41 per cent of the total; however, as Cottrell (1980: 91) points out, 
many people who gave a London address often had an additional address 
elsewhere which makes meaningful analysis more difficult. Nevertheless, looking 
at the information available, men ‘external’ to north Wales made up the majority 
of the subscribers, as only 21 per cent of subscribers gave addresses in north 
Wales. However, if one bears in mind the proximity of Cheshire, Shropshire, 
Lancashire and Herefordshire to north Wales, the proportion of subscribers that 
can be described as ‘local’ rises to 47.65 per cent, or almost half of all the 
subscribers.
The value of analysing the subscribers of a company might be questioned 
given that, in many cases, the subscribers often had little else to do with the 
company once it was incorporated, and were often only included to ‘make up the 
numbers’ needed so that the company could be incorporated8. To see whether 
this was the case with the companies in Denbighshire the surviving lists of 
shareholders were scrutinised to assess whether or not the subscribers remained 
involved with a company five to ten years after incorporation (see Table 4.3).
Table 4.3: Percentage of shares held bv subscribers five to ten years after incorporation
Company Year of 
incorporation
Year of 
analysis
Subscribers 
still involved? 
How many?
% of shares 
held by 
subscribers
Plas Power 1881 1891 Yes - 4 12.7
Westminster 1858 1868 Yes -  all 55.9
Ruabon Coal 
Co.
1856 1862 Yes -  6 22.3
Wynnstay 1889 1894 Y e s - 2 00.2
Wrexham 
Colliery Co
1863 1869 Y e s - 6 29.0
(Sources: returns for companies from National Archives and other records, namely:
Ruabon Coal Co. Ltd., 1857, NA/BT31/1/2; Westminster, Brymbo Coal & Coke Co. Ltd., 1858, 
NA/14299/1145; Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd., 1863, NA/14345/821C; Broughton & Plas Power 
Coal Co. Ltd., 1881, D/DM/309/3; Wynnstay Collieries Ltd., 1889, NA/14998/2925).
8 A total o f 7 subscribers were needed on the Memorandum of Association before a company could be 
incorporated.
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Table 4.3 demonstrates that, apart from the Wynnstay company, a 
majority of the subscribers in the, admittedly, small sample remained 
shareholders in the company some five to ten years after incorporation and 
continued to hold fairly significant proportions of the shares. None of the 
Wynnstay company’s seven subscribers was local to north Wales, all coming 
from London, and none was described as having anything to do with the coal 
industry: there was a chartered accountant, a solicitor and five gentlemen 
(NA/14998/29254). Given that, in 1894, these 7 subscribers only held 0.2 per 
cent of the shares in the company, it would thus appear that, in this case at least, 
the subscribers were merely people who facilitated the formation of the company 
by signing the Memorandum of Association, rather than being substantive 
investors in the business.
Shareholders
Having looked at the subscribers of the companies, the shareholders will now be 
analysed to establish whether trends highlighted among the subscribers also 
apply to shareholders more generally. Again the limitations of the analysis must 
be pointed out. Ideally we should examine shareholder lists for the different 
companies for the same year but this has proved impossible due to the fact that 
only selective records for each company have survived. With this in mind it was 
decided to examine the records within as narrow a period as possible while trying 
to ensure that the most significant companies within Denbighshire were included 
in the sample. This has left a sample of 6 companies from the period 1885-1895, 
details for which can be found in Table 4.4.
Shareholder occupations
The breakdown of shareholders’ occupations for those individual coal companies 
whose records have survived and for the aggregate of all such companies, can 
be seen in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 below. Table 4.4 indicates the number of shares
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held in the individual companies, while Table 4.5 presents the information in 
percentage terms.
Table 4.4: Analysis of shareholders' occupations in Wrexham coal companies. 1885-1895- by 
number of shares held
OccuDation PP West Wvnn Ruabon W & A Vron
Professional 4,440 140 798 116 884 10
Shipowners 32
Women 3,800 2,130 267 33 1,716
Members of HM 
Forces
21,800 218 1,148 491
Civil engineers 12,680 412 1
Mining engineers 500 384 255
Gentlemen (inc. Lords) 62,340 1378 3,467 301 3,186 1,252
Merchants and 
tradesmen
1,020 104 1,300 50 261
Crown officials 327 220
Farmers 10 40
Government officials 117
Medical doctors 40 195
Bankers 590 170
Churchmen 10 600
Agents 34,620 88
Colliery employees 1,090 79 10
Ironmasters 250
Occupation Unknown 25,620
Total 168,750 4,800 7,000 500 8,077 1,863
(Key/Sources:
PP Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. Dec 1891
West Westminster, Brymbo Coal & Coke Co. Ltd. Sept 1888
Wynn Wynnstay Collieries Ltd. Oct 1894
Ruab Ruabon Coke & Coal Co. Ltd. Aug 1890
W&A Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. Ltd. Apr 1889
Vron Vron Colliery Ltd. Dec 1887
D/DM/309/4 
D/BC/2251 
NA14998/29254 
NA/38194/14301 
NA/145345/821c 
NA/3931/24885).
Two total columns have been included in Table 4.5 because the 
Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd.’s issued share capital is so much higher 
than that of the other companies in the sample that it distorts the totals, and 
therefore the totals, excluding Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd., might be 
deemed to be more representative. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show that, overall, the 
most important occupational category in Denbighshire coal companies was
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‘gentleman’, who held 37.7 per cent of the shares issued by the companies in the 
sample. If the totals in Table 4.5 including Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. 
are examined, the second most numerous category was ‘agent’ (18.2 per cent) 
but, if that company is excluded, interestingly, women take second place, with 
18.6 per cent.
Table 4.5: Analysis of shareholders’ occupation in Wrexham coal companies. 1885-1895- bv 
proportion of shares held
Occupation PP West Wvnn Ruab W&A Vron Total% 
inc. PP
Total%
exc.
PP
% % % % % % % %
Professional 2.6 2.9 10.0 23.2 10.9 0.5 3.30 8.80
Shipowners 0.4 0.01 0.10
Women 2.3 44.4 3.8 6.6 21.3 4.20 18.60
HM Forces 12.9 4.6 16.4 6.1 12.40 8.40
Civil engineers 7.5 5.1 0.05 6.90 1.90
Mining engineers 0.3 8.0 3.2 0.60 2.90
Gentlemen (inc. 
Lords)
36.9 28.8 49.6 60.2 39.4 67.25 37.70 43.10
Merchants & 
tradesmen
0.6 2.1 18.6 10.0 3.2 1.40 7.70
Crown officials 6.8 2.7 0.30 2.50
Farmers 0.1 0.5 0.03 0.20
Government officials 1.4 1.5 0.06 0.50
Medical doctors 0.8 2.4 0.10 1.00
Bankers 0.4 2.1 0.40 0.80
Churchmen 1.1 32.21 0.30 2.70
Agents 20.5 0.1 18.20 0.40
Colliery employees 0.7 1.6 0.1 0.60 0.40
Ironmasters 0.1 0.10
Unknown 15.2 13.40
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.00 100.00
(Key/ Sources: as for Table 4.4).
If one looks at the shareholders of individual companies in Denbighshire 
(see Table 4.5), ‘gentlemen’ is the most important category for all companies 
except for the Westminster, Brymbo Coal & Coke Co. Ltd. For this company 
‘women’ formed the largest category and were also significant at the Wrexham & 
Acton Collieries Co. Ltd, where they occupied second place. In other companies
121
the group occupying second place varied: in Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. 
Ltd. it was ‘agents’, in Westminster, Brymbo Coal & Coke Co. Ltd. was 
‘gentlemen’; in Vron Colliery Ltd. it was ‘churchmen’; in Wynnstay Collieries Ltd., 
it was ‘merchants & tradesmen’, while in Ruabon Coke & Coal Ltd. it was those 
described as ‘professional’.
Recent studies of women shareholders in the nineteenth century (Carlos & 
Neal, 2003; Newton & Cottrell, 2006; Freeman et al., 2006) reveal that women 
often held shares, either because they had inherited them from a deceased 
husband or, because they were spinsters who had been given the shares as part 
of a paternal package that would provide them with an independent income for 
the future. Few of the female shareholders in Denbighshire owned shares in their 
own right once they were married, indeed, only a handful were described as 
‘wife’, or ‘Mrs’9, they were usually ‘widow’ or ‘spinster’. This, according to Newton 
& Cottrell (2006: 25) was “a direct consequence of the legal status of married 
women’s property” which became that of her husband upon marriage.
Freeman et al. (2006: 5) claim that there is “considerable evidence of 
women holding shares in family clusters” which is certainly true of the 
Westminster, Brymbo Coal & Coke Co. Ltd. where Barbara Ross, Anne Ross, 
Helen Ross and Martha Ross were four of the original eleven subscribers in 
1858. Freeman et al. (2006: 18) explain that most women were involved in “kin 
dependent rather than individualistic investment” and it is highly likely that these 
women were either related in some way to Roy or one of his associates. Earlier 
in this chapter (page 104) we noted that one of the original owners of the North 
Wales Mineral & Railway Co., in association with Roy and Henry Robertson, was 
Alexander Mackenzie Ross. If we assume that when Roy split from Robertson in 
1856 Ross remained close to Roy, it is not unexpected to find females of the 
same name owning shares in Roy’s company and, indeed, three of the four 
above-named women still owned 16 per cent of the shares in 1889. A review of 
the surnames of female shareholders in Denbighshire reveals that they usually 
share the same surname as one of the male shareholders so it is highly unlikely
9 Six women shareholders in the Wrexham &  Acton Collieries Co. Ltd. were described as ‘Mrs’ , in April 
1889 (N A/14345/821C)
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that they were acting as “independent investors” (Newton & Cottrell, 2006: 28) 
but, whatever the motivation behind their investment, women were certainly not 
insignificant shareholders in Denbighshire coal companies.
In all of the companies sampled, those who actually describe themselves 
as being involved in the coal or iron industries make up a very small proportion of 
the shareholders. However, as mentioned earlier, prominent coalowners such as 
Henry Dennis had, by the decade under review, ‘graduated’ from being described 
as ‘mining engineer’ to being a ‘gentlemen’. In this way, the true background of 
shareholders is often obscured by the method of self-classification chosen.
Geographical location of shareholders
To establish whether the share capital of the companies came from local 
sources, the addresses of the shareholders were analysed. Unlike other studies 
(Cottrell, 1980), the actual addresses have been analysed rather than the 
distance from the Registered Office; this allows us to build up a picture of the 
degree of ‘remoteness’ that existed between the shareholders and the collieries 
they owned (see Table 4.6 for numbers of shares held in individual companies 
and Table 4.7 for the respective percentages).
The overall ‘total’ figures in Table 4.7, for the entire sample of companies 
would appear to support Mitchell’s assessment (for the British coal industry as a 
whole) that most of the capital came from local sources. However, the difference 
in the volume of shares issued by Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. (see 
Table 4.6), skews all the figures towards the pattern exhibited by this company 
and therefore the figures excluding Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. have 
also been presented (see penultimate column of Table 4.7). These figures 
reveals that the highest proportion of shareholders for the other companies in the 
sample, resided in London and the south east of England; these shareholders 
accounted for 33 per cent of all the shareholders, and the only other region with a 
significant presence was Scotland. Shareholders giving their address as being 
either in Denbighshire or north Wales accounted for only 6 per cent of the total, 
excluding Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. If Broughton & Plas Power Coal
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Co. Ltd.’s figures are included, the picture changes dramatically: 46.1 per cent 
come from north Wales (excluding Denbighshire), 23 per cent from London and 
the south East of England with 13.4 per cent ‘not known’.
Table 4.6: Analysis of addresses of shareholders in Denbighshire coal companies. 1885-1895 -  
bv number of shares held
Address
PP West Wvnn Ruabon W & A Vron
Denbighshire 1,840 727 84 93 346 10
Other north Wales 87,940 80
Shropshire 40 100 116 414
Cheshire 4,440 454 1,325 413
Lancashire (including 
Merseyside)
12,450 51 1,768 38
Yorkshire 550 600
London & south east 
England
36,460 1,510 2,284 291 3,288 3
Herefordshire 40
Staffordshire 60 125 120
Cumberland 80
Warwickshire 73 150
Devon & Somerset 120 171 550
Hampshire 200 200 700
Scotland 1,685 25 2,873
Overseas 30
Lincolnshire 150 144
Gloucestershire 9
Rutland 150
Not known 25,620
168,750 4,800 7,000 500 8,077 1,863
(Sources: as for Table 4.4)
If figures for the individual companies are looked at, a rather different story 
emerges (see Table 4.7). Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. is the only 
company where ‘control’ (more than 50 per cent of shares held) lies in north 
Wales and, of the remaining companies, only Westminster, Brymbo Coal & Coke 
Co. Ltd. and Ruabon Brymbo Coal & Coke Co. Ltd. exhibit a north Wales holding 
in excess of 10 per cent, the figures being 15 and 19 per cent respectively. In 
almost all the other companies, shareholders in London and the south east of 
England are the most significant category and, in two companies, Westminster,
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Brymbo Coal & Coke Co. Ltd. and Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. Ltd., 
shareholders in Scotland have important stakeholdings. This latter finding can be 
explained by the fact that both companies had close connections with Robert 
Roy, who hailed originally from Invernesshire.
Table 4.7: Proportion of shareholders, analysed bv address. 1885-1895 -  bv percentages
Address PP West Wvnn Ruab W&A Vron Total
exc.
PP
Total 
inc. PP
% % % % % % % %
Denbighshire 1.1 15.1 1.2 18.6 4.2 0.5 5.7 1.60
Other north Wales 52.1 1.1 0.4 46.10
Shropshire 0.8 1.4 23.2 5.1 3.0 0.35
Cheshire 2.6 9.5 18.9 5.1 9.9 3.50
Lancashire (including 
Merseyside)
7.4 1.1 25.3 0.5 8.3 7.50
Yorkshire 7.8 32.2 5.2 0.60
London & south east 
England
21.6 31.4 35.5 58.2 40.7 0.2 33.2 23.00
Herefordshire 0.5 0.2 0.02
Staffordshire 1.3 1.8 1.5 1.4 0.15
Cumberland 1.0 0.3 0.04
Warwickshire 1.5 1.9 1.0 0.10
Devon & Somerset 1.7 2.1 29.5 3.8 0.40
Hampshire 4.2 37.6 4.9 0.60
Scotland 35.1 0.4 35.6 20.6 2.40
Overseas 0.4 1.8 0.1 0.02
Lincoln 2.2 1.3 0.15
Gloucestershire 0.1 0.0 0.00
Rutland 2.2 0.7 0.07
Not known 15.2 13.40
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.00
(Sources; as per Table 4.4)
Table 4.7 also reveals that the shareholders were dispersed across the 
UK and elsewhere. If we take Shropshire, Cheshire, Lancashire and 
Herefordshire as coming within the definition of ‘local’, the local shareholdings for 
each company are as indicated in Table 4.8. These reveal that only Broughton & 
Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. can therefore be said to be truly locally owned, 
although Wynnstay Collieries Ltd. and Ruabon Coke & Coal Co. Ltd. have a 
significant local presence (47.9 per cent and 41.8 per cent respectively). It would
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thus appear that the Denbighshire coalfield does not conform to the “localised 
capital market” outlined by Cottrell (1980: 93), and supported by the findings of 
both Mitchell (1984: 54) and Church (1986: 145) in relation to the coal industry as 
a whole. Rather, it relied on external funding, just as Church found in the case of 
the west Midlands and south Wales. Church (1986: 145) explains that in the west 
Midlands, “the existence of relatively large numbers of small and medium-sized 
companies offered accessible forms of participant investment” which was likely to 
attract those with smaller amounts to invest. This is possibly also the case with 
Denbighshire.
Table 4.8: ‘Local’ shareholdings in Denbighshire coal companies. 1885-1895
Collierv PP West Wynn Ruab W & A Vron
% % % % % %
North Wales 53.2 15.1 2.3 18.6 4.2 0.5
Shropshire 0.8 1.4 23.2 5.1
Cheshire 2.6 9.5 18.9 5.1
Lancashire 7.4 1.1 25.3 0.5
Herefordshire 0.5
Total ‘local’ 63.2 26.5 47.9 41.8 15.4 0.5
(Source: based on figures in Table 4.7)
The majority of coal companies in Denbighshire fell into the small/medium 
category and, given the ‘semi-private’ nature of the companies, most of the 
shareholders would have had strong ties of family or acquaintance with each 
other, as borne out by the analysis of individual lists of shareholders in 
Denbighshire. Hence the ties were ‘local’ to the families but not necessarily ‘local’ 
to the actual colliery location. This is illustrated by the number of Scottish 
shareholders in the Westminster, Brymbo Coal & Coke Co. Ltd. with ties to 
Robert Roy, and the number of shareholders from London and the south east of 
England in the Ruabon Coke & Coal Co. Ltd. The significance of London and the 
south east to the latter company is due to the fact that Daniel Gooch, Chairman 
of GWR, was instrumental in creating the company, indeed he was the major 
subscriber and shareholder in the company, and he was based in London.
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In the larger coalfields such as south Wales, however, the reason for the 
widespread geographical nature of shareholdings was somewhat different. 
Church (1986: 145) believes that the growth of the steam coal export trade 
“exercised a greater attraction for capitalists, the professions and mercantile 
sections of the wider investing communities”. This meant that the shareholders of 
coal companies in such regions were much more ‘remote’ from the other 
shareholders. The companies were often much larger and ‘public’ ownership was 
more of a possibility than in smaller coalfields such as Denbighshire where the 
shareholders, although sometimes ‘remote’ geographically from the company in 
which they held shares, were not remote from each other. In the smaller 
coalfields such as Denbighshire, it is likely that the shareholders could all be 
linked, however tenuously, through acquaintanceship with each other.
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to, first, provide details of the major 
‘pioneers’ in the Denbighshire coalfield in terms of entrepreneurs and major 
shareholders, before trying to establish whether trends in Denbighshire, in terms 
of shareholder occupation and geographical location, corresponded to those for 
the British coal industry as a whole. A major problem with the analysis has been 
the fact that the source material has not made it possible to conduct an inter­
company comparison for any specific year. This has meant that the data for 
certain companies has had to be pooled across various periods. Athough such 
an approach has obvious shortcomings, it has highlighted certain trends; 
Denbighshire does not appear to conform to the views of either Mitchell (1984) or 
Church (1986). Not only did most of the capital come from shareholders who 
could not be categorised as local, but the shareholders themselves did not 
categorise themselves as being involved in business.
In Denbighshire the majority of shareholders in coal companies, if 
Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. is excluded from the analysis due to the 
disparity in the number of shares issued, came from outside north Wales. Indeed,
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the biggest proportion, 33 per cent, gave their address as being in London and 
the south east, while the second largest ‘contingent’, 21 per cent, was from 
Scotland. This latter statistic is not unexpected given that two of the most 
important ‘pioneers’, Robert Roy and Henry Robertson, came to north Wales 
from Scotland and Roy, in particular, retained strong ties with his homeland. 
Given that north Wales is a small coalfield, the influence of characters such as 
Roy and Robertson and the way the former encouraged the involvement of 
Scottish shareholders in Welsh companies, is far stronger than it would have 
been in other, larger coalfields where the network links of a ‘foreigner’ would 
have been diluted by the scale of investment. Neither is the influence of London 
as a shareholder-base particularly surprising; London was, after all, the financial 
centre of the United Kingdom and “probably one of the wealthiest [regions] as 
well” (Cottrell, 1980: 94).
When the occupations of the shareholders are considered, again 
excluding Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd., the most important categories 
were ‘gentlemen’ and ‘women’ who made up 43.1 per cent and 18.6 per cent of 
the total respectively. If the companies are considered on an individual basis 
‘gentlemen’ remains the most important category for all but one of the companies 
and, perhaps very surprisingly, in this company, the Westminster, Brymbo Coal & 
Coke Co. Ltd., ‘women’ hold the highest proportion of shares, at 44.4 per cent.
Having examined the background of those who invested in the coal 
companies, the next three chapters will consider the other major ‘stakeholders’ in 
a coal company. Chapter five will consider the mineral owners, chapter six, the 
employees and their unions, and chapter seven, the customers. All these had a 
significant interest in the success of the coal companies and the relationships of 
each of these stakeholders with the coalowners could often have an important 
effect on the performance and, therefore, the profits of the coal companies.
128
Chapter 5
MINERAL OWNERSHIP 
Introduction
In this chapter we will discuss the issue of mineral ownership and the relationship 
between the mineral owners, the lessors, and the coal companies, the lessees. In 
this context, mineral owners are the landowners who owned the land, because 
ownership of coal (the mineral) was vested in the owner of the surface land. As 
mineral owners they were entitled to a ‘share’ of the income derived from the sale 
of coal; this came in the form of a ‘royalty’. Royalties were part and parcel of a 
coal company’s life because land was often leased, rather than held freehold, 
and therefore maintaining a good relationship with the lessors was important. 
This chapter will outline the means by which landowners received recompense 
for allowing the companies to mine their land, and will look at the issues which 
often caused conflict between lessors and lessees. In particular, we will discuss 
royalties; what they are, how they were calculated and the reasons why they 
caused problems between landlords and coal companies.
Leases
According to Mitchell (1984: 250), there are three factors of production within the 
coal industry: capital, labour and land. Given that, without mineral-bearing land, 
there is no need for either of the first two factors, buying or gaining access to land 
was the single most important factor required by any ‘coal entrepreneur’. Due to 
the fact that land was an expensive commodity, most coalowners relied on 
leasing land to give them this access. For this reason, coalowners had to ensure 
that they cultivated, and maintained, good relationships with the local landowners 
because, without these, lease agreements could be difficult to come by or difficult 
to re-negotiate if the need arose.
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The process of obtaining agreement over a lease between a coal owner 
and the mineral owner(s) could be a very long and protracted affair, especially if 
more than one mineral owner was involved, as was often the case (Morris & 
Williams, 1958: 122). One of the most important elements concerning a lease 
was its duration. This, according to Morris & Wiliams (1958: 117), was of 
fundamental importance to the tenant; he required security from the knowledge 
that the lease would be of long enough duration to ensure that there was ample 
time to secure a return. This view is reinforced by Cockburn (1902: 271) who 
stated that “ to enable the lessee to recoup his expenditure and to save him from
having to hasten the working out of mineral it is very desirable that the term
should be for as long as possible”.
The landlord on the other hand wanted the freedom to change his tenants 
and have the ability to include new clauses or alter existing ones to his own 
benefit, which meant he generally favoured short leases (Dron, 1928: 17). This 
inherent conflict generally resulted in a compromise, with leases normally running 
for between twenty to forty years in regions such as north Wales (Dron, 1928: 
17). In especially successful regions, such as south Wales, leases were often for 
between forty and sixty years duration. This was possibly due to the fact that, as 
the nineteenth century progressed and the south Wales coal industry became 
increasingly successful, the landowners became convinced of the success of the 
coal industry and realised that if a successful coal mine was located on their land 
they could anticipate a good income over a guaranteed period. This is not to say 
that both parties to the lease remained happy with its terms for the whole period 
of the lease, or that disputes did not occur, but generally the average length of 
the leases in south Wales was a reflection of the strength of the industry in that 
region because lease agreements were “the results of the circumstances and 
expectations of the industry at the particular time [when the lease was 
negotiated]” (Mitchell, 1984: 251). Landlords in other, smaller, coalfields may not 
have been quite as confident and ‘hedged their bets’ when agreeing terms, which 
generally meant shorter lease terms for the coalowners.
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Another important factor that could affect the length of the negotiations 
over a lease was the number of lessors. If the land that a coal company wished 
to mine all belonged to a single landlord, the negotiations could usually be 
concluded quickly. If several landowners were involved, however, the 
negotiations often became fraught, as different landlords vied for preferential 
terms. The main contentious issue (in relation to a new undertaking) was where 
the mine (buildings, shafts etc) were to be situated. Having a mine on a 
particular piece of land, increased the value of that land, and also ensured that 
the land was usually worked first. This meant that landlords might argue about 
where the pit should be sunk, a process which might ultimately result in the pit 
being sunk in a position that was less than optimal from other perspectives.
We will now consider the payments made to the landlords, what they were 
made up of, how they were calculated, and what proportion of total cost per ton 
they constituted, before examining in detail, for those Denbighshire coal 
companies for which archival evidence is available, the relationship between coal 
companies and their lessors.
Payments to Landlords
How then did the landlord receive a return for leasing his land to coal 
companies? According to Sorley (1889: 6), “in this country, payments to landlords 
consist of:
i) fixed I certain / dead rent
ii) royalty
iii) wayleave”.
Dead rent
A dead rent was a specified annual amount which was not charged in addition to 
royalties, but was payable if royalties did not equal or exceed this specified
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amount (Sorley, 1889: 6). Any ‘shorts,’ i.e the difference between the royalties 
payable and the dead rent, could usually be carried forward into future years and 
set-off against royalties which exceeded the fixed rent (Dron, 1928: 20). This, 
however, did depend on the terms of the lease; most allowed for the recovery of 
shorts, but some landowners did specify a time-scale for their recovery (Sorley, 
1889: 6). The way shorts work is illustrated by the following example taken from 
Dron (1928: 21) :-
Dead rent £600 p.a
royalties payable - year 1 £200
- year 2 £400
- year 3 £800
- year 4 £1,200
Year Dead rent Royalties Shorts Cumulative
shorts
Paid to lessor
£ £ £ £ £
1 600 200 400 400 600
2 600 400 200 600 600
3 600 800 400 600
4 600 1200 - 800
The purpose of a dead rent, was, in part, a method of guaranteeing the 
landlord a minimum amount per annum, especially in the early years of sinking 
and opening out a colliery. An additional purpose of dead rent, according to 
Cockburn (1902: 272), was for it to act “as an incentive to diligence of working”; it 
prevented a lessee from renting land and then failing to work it (Mitchell, 1984: 
251), either because he wished to ‘lock-up’ the minerals and prevent his 
competitors from gaining access to them (Cockburn, 1902: 272), or because he 
wished to concentrate on working the land of another lessor who might be 
charging less in terms of dead rents and royalties.
In Denbighshire the dead rents varied considerably depending on the size 
of the colliery and the amount of land leased. For example, larger collieries such 
as Westminster, which leased its land predominantly from the Duke of
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Westminster, agreed to a dead rent of £1,000 per annum in 1872 (D/GR/685), 
while smaller collieries such as Pentrebychan and Gwernygo which leased land 
from Colonel Meredith of Pentrebychan Hall had dead rents of £50 per annum in 
1882 (D/DM/285/85 & 91).
Royalties
The main method by which landlords received recompense was by royalties, the 
rates of which could vary significantly both between and within regions. Dron 
(1928: 16-17) explained that the use of the word ‘royalty’ rather than ‘rent’ is 
important; rent is paid for the use of something which lasts for a period of time, 
whereas a royalty is paid fo'r the commodity itself, which is removed once and for 
all. In other words a royalty is a “charge for depletion” (Mitchell, 1984: 252). 
According to Fine (1990: 50) this issue is not as clear cut as Dron and Mitchell 
might make it appear, and he concludes that royalties cannot easily be 
distinguished from rent because, within the royalty payment, an element of rental 
payment exists “in so far as each (rent and royalty) represents the revenue that 
accrues to the landlord in return for capital’s access to the land for mining or 
farming”.
According to Cockburn (1902: 273-4), the main consideration taken into 
account when setting the royalty rates were as follows:
a) the geographical position of the mine, “very important because in 
seasons of depression, the mine best situated geographically gains the 
trade”;
b) conditions for getting the coal: was the mine deep?, did it contain faults 
or a bad roof?;
c) the facilities for getting coal to market: was the mine well positioned in 
relation to the railways and ports?;
d) the number and thickness of the seams, and the quality of the mineral;
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e) the state of the trade at the date the lease and, therefore, the royalties 
were negotiated.
Not only did the royalty rates vary significantly, but there were also 
different ways of applying the rates. There were four main methods of applying 
the royalty (Cockburn, 1902: 280):
i) according to acreage: x d per acre for the area of the mineral worked;
ii) according to footage: x d per foot in thickness and per acre worked;
iii) according to tonnage: x d per ton of coal got;
iv) according to a sliding scale which varied “according to the price of 
minerals gotten, and being the saleable value, or the price or value 
appearing in any trade or market”.
Regardless of the method chosen, the main aim of the royalty was to protect the 
landlord from rapid exhaustion of his asset (Sorley, 1889: 7), and especially with 
regard to the first two methods, to protect him from wasteful methods of working, 
which would deprive him of legitimate royalties (Dron, 1928: 20).
The method used, to some extent, depended on the region. Mitchell 
(1984: 252) observes that “in most of the inland coal fields, it became common 
early in the nineteenth century to lease mineral land by the acre and thickness of 
seams”. However, in areas such as South Yorkshire, where the seams were fairly 
uniform and the longwall system was in use, “simple acreage ...which made 
intermittent measurement easy and reliable... was the normal unit” (see Table
5.1). This contrasted with regions where the pillar and stall method was used, or 
where faults were common; here, a fixed rate per ton of coal was more common, 
probably because, by leaving the pillars unworked, establishing the area actually 
worked was more complex.
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T able 5.1: British Minina Royalties for Coal
District Acreaae rent Footaae rent Der foot 
thick Der acre
Tonnaae rent- 
averaae Dence 
Der ton
Slidina scale 
fraction of sellina Drice
Rates of rovaltv Der 
ton-Dence
max min av
Northumberland 4 Average about 1/12th of 
av.annual selling price at 
pit
10 2.5 4
Durham 5 H U  U II 10 2.5 5
Cumberland & Westmorland 6 Some cases 1/7,n to 1/12tn 
nett sales
8 3 6
South Lancashire & Cheshire £40 to £150 (av.£72) 
per foot thick per 
Cheshire acre of 
10,240 sq. yds
very few 
tonnage rents
Sliding scale not 
customary
6
South Yorkshire Thick coal £120 to 
£400 (av.£275) per 
acre
Silkstone seam £20 
to £60 (av. £30)
Sliding scale not 
customary
6
West Yorkshire £50 to £300 u u u u 6
Derbyshire, Notts & 
Leicestershire
£30 to £200 (av.£80) 6 4 4.75
N.Staffs & Cannock Chase u u u £20 to £40 Few cases 1/12" to 1/16tn 5.5
S Staffs, Worcestershire & 
Warwickshire
Thick mine at SW of 
Staffs £400 to £500 
per acre
£10- to£40 (av £27.5) 6 Sliding scales not usual 
now
8 3 6
Shropshire 6
Somersetshire Mixed coal 9 Av. 1/10th of selling price 9 5 6
Gloucestershire, Bristol Field 
& Forest of Dean
6
Monmouthshire & S Wales Steam coal, 
large 6, small 3, 
house coal 7.
1/10'" to 1/12in of selling 
price at pit, with min of 6d 
per ton
9 4
North Wales £15 to £35 (av 
£.22.5)
4 1/12,n to 1/20,n 10 4
(Source: The Mining Royalties Report I., 203, 218 (P. P., C.6195, 1890); V.5 (P.P., C.6980, 1893). Cited in Cockburn (1902: 274))
In other areas, especially Scotland, Cumberland and Lancashire, a system 
prevailed which related the royalty to the value of sales achieved. Dron (1928: 
22) believes that royalties were much easier to calculate if based on sales 
values. This view was reiterated by A Hewlett of the Wigan Coal & Iron Company 
during the inquiry undertaken for the Toynbee Trustees in 1889 (cited by Sorley, 
1889: 34). Hewlett believed that such a system was to the benefit of the landlord 
and the lessee; for the lessee, as prices fell so did the royalties payable, and for 
the landlord “the gross royalty yield of a mine will be found to be much greater 
than it is under the present system of fixed royalties”.
Mitchell (1984: 253) states that such agreements were popular in the early 
to mid-1870s when landlords wanted to take advantage of the high prices being 
commanded by coal, but that they fell out of fashion for a variety of reasons, 
including the difficulty of ascertaining average prices when there was “a 
multiplicity of markets”, and the reluctance of the coalowners to allow the 
landlords access to their records and results. As a result no one system ever 
prevailed, and lessors and lessees continued to use various combinations of the 
systems available.
In Denbighshire the method of royalty calculation was not ‘uniform’ and a 
mix of lease terms is evident. Mitchell’s comment (1984: 253) re. the popularity of 
royalties based on sales being predominantly in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century does not appear to apply. Even in the eighteenth century collieries in 
Denbighshire were paying royalties as a proportion of the coal raised, for 
example, leases agreed with Sir Watkin Williams Wynne of Wynnstay Hall in 
1772 required royalties of “1/6 part of all coal” to be paid (DD/WY/5178-9). In 
Denbighshire landlords do not appear to have been ‘consistent’ in their preferred 
method of royalty calculation and offered a mix of per acre and per ton royalties 
to different tenants. This is illustrated by the Plas Power Estate; the royalties 
charged to the Brynkinallt colliery from 1906-1911 were calculated on a per foot 
per acre basis, but those charged to the Plas Power and Gatewen collieries in 
the same period, were calculated as a proportion of coal sales. An illustration of a 
royalty per ton calculation can be found in Table 5.7 below (p. 151).
136
W a y  I e a v e s
The final method of paying for the use of land was via wayleaves; it often 
happened that, in order to access the seam being worked, or in order to remove 
the coal from the face and move it to market, the land of more than one landlord 
might have to be traversed, either underground, or on the surface. According to 
Dron (1928: 17), there was an inherent conflict between the landlord and the 
tenant; the latter wanted the freedom to work coal from any of his leases as and 
when he wished, while the landlord wanted to ensure that as much of his land 
was worked as opposed to those of his co-lessors. As a compromise to this 
conflict, a wayleave, or fee of, for example, 1d per ton was paid for minerals from 
adjacent lands which were carried over or below the ground owned by the 
various lessors. Table 5.2 illustrates the different wayleave rates a landlord, R 
Middleton-Biddulph, of Chirk Castle, charged the Brynkinallt colliery for the 
different minerals or products that were carried by rail or tram over his land.
Table 5.2: Wavleaves agreed by Brynkinallt Colliery with R Mvddleton-Biddulph. Chirk Castle. 23 
June 1875. for tramways crossing the latter’s land
Mineral Rate
per ton of coal 3d
per ton of slack 1.5d
per ton of ironstone 3d
per ton of clay 2d
per 1000 bricks 6d
Source: DD/DM 473/1
Impact of royalties on colliery companies
From the evidence available in Denbighshire, it would appear that the 
relationship between lessor and lessee was often a difficult one. Despite the fact 
that leases often took an interminable amount of time to be negotiated and 
agreed, disputes often arose before the ink had had time to dry. The arguments 
usually centred on the rate of royalty and the perception, from the point of view of
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the coalowners, that the landlords were exploiting the relationship. The biggest 
problem was that if the leases were agreed during the ‘good times’, lessees were 
more than willing to agree to royalty rates which, when trade and, therefore, 
prices dipped, they soon found it impossible to pay (Sorley, 1889: 32). This issue 
is illustrated in the evidence given by Sir Lothian Bell to the ‘[Royal] Commission 
on the Depression of Trade’ (cited by Sorley, 1889: 13), when he said that “it is 
contended that should the present [1889] low prices continue, those engaged in 
mining in this country must be reduced to bankruptcy, and a great industry must 
be extinguished, unless the receivers of royalties are willing to abate something 
of their legal right”.
This may be something of an over-dramatisation, but it does illustrate how 
significant an impact coalowners felt royalties had on their results. This 
perception was not borne out by the commission, which demonstrated “that 
royalties formed a comparatively unimportant fraction of the total cost of the coal 
industry in the nineteenth century” (Mitchell, 1984: 256). However, despite the 
fact that “unambiguously ...over the long term, archival evidence suggests that 
the burden of rents and royalties was downwards (from the mid 1870s to 1913)” 
(Church, 1986: 506), the coalowners persisted with their view that “royalty 
owners took an increasing proportion of the value added by the industry” 
(Mitchell, 1984: 255), which contributed to feelings of great resentment and 
meant that disagreements over royalties often became very heated and 
protracted affairs, indeed it was the furore created by coalowners over the issue 
of royalties in the coal industry and whether or not they were fair, that led to the 
Royal Commission on Mining Royalties being set up in 1890. The Commission’s 
remit was to investigate “the extent to which the separation of the ownership of 
land and its minerals from the ownership of the working capital of the mines 
impeded the progess of the industry, and in particular whether high coal royalties 
disadvantages the industry” (Fine, 1990: 36). One of the issues discussed was 
whether lessees tended to be naive when they agreed to the terms of a lease; 
James Barnes, of Nantyglo, south Wales, when asked why he agreed to certain 
terms if he disliked them, replied that “colliery people agree to many things that
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afterwards they find they should not have done” (BL/B/S/18). James Haslam, of 
the Miners’ Federation of Derbyshire, when asked about the leases that were 
agreed in the “high times of 1872” explained that “it is a well known fact that the 
royalties entered into at that time., when everybody who had a bit of money was 
rushing for coal, were up to an abnormal price, and a good many people have 
had to go to the wall as a consequence” (BL/B/S/18).
Another issue discussed was whether royalties had a disproportionate 
impact on profits, given that they were a relatively fixed element of cost. Evidence 
was taken from a number of trades union representatives who, perhaps 
unusually, sided with the coalowners in their condemnation of lessors. The trades 
unions, however, were concerned with the welfare of their members and the 
wages paid, unlike the owners who were concerned with their ‘bottom line’. The 
unions, perhaps naively, felt that if the royalties were lower, the owners would 
use the savings to pay increased wages. It was felt by Edward Cavesey, 
President of the Yorkshire Miners’ Association, that because royalty reductions 
took so long, when owners felt the need to cut costs they immediately looked to 
cut wages first, as these were seen as the most negotiable cost (BL/B/S/18). 
James Haslam agreed with this view; he asserted that “any cost imposed upon 
the production of any commodity is a hindrance to it, and we look upon these 
royalties as being very largely a cause of rivalry between the workmen and the 
royalty owners as to which shall have, or which shall not have a certain part of 
the profits” (BL/B/S/18). Haslam added that “we believe fairly that if the colliery
owner was not very often heavily handicapped with royalties the miner would
do better under his employer, and that the employer very often would be getting a 
little profit where he does not get any now” (BL/B/S/18).
Whether reduced royalties ever induced coalowners to increase wage 
rates, or avoid reducing them, is a matter of conjecture but, protracted disputes 
with lessors in difficult trading conditions, when owners were looking to squeeze 
costs, did make wage cuts more likely. It would thus appear that although 
royalties appear insignificant in absolute terms, when looking at their impact on 
the profit margins of coal companies, a small increase of perhaps half a pence
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per ton could mean the difference between the company recording a profit or a 
loss per ton. During the Royal Commission on Mining Royalties, 1890, evidence 
was presented that illustrated the significant differences in royalties charged by 
lessors in the different regions. Table 5.3 shows that royalties per ton varied from 
a low of 3d per ton in the Forest of Dean, to a high of 9d in Scotland. Given the 
differing conditions that prevailed in the various coal mining regions of the UK, it 
is difficult to make comparisons of the royalties per ton in absolute terms; the 
Royal Commission therefore received evidence showing average royalties as a 
percentage of the average selling price within a region (see Table 5.3). This 
again shows some wide variations, but it can be seen that whichever method is 
used, Scotland suffered the highest royalties. Fine (1990: 57-9) believes that this 
has much to do with the concentration of ownership in Scotland. Much of the land 
involved in mining was owned by relatively few landlords which meant that there 
was less ‘competition’ with other lessors; in other regions where concentration of 
ownership was less prevalent, if one coal company mined land owned by more 
than one lessor, and received a concession from one lessor, the other lessors 
might be expected to follow suit. This was less likely to happen in Scotland, 
because “the landowner was in a powerful position to extract a monopoly-type 
rent” (Fine, 1990: 59).
The Royal Commission did not give a figure for the royalty of Denbighshire 
and Flintshire as a proportion of the selling price, but an indication of this can be 
gained if the average price per ton per annum, as provided by FA Gibson (1922: 
157) is used. For 1890 the average selling price was 8/3d which means that the 
average royalty as a proportion of average selling price was 4 per cent and only 
the Forest of Dean had a lower figure than Denbighshire (see Table 5.3). The 
average royalty figure for Denbighshire and Flintshire has, however, been 
calculated from the averaging of aggregated figures for two coalfields, each with 
collieries of various sizes, paying royalties at different rates to different landlords, 
and calculated by different methods. It is likely, therefore, to mask some fairly 
significant differences. These differences are illustrated by figures extracted from 
the records of the Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. and the Wrexham &
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Acton Collieries Co.Ltd. which reveal that although the average royalties paid by 
Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co.Ltd. between 1911 and 1914 were not much 
higher than the average, either in absolute or percentage terms (see Table 5.4), 
those for Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. Ltd., for 1883, were up to 50 per cent 
higher in absolute terms, and were significantly higher in percentage terms (see 
Table 5.5). It must be pointed out that these two sets of figures, however, relate 
to periods which are thirty years apart and these thirty years saw royalties fall in 
many of the inland coalfields (Mitchell, 1984: 261), such as Denbighshire.
Table 5.3: Average royalties per ton in the coal mining regions of the UK
Reaion Rovaltv Der 
ton- d
Rovaltv as % 
of sellina 
Drice
Northumberland 4 - 4/4 6.18
Durham 5 8.09
Cumberland 6 - 7 8.67
South & west Yorkshire 6 8
Lancashire and Cheshire
CO1CD 7 .1 4 - 8
Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire and 
Leicestershire
43A  - 5 5 .3 7 -5 .9 5
North Stafforshire 51/4 7.06
Shropshire 6 7.14
Cannock Chase 5/4 - 6 -
Warwickshire, south Staffordshire and 
Worcestershire
6 7 .08 -7 .8
Forest of Dean 3 2.83
Bristol 6 5.66
Somerset 6 5.66
Denbighshire & Flintshire 4 -
South Wales & Monmouthshire 6 6.06 -  7.4
Fifeshire & Clackmannshire, and east and mid 
Lothian
6 - 7 10.83
Central Scotland, Ayrshire, Argyll and Dumfries 7 - 9 9 .0 9 -1 0 .4 8
(Sources: Royal Commission on Mining Royalties, 1890 (cited by Mitchell, 1986: 261), and Royal 
Commission on Mining Royalties, 1890, Appendix V  (BL7 BS/18)).
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Table 5.4: Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd.. revenue, cost and profit per ton 1911-1914
6 months to Dec.
1911
June
1912
Dec
1912
Dec.
1913
June
1914
Average sales value per ton (including wagon 
earnings) (s./d.) 8/4.34 9/0.26 9/2.28 10/8.25 10/9.00
Wagon earnings per ton (d.) 4.14 3.80 3.83 4.49 3.49
Total cost per ton (s./d.) 8/2.70 8/10.6 9/0.46 10/3.45 10/6.65
Profit per ton (d.) 1.64 1.64 1.82 4.80 2.34
Profit as a percentage o f average seling price 1.6 1.5 1.6 3 .7 1.8
Royalty per ton of coal sold (d.) 4.38 5.05 4.68 4.84 5.24
Royalty as percentage o f total cost 4 .4 4 .7 4.3 3.9 4.1
Royalty as percentage o f selling price 4.4 4 .7 4.2 3.8 4.1
Notes:
i) Items in itallics have been calculated by the author
ii) No information available for the 6 month period to 30 June 1913
(Sources: 1911-1912, D/BC/2289; 1913-1914, DD/PP/620).
One of the main reasons why the average figure for Denbighshire and 
Flintshire might mask significant differences relates to the preponderance of 
small collieries in the coalfields, especially Flintshire. In 1894, the first year for 
which such information is available, in Denbighshire, 54 per cent of the collieries 
employed fewer than 250 persons (see Chapter 2 above) while, in Flintshire, the 
proportion was 84 per cent (List of Mines). This would have obviously skewed the 
average in favour of the smaller collieries which were likely to have lower royalty 
rates than the larger companies, for a number of reasons. In particular, smaller 
collieries were likely to pay lower royalties because they were usually older, 
which meant that the better quality coal had been worked out. Additionally, their 
leases may have been negotiated earlier, possibly before the boom of 1872 
which caused royalty rates to increase significantly (Mitchell, 1984: 254). 
Moreover, the older collieries were likely to have poorer facilities for getting coal 
and had probably been sunk before the rail infrastructure was in place, which 
made transporting coal that much more difficult. All these generic problems 
affected the royalty rates paid by a colliery, but ultimately the rate finally 
determined was down to the negotiation skills of the lessor and lessee, or their 
agents.
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Fine (1990: 65) asserts that “the significance of royalties cannot be 
measured by their absolute or relative size in revenue terms”, rather it is 
necessary to look at their marginal impact on profits in order to assess whether 
the coalowners’ complaints about royalties were justified. Before looking at the 
detailed figures (Tables 5.4 & 5.5) relating to profits and losses per ton for 
collieries in Denbighshire, it is first necessary to issue two caveats; not only is the 
scope of the information used very limited, in that it relates to only two coal 
companies in Denbighshire, but also this information is as provided by the coal 
companies themselves and, as will be discussed more fully in Chapter 8, such 
figures were often open to manipulation. However, this having been said, the 
figures will illustrate the point being made, and also, given that the figures are a 
contemporaneous record used for management purposes, they might be deemed 
more reliable than figures that were produced for external reporting purposes.
Table 5.5: Extracts from monthly cost sheets. Wrexham and Acton Collieries Co. Ltd. January to
July 1883.
1883 Jan Feb Mar Aor Mav June Jujy
Average Selling 
price per ton 
(s./d.)
5/4.25 5/5.10 5/3.87 5/4.25 5/4.20 5/4.0 5/1.12
Cost per ton 
(s./d.)
4/11.8 5/4.78 5/4.78 5/6.37 5/6.24 5/8.8 5/6.12
Profit/floss) p er 
ton (d.)
4 .45 0.32 (0.91) (1.12) (2.04) (4.8) (5.0)
Profit as 
percentage of 
sales value
6.9 0.5 (1.4) (1.7) (3.2) (7.5) (8.2)
Royalty per ton 
(d.)
5.47 5.60 4.50 4.54 5.46 4.9 6.06
Royalty as 
percentage o f 
total cost
9.1 8.6 6.9 6.8 8.2 7.1 9.1
Royalty as 
percentage o f 
selling price
8 .5 8.6 7 7 8.5 7.6 9.4
Notes:
i) Items in itallics have been calculated by the author
(Source: NLW/HR/76)
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Table 5.4 shows how small the margins being earned by the Broughton & 
Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. were in the period immediately prior to World War I, 
and if wagon earnings are excluded from the figures, a profit would only be 
recorded in one of the five 6-monthly periods for which figures exist, namely that 
for the period to December 1913. The impact of an increase in royalties on profit 
margins can be seen if we look at the 6 month period to 31 December 1911; if 
the royalty had increased by 0.5d per ton from 4.38d to 4.88d per ton, an 
increase of just under 12 per cent, the profit would have fallen from 1.64d to 
1.14d i.e. a reduction of 30 per cent. Such a change would clearly have had a 
serious impact on the results of any company. Thus, relatively small changes in 
royalty rates could significantly impact upon a coal company.
Also available are some monthly cost figures for the Wrexham & Acton 
Collieries Co. Ltd. from a much earlier period, 1883 (see Table 5.5). These again 
show how difficult it was for colliery companies to achieve profits, although it 
must be borne in mind that the 1880s was a period of depression for the coal 
trade. If the figures in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 are taken to be representative of 
royalties throughout Denbighshire, it can be seen that, as a proportion of total 
cost, royalties were less significant in the years prior to World War I than they 
were in the 1880s, a fall which Mitchell (1984: 261) maintains echoed a general 
trend towards lower royalties in many inland coalfields.
It can also be seen, from Tables 5.4 and 5.5, that the average royalty per 
ton, and the proportion of royalty per ton to average selling price per ton, for both 
Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. and Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. Ltd. 
(although the figures are not for the same years as those provided by the 
Commission), lie within the parameters given for average royalties in the UK, 
issued by the Royal Commission in 1890. Although the proportion of royalty to 
price for Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. is on the low side, this may be 
because the figures for this company relate to 1912 and, as has been explained, 
royalties had a tendency to fall in many areas after the 1890s (Mitchell, 1984: 
261). However, the fact remains that, despite assertions by authors such as 
Mitchell (1984: 262) and Church (1986) that royalties were a comparatively
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insignificant element of cost, colliery owners did not believe that this was the 
case, and they continued, from time to time, to rail against the terms imposed by 
mineral leases.
The relationship between coal companies and coalowners in Denbighshire
The two issues which caused most disputes were the desire of lessees to obtain 
reduced royalty payments when trade conditions worsened, and the desire of the 
lessors to ensure that the mines on their lands were being worked efficiently. 
These problems, and many of the other issues discussed above, can be clearly 
illustrated by looking at the correspondence that survives for a number of 
collieries located on the Denbighshire coalfield. Such disputes were common 
throughout the UK and, as such, Denbighshire will be used as an example to 
highlight the main issues being disputed.
The major mineral owners in the Denbighshire coalfield were the Williams- 
Wynns of Wynnstay Hall, the Myddletons of Chirk Castle, the Fitzhughs of Plas 
Power Hall, the Yorkes of Erddig Hall, the Merediths of Pentrebychan Hall and 
the Duke of Westminster of Eaton Hall. These families did not get directly 
involved in investing in the coal industry; they conformed with the behaviour of 
the majority of landowners who “preferred] the role of royalty recipients to that of 
entrepreneurs” (Church, 1986: 122). This meant that they were able to benefit 
from the success of mining enterprises, but did not become involved in the highly 
risky business of sinking mines and getting coal.
Most of the coal companies in Denbighshire mined land that was 
owned by a number of landowners; an illustration of the numbers that could be 
involved can be seen in Table 5.6 which lists the leases held, in 1912, by the 
Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd., one of the largest colliery companies on 
the coalfield. Table 5.6 shows that land was leased not only in very large parcels, 
but also in parcels as small as two acres, a factor which made royalty 
negotiations with lessors all the more difficult. Another factor which made 
negotiations difficult was the fact that, as already discussed above, different
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lessors leased their land under different terms, while some landlords could apply 
different methods to different tenants.
Table 5.6: Leaseholds held bv the Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. -1912
DATE Lessor Land in Acres
leased
Term-years
1880 P Fletcher & R 
Curries
Coed Eva Farm, 
Broughton
45 30
1889 T Fitzhugh Bersham & Broughton 897 42
1892 S.K Mainwaring Croes Newydd 32 21
1901 G Fitzhugh Broughton 19 30
1902 W.R Mainwaring Bryn Offa ? 12
1906 P Meredith The Court,Wrexham 73 21
1906 Misses Nickson Vron & Brymbo ? 25.5
1907 Miss Smith et al Hafod ? 21
1907 Duke of Westminster Talwrn ? 21
1907 Trustees B.Piercey Wrexham 20 21
1908 Bishop of Minevia Plas Maelor 2 21
1908 T Hayes et al Gatewen 196 60
1910 C Jackson Felin Puleston 19 21
1910 P Yorke Erddig 381 42
1911 T James & P Brown Talwrn 4 21
1911 F Mostyn Adwyr Clawdd 6 21
(Source: D/BC/2289)
To illustrate the main issues that caused problems between coal 
companies and their lessors, we examine below in greater detail, certain 
individual colliery companies and the disputes that they had with their lessors.
Vron
The Vron colliery was run by Messrs Maurice and Low from 1850 to 1882. One 
important lessor was Colonel Meredith of Pentrebychan Hall who had continuous 
problems with the colliery. As early as 1866, in a letter dated 17 October to Mr 
Bury (Meredith’s solicitor), Henry Dennis, the royalty agent for Pentrebychan Hall, 
remarked that “the Vron royalties are a farce this half year... Low is a beautiful 
promiser but a damn bad performer” (DD/DM/285/102). It appears that one of the 
reasons for the poor royalties was the fact that the lessees were working
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adjoining lands “the coal from which is not chargeable with wayleaves” 
(DD/DM/285/102, 17 October 1866), to the detriment of the Colonel’s royalties. 
The surveyors, Dennis and Glennie, in a letter dated 26 April 1867, wanted to 
enforce the clause that said that the lessees “shall at all times during the 
term ....continue to work and carry on the said mines in a proper uninterrupted, 
skillful and workmanlike manner” (DD/DM/285/102). They had urged the lessees 
to work the seams (some of which had not been worked for over twelve months), 
but they had made “lots of promises but no action”. The lessees “allege the 
badness of the times as an excuse for not having done more” and “as might be 
expected we have received promises of further progress during the winter, but 
we cannot but fear that there would have been nothing done during the last half 
year but for the letter you wrote to them, and we think it would be well that you 
should remind them again” (DD/DM/285/102, 12 October 1867).
Their entreaties did not have much effect, and the same problem 
continued for many more years; by 1874 “the [royalty] amount remain[s] very 
small and there is little chance of any improvement at present” (DD/DM/285/102, 
28 March 1874), due mainly to the difficulties of working the pit. These difficulties 
persisted until, in 1878, the working of the colliery was suspended for four 
months “owing to the depression in the coal trade”; this depression and the 
consequent poor performance meant that the colliery had been paying only dead 
rent to the Colonel for several years.
Colonel Meredith was not alone in his dispute with Vron. The Duke of 
Westminster was also a significant lessor, and surviving correspondence outlines 
that Messrs Maurice & Low were also disputing the royalty rates charged by the 
Westminster Estate. In 1880/81 the company was asking the Westminster Estate 
for a reduction in royalties because, as Mr Low explained to Isaac Shone, a 
mining engineer and partner in Shone & Ault, a mining engineering consultancy, 
in a letter dated 4 May 1881, there were “disadvantages under which we labour 
as compared with neighbouring and competing collieries” (D/GR/681). He 
continues, “as you are no doubt aware, the circumstances of the coal trade have 
completely changed and competition has become so keen that a difference of 1d
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per ton will gain or lose orders and prices are so fine 1d per ton either way makes 
profit or loss. It is therefore evident that no colliery can be carried on for any 
length of time unless it is on an equality with competing collieries”. He felt that
“we are not on an equality with our competitors, our royalty is 1/4th higher and
unless we are relieved by our lessors, we must succumb and stop working” 
(D/GR/681).
Shone’s advice to the Duke’s agent, George Hughes, was to “strongly 
urge upon you ... not to go on with a proportional rate of sales, but rather alter 
the manner of arriving at the royalties. You might charge so much per acre or so 
much per statute acre for the full thickness of the mine. These royalties, I 
consider would be even easier to the lessee than the reduced 
proportion....suggested” (D/GR/681). This change was not adopted, but the Duke 
agreed to reduce the royalty from 1/9th to 1/12th of sales value from May 1881. 
This was after further advice from Mr Shone who, in a letter dated 6 May 1881, 
pointed out that the great changes that had taken place in the coal trade in recent 
years, made it “not only difficult but impossible, except in exceptionally favourable 
situations for colliery proprietors to carry on their collieries to a profit” (D/GR/681). 
He acknowledged that the shift from local to ‘foreign’ (non-local) markets meant 
that Vron, due to its less favourable geographical position, was finding the royalty 
“a formidable item of cost”, and that it should be reduced as requested 
(D/GR/681). By 1882 the company was in liquidation, and a resolution was 
proposed “that to enable the liquidator to keep open and carry on the colliery 
during negotiations for its disposal as a going concern, the lessors will reduce 
dead rents, royalties and wayleaves, one half from the 25th day of March last. 
This reduction to terminate, if the colliery be meantime sold, or if and when the 
average price of coal at the pit reaches 8/- per ton” (D/GR/682).
By 1884, a new company had been created by F Butler, who negotiated a 
new 21 year lease. He wanted to move away from the proportion of sales royalty 
to the footage royalty due to the number of lessors involved. As his solicitor 
explained in a letter to George Hughes, dated 20 January 1885, “the number of 
properties that will be worked...will render the keeping of the coals raised from
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the different estates separate to meet the proportional royalty covenants almost 
an impossibility” (D/GR/682). The estate, however, would not agree unless all the 
other lessors concurred and, as this was not forthcoming, the 1/12th royalty 
continued.
A dispute soon developed and, by April 1886, the lessee was asking for a 
reduction in the royalty rate; in a letter to Hughes, dated 21 April, Butler explained 
that “there has been a very considerable fall in prices of shipping coal at 
Birkenhead and I fear that if you cannot meet us in the matter of royalties we 
shall be compelled to discontinue working one or both of the above seams 
[Brassey and Two yard]” (D/GR/681). Hughes replied on the 2 May 1886, 
expressing his disappointment at Butler’s dissatisfaction, given that “a good deal 
of trouble has been taken by the different lessors and their agents to arrive at a 
reasonable and fair charge” (D/GR/682). He further explained that he was unable 
to act unilaterally; Butler would have to gain the agreement of all the other 
lessors (D/GR/681).
An additional dispute arose when the company was looking at taking over 
the Talwrn colliery; it wanted to alter a clause so that the collieries could be 
worked as one single concern. Hughes would not agree to this because it would 
mean that the coal owned by the Duke was not being worked to the Estate’s 
advantage. If the company wanted the Talwrn lease it “must be worked 
independently of any adjacent collieries in the holding of the lessees and not in 
connection with any other collieries, also that the Talwrn colliery must be fairly 
and continuously worked” (D/GR/681). An agreement was eventually reached 
(the terms of which are not available), and the takeover went ahead.
By 1895, of the original shareholders of the Vron Colliery Ltd., only Butler 
was alive and the executors of the deceased shareholders wanted the company 
to be released from its leases due to its extremely poor performance. One of the 
shareholders, Mr FC Hyde, died in 1892 and his solicitor, in a letter dated 28 
June 1892, explained to the Duke’s solicitors that “we are sorry to say that the 
last half year has been more disastrous than ever. There is a temporary 
improvement in prices just beginning but we have lost very heavily since we saw
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you nine months ago, and should only be too glad to be relieved of all our leases, 
but fear there is no likelyhood [sic] of Mr Fitzhugh doing this with regard to his 
lease” (D/GR/682). By 1895 “the colliery itself barely pays expenses” (D/GR/682); 
it was badly in arrears of royalty and, in 1896, the shareholders’ representatives 
made a formal case for a reduction in royalties via a Memorandum, because 
“they have practically lost the whole of their capital [and] the share and debenture 
holders have received neither dividend nor interest for several years...The 
lessees have done all they believe possible in carrying out the terms of the 
leases and have expended large sums with the object of working as economically 
as possible, but owing to the extended nature of the old colliery, which they have 
done all they can to consolidate; to the distance the workable coal is from the 
shaft, to the extremely faulty nature of the ground necessitating an unusual 
expenditure in drivings and other dead work; to the excessive consumption of 
fuel consequent on the mine being so heavily watered, and to the geographical 
position of the colliery resulting in higher railway rates in several instances than 
are paid by other collieries in the district, the concern is unfortunately carried on 
at a loss” (D/GR/682). The lessees continued to struggle under the terms of the 
lease from which they were unable to extricate themselves but, by 1900 the 
company had failed, mainly due to the continuing problems with water, and the 
colliery was purchased by the Broughton & Plas Power Colliery Co. Ltd., 
principally as a shaft and a pumping station.
Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd.
The Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd was created in 1881 by the 
amalgamation of two partnerships: The Old Broughton Company, and the Plas 
Power Coal Company. It had two collieries, one at Plas Power and one at 
Gatewen (D/DM/309/2). The amount of land held freehold by the company was 
minimal (according to a mortgage deed of 1912, approximately 76 acres 
(D/BC/2289)), and it relied heavily on leasing land for mining purposes. The 
principal lessor for the Plas Power and Gatewen collieries was the Plas Power 
Estate owned by the Fitzhugh family; of 1120 acres available to the Plas Power
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colliery, 98 per cent was leased from Plas Power, and of the 809 acres available 
to Gatewen, the proportion was 54 per cent (D/BC/2289).
The leasehold arrangements with the Plas Power Estate had been entered 
into by the original partnerships, which preceded incorporation, but were later 
assigned to the company. These gave the mineral owner a fixed percentage 
royalty based on the sales value of the coal raised. The royalties were calculated 
on a 6 monthly basis in March and September until 1897 and, June and 
December thereafter. The sales value was reduced for royalty purposes by an 
allowance of 2d per ton of coal and 1d per ton of slack raised; the value of the 
coal supplied to the Estate was also excluded, as was a fixed amount of £21.7.6d 
(per half year) for the maintenance of ‘pit supports’. Once the royalty had been 
calculated, any tax due on it was deducted; a wayleave of 1d per ton was added 
and the final balance was then payable in full (see Table 5.7 for an illustration of 
such a calculation).
Table 5.7: Illustration of rovaltv calculation bv Broughton & Plas Power Co. Ltd. for Plas Power 
Estate. 1894
Coal 
tons cwt
Slack 
tons cwt
Sales 
£.s. d
Rovaltv
1/15
£.s.d
Brassev 30361.50 679.19 11199.09.20
less allowance
coal 2d per ton (253.00.20)
slack 1d per ton 2.16.80)
10943.12.40 729.11.6
Main 34187.13 765.15 12610.17.11
less supplied to Fitzhugh (43.10) (14.07.00)
12596.10.11
less allowance
coal 2d (284.10.10)
slack 1d (3.03. 10)
12308.16.30 820.11.9
1550.03.3
less allowance- pit supports 
a.r.p 2.3.16 @£15 per acre 
p a
(21.07.6)
Add any wayleave -
Total due 1528.15.9
(Source: DD/PP/614 Royalties, payable for 6 months to 31.3.1894).
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Relations with the Plas Power Estate were generally good; the only time 
tensions appeared was when the company faced financial difficulties, either due 
to prolonged strikes or to a general downturn in the industry. When such an event 
occurred the company negotiated for reductions in royalties; for example, in 1893 
a prolonged strike from 29 July to 17 November badly affected the performance 
of the company, and so the “directors deemed it reasonable to ask the royalty 
owners to pay a share of the very heavy loss we incurred” (D/DM/309/4). The 
cost of the strike was estimated at £1,900, of which £1,000 was ‘allowed’ by Mr 
Fitzhugh on 29 May 1894 as a deduction from the amount of royalty due 
(D/DM/309/5). However, the company continued to chafe against what it 
considered very high royalties of 1/15; on 5 April 1899 a meeting was held with 
representatives of the Plas Power Estate in an attempt to gain concessions due 
to “the unprofitableness of the trade in general since the company began to work 
and upon the disadvantages attaching to our trade in particular arising from the 
position of the pits insisted upon by the lessor [no details available as to what 
conditions were]...[and because the royalties paid]....by our neighbours [for 
example Bersham and Westminster] are much less than those we pay” 
(D/DM/309/5, 26 April 1899).
Concessions were finally gained at the end of 1902: not only did the lessor 
agree to a reduction of the royalty from 1/15th to 1/18th, but he also agreed to 
deduct a 10% ‘allowance’ from the total royalty, covering the half years from 
December 1903 to December 1906. Continued pressure from the lessees 
persuaded the Plas Power Estate to alter its policy from a ‘blanket’ royalty rate, to 
separate rates for various coal qualities; from the half year to December 1905 the 
royalty on Powell, Crank and Two Yard coal was calculated at 1/30th, while that 
on Main and Brassey coal remained at 1/18th, reflecting the poorer quality and 
hence lower value, of the former coals compared to the latter.
At the end of 1912 the company applied for further allowances from the 
Plas Power Estate, citing poor performance, legislation and the national strike as 
mitigating factors (DD/PP/618). The company estimated that the national strike 
had cost it £3,756 (D/DM/309/7, 24 April 1912) and since the introduction of the
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minimum wage meant that wages could not be squeezed, it turned its attention to 
its royalty rates. While the directors did “not forget that Mr Fitzhugh has been 
content to accept much less than the royalty originally stipulated in the lease, 
recognizing the great change in the conditions of trade since 1881; ...they [did 
not] think that he...[could] be aware of how great that change has been”. To 
illustrate the extent of this change the directors pointed out that a royalty of 1/18th 
in the years 1909-10-11 yielded 6 per cent more than in 1904-05-06, and that the 
increased legislation recently imposed upon them had increased the selling price, 
“although not to the extent ....it has increased the cost. This legislation 
[especially the Eight Hours Act] has therefore told in favour of the royalty owner 
under a sliding scale, by increasing the price” (DD/PP/618, 18 July 1912). The 
directors further added that “the effects of the Minimum Wage Act and the 
[National] Insurance Act whilst increasing the cost very largely will no doubt lead 
to some further increase in the selling price of coal, and this again will raise the 
royalties to a still higher figure to the advantage of the lessor, but judging from 
our past experience, without any corresponding benefit to the lessees” 
(DD/PP/618, 18 July 1912). The mineral agent employed by Mr Fitzhugh, Mr E 
Lloyd Jones, was given the task of considering the Broughton & Plas Power Coal 
Co. Ltd. application. In his opinion, “I cannot recommend a larger allowance 
towards the strike cost than £150 in all” (DD/PP/618, 23 January 1913).
The company continued in its efforts and, in August 1913, asked the Plas 
Power Estate’s solicitor if it could “let the payment of the royalty accounts stand 
over for a while as we are for the time being very short of cash” (DD/PP/618, 25 
August 1913). In a meeting in November the Plas Power Estate countered by 
saying that “Mr Fitzhugh was under the impression that prices of coal were high 
and coalowners were doing well [and that]....no other lessee had made an 
application for an allowance” (D/DM/309/7, 29 November 1913). In its defence 
the company cited the fact that water was badly affecting the Gatewen colliery 
and that there was a “falling off in the supply of coal from the best seams which 
could only be made up by coal from inferior seams at a higher cost [which] was a 
disadvantage constantly increasing” (D/DM/309/7, 29 November 1913).
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Negotiations continued throughout 1914 and finally, in a report on the 
issue, Mr E Lloyd Jones conceded that “there is no doubt from the figures in the 
Balance Sheets that the company have (sic) done badly during that half year 
[31.12.1914]”. He cited as reasons the reduction in good coal which increased 
the cost of getting, the increase in water, the increase of general costs and 
wages, and the system of contracts which often meant that costs were not 
covered by the selling price" (DD/PP/620, 3 July 1915). “The general result of the 
rise in wages and materials over the last 20 years and particularly of late years, 
has been to send up gradually the price [cost] of coal, whilst at the same time the 
profits of the coal proprietors have been more restricted than they used to 
be....The result of the foregoing circumstances alters the value of a proportional 
royalty rate, and I think that the time has come when the lessor might reconsider 
the royalty rate with a view to a fair adjustment between landlord and tenant” 
(DD/PP/620, 3 July 1915). The ultimate result of this report was to reduce, from 
the half year to December 1914, the royalty payable from 1/18th to 1/19th.
Westminster
The Westminster colliery was developed by the Brymbo Mineral & Railway Co. 
from the mid 1840s (Lerry, 1958: 47), and was one of the main ventures in which 
Robert Roy and Henry Robertson were involved. However, the relationship 
between the two broke down, and by 1855 they and their other partners, R 
Ellerton and WE & CE Darby, were proposing to split their interest in two; Roy 
and Ellerton to take on the Westminster pits, leaving Robertson and the Darbys 
with the Brymbo interests. To be able to do this they had to approach their main 
lessor, the Duke of Westminster, for approval. In a letter to the Duke’s agent, 
George Hughes, dated 19 February 1856, the surveyor, William Lowe, remarks 
that “under the circumstances, I would advise you to allow Messrs Darby and 
Robertson to retire (although I should have preferred they had remained and the 
others retire) as the two parties can never now work amicably and energetically 
together again” (D/GR/686). He also strongly advised that the lessor ‘keeps an
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eye’ on the ‘new’ tenants (Roy & Ellerton) to protect his interest, “the work will 
however require to be on the part of the Marquis, for some time strictly looked 
into and the parties greatly urged to open out the works better than has been 
done during the past six months, otherwise in a short time the royalty will be 
down to the minimum rental” (D/GR/686 - underlining in the original). In a later 
letter, he continues, “I have no hesitation in saying that [the work] only requires to 
be carried out with energy and spirit to become by far the most valuable and 
important colliery in the neighbourhood of Wrexham” (D/GR/687).
However, a dispute began over the terms of the lease, with the newly 
incorporated Westminster, Brymbo Coal & Coke Co. Ltd. questioning the method 
used by the Estate’s surveyor to calculate the royalty payable. The essence of 
the initial dispute was the treatment of pillars; until 1855, no royalty was levied on 
the pillars that the company left standing during the working of the pits but, from 
that date, the surveyor, Isaac Shone, deemed that as it was the company’s 
choice not to work the pillars, they could be accused of not working the pits 
properly, as coal which should by rights have been worked, was not. This view 
was reiterated by AH Maurice, surveyor, in a report to Mr Meredith of 
Pentrebychan Hall, in 1868, over a similar dispute. “In ordinary cases all pillars 
are to be worked or paid for whether worked or not unless there is some good 
reason for leaving them, such as the support of buildings on the 
surface....Oftentimes they become difficult or expensive to work owing to the 
pressure of the roof or other causes, yet the lessee is in no way exempt from 
payment for royalty on this account” (DD/DM/285/88 - underlining in original).
Thus began an extremely long and acrimonious dispute which covered 
many issues including royalty rates: in a letter dated 18 September 1866, Robert 
Roy described the threat of court proceedings against the company as “the most 
injurious and offensive mode of proceeding”. He continued that “the company did 
not abandon hopes of an amicable adjustment”, but he felt that the Westminster 
Estate was guilty of “grievous overcharges and injustices” (D/GR/688). He 
explained that the company was “seriously aggrieved by the delay that has 
occurred - a delay not arising from the merits or difficulties of the questions at
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issue which are very simple - but merely from casual obstacles upon your side, to 
adjusting the machinery for settling them”. So bitter did the dispute become that 
the two sides could not even agree on the appointment of an ‘arbitrator’ 
(D/GR/688).
In order to strengthen its arguments, the company commissioned a 
number of reports; one, by Marcus Scott, “a mining surveyor of considerable 
experience”, dated 3 April 1872, explains that “the Westminster collieries cannot 
bear higher rates than those above named (£20 per foot thick per acre for 2 yard 
and Brassey, and £25 for Main). The company will shortly have to meet a strong 
competition from the Broughton Hall colliery [and given that the company makes] 
a very small return for their capital [and is also suffering] the heavy expenses of 
litigation, the Westminster Estate would be advised to accept the lower royalties” 
(D/GR/689). The Estate, however, would not agree; in a letter to Henry Dennis, 
colliery manager, dated 17 August 1872, George Hughes explains that “the 
proposed reduction already agreed to from £35 to £30 per foot per acre is a very 
liberal one - more particularly considering the present very high price of coal” 
(D/GR/685). The dispute was eventually resolved in 1873, when a new lease was 
negotiated, unfortunately however, the terms of this lease are not available 
(D/GR/688).
Conclusion
The three royalty case studies examined in this chapter have served to outline 
many of the most contentious issues that the coal companies of Denbighshire 
faced. For the Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. the legislation that was 
introduced in 1908 (Eight Hours Act) and 1912 (Minimum Wage Act), coupled 
with general downturns in trade was behind its relatively regular requests for a 
revision of its royalty rates. The Westminster, Brymbo Coal & Coke Co.Ltd.’s 
protracted dispute with the Westminster Estate centred on its desire to change 
the royalty rates that had been agreed at the inception of the lease while the Vron 
colliery’s difficulties stemmed from geological problems and its poor location. One
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can assume that these companies were not unique in having problems with their 
lessors and that similar disputes happened throughout Denbighshire, as others 
have indicated was the case throughout the British coal industry.
It can be concluded that, far from being a straightforward business 
arrangement, the relationship between lessee and lessor was often a difficult 
one; many protracted disputes arose and in some cases resulted in litigation 
which ultimately was of little or no benefit to either party. Thus, mineral ownership 
was far from being a means of guaranteed, ‘easy money’ for the landowner. 
From the point of view of the coal companies it is difficult to conclude whether 
royalties were indeed as significant as the companies often claimed them to be or 
not. It is certainly true that, in absolute terms, royalties did not constitute a 
particularly significant element of costs but, it is equally true that changes in 
royalty rates could severely affect the profit margins of coal companies (see also 
Chapter 8). Leases entered into when the market was buoyant could soon 
become onerous if any of the hazards associated with mining, such as water, 
gas, or simply a downturn in the market, were encountered.
The Royal Commission on Mining Royalties of 1890 concluded that there 
was nothing unfair in the existing system and recommended maintaining the 
status quo (Mitchell, 1984: 255) and it is difficult, if not impossible, to conclude 
whether any particular region suffered disproportionately under the burden of 
royalties compared to other regions. The coalowners of Denbighshire would 
probably have asserted that they were at such a disadvantage, but if average 
royalties are scrutinised (see Table 5.3), it appears that Denbighshire, far from 
suffering from unduly high royalties in comparison with other regions, had, in 
1890, one of the lowest average royalty rates at 4d per ton. This, however, is an 
average figure which would have been extracted from official statistics and, given 
the high proportion of ‘small’ coal companies (those employing fewer than 250 
persons) in Denbighshire, and especially Flintshire (54 and 84 per cent 
respectively), the average undoubtedly reflects the lower royalties paid by the 
smaller companies.
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It may have been concern over the impact that royalties had on their profit 
margins that made the coal companies grumble so much, or it may be that they 
simply resented having to pay what they considered a considerable amount to 
landlords who did little to ‘earn’ their return. Whatever their reason for disliking 
royalties so much, the limited evidence available allows us to conclude that, 
during the period under review, although individual companies may have suffered 
under the terms of their leases, the coal industry in Denbighshire, as a whole, 
does not appear to have been economically disadvantaged, as compared with 
companies operating in other coalfields, by the royalty system that prevailed at 
the time.
Having looked at the first of our other stakeholders, the mineral owners, 
we will now turn our attention to the employees of the coal companies, possibly, 
the most important stakeholders for, without their toil, no coal could be extracted 
and no profits made. The next chapter will therefore consider not only the 
relationship of the coal companies with their employees, but also the 
development of the trade unions in Britain, Wales and Denbighshire, because as 
the trade unions grew in strength they had a significant impact on the relationship 
between coal companies and the miners.
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Chapter 6
LABOUR RELATIONS 
Introduction
The ‘miner’ and his relationship with his boss, ‘the coalowner’ was integral to the 
performance of a colliery. The miner was dependent on the coalowner for his 
livelihood but, equally, if the miner withdrew his labour then the coalowner was 
unable to trade. This inter-dependency made for a very turbulent ‘marriage’ which 
saw the ‘balance of power’ shift steadily, in the last decades of the nineteenth 
and the first decades of the twentieth centuries, from the ‘masters’ to the ‘men’. 
The main reason for this shift was the growth of trades unions within the coal 
industry and the main aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how and why the 
trades unions were able to grow.
This chapter will first chart the development of national miners’ unions 
through the nineteenth century, before focusing on the relationship between 
Welsh miners and their employers in the period 1850 - 1914, concentrating in 
particular on the history of trade unionism in Denbighshire. The issue of wages 
as a component of cost and their impact on profits will be discussed elsewhere in 
this thesis (see Chapter 8), however, wages as a means of reward and the 
methods that were used to determine levels of remuneration will be discussed in 
this chapter. The main focus of the chapter is on north Wales, and Denbighshire 
in particular, but the development of the union movement in south Wales is 
covered in some detail. One reason for this is that, despite the disparity in size, 
many of the issues raised are relevant to both regions. Another is that, as the 
nineteenth century developed, south Wales and the issues specific to that region 
came to the forefront of labour relations, not only in Wales, but throughout Great 
Britain and thus had a direct impact on events in Denbighshire.
South Wales has also been used as a focal point for this chapter because 
the development of a strong union in north Wales had more similarities with the
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developments in south Wales than, for example, those in nearby Lancashire. 
Although Lancashire is geographically closer to north Wales, it has not been 
used as the main comparator because, unlike in Wales, mining in Lancashire 
was not in remote areas where it was the dominant employer “but in large urban 
areas in which occupational diversity was the norm and where colliers were 
integrated into a wider industrial workforce” (T Griffiths, 1996: 199). The problems 
faced by unions in Lancashire and other more developed mining areas were 
therefore different to those faced by the unions in newer coalfields such as those 
in Wales, which did not ‘take off until the mid-nineteenth century. However this is 
not to say that events in Lancashire did not have a significant impact on north 
Wales and, as such, comparisons will be made with this region as and when they 
apply.
We will first outline the various attempts that were made throughout the 
nineteenth century at creating a ‘national’ miners union before briefly examining 
developments in Wales, both north and south, in the years to 1875. We will then 
examine, in detail, the experiences of Denbighshire and south Wales in the years 
1875-1914, looking specifically at issues such as the Sliding Scale, the 1893 
strike, the 1908 Eight Hours Act and ‘hard and difficult places’.
National Miners’ unions in the nineteenth century
Pre 1840
The term trade union was not recognised by legislation until 1871; prior to that 
date the term ‘trade society’ was more commonly used (Chase, 2000: 2). The 
early trade societies (eighteenth century) were local affairs “restricted to 
members of a particular craft in a particular town” (Musson, 1972: 17), and were 
almost exclusively to be found in the “artisanal sector” (Chase, 2000: 36). 
Throughout the late eighteenth/early nineteenth centuries, trade societies 
flourished in the ‘craft’ sector, but were slower to develop in the non-craft trades
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such as mining because here “the division between capital and labour was 
deepest and the feeling of exploitation keenest” (Musson, 1972: 15). Indeed, 
rather than organise themselves into a coherent, wide-ranging movement, the 
miners tended to embark on ad hoc demonstrations which were generally 
confined to a specific pit or village.
Before a national miners’ union was finally successfully created in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century, there had been a number of attempts to create 
such a national movement. The 1830s had seen the “rise of the concept of 
national trade unionism” (Challinor & Ripley, 1990: 7), and there had been an 
attempt to create a ‘Grand National Consolidated Trade Union’ to encompass all 
the various trades and crafts. This proved to be far too ambitious for the time, 
and soon failed.
It was also in this period that “in the mining industry, the same desire for 
‘collective’ action made itself manifest” (Rogers, 1928, III: 218). In Lancashire the 
miners decided to organise themselves on a wider scale than simply a district 
basis, and the Friendly Associated Coalminers’ Union (FACU) was formed (EW 
Evans, 1961: 39). The main aim of the union was to protect wages and support 
miners in their struggles against the masters. With this in mind, the union sent its 
agents into other regions such as north Wales and Staffordshire with a certain 
amount of success, and it was able to support the south Wales miners in their 
1831 strikes. However, the coalowners and authorities were alarmed by such 
developments and did all they could to stamp out such ‘sedition’. Eventually, as a 
result of a combination of factors, the union disappeared as a potent force for 
unity among the miners. According to EW Evans (1961; 44), “it is not difficult to 
find reasons for the catastrophic collapse. Indeed the problem is rather to select 
the most important”. EW Evans (1961: 45) cites three reasons:
i) politics - agitation for parliamentary reform took away the attention of 
the unionists from the miners;
ii) the Truck Act’ removed one of the main reasons for discontent; and
iii) the opposition of the non-conformist groups which had a significant 
influence over many miners.
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Ultimately, it was the miners themselves who prevented the success of a 
national union; “they were too sectional and localised for [such a] general union 
to be successful” (Musson, 1972: 30). This view is reinforced by Rowe (1923: 5- 
6) who states that “there are considerable grounds for taking each coalfield as a
distinct unit and the mining of coal in each field as an industry in itself each
coalfield was in the matter of wages, a more or less distinct unit”. This obviously 
meant that miners were more concerned with issues affecting their own coalfield, 
and it was difficult to find issues that applied to the country as a whole which 
could unite them.
In 1842 the first national strike of workers occurred, “a cry of anguish and 
despair” (Challinor & Ripley, 1990: 25) which started when coal and iron workers 
went on strike in the Black Country to protest against the masters’ demands for 
wage cuts. The strike spread to north Staffordshire and “by the end of July all the 
North Staffordshire mines were closed and the whole of the Midlands was 
engulfed. Industry ground to a halt” (Challinor & Ripley, 1990: 25). The 
millowners of Lancashire and Yorkshire also tried to reduce wages and soon 
these regions were also at a standstill. “By August, almost all the industrial parts 
of Britain were involved in industrial strife”, and hardship was acute, “especially in 
the mining communities where opposition was the staunchest and most 
prolonged” (Challinor & Ripley, 1990: 26). Eventually there were riots in 
Staffordshire which were put down by troops, and there was a period of savage 
repression. According to Challinor & Ripley (1990: 34), “this helped to develop a 
feeling of class consciousness....especially among the miners [who began] to 
think of themselves as a separate and distinct entity in society”.
1840-1860
It was in this context that the next attempt at creating a national miners’ union 
took place when, on 7 November 1842, the Miners’ Association of Great Britain 
(MAGB) was established (Challinor & Ripley, 1990: 7). The aim of the union was
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“to unite all miners, to equalise and diminish the hours of labour and to obtain the 
highest possible amount of wages for the labour of the miner” (Challinor & Ripley, 
1990: 8). It was the first union to use the courts to protect its members, and was 
one of the first unions “to be seriously involved in political and Parliamentary 
action” (Challinor & Ripley, 1990: 9). The desire to equalise pay throughout the 
UK was an acknowledgement of one of the reasons for the earlier union’s failure; 
if different conditions persisted in different areas then common issues were more 
difficult to establish, and factionalism would destroy this union as it had the earlier 
one. As Taylor (1955: 47) explains, “the miners of the northern counties had 
learned one lesson above all others from their past experience: that the strongest 
weapon in the hands of the coal-masters was the ability to break a local strike by 
importing ‘strangers’ from other mining areas. Only an organisation with a 
national basis and membership could counter this decisive advantage”. However, 
despite this realisation, local issues continued to dominate because every 
coalfield had its own specific problems; in some it was child/women labour, in 
others it was the truck system and in others the exhorbitant prices charged by 
masters for powder, lampoil etc. (Challinor & Ripley, 1990: 55).
Nevertheless, the miners were motivated to join the MAGB; possible 
motivating factors were the repression that followed the 1842 strike and the 
realisation that only organised opposition had a chance of success, the continued 
existence of truck shops and other localised grievances, and the shocking 
publicity stimulated by the “unparalleled volume of documents describing coal­
mining conditions” (Challinor & Ripley, 1990: 45) that were published in the 
1840s. The miners could see the justice behind their desire to improve conditions 
for themselves and their mining ‘brethren’ throughout Great Britain.
The MAGB resolved to “form ourselves into societies, these into Districts 
and those Districts into one grand body, as speedily as possible, to consist of the 
whole of the coalminers of England” (cited by Challinor & Ripley, 1990: 62). 
Initially it made little headway beyond Yorkshire and the north east; when the first 
‘national’ meeting took place, in May 1843, most delegates were from these 
regions, “with a sprinkling from the Scottish coalfields, only one came from
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Lancashire and none came from elsewhere. The union could hardly be 
described ....as attaining national dimensions” (Challinor & Ripley, 1990: 65). 
However, the union grew; at the time of the May meeting it had 4,802 members, 
by July membership “was claimed as 30,000” (Leeds Mercury, 22 July 1843, 
cited by Taylor, 1955: 48) and it “was an object of awe....its size and financial 
resources were spoken of in legendary terms” (Challinor & Ripley, 1990: 8).
It appeared that the MAGB had “achieved the miracle of becoming a 
genuinely national union” (Challinor & Ripley, 1990 : 73). However, unfortunately, 
before the national organisation was firmly established, it had to “undergo a great 
ordeal” (Rogers, 1928, V: 154). The miners of Durham and Northumberland were 
determined to free themselves from the Bond, a system of annual employment 
contracts which gave the men little flexiblility and “left [them with] no safetly-valve 
for the active expression of discontent” (Taylor, 1955: 54); when the owners 
refused to compromise they went on strike. The MAGB supported the strike but, 
“the harshness of the employers” and “the relentless force of economic pressure” 
meant that after eighteen weeks the miners returned to work (Rogers, 1928, V: 
154). The union, having lost here in its heartlands had suffered a body-blow from 
which it never recovered, and although the MAGB continued strongly in some 
areas, e.g. Lancashire, its aspirations as a national movement were destroyed. It 
continued to limp along but by March 1848, “the union had ceased to function 
and miners throughout the British Isles were unorganised” (Challinor & Ripley, 
1990: 234).
The main reason for the failure of the MAGB was the fact that there was 
such a multitude of grievances in the various parts of the British coalfield. As 
Challinor & Ripley (1990: 59) explain, “the many evils against which the men 
pitted their strength [meant that] the Association had many voices, not one. The 
very things that called the union into being also destroyed it”. Another factor that 
contributed to the union’s failure was the severity of the ‘cruel forties’; the 
depression meant that members withdrew through lack of funds, and the instinct 
for self-preservation meant that the ‘common good’ was a principle that was soon 
forgotten. As Mathias (1969: 366) observes, ’’the economic context was  a
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potent barrier" to union membership, especially as “the malicious hostility of the 
powers that be” were also ranged against union members (Challinor & Ripley, 
1990: 239). Thus had the second attempt at a nationwide miners’ union also 
failed.
1860-1885
Although the attempt to establish a national body had failed, local unions 
remained (Rogers, VI: 102), and in some regions could even be described as 
strong (Musson, 1972: 53). On a national scale, despite a “futile attempt” to re­
form the MAGB in 1855 (EW Evans, 1961: 86), little was done until the 1860s 
when the National Association of Miners, “a powerful combination”, was created 
in 1863 (Nelson Boyd, 1879: 160). Unlike the earlier unions, the main aim of this 
union was not to maintain or improve wages; “its sole function was to press for 
mining legislation and to defend the colliers rights in the courts” (EW Evans, 
1961: 89).
Issues of safety in the mines and the need for some sort of mechanism to 
enforce minimum standards had been highlighted by the end of the 1840s by the 
MAGB amongst others. The 1842 Report of the Commission to investigate the 
employment of women and children was particularly shocking and led directly to 
legislation to outlaw the employment of women and boys under ten years old 
underground (Nelson Boyd, 1879: 49). It also introduced the concept of mines 
inspection which was particularly hated by the masters; they considered the 
policy “a useless and mischievous prying into the affairs of individuals” (Nelson 
Boyd, 1879: 58).
A series of serious accidents in the 1840s led the Government to 
commission a number of inquiries to be made into conditions in the mines; these 
“disclosed a blameable state of affairs; the collieries were in many cases ill- 
managed, the overmen illiterate, the ventilation poor, the discipline lax and 
human life disregarded” (Nelson Boyd, 1879: 78). This resulted in the 1850 Mines 
Inspection Act which Rogers (1928, VI: 101) describes as a “meagre measure of
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reform”, and which Nelson Boyd (1879: 105) says “did little else than establish 
the principle of underground inspection”. However, the principle had been 
established and, in the case of accidents, it meant that at least there now had to 
be a thorough investigation (Nelson Boyd, 1879: 107). Nevertheless, only four 
inspectors were appointed and although “they performed their duties admirably” 
(Rogers, 1928, VI: 101), there were simply too few of them, and agitation 
continued for more effective legislation. This came about in a series of Acts; the 
1855 Act “was a great step in advance of the previous one [because] the 
responsibility of management became more defined, and the owners became 
accountable in the eye of the law for keeping the pits in a safe condition” (Nelson 
Boyd, 1879: 132). The 1860 Mines Regulation and Inspection Act even “more 
clearly defined the respective duties of masters and men” (Nelson Boyd, 1879: 
132), and an Act in 1862 ensured that the men working underground had two 
effective means of escape in the event of an accident. As mentioned earlier, the 
main aim of the new union was to push for even stronger legislation to protect the 
miners.
The new union, the National Association of Miners (NAM), had its roots in 
Staffordshire in 1861; it had grown quickly there and had spread so successfully 
into parts of north Wales that The North Staffordshire and North Wales Miners 
Association’ became its first district. In November 1863 a national conference of 
unionists was held and, according to Rogers (1928, VII: 160), this “marks a 
distinct stage in the miners’ movement in this country”. This is because for the 
first time a central fund was established, and a “policy of persuasion was adopted 
as opposed to a policy of confrontation” (Rogers, 1928, VII: 160), which again 
marked a move away from the sometimes violent policies of the past.
Unfortunately, within a short time, factions appeared within the NAM and it 
split into two distinct ‘camps’; one supporting Alexander MacDonald, a Scottish 
unionist, and the other, John Towers, editor of ‘The Miner’, who represented the 
north Wales coalfield. According to Rogers (1928, VII: 168), “the personal enmity 
that arose between [these two] boded ill for the national movement” and 
throughout 1863 and 1864 bitter quarrels between the two factions dominated
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NAM business. Another problem was that the union did not have a formalised set 
of rules, a fact that resulted in different areas doing their own thing, which was 
obviously detrimental to those advocating a truly national body. The animosity 
between the two camps was so great that eventually a group of unionists 
seceded from the union and tried to create a new union; this proved 
unsuccessful, but the development immeasurably weakened any chance of 
creating a strong national organisation (Rogers, 1928, VII: 175). The NAM 
continued under the leadership of MacDonald whose faction had prevailed while 
Towers ceased as editor of The Miner’ in September 1865 (Rogers, 1928, VIII: 
113). However, the NAM could no longer be deemed a national union, and as 
Rogers (VIII: 113) states, “the year 1864 left the union in an enfeebled condition”.
In 1869, two prominent union leaders from Lancashire, William Pickard 
and George Halliday, felt that it was time to create a more aggressive union than 
the NAM, and established the Amalgamated Association of Miners (AAM); they 
advocated a “national union to replace inefficient local unions [which] were 
rendered ineffective through competition” (Rogers, 1928, VIII: 129). This meant 
that two unions co-existed and were often represented within one coalfield. This 
obviously weakened the workers’ negotiations with owners as the different unions 
had different agendas, and often the most important issue was to ‘get one over’ 
on the other union, a policy that would do little to further the welfare of the miners 
(Rogers, 1928, IX: 196).
The 1870s saw various other alternatives to the NAM being suggested 
due to the “growing opposition to its moderate policy” (Rogers, 1928, IX: 190). 
However, the regional nature of both the NAM and AAM meant that, although 
district associations might be relatively strong, their objectives often differed from 
those of other districts which made creating a national union very difficult. 
Furthermore, the depression of the late 1870s saw both the NAM and the AAM 
“withdraw defensively into their sectional shells” (Musson, 1972: 67), and while 
such circumstances prevailed the likelihood of creating an effective national 
union was minimal.
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By the late 1880s many of the district associations had come to realise that if 
they wanted to create an effective opposition to the employers and a mechanism 
for securing legislation to protect the miners, they had to overcome their local 
chauvinisms and work together. It was with this principle in mind that in October 
1889 the Miners Federation of Great Britain (MFGB) was created. Its specific 
aims were higher wages and legislation to bring in an eight hour day (EW Evans, 
1961: 145).
According to Rowe (1923: 35-6) it is “easy to over-estimate the effective 
influence of trade unions (MFGB) at that date....[because] in the smaller 
coalfields there was little or no organisation” but, as those district unions that did 
exist fought, and usually lost battles with the employers, they gradually came to 
understand the value of national co-operation, and affiliated themselves to the 
MFGB which had become “a rallying point for all who were discontented” (EW 
Evans, 1961: 146) with their current circumstances. Despite this it still took 
almost twenty years for the MFGB to absorb all the district organisations, and 
“only in 1919 did the general secretaryship become a full time post” (Howell, 
1996: 35).
Although the district unions affiliated themselves to the MFGB, many 
remained strong, to the extent that Howell (1996: 36) describes the Federation as 
“more of a collection of disparate unions than a national body”, especially in 
moments of stress because “each district union had its own history - usually 
longer than the Federation - its own myths and symbols and ethos".
These problems gradually disappeared and the national body grew in 
strength and influence; its demands for an eight hour working day were met in 
1908 and it then concentrated its efforts on improving the wages of the miners; 
their eventual demand being for a national minimum wage. By 1912, this issue 
was at the forefront of British industrial relations, and the organisation was by this 
time sufficiently united to call a national strike, “a strike of a magnitude hitherto
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unknown” which meant “a creeping paralysis of the whole of the industrial life of 
Great Britain” (Page Arnot, 1967: 284).
The 1912 strike had come about largely as a result of issues raised in 
south Wales, which had emerged as the ‘“storm centre’ of industrial unrest” (C 
Williams, 1996: 125), in the first decade of the twentieth century. This emergence 
of south Wales as a proactive, and even leading ‘unionist’ district within the 
MFGB is surprising given that the district did not become affiliated to the national 
organisation until 1899 (EW Evans, 1961: 146) and its history, up until then, had 
been one of division, defeat and conciliation, which resembled in many ways the 
struggles of the unionists in its smaller northern neighbour.
Labour history in Wales
In this section we will examine the development of trades unions in both south 
Wales and Denbighshire in the period to 1914, and will attempt to draw out the 
similarities between developments in the two regions. Despite the obvious 
disparities between the north and south Wales coalfields in terms of size, north 
Wales having an output of 2.4 million tons in 1874, and employing 14,000 men, 
whereas south Wales had corresponding figures of 16.5 million tons and 73,000 
men, the histories of the union movement in each region contain many parallels. 
One of the strongest parallels between the two regions is the fact that, despite 
many attempts throughout the nineteenth century at creating a strong regional 
union, neither region was able to do this until the last years of the nineteenth 
century. However, it must be pointed out that the sheer numbers involved in 
south Wales, compared to north Wales, made the creation of such a union much 
more difficult in the former than in the latter region. It was far harder to create 
unity among the larger numbers in south Wales; despite the fact that, at various 
times, in numerical terms, unions in that region might appear strong, local issues 
often caused regional unity to break down. According to EW Evans (1961: 125) 
such issues were often more divisive in south Wales than in other regions 
because “geographical factors and inadequate communications isolated each
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mining valley from its neighbours”. This factor was exacerbated by the fact that 
south Wales produced so many different types of coal, each of which had its own 
market and therefore associated issues and problems.
The analysis will be split into two periods; the period up to 1875 and 1875- 
1914. Within each section we will follow the pattern of discussing developments 
in south Wales first and then those in Denbighshire.
The period up to 1875
South Wales
According to EW Evans (1961: 15), the first strike “to involve something that 
resembled a trade union” in south Wales was in 1822 when a strike protesting 
against wage reductions and the truck system in the coal industry affected almost 
the whole of Monmouthshire. This was a marked departure from the earlier 
pattern of isolated ad hoc strikes; although it was not organised in any way by a 
union, it was significant in that it involved a ‘combination’ of men from different 
pits, who “represented an intermediate stage between the spontaneous riots of 
the first two decades of the [nineteenth] century, and formal trade union activity” 
(EW Evans, 1961: 23).
Again, in 1830, the colliers of Monmouthshire went on strike. EW Evans 
(1961: 38) describes this as “an important turning point in the history of the 
colliers for it heralded the establishment of the first trade union in the coalfield”, 
undoubtedly, as in Denbighshire, influenced by the recently created FACU. This 
initial flurry of union activity was short-lived, and “in south Wales as in north 
Wales no mention of the Friendly Society ....is to be found after December 1831” 
(EW Evans, 1961: 44). The reason for this failure was common to both regions: 
disillusionment, victimization and lack of finance (both on the part of the miner 
and the union), issues that pervade the histories of the Welsh unions throughout 
the nineteenth century. Attempts by the MAGB to enlist members in Wales in the 
early 1840s met with little success in either Denbighshire or south Wales. In the 
former district the union claimed a membership of 400 in 1844, “although they
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were too poor to pay union dues” while it failed to make any substantial gains in 
south Wales (EW Evans, 1961: 68), and union activity was almost non-existent in 
south Wales until the 1860s.
The revival of union activity in the late 1860s/early 1870s saw three major 
stoppages in four years at the beginning of the 1870s, culminating with a five 
month long strike and lockout in 1875; this failed “gan fod yr undeb mewn cyflwr 
mor wan” (because the union was in such a weakened state) (ID Thomas, 1975: 
40) and the men had gone back to face a 15 per cent reduction, “wedi’u concro 
a’u gwaradwyddo” (having been conquered and disagraced) (ID Thomas, 1975: 
40). The AAM, which had supported the strike, found itself “substantially 
destroyed” (LJ Williams, 1976: 83), and according to ID Thomas (1975: 40) it 
disbanded, and “edrychai pethau’n dywyll ir glowyr ac i’r undebau” (things looked 
black for the miners and the unions).
It was in such circumstances that the form any new district union should 
take was being considered; should it be a centralised union with centralised 
funds, or should it be more district based? According to EW Evans (1961: 115) it 
was unfortunate for the miners that they decided on a union format that was 
based on districts with no central unit, and with each district individually affiliated 
to the national body. EW Evans (1961: 115) believes that “this ensured that no 
effective union was to exist in South Wales for over twenty years”. The 
“enthusiasm for independence reigned unchecked” (EW Evans, 1961: 116), and 
this saw the district organisations splinter into smaller units which meant that,
unlike the coalowners who were “united and victorious the men were
defeated, dispirited and disunited” (LJ Williams, 1976: 84).
Denbighshire
The miners in Wrexham had gone out on strike as early as 1776 (Rogers, 1928, 
III: 133) against the employment of ‘foreign’ workers but, before 1830, any 
industrial disputes were isolated and spontaneous, with little or no organisation 
beyond the immediate vicinity of the colliery involved. The year 1830 saw the 
“first large scale strike in North Wales” (Rogers, 1928, III; 237). This was in
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Denbighshire and became known as the ‘Cinder Hill Riots’ (see Appendix E for 
full details of the riots). The catalyst for these riots was poverty; a countrywide 
depression had seen conditions for the miners decline to such an extent that 
“much distress prevails among the working classes in the neighbourhood of 
Wrexham, Ruabon and other parts of Denbighshire [and] the privations endured 
by the families of these poor men are very great” (Shrewsbury Chronicle, 5 June 
1829, cited by Rogers, 1928, II: 135).
This episode was the the first example of men combining together for their 
common good but it should not be accorded too much significance; it was a 
purely industrial event precipitated by economic necessity and a loathing of the 
truck system. It should not in any way be seen as a political event, especially on 
the part of the Denbighshire miners. Their Flintshire counterparts, who were the 
instigators of the action, may have been influenced by the FACU (it had become 
established in Flintshire in 1830 -  Rogers, 1928, III: 239), but there is no 
evidence that the Cinder Hill Riots were anything other than an impulsive 
demonstration of ‘fraternity’ by the Denbighshire miners.
The success of the riots (the coalowners conceded a wage of 3 shillings a 
day and closed the Tommy shop at Acrefair), led to a flurry of union activity in 
Denbighshire but membership quickly waned as wages continued to fluctuate 
“according to the whims of the owners and the selling price of iron and coal” 
(Rogers, 1928, V: 133). In 1841, a slump in the iron trade precipitated a fall in 
wages and widespread distress prevailed. However, no disturbances on the 
scale of 1830 occurred, and the coalfield remained quiet (Rogers, 1928, V: 144). 
The possible reasons for this are twofold: the increasing influence of the Non­
conformists who preached ‘patience and resignation’, and the sheer magnitude of 
the distress which left the miners with little to strive for other than survival.
In 1843, according to Mr Benjamin Watson, a delegate from north Wales, 
in a report to the National Conference of the MAGB, north Wales “was probably 
in a worse plight than any other coalfield” (Morning Star, 9 September, 1843, 
cited by Rogers, 1928, V: 147) and, by 1847, little had improved. Indeed, the 
Report of the Commissioners of Enquiry into the State of Education in Wales -
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Part III (1847: 395-396, cited in Rogers, 1928, V: 141-2) described 
Rhosllanerchrugog as a place where housing conditions were ‘repugnant’. The 
Inspector reported, “I have never beheld anything to equal some of the cottages 
at Rhosllanerchrugog as regards confinement, filth and utter unfitness for human 
abode”. He continued, “[even] Merthyr Tydfil, the most depraved and uncivilised 
locality in Wales had yet to reach the depth of poverty and concomitant evils that 
Rhos had touched”. The deplorable conditions prevailing in the Wrexham area 
were blamed for the poor “moral standardfs]” existing at that time, and such was 
the reputation of the miners that “when the agents of the society went to North 
Wales and began to inquire for some of the colliers, the other inhabitants 
expressed their surprise that any man should inquire for a collier, stating that if 
they were seen with them, that decent people would avoid their company” 
(Benjamin Watson, 1843 Report to the Miners’ Association, cited by Challinor & 
Ripley, 1990: 53).
According to Challinor & Ripley (1990: 166), only one colliery in Ruabon 
was without a tommy shop and wages for a 12-14 hour day were between 1s 6d 
and 2s per day, which, according to Dodd (1971: 343-4), “were at best not much 
more than three quarters and at worst barely half those paid in England and 
Scotland”. Given such conditions it is hardly surprising that when, in 1843, the 
recently formed MAGB sent ‘missionaries’ into Denbighshire, “the response [they] 
invoked left much to be desired” (Rogers, 1928, V: 149). The union expected 
men to rush to join but, given the prevailing poverty in the region, the men were 
unwilling, and in many cases unable to join due to the cost. In addition to this, 
victimisation by the coalowners, “the rigid church discipline of the non­
conformists” and the lack of literacy, especially in English, prevented many 
miners from knowing what was going on in the wider world which prevented them 
from being influenced by ‘radical’ ideas (Rogers, 1928, VII: 147).
In the 1860s, reducing wages became an important objective for the 
coalowners of Denbighshire because production costs were increasing, and they 
tried a number of tactics to achieve this end. For example, in 1864 the Ruabon 
Coal Company wanted to revert to the pre-1860 local ton of 2460 lbs as a basis
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for payment. Although the men went on strike, due to the “enfeebled” state of the 
NAM, they ultimately had to submit and agree (Rogers, 1928, VIII: 113-15). Also, 
in 1867, the Brymbo owners succeeded in reducing wages by 10 per cent; the 
union was simply not strong enough to prevent it from happening and, although 
“these reductions led to considerable ill-feeling”, many collieries followed suit 
“with very little co-ordinated opposition from the men” (Rogers, 1928, VIII: 113- 
15).
In 1869-70 the AAM made inroads both in Denbighshire and in south 
Wales mainly due to the fact that it agitated for improved wages, and links were 
made between north and south Wales, Lancashire and Staffordshire (EW Evans, 
1961: 101). However, the union’s efforts saw more success in Denbighshire than 
in south Wales where recruitment was slow. By 1870 there were four districts in 
Denbighshire affiliated to the national organisation: Brymbo, Coedpoeth, Rhos 
and Cefn (Rogers, 1928, VIII: 131).
The early 1870s saw the the influence of the AAM in Denbighshire grow 
significantly; the Franco-Prussian war stimulated both the iron and coal industries 
until they were “booming” (Rogers, 1928, IX: 191). This boom in trade brought 
with it a corresponding increase in wages; many miners ascribed these increases 
to the union’s negotiations and, as they could now afford the levies, union 
membership was popular. However, what the miners may not have realised was 
that the wages would have increased without the AAM’s intervention, simply 
because the price of coal had increased; in north Wales coal was 8s a ton in 
January 1872, by October it was 21s and in April 1873 daily wages had risen to 
between 4s 9d and 5s (Rogers, 1928, IX: 191-3).
Trouble, however, lay on the horizon. The year 1873 saw a decline in coal 
prices and, “by March 1874 the slump in the coal trade had brought the prices 
down to 13s 6d a ton and it was difficult to find customers even at that price” 
(Rogers, 1928, IX: 197). The slump in the economy was echoed by a slump in 
union membership and “the autumn of 1874 found the tide of trade unionism 
ebbing” throughout Wales (EW Evans, 1961: 109). EW Evans (1961: 113) sums 
up the reasons for this as being:
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i) the financial weakness of the unions which prevented them from
having the resources to support their members in times of industrial 
unrest;
ii) the co-ordination of the owners; in both north and south Wales the
coalowners had joined together to form associations specifically to 
counter the wage demands of the men; and
iii) the heavy union dues; this was an important issue in both regions,
but in south Wales the miners were particularly against having to 
contribute towards a central fund, wishing to keep the funds locally 
so that local rather than national disputes could be funded. They 
wanted “a [southern] Welsh union with Welsh officials, a Welsh 
treasury, in fact [an] entirely [southern] Welsh [union]” (EW Evans, 
1961: 114).
In Denbighshire the coalowners were organised around the North Wales 
Coalowners Association (NWCOA). This association was created on 20 June 
1870 and replaced an earlier employers’ group which had been formed in 1855 
(Lerry, 1968: 33). The main impetus for the NWCOA was the desire of the 
coalowners to present a ‘united front’ to the miners in wage negotiations. All the 
major coal companies in Denbighshire were members of the NWCOA and the 
Chairmanship was held at various times by some of the most prominent 
coalowners in Denbighshire including Robert Roy, Henry Robertson and Henry 
Dennis (Lerry, 1968: 33).
In 1875 the NWCOA gave notice of a 15 per cent reduction from April; the 
men “unanimously decided to inform the owners of their determination to resist 
the proposed reduction” (Rogers, 1928, IX: 205). The owners countered with 
arguments to support the need for such a reduction; they asserted that wages in 
1875 were 32 per cent higher than in 1870 and that the costs of production had 
increased by 69 per cent in the same period. They “further asserted that while the 
North Wales coalfield depended chiefly on the export trade, large quantities were 
directly consumed by such local concerns as the British Iron Company, Brymbo
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iron works etc, and hence the slump in the selling prices of iron should also be 
considered” (Rogers, 1928, IX: 208). The men responded by saying that the 
selling price of coal should dictate the wages paid, but in effect they ‘shot 
themselves in the foot’, because by August 1875 the price of coal had fallen to 9s 
4d per ton (Rogers, 1928, IX: 209), and an investigation into prices by the union 
showed that the coal firms had “incurred a serious loss” (Rogers, 1928, IX: 214). 
The dispute was taken to a locally organised Conciliation Board, which met twice 
and advised an initial reduction of 10 per cent and a subsequent reduction of 15 
per cent (Rogers, 1928, IX: 210-14). The men were wholly opposed to this latter 
reduction and, by October 23 “the colliers of Brymbo, Coedpoeth, Cefn and 
Rhosllanerchrhugog turned out almost to a man”. The strike continued for almost 
two months but, by 17 December, the men returned on the owners’ terms, “worn 
out” by the struggle (Rogers, 1928, IX: 215). These wage reductions heralded 
“bitter times” for the miners; the depression “wrought havoc in the North Wales 
coalfield [and] economies were ruthlessly introduced at different collieries, and 
many owners had either to reduce wages or close the mines” (Rogers, 1928, X: 
186).
1875-1914
As can be seen from the above narrative, by 1875, trade unionism in Wales was 
at a low ebb. However, depite the failure of the different unions, some of the 
factors that strong unions would require were in place. The most important of 
these was the men themselves; unions could only work if they had members, and 
to be truly effective they had to have many members. The growth of the coal 
industry in north Wales between 1850 and 1875 had seen the number of 
employees increase from 4,623 in 1854 (Hunt’s ‘Mineral Statistics’) to 13,592 in 
1875 (FA Gibson, 1922: 29-30), an increase of 194 per cent. This increase was 
mirrored in south Wales where numbers increased from 31,373 (Morris & 
Williams, 1958: 73) in 1851 to 72,643 in 1875 (FA Gibson, 1922: 12), an increase 
of 131 per cent. The increase in the potential membership was obviously a good
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thing for a union in that the more members it had, the more influence it had, both 
on non-union miners, and on mine owners. It also allowed the union to grow 
financially; the more members it had, the more subscriptions it could expect. This 
would enable it to support its members during strikes, a factor that (hopefully) 
would encourage increased membership as non-members saw the evidence of 
the union working to protect its members.
However, as has already been discussed above, agreement was already 
difficult to achieve during this period and increasing the numbers of members 
was not likely to make this any easier. Also, as the number of collieries 
increased, the number of union lodges increased; each of these had its own 
issues and problems and these were often accorded more importance than more 
regional issues, let alone national issues, and until this problem could be 
surmounted the union movement in both north and south Wales was not likely to 
succeed.
This section will discuss how the trade unions in Denbighshire and south 
Wales faced these problems and finally succeeded in achieving their aims. The 
section will be divided up chronologically and will consider the following 
issues/periods: the sliding scale; 1875-1892; 1893; 1894-1908; the Eight Hours 
Act, 1908 and 1909-1914.
The sliding scale
According to LJ Williams (1976: 80) “wages were always, either formally or 
informally, closely geared to price changes” which meant that wages fluctuated, 
often fiercely, according to the vicissitudes of the coal industry. Without any 
formalised agreement as to how wage levels should be set, wage changes were 
often “only won or conceded after some sort of struggle” (LJ Williams, 1976: 80) 
which meant that industrial strife was an almost constant feature of some 
coalfields, for example, south Wales. A sliding scale was a mechanism designed 
to formalise the link between the price of coal and wage levels because it allows 
for “changing the levels of wages according to the movement of coal prices”
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(Rogers, 1928, X: 187) and provides an “easy, almost mechanical method” 
(Morris & Williams, 1969: 218) of doing so. By formalising this link and by 
achieving agreement from both coalowners and miners, in theory, industrial 
disputes should have become less frequent because both sides had signed up to 
the principle: in practice, as we shall see from examining events in Wales, this 
was far from the case.
South Wales
The first example of a Sliding Scale in Wales was an agreement made after the 
strikes of 1875 in south Wales. Here, according to Morris & Williams (1969: 219), 
“the owners accepted the principle [of a sliding scale] with reluctance and 
misgivings”: they wanted to assert their position and were generally opposed to 
any agreement that contained an element of arbitration (Morris & Williams, 1969: 
219). However, as EW Evans points out (1961: 98), the employers realised that 
some form of agreement had to be made because the costs of stoppages could 
be significant and, as they became more common, a solution to these “ruinous 
conflicts” (Morris & Williams, 1969: 220) had to be found, so the majority of 
owners accepted the sliding scale principle.
The miners felt that a sliding scale was something of a “significant 
concession” (Morris & Williams, 1969: 220): although they had long resisted such 
a mechanism they nevertheless felt that, at that time, it would help them ‘save 
face’ and also force the owners to negotiate with their leaders. More importantly 
they felt (somewhat erroneously as the future would demonstrate) that “it 
liberated future variations in wage rates from the arbitrary control of the 
employers” (Morris & Williams, 1969: 224).
According to EW Evans (1961: 117), negotiations were “protracted and 
hard fought”, but “owing to the weak bargaining position of the men”, the 
agreement that was made looked to be much in favour of the employers. This 
view is supported by LJ Williams (1976: 86) who says that “the scale that 
emerged in December 1875 seemed eminently satisfactory to the owners”. The
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terms of the agreement stated that the minimum cutting rate was to be set at 5 
per cent more than the 1869 rate; this meant that the wage was set at a level 
which corresponded to a selling price of 12 shillings per ton. If prices increased 
beyond this level, the wage rate would be increased by TA per cent “for each 
complete shilling rise in the average selling price, until wages reached their 
maximum when the average selling price was 21 shillings” (LJ Williams, 1976: 
86). Initially, both sides were happy; the owners anticipated saving money if 
prices fell, and the men felt that such a mechanism protected them because of 
the minimum wage rate, which EW Evans (1961: 119) believes was “the only 
clause advantageous to the men”.
It did not take long for both sides to rue their decision to sign the 
agreement. The reason being that, “no one had anticipated that the depression 
after 1876 would be as deep or as enduring as it proved to be” (Morris & 
Williams, 1969: 226). From the point of view of the owners, the fact that there 
was a minimum wage rate meant that due to the “catastrophic” fall in prices (LJ 
Williams, 1976: 87), they were unable to reduce the wages as much as they 
would have liked, and therefore the savings that they made were ‘capped’ 
because “the persistent fall in prices under the strict terms of the scale, could not
be matched by wage reductions the owners in brief had sadly misread the
trend of trade at the time the scale was negotiated” (LJ Williams, 1976: 88). From 
the point of view of the men, it took them a little while to realise that the terms of 
the agreement “made the scale extremely insensitive” because a half yearly audit 
would have to be held and an average selling price established, before any 
change could be effected (EW Evans, 1961: 120). The fact that the wage rates 
were governed by the average price throughout the coalfield meant that long 
term contracts for the sale of coal could bring the selling price, and therefore 
wages down, even if current prices were rising, a situation which EW Evans 
(1961: 120) describes as “a powerful incentive to sell as cheaply as possible 
[which] was an important factor in encouraging underselling and overproduction”. 
With both sides having realised the shortcomings of the sliding scale, the rest of
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the history of the sliding scale in south Wales was a battle of wills between the 
two sides as they tried to negotiate better terms for themselves.
Denbighshire
In Denbighshire the experiment with a sliding scale happened later than in south 
Wales and was short lived. In January 1880, representatives of the employers 
and workmen met, with WH Darby (Brymbo) as Chairman, and a committee was 
appointed to draft a scheme (Rogers, 1928, X: 188). Only seven collieries (albeit 
the biggest and most important collieries in Denbighshire) signed up to the 
agreement, which obviously left the owners of the other collieries free to 
‘negotiate’ their own wage rates, a division which did little to bring together the 
miners in the region. The Denbighshire agreement provided for the following: 
“The wages of all classes of underground workmen and of banksmen shall be 
regulated by a sliding scale based upon the net average selling price of the 
output at collieries of owners parties (sic) to this agreement” (‘North Wales 
Sliding Scale of 1880, Memorandum of Agreement’, cited in Rogers, 1928, X: 
188). The average selling price was to be agreed by two accountants, one 
appointed by the owners and the other by the workers, who would only disclose 
the district average, thus allaying the fears of the owners that sensitive 
information might be disclosed (cited in Rogers, 1928, X: 188). The selling price 
and wage rate to be used as ‘standard’ was that of December 1879, and “the 
advance shall be at the rate of 21/4 per cent on the standard rates for every 
fourpence per ton advance in the average selling price”. The average selling 
price was to be ascertained quarterly “and the wages payable in the following 
three months shall be regulated thereby” (cited in Rogers, 1928, X: 188), which 
made the system in Denbighshire more sensitive to price changes than the 
method used in south Wales where the audit of selling prices happened on a 
half-yearly basis (LJ Williams, 1976: 86). There is no direct evidence available,
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but it is likely that those negotiating the agreement were able to refer to the south 
Wales experience when determining how the agreement should work.
An initial 714 per cent increase was promised for February 1880, but this 
had to be withdrawn when the sliding scale mechanism did not justify it. This left 
many miners “disgruntled and disillusioned” (Rogers, 1928, X: 189), and even a 
714 per cent increase in February 1881 did little to endear the miners to the 
scheme. The colliers of Rhosllanerchrugog were especially against the scheme 
and invited representatives from the Lancashire and Cheshire Miners’ 
Association to visit Denbighshire. The leaders from Lancashire “lost no time in 
coming” to Denbighshire and “it was doubtless under their influence that miners 
throughout the Ruabon and Wrexham districts handed in notice on October 1 
demanding weekly wages and an advance of 714 %” (Rogers, 1928, X: 191). This 
in effect signalled the end of the sliding scale in Denbighshire and, unlike in south 
Wales, where both sides persevered with the sliding scale until 1902 (EW Evans, 
1961: 184), no attempts were made to resurrect the scale; instead, in October 
1883, north Wales was accepted as a district of the Lancashire Federation10 
which supported conciliation boards, rather than sliding scales, as a method by 
which to settle wage disputes. According to the Wrexham Advertiser (8 
September 1883, cited in Rogers, X: 201) this amalgamation would “improve our 
position financially, socially and morally” and allow the miners of Denbighshire to 
negotiate with their employers with the backing of a more effective union 
movement than they had been able to create on a local level.
‘One step forward, one step back’ -1875-1892
South Wales
In south Wales in this period, while the attention of the miners was concentrated 
on trying to vary the terms of the sliding scale agreement, some unionists, for 
example, William Abraham (Mabon), who had realised the importance of unity,
l0The Lancashire, Cheshire, North Staffordshire and Forest of Dean Miners Federation.
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tried to push for a centralised union; all he met with was “apathy, indifference and 
hostility” (EW Evans, 1959: 18). Mabon was “one of its [the sliding scale’s] most 
ardent supporters” (EW Evans, 1959: 14) because he believed that the 
mechanism would end strife in the coalfield, especially as it included what some 
interpreted as a minimum wage rate. This minimum rate, however, was not the 
benefit that it initially appeared to be, and “miners’ wages were reduced to 
subsistence level[s] as a consequence of the existence of a sliding scale” (EW 
Evans, 1959: 14). As previously discussed, the depression that followed the first 
sliding scale agreement meant that the miners’ wages were often at the minimum 
level. Having realised that they were unable to make savings in this area, the 
coalowners sought to reduce labour costs by indirect methods such as abolishing 
allowances for all work other than hewing. It might seem that such conditions 
would cause the miners to flock to a strong centralised union which covered the 
coalfield as a whole, but the opposite was true and, by 1877, EW Evans (1959: 
140) asserts that “the cause of [centralised] unionism [in south Wales] was dead”.
Despite the weakness of the central, coalfield-wide union in this period in 
south Wales, there was a proliferation of district unions, covering various parts of 
the coalfield. These district unions were organised around the ‘pit lodge’, which 
was the traditional means of organisation in the coal industry. These lodges 
were, in essence, mini-unions centred on an individual colliery and it was often 
the case that the loyalties of the miners were to the lodge rather than to the 
district union body, an issue which was to create great problems, as we shall see.
Although the district unions had no common policy regarding structure or 
funding, they did have a number of common characteristics: they wanted 
legislation for an eight hour day, they wanted to defend the interests of the 
workmen, and possibly of greatest importance “was their emphasis upon 
peaceful settlement of disputes” (EW Evans, 1961: 137). This desire for peace, at 
almost any cost, was reflected in the new sliding scale agreement which was 
signed in 1880. According to EW Evans (1959: 23), “its terms are noteworthy 
because the concept of a minimum wage rate was finally discarded”, wages were
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now dependent on the selling price with no limitation on their movement either 
upwards or, more importantly, downwards.
There was, however, some hope for a coalfield-wide union; despite the 
fact that “no effective organisation existed for the coalfield as a whole” (EW 
Evans, 1961: 133), the foundations for such an organisation existed as the 
district unions developed and strengthened. Although this was a positive move as 
far as ‘unionism’ itself was concerned, it was not a good move from the point of 
view of those national unionists, such as Alexander McDonald, who wanted to 
see a strong national union created. The AAM was “horrified” by the number of 
district unions that existed in south Wales, and rightly recognised it as a source of 
weakness; the AAM’s representatives constantly advocated centralisation, but 
were consistently ignored (EW Evans, 1961: 116). Mabon, despite being an 
advocate of a centralised union covering the whole of the south Wales coalfield, 
had realised, by the end of 1877, the futility of trying to force through a coalfield- 
wide union; he realised it would have to be achieved gradually, and “from this 
period [late 1870s] dates the real foundation of mining unionism in the South 
Wales coalfield” (EW Evans, 1959: 20).
A recession in the coal industry between 1885 and 1887 saw coal prices, 
and therefore wages, fall continuously (EW Evans, 1959: 47). The miners’ 
representatives tried to revise the sliding scale agreement, but the coalowners 
would not agree and it was this attitude that was one of the main reasons for the 
increase in support for a coalfield-wide union. The question of such a union was 
first discussed in 1886, but it was January 1888 before the South Wales & 
Monmouthshire Colliery Workmen’s Federation (SWMCWF) was created, with 
Mabon as president. Even then, the districts remained autonomous (EW Evans, 
1961: 141), and the Federation was merely “a loose confederation [which] was
no stronger than its constituent parts and had no real influence over their
actions” (EW Evans, 1959: 48).
Agitation against the sliding scale continued and, in November 1888, the 
SWMCWF won the chance to re-negotiate the agreement; however, conditions 
were very strained, and the men’s demands were so far-reaching that the
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employers rejected them all out of hand (EW Evans, 1959: 50). By December 
1889 it looked as though the sliding scale would cease to exist, especially as the 
newly created MFGB was totally opposed to the principle, but Mabon still 
believed that it was the most effective method and, due to his influence, a new 
settlement was reached which won the men many of the concessions they had 
demanded (EW Evans, 1959: 52). Unfortunately, coal prices fell in 1890, and the 
union was too weak to protect wages; when the owners gave notice to terminate 
the agreement, the men’s representatives, in their determination to keep hold of 
the sliding scale, gave up many of the concessions they had so recently won. 
“The miners undoubtedly realised that their triumph ...had been won by the 
pressures of the coal market rather than by their own efforts” (EW Evans, 1959: 
52-3).
Again, many of the miners’ leaders realised that a strong central union 
was essential, but the miners themselves did not want to pay the necessary 
contributions, “and once again the rank and file withheld their support, and in 
October 1893, Mabon could only compare the existing lack of organisation with 
the disorganisation of the years 1877 and 1879” (EW Evans, 1959: 53). The 
situation was not helped by the creation, in the early 1890s, of an alternative 
union, the Amalgamated Association of Colliery Workmen of South Wales & 
Monmouthshire (AACWSWM), by William Brace (EW Evans, 1961: 150). This 
union was very much against the sliding scale, and more militant in its approach 
to the owners (EW Evans, 1959: 15). Thus, by 1892, there were two distinct, 
opposing camps in south Wales, and “as a result, neither party could make much 
progress” (EW Evans, 1959: 54); the miners, faced with a choice, could not make 
up their minds, and “their indecision was reflected by apathy and indifference” 
(EW Evans, 1961: 153). According to EW Evans (1959: 54) “the effect [of this] 
upon unionism in the district as a whole was disastrous”. By 1893, although the 
principle of a strong centralised union was accepted by many leaders, in practice 
its successful creation was still a long way off.
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D e n b i g h s h i r e
Throughout the early 1880s in Denbighshire the union movement remained weak 
and any actions that were taken were defeated by the owners’ unity of purpose, 
and the lack of such sentiments among the men; for example, a strike from 
October to December 1881 ended when the men were told that due to a fall in 
prices “the masters could not entertain an advance [and] if the men should strike 
(they had returned to work having been conceded weekly wages and a possible 
wage rise), they would at once have their weekly pay stopped and be served with 
notices for a reduction in wages” (Rogers, 1928, X: 192). In March 1882 the 
owners demanded a 5% reduction in wages which they justified “on the ground 
that contracts for coal can only be obtained at quotations, not only lower than 
those of 1878 and 1879, but lower than anything for the past thirty years” 
(Wrexham Advertiser, 22 April 1882, DD/DM/506/4/ This led to a strike starting 
on 15 April which saw “scenes of a terrifying description” (Wrexham Advertiser, 
22 April 1882, DD/DM/506/4J at the Westminster colliery which required the 
attendance of the police and the local militia (Wrexham Advertiser, 22 April 1882, 
DD/DM/506/4/
By mid-May, however, the strike was faltering; the owners emphasised the 
“ruinous condition” of the industry and stressed that “unless some steps are 
taken to reduce the enormous cost of production [the collieries]... must be 
closed” (Wrexham Advertiser, 13 May 1882, DD/DM/506/4). From the point of 
view of the colliers, despite the reduction being seen as “nothing but oppression”, 
“the privations prevailing in numerous families is beyond description” (Wrexham 
Advertiser, 15 May 1882, DD/DM/506/4J and miners at individual collieries began 
to agree terms (Rogers, 1928, X: 196). Some collieries, for example Hafod in 
Rhos, remained on strike in early June. The Wrexham Advertiser {3 June 1882, 
DD/DM/506/4) noting that many families in the village were on the verge of 
starvation, indicated that the men “feel very embittered against the independent 
action taken by others”. Despite the strength of feeling, lack of union funds soon 
meant that the men of Rhos had to return to work, on the masters’ terms, and by
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the middle of June all the pits, bar Black Park in Chirk, had resumed working 
(Wrexham Advertiser, 17 June 1882, DD/DM/506/4j.
The main reason for the collapse of this strike, apart from insufficient union 
funds, was the lack of unity among the men; no single union represented the men 
as a whole, so disagreements were common. In addition to this, the Lancashire 
colliers were half-hearted in their support of the strikers, despite the fact that 
north Wales was an affiliated district of the Lancashire Federation; Lancashire 
was the main competitor for Denbighshire coal at Birkenhead and therefore a 
strike in the latter district benefited the former, which was able to fill the ‘gap’ 
caused by the strike.
By 1885 the Denbighshire coalfield was relatively peaceful “not for lack of 
grievances, but because the men were broken in spirit, lacking in unity and
suffering from depressed trade It was clear that some force was needed to
inspire the North Wales colliers to combine” (Rogers, 1928, XI: 74). This impetus 
was given to the colliers by the actions of the coalowners at the Broughton & Plas 
Power Colliery Co. Ltd. in 1886. In his report for the year 1885, Henry Hall, the 
Inspector of Mines for West Lancashire and North Wales, reported that although 
production was higher than the overall output for 1884, “the output at the pits has 
nevertheless been irregular owing to the slackness of demand prices [which] 
have ruled lower than in the previous year, North Wales has suffered very much 
in these respects, many of the pits being unable to obtain orders sufficient to
keep them working more than 2 or 3 days a week............. The selling price of
coal has not averaged more than about 5/2d per ton [therefore] in many cases
the year’s operations will have resulted in a considerable loss and the coal
trade generally has had as bad a year as perhaps has ever been known” 
(Wrexham Advertiser 11 September 1886, DD/DM/506/9).
Given these circumstances, in July 1886, the directors at Broughton & 
Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd., to maintain orders and keep the pits open, demanded 
that their workers bring up 21 cwt to the ton rather than 20 cwt and promised the 
men five shifts a week (rather than the current three and a half). Although this 
would enable them to win a significant order and ensure the employment of their
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colliers, according to Rogers (1928, XI: 74) this amounted to a 4.8 per cent 
reduction in wages. In an attempt to justify this move JH Darby (co-owner) 
explained, in a letter to the Wrexham Advertiser (DD/DM/506/9) on 9 September 
1886, that “the colliers who had not been working more than 2 days before the 
order was taken, have now for the last 7 weeks been working full time, greatly to 
their advantage”. He insisted, in the same letter, that the motivation of the 
company was not to undercut competitors because the order was “formerly 
supplied by another district which had never been placed in North Wales before”, 
and thus he believed that it would have no implications on any of the other 
collieries in the district. However, as was reported in the editorial of that same 
edition, “the reduction, however small it may have been enable(d), it was 
contended, the proprietors of Plas Power colliery to undersell the other colliery 
proprietors at Birkenhead” (Wrexham Advertiser, 9 September 1886, 
DD/DM/506/9).
Unfortunately for the directors of the company their actions caused a 
furore in the district; other coalowners insisted that, in order to maintain their 
competitiveness, their men should also bring up the 21 cwt ton, while the miners 
themselves felt that “it would be well for Mr Darby and all the other employers to 
consider that when they are going to the market and underselling one another 
they actually give the workingmen’s labour away. Coal merchants are doing well 
when scores of coal proprietors have been ruined and hundreds of colliers 
starved” (letter signed ‘a collier’ - Wrexham Advertiser 18 September 1886, 
(DD/DM/506/9).
By the end of September many colliers had been issued with notice of 
wage reductions or were already working under such reductions, and feelings 
against the directors and men of Plas Power were running high, “the general 
impression being that this was the result of the unjustifiable action of Mr JH 
Darby and the Plas Power employes” (Wrexham Advertiser, 25 September 1886, 
(DD/DM/506/9). Many of the employers were also condemnatory of this action; 
they felt that JH Darby was undercutting other coalowners, “while his miners 
were also underselling their fellow labourers” (Wrexham Advertiser 2 October
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1886, D/DM/506/9). The Wrexham Advertiser explained on 2 October that the 
masters were “unwilling to make [the] reductions] but were compelled to do it as 
they were being underquoted at Birkenhead”.
At a meeting on 20 September 1886, the miners issued the following 
resolution: “the action of the Plas Power men is positively on the eve of casting 
us, the miners of North Wales into general trouble, and we hereby advise that the 
above named men come back to their former terms with their employer at once, 
or, failing this that they at once cease work” (Wrexham Advertiser, 10 October 
1886, D/DM/506/9). The miners in the Ruabon district had “more than once 
threatened to stop the colliers at Plas Power from continuing work at the lower 
scale” (Wrexham Advertiser, 2 October 1886, DD/DM/506/9), and were 
instrumental in getting the vast majority of colliers to stop work on 30 September. 
“Great dissatisfaction has prevailed throughout the district” (Wrexham Advertiser, 
2 October 1886) at the decision by the Plas Power men to accept the reduction in 
wages. The Ruabon miners had resisted all attempts to enforce a similar 
reduction in the district, and they were determined either to stop the colliery (Plas 
Power) or to make the owners change their policy. They were also prominent in 
the “very serious riot [which] took place at Plas Power on Thursday afternoon [30 
September]” (Wrexham Advertiser, 2 October 1886, DD/DM/506/9).
On the morning of 30 September 1886 “a mass meeting of colliers was 
convened ....adjacent to Gatewen colliery [sister pit of Plas Power]....when 
upwards of 3,000 - 4,000 colliers” assembled and, despite being cautioned by 
their leaders “there were a very large number of turbulent spirits in the crowd... 
that nothing else would seem to satisfy but a demolition of some property” 
(Wrexham Advertiser, 2 October 1886, DD/DM/506/9). At the meeting a decision 
was made to send a deputation of men to Plas Power to try to discuss the 
situation with JH Darby; unfortunately they were preceded by a crowd which 
“numbered several thousands”, and when Mr Darby arrived “he was pelted with a 
few stones” (Wrexham Advertiser, 2 October 1886, (DD/DM/506/9). Mr Darby 
refused to negotiate with the mob, but conceded that his men could continue to 
work under the old rules until 9 October, when two weeks notice would be given
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of any future change (Wrexham Advertiser, 2 October 1886, DD/DM/506/9). It 
was also reported that “Mr Darby was most reluctant all through to treat or 
discuss the question with any but his own men, and this fact being known, 
together with the assertion that the mob had been told to keep from the colliery 
irritated the men, and it required little more to put the whole crowd into operation 
in their work of destruction. The mob [was] bent on the greatest destruction 
imaginable...[and] the anger could not be restrained” (Wrexham Advertiser, 2 
October 1886, DD/DM/506/9); windows were broken, coal tubs overturned, and 
machinery was hurled down the shafts, before order was finally restored when 
rumours of police and military intervention caused the men to disperse. By Friday 
1 October work was resumed at all the big collieries and Plas Power went back 
on Sunday 3 October. When the owners withdrew their demand for an additional 
reduction, further strike action was avoided (Wrexham Advertiser, 10 October 
1886, DD/DM/506/9).
At the end of 1885 the only union in Denbighshire that was still in any way 
active was the Union Society of the Miners of Rhosllanerchrugog which had 183 
members (Rogers, 1928, X: 203), but the events of 1886 helped ‘kick-start’ a new 
interest in unionism. In November, two delegates from Denbighshire were sent to 
the Miners’ National Conference at Manchester, a decision which “augured well 
for the future, for it showed that the local leaders had realised the importance of 
linking up to the national movement” (Rogers, 1928, XI: 78). However, this was 
something of a false start for “the colliers were not united” (Rogers, 1928, XI: 79); 
different pits had different attitudes to industrial relations, and often the Ruabon 
men were more militant, “while Gatewen, Westminster and Plas Power were 
resolutely opposed to strike action”. The leader of the unionists, David Gough, 
the Rhosddu lodge representative, tried to encourage the men to combine, but in 
April 1887 the union “was hopelessly disorganised”, a major reason being that 
the Ruabon district wanted to go it alone (Rogers, 1928, XI: 79).
By 1888, when the North Wales Miners Federation (NWMF) was created, 
this opposition had ceased and moves were made to widen both participation in 
the union and co-operation between the districts. The leaders of this union
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worked closely with the Lancashire Federation and “the year 1889 proved a very 
successful one for the union”, basically because, in conjunction with the MFGB, it 
secured three advances in wages (Rogers, 1928, XI: 84-5). These pay increases 
were probably used by the union as recruitment ‘propoganda’ to attract new 
members. However, given that the increases came in a time of boom and that 
wages would have risen anyway, it is unlikely that the union had infuenced the 
decisions to the extent that they would have the miners believe. Whatever the 
factors behind the pay increases, by December 1889 wages were 45 per cent 
above the 1879 standard, and there were 25 lodges in the NWMF.
The years 1890-1892 saw the NWMF progress further, to the extent that,
by August 1891, “the union was sufficiently strong to appoint an agent”, Mr
loan T Williams; and in 1892 it was able to send two delegates representing 
5,000 members to the national MFGB conference. However, this supposed 
success masked some real problems within the region; there were “difficult cross 
currents” within the various lodges, especially over how the union was to be 
organised centrally and, more especially, funded: many of the lodges were 
reluctant to pay more than a nominal sum into a central fund, wanting funds to 
remain local. After a great deal of discussion a set of rules, governing levies and 
benefits was drafted in November 1892; thus, as 1892 drew to a close, the 
Denbighshire and Flintshire Miners’ Federation (DFMF), as it was now named, 
possessed a new constitution, an active organisation and a membership of 5,750 
(Rogers, 1928, XI: 88-9). Although membership figures for individual lodges are 
no longer available for this period, given that Denbighshire was the prominent 
‘partner’ within the north Wales coalfield, at that time (see Chapter 2), it is fair to 
assume that the majority of these members were from Denbighshire.
1893 - a year of turmoil
The year 1893 was one of struggle for the miners of Great Britain because, by 
February of that year, “a depression...had overshadowed the coalfields” (Rogers,
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1928, XIII: 238). The MFGB advocated a ‘general holiday’ to reduce stocks in 
over supplied markets such as Lancashire, Yorkshire and the Midland counties. 
This holiday was to apply throughout Britain, but attitudes towards this 
suggestion varied significantly in different regions.
South Wales
In 1893, the miners in south Wales were still trying to negotiate an improvement 
to the sliding scale agreement and did not get involved in the MFGB’s ‘national’ 
strike; they did, however, become embroiled in their own regional dispute, 
possibly emboldened by the resolve of miners in other regions and “the electric 
atmosphere” created by the prolonged lock-out in the Midlands (Page Arnot, 
1967: 33). In south Wales the dispute was precipitated by the hauliers of the 
Ogmore Valley who struck work on 1 August 1893, unhappy with the 
postponement of an anticipated advance and demanding a 20 per cent increase 
in wages (Page Arnot, 1967: 33). The strike was “rapidly spread by marching 
bands” (EW Evans, 1961: 156), and by mid-August “it was considered virtually a 
general strike in most of the coalfield; collieries with two thirds of the coalfield 
tonnage were stopped” (Page Arnot, 1967: 34). As EW Evans (1961: 156) 
comments, “this outbreak was clearly directed against the sliding scale”, and it 
was the first time that anger at the agreement had been transformed into 
violence. The strength of feeling against the sliding scale is illustrated by a 
resolution issued on the 14 August and cited by Page Arnot (1967: 34): “we the 
workmen of Monmouthshire and South Wales....denounce the demoralising
effect upon us as a body, of the sliding scale and that we uphold the actions of
the hauliers of Glamorganshire and Monmouthshire, come what may, and that 
we call upon the few men now at work to join in with the common cause of 
struggling for freedom”.
Despite such rhetoric, according to EW Evans (1961: 156) “the collapse of 
the strike was inevitable from the first”. The owners refused to negotiate and
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resolved to prosecute strikers for breach of contract; troops were called in to 
prevent the marching gangs from traversing the coalfield and, most importantly, 
the strikers had no financial help either from the MFGB (who were struggling to 
find money for the strikers in other regions), or local unions (EW Evans, 1961: 
156). Another important contributory factor was that the men’s own 
representatives on the sliding scale committee were totally against the strike; 
they issued a manifesto on 18 August which concluded that “we cannot 
honourably encourage any attempt to violate the agreement and....it becomes 
our imperative duty to ask you, in the interests of yourselves and families, as in
the interests of the trade....to resume your work and honourably carry out the
obligations which you entreated us to enter into on you behalf (Page Arnot, 
1967: 36).
By the end of August the men began to return to work, encouraged by a 
wage increase which the latest sliding scale audit had granted, and the belief that 
the worst times were over (EW Evans, 1961: 156). According to Page Arnot 
(1967: 39), a major reason for the failure of the strike was that the “protest came 
up against the most thoroughly organised counter-force that existed amongst the 
employers of the British coalfields”, namely, The Monmouthshire and South 
Wales Coalowners Association (MSWCOA). The owners had an effective 
federation which could offer a united front while the men were totally unorganised 
and without funds; the strike had been more of a spontaneous event than an 
organised one, and although it “spread like wildfire” (Page Arnot, 1967: 38), there 
was no attempt at real effective organisation.
Denbighshire
In north Wales, attitudes were generally against the idea of a general ‘holiday’ 
because, as Edward Hughes, then working at Point of Ayr (Flintshire) said, “in 
North Wales we had no stocks whatsoever” (D/NM/853). Indeed, some collieries 
were only working a two day week and, therefore, were already suffering an 
enforced ‘holiday’. Despite this, the union officials such as Hughes worked hard
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to garner support for the MFGB stance. The difficulties facing them are well 
illustrated by the problems Hughes faced within his own lodge at Point of Ayr. He 
had urged the men to support the national organisation, but the manager of the 
colliery, Mr Isaac Davies, told the men “how unwise it was to have a weeks (sic) 
play [as] we had no stock of coal, although I argued with him, he beated me fare 
(sic) and carried a resolution to resind (sic) my resolution of a few days before” 
(D/NM/853). This public show of disloyalty led the MFGB to expel the Point of Ayr 
lodge until January 1894, even though the ‘holiday’ policy was turned down by a 
narrow majority at the Birmingham Conference on 1 March (Rogers, 1928, XIII: 
239).
By July 1894 the Coalowners Federation, an employers’ organisation 
covering the ‘Federated Area’11, was calling for a reduction of 25 per cent in 
wages. The miners’ representatives found this stance difficult to understand, 
given that, as James Darlington, manager of Black Park colliery, Chirk, had said 
in a speech, “the outlook of the coal trade [is] more encouraging” (Wrexham 
Advertiser, 24 June 1893, Wrexham Museum, hereafter, (WM)). The coalowners, 
however, argued that, “no employer seeks to reduce wages from sheer 
wantonness, it is because he is compelled, or close his works” (ES Clark, Llay 
Hall colliery, quoted in Wrexham Advertiser, 29 July 1893, WM). The employers 
also pointed out that, to be precise, the reduction was a 25 per cent reduction in 
the 40 per cent advance in wages that had occurred since 1888, which 
approximated to a 17 per cent reduction in gross wages, not 25 per cent 
(Wrexham Advertiser, 29 July 1893, WM). The miners’ position was outlined by a 
writer, ‘Gwalia’, in the Wrexham Advertiser (1 July 1893, WM) when he 
commented, in a letter, that “a miner’s aggregate earnings for twelve months will 
not average more than 17 shillings a week. Can a man maintain himself and his 
family in the present day with 25% less than this?”.
Not all coalowners in north Wales supported the Coalowners Federation, 
indeed, many of the Flintshire owners actually increased wages when faced with
11 The Federated Area had been set up in 1888 to govern wages in those regions that believed in collective bargaining 
rather than a sliding scale, namely Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, north Wales, Staffordshire, Warwickshire and 
Leicestershire (Rowe, 1923: 39).
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a stoppage, while some of the Denbighshire owners “were going to the markets 
to undersell their fellow proprietors” (Wrexham Advertiser, 1 July 1893, WM). 
This division among the owners was unlikely to encourage the miners to unite; 
those in unaffected collieries would not come out in support of their colleagues 
who went on strike on 26 July against the pay cut. On 29 July the owners locked 
the miners out because, according to WF Butler, owner of Vron, “the masters 
were absolutely compelled to close their pits until the reduction was accepted, 
not from any desire to oppress the men, but because they really could not go on 
at the present rate” (Wrexham Advertiser, 5 August 1893, WM).
Once again, “the main problem in North Wales was ...lack of unity” (E 
Griffiths, 2000: 142). The miners of the two counties, Flintshire and Denbighshire, 
were divided to the extent that, at a meeting of the DFMF, a delegate, referring to 
the fact that many of the colliers in Flintshire had defied the union and continued 
working, said that “his men were determined that the Flintshire men must stop, or 
be compelled to do so” (Wrexham Advertiser, 5 August 1893, WM). Even within 
Denbighshire, individual collieries withheld support, despite the best efforts of 
union men, such as Hughes, who urged solidarity.
The strike was a long one, ending in November and causing tremendous 
hardship in Denbighshire; by the end of September, the Wrexham Advertiser (30 
September 1893, WM) was reporting that in Gwersyllt and Summerhill, a soup 
kitchen was feeding more than 700 people, three times a week. In October, the 
men of north Wales asked if they could resume work at the old rates, but this was 
“not such as the coalowners can entertain” (Wrexham Advertiser, 7 October 
1893, WM). Indeed, at a meeting of the Coalowners Federation in Westminster, 
London, it had been affirmed that no agreement could be arrived at that did not 
include a wage reduction. The hardships continued; the men were forced to “pick 
coal out of the old spoil banks and workings. The coal so got was of little or no 
ordinary value, but was saleable, or could be used in lieu of anything better while 
the pits of the entire district were closed” (letter to solicitors Burne & Wykes, 
London, from Colonel Meredith’s solicitors, Acton, Bury & Acton; 6 February 
1896, DD/DM/285/95). Even the national press became involved; a
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correspondent for the London Daily Chronicle reported that “Ruabon is 150 miles 
from Bristol, yet here exactly the same conditions are reproduced in an 
exaggerated form. Here 11,000 men have been locked out for 10
weeks reduced to a condition of absolute hunger, and yet nobody knows
anything about it because the fate of North Wales is swallowed up in the larger 
fate of Lancashire and Yorkshire” (cited in Wrexham Advertiser, 7 October 1893, 
WM).
One of the main problems for the men was the fact that the union (both 
national and local) was unable, through lack of funds, to provide adequate strike 
pay (E Griffiths, 2000: 142). This was discussed by the reporter for the Daily 
Chronicle, who explained that “the total amount of locked-out pay which they 
have received has amounted to 4d per head for the whole time”. He went on to 
say that “this ought to say something for the ability of the North Wales miner....as 
they have solved the problem of existing on two fifths of a penny a week for 10 
weeks”. The correspondent appeared admiring of the stoicism of the men for 
“[they] are as firm today as ever they were. ‘No reduction’ is the word, and their 
wages are low enough in all conscience already, four and sixpence a day is the 
very top wage for an experienced collier” (cited in Wrexham Advertiser, 7 
October 1893, WM). He heaped opprobrium on the coalowners when he 
remarked that “in spite of all efforts at self-denial and self-sacrifice, gaunt hunger 
has stalked up and down the hills and vales of Denbighshire at the bidding of the 
coalowners”, and illustrated how far reaching the strike was when he explained 
that “what aggravates the distress in the Wrexham district is that owing to 
scarcity and the price of fuel, the steel works and terracotta factories are closed” 
(cited in Wrexham Advertiser, 7 October 1893, WM).
There is no denying that, despite the ‘over-the-top’ nature of such reports, 
distress in the county of Denbighshire was widespread, and by mid-October 
many of the men were desperate to return to work as they felt that the reason for 
the strike (overstocking) was no longer an issue. David Gough, the Rhos Ddu 
lodge representative, explained, at a meeting of the miners, that “there was no 
doubt that the lock-out occurred in the first place because there were large stocks
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of coal in Derbyshire, Yorkshire and Lancashire. These had now been dispersed 
and so there was no cause for a further lock-out on that ground”. Prices were 
starting to rise and so the owners could no longer use that as a stumbling block 
to agreement. Yet still the lock-out continued and, according to Gough, ’’the only 
reason left was one which the masters dare not make public, they desired to 
starve the men into submission and break up the Federation” (Wrexham 
Advertiser, 14 October 1893, WM).
By 21 October there had been a national offer to let the men back at a 
reduction of 15 per cent; this signalled the beginning of the end for the strike as 
men began to drift back to work on the basis of varying individual agreements. 
For example, the men of Vron and Llay Hall went back at a 15 per cent reduction, 
whereas the men of Vauxhall and all the men in the Mold district were able to 
return at the old rates (Wrexham Advertiser, 21 October 1893, WM). In 
November, Gladstone invited representatives of both sides to a conference, and 
it was agreed that the men would return at the old rate until February 1894, and a 
Board of Conciliation would be set up in the meantime to look into the whole 
issue of wages in the ‘Federated Area’ (Wrexham Advertiser, 19 November 1893, 
WM).
The effect of 1893
The year 1893 therefore saw long strikes in both north and south Wales; in south 
Wales the issue was a regional one, the sliding scale, while in north Wales, the 
miners of Denbighshire were dragged into a strike by virtue of the fact that the 
region was part of the ‘Federated area’ for union purposes, and the MFGB had 
called a strike covering this region. The strikes, in both north and south Wales, 
were doomed almost from the start, neither the national union, nor the local 
lodges having sufficient funds to sustain the miners in a prolonged strike, and 
much hardship prevailed. After the long strike “the North Wales coalfield was left 
with a divided union riven by dissension. [The] Flintshire collieries remained 
disorganised, the Wrexham and Ruabon districts wanted the executive
196
committee of the DFMF to consist of their representatives only, while the Rhos 
union decided to go its own way” (E Griffiths, 2000: 143). In south Wales the 
main representatives of the miners were at loggerheads; one faction, headed by 
Mabon, was against using strike action, while the other, led by Brace, was wholly 
committed to the abolition of the sliding scale. Brace was convinced that new 
methods were needed if the sliding scale was to be removed, and he felt very 
strongly that a strong centralised union, with strong ties to the MFGB was 
required (EW Evans, 1961: 158). However, he ‘battled against the tide’ in that he 
was implacably opposed by Mabon who, despite the shortcomings of the sliding 
scale, had very strong support among the south Wales miners. It was thus that, 
by the end of 1893, the miners of south Wales were no nearer creating a strong, 
united union than their brethren in north Wales, and it would be a few more 
years, in both regions, before this became a reality as, yet again, the colliers 
failed to find an issue behind which they could to unite.
Towards unity -1894-1908
The last years of the nineteenth century saw the miners and their organisations, 
in both north and south Wales, finally realise that, if they were to be effective, 
they had to speak with one, regional voice, which in turn supported a strong 
national movement; once this realisation had hit home, union membership and 
influence began to increase significantly in both regions. One issue which began 
to unite miners from different regions was the issue of wage bargaining and the 
pursuit of a national minimum wage. However, before unity could be achieved, 
several issues had to be resolved, not least that of sliding scales compared to 
alternative methods of settling wage rates.
In 1894, the sliding scale remained one of the biggest issues that divided 
the coal miners on a national basis; according to Rowe (1923: 38), since 1888, 
when the Federated Area had been created, there had been “a complete 
cleavage in opinion and practice regarding the regulation of wages by [a] sliding
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scale”. Those in the Federated Area were wholly opposed to the principle, and 
relied on Joint Conciliation Boards (JCBs), whereas the other main areas, the 
north east of England and south Wales, continued to support, if somewhat 
reluctantly in the latter’s case, the idea that wages and prices should closely 
follow each other. In both the Federated and other regions where JCBs operated, 
much was made of the fact that wages in the ‘other’ area were generally 
perceived to be higher by the workmen, or lower by the owners, than in their own 
area. However, miners in those areas outside the Federation had the same 
perception, for example, miners in south Wales believed that the sliding scale 
kept their wages lower than those in the Federated Area. Rowe (1923: 39) 
argues that although this may well have been the case at different times, it was 
not because of the way the systems worked, but because of the markets that 
each area predominantly served. Rowe explains (1923: 40) that, in general, 
wages in the Federated Area were more stable than in the other regions, but this 
was due to the fact that the latter were more involved in the export market where 
prices fluctuated much more significantly than in the home market, which the 
Federated Area predominantly served. It must be pointed out that although north 
Wales was part of the Federation, it did not conform to Rowe’s (1923: 40) view as 
it became increasingly involved in the export market and may not have exhibited 
the same traits as other coalfields in the Federation.
Table 6.1 shows how wages increased above the 1888 standard in both 
the Federated Area and the non-federated regions; it can be seen that in the 
Federated Area wages only ever went up, whereas in the non-federated regions 
they fluctuated both up and down. While increases in, for example, 
Northumberland, were often higher than those in the Federated Area, at no time 
do wages in the latter fall, whereas in Northumberland, wage rates could fall 
significantly as, for example, between August 1894 and October 1895.
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Table 6.1: Statement of percentages above the 1888 standard, bv coalfield region. 1894-June 
1902
Date Fed.
Area
Northum
berland
Durham East
Scotland
West
Scotland
Cumber­
land
South
Wales
Somer­
set
Forest
of
Dean
% % % % % % % % %
Aug 1894 30.00 34.28 21.95 25.00 25.00 33.33 21.25 22.25 22.50
Oct 1895 30.00 22.85 12.20 12.50 12.50 23.81 10.00 15.00 15.00
Oct 1896 30.00 18.56 12.20 par par 23.81 07.50 15.00 15.00
Oct 1897 30.00 21.42 14.64 12.50 12.50 23.81 08.75 15.00 15.00
Oct 1898 32.50 35.71 21.95 42.50 50.00 26.19 15.00 20.00 17.50
Oct 1899 40.00 42.85 26.82 53.75 56.25 33.33 26.25 27.50 25.00
Apr 1900 45.00 60.00 35.36 72.50 75.00 47.62 46.25 37.50 40.00
Oct 1900 50.00 84.30 51.18 97.50 100.00 52.38 68.75 42.50 60.00
Apr 1901 60.00 68.57 59.54 72.50 75.00 52.38 76.25 52.50 50.00
Oct 1901 60.00 58.56 41.47 47.50 50.00 52.38 66.25 47.50 40.00
Jun 1902 60.00 48.57 32.92 47.50 50.00 42.86 46.25 45.00 35.00
Net
increase 30.00 14.29 10.97 22.50 25.00 09.53 25.00 22.50 12.50
(Source: Agreements arising out of Rosebury Conference - 17 November 1893 at the Settlement 
of the Great Strike of Miners in the Federated Areas, D/NM/312).
These fluctuations, and the steady increase in the Federated Area’s wage 
rate, are perhaps more apparent if plotted on a graph (see Figure 6.1). In all 
areas, whether the sliding scale was used or not, wages were “formally adjusted 
by a percentage system on or off the rates existing at a certain date” (Rowe, 
1923: 46), i.e. ‘the standard’. One of the factors that caused problems in the 
years before the minimum wage was introduced in 1912, was that ‘the standard’ 
was not identical throughout the British coalfield; for example, in Northumberland, 
Durham, south Wales and Cumberland, the standard year was 1879, whereas in 
Scotland and the Federated areas it was 1888 (Rowe, 1923: 46). This caused 
friction because the standard did not provide a ‘level playing field’ and some 
coalfields might have been starting from a better position than others.
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According to Mitchell (1984: 241) the year that was chosen as standard 
“depended on the way in which collective bargaining developed"; in those regions 
where it developed earliest, for example in south Wales and Durham and 
Northumberland, the earlier year of 1879 was used. Additional problems arose at 
the local level where different collieries could have different standard years. This 
can be illustrated by looking at north Wales where “the problem of ascertaining 
the 1888 basis was not solved” (Rogers, 1928, XIII: 244) and three different 
standards were used: in the Ruabon area they used the 1879 standard, in the 
Hafod colliery they used the 1882 standard, and the remaining collieries used 
1888 (Rogers, 1928, XI: 84). If such were the difficulties in a minor coalfield, the 
problem can only have been magnified many times over in the larger coalfields. 
The differing notion of the issues and the problems to which they gave rise can 
be illustrated by examining the south Wales and Denbighshire coalfields during 
the period 1894-1908.
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S o u t h  W a l e s
In south Wales, the 1894-1908 period saw the development of a stronger, more 
centralised union; again, the issue which brought the miners together was the 
sliding scale. Although the sliding scale had been renewed in 1892, “in the five 
years after the hauliers’ strike (1893) it had become more and more unpopular” 
(Page Arnot, 1967: 44); wages had fallen steadily “in a long slow decline”, and by 
August 1896 they were only 10 per cent above standard. “Prices and wages with 
them seemed to be tumbling into a bottomless pit” (Page Arnot, 1967: 44-5) and, 
in 1897, the miners began to plead for a minimum wage to be agreed. When this 
was refused, the miners voted in a ballot by 41,880 to 12,178 to give six months 
notice to re-negotiate the sliding scale agreement (Page Arnot, 1967: 44-5). By 
this date, even Mabon had conceded that significant changes were required, but 
he still clung to the belief that the sliding scale was still the best method of 
governing wages, although he did now advocate a minimum wage (EW Evans, 
1961: 168). Many of the miners also believed in the principle of the sliding scale; 
it gave them a sense of security despite its shortcomings, and they believed that 
without it, wages would have fallen faster and further (EW Evans, 1961: 168).
It was unfortunate for the miners that the owners actually welcomed the 
chance to alter the agreement; EW Evans asserts (1961: 170) that they too 
wanted a new agreement, skewed in their favour, that would help them reduce 
the production costs of a region where output per man year was 64 tons lower 
than the national average, and where labour costs amounted to nearly 80 per 
cent of operating costs per ton. The circumstances proved unfortunate for the 
men because they were not in a position to put up much of a fight; their 
negotiators “found the owners in a very unaccommodating mood” (Page Arnot, 
1967: 45). The owners refused to discuss a minimum wage and threatened a 
lock-out (EW Evans, 1959: 63; Page Arnot, 1967: 45). This threat was carried out 
at the beginning of April 1898, and yet again the miners found themselves “in a 
desperate position from the beginning” (Page Arnot, 1967: 47). One of the main 
problems was the split in the leadership; Brace and Morgan wanted continued
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resistance but Mabon advocated compromise (EW Evans, 1961: 173). At the 
beginning of the dispute, the former leaders prevailed and Mabon was voted out 
as Chairman of Conference, an event that demonstrated “the rejection of his 
policy of compromise by the miners” (EW Evans, 1961: 63). However, “after forty 
days of idle pits and growing privation”, Mabon was re-elected by a small 
majority, and given instructions to settle the dispute (Page Arnot, 1967: 51). The 
main reason for the “widespread distress” (EW Evans, 1961: 174) was the lack of 
funds; this is hardly surprising given the general attitude of the miners to union 
levies and, despite receiving some help from the MFGB, it was becoming 
increasingly obvious that an agreement had to be reached if further suffering was 
to be prevented.
However, despite wanting to end the stoppage quickly, Mabon and his co­
negotiators found that they were unable to do so. The coalowners knew they had 
the upper hand, and would not move on any of the men’s demands; they insisted 
that the lock-out would only end when the men agreed to re-establish the 1892 
agreement, and abolish Mabon’s Day (a monthly ‘holiday’) (EW Evans, 1959: 
63). The miners held out for as long as they could, but “that they should 
surrender in the end was inevitable” (Page Arnot, 1967: 60), and they finally 
agreed to return to work, under the owners’ terms, on 1 September 1898, after a 
period of terrible hardship that had seen widespread hunger and deprivation. As 
Mabon told the South Wales Daily News on 2 September 1898 (cited in ID 
Thomas, 1975: 43), “this has been a terrible day for us, and it ends with a terrible 
disappointment for all of us”. However, there was one clause that the union 
appeared to welcome as a face-saving opportunity; namely, that wages would 
not fall below 12'A per cent above the 1879 standard, and Mabon seized on this 
as meaning that the principle of a minimum wage had been satisfied (EW Evans, 
1959: 65). EW Evans (1961: 174), however, comments that “this was probably an 
unduly optimistic appraisal of the owners’ concession”; all the clause did was 
allow men to terminate the sliding scale agreement, it did not force employers to 
always pay at least 121/2 per cent above the standard. The miners had lost, and 
all they could do was “accept the inevitable and to prepare to organise for better
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things” (Mabon, cited in ID Thomas, 1975: 44). According to Page Arnot (1967: 
60), however, “the struggle had not been in vain” because the miners were finally 
forced to confront the reason for their failure, and “at last the rank and file were
aroused from their apathy and were wholeheartedly in favour of forming a
strong union in South Wales” (EW Evans, 1959: 65).
In October 1898, the South Wales Miners’ Federation (SWMF) was 
formed with Mabon as its President and its main aim being to abolish the sliding 
scale agreement. The fact that the agreement was still in force was a major 
stumbling block to acceptance into the MFGB (it did not want affiliates from areas 
where sliding scale agreements were in force), but the MFGB finally accepted 
that the sliding scale was more likely to be abolished if the SWMF was 
incorporated within, and supported by, the national organisation, and the SWMF 
was eventually accepted as a member in January 1899 (Page Arnot, 1967: 70).
According to Howell (1996: 26) the new union adopted a pit-lodge system 
because “the miners felt [that] this best enables them to preserve the work 
control and customs which they had established at the pit”. The SWMF was 
reliant upon voluntary contributions, and had a central fund (EW Evans, 1959: 
66), but it was not a federation in the same sense as in other areas: “its title
signified only that a number of local associations had come together to form a
single trade union”; districts still had a great deal of independence, and “the 
source of effective power remained very largely in the districts ...[which]... 
jealous of their powers, yielded only the very minimum necessary to the new 
single trade union” (Page Arnot, 1967: 74-5). Despite the creation of a central 
fund, funding remained a significant problem; the miners persisted in rejecting 
any attempts to increase their levies, and indeed their contributions, according to 
EW Evans (1959: 69), were only half of those paid in England. This, combined 
with the rules governing the funding of disputes, meant that the central fund was 
often low on funds but, whatever the shortcomings of the new system, an 
important principle had been established. The new union achieved 
“instantaneous” success (EW Evans, 1959: 69); within six months of its creation it 
had 92,000 members; by the end of 1899 this had risen to 104,212 or 78.5 per
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cent of the total workforce, and by the end of 1900 the figure stood at 127,894 or 
86.6 per cent (Page Arnot, 1967: 70; Gibson, 1922: 21). EW Evans (1961: 179) 
attributes some of this success to the intimidation of non-union men by union 
members; he observes that “it is interesting to note that previous organisations 
had not attempted to coerce reluctant workmen into becoming members”, but 
now, as in north Wales, this tactic was much used, and many stoppages 
occurred over the issue.
In 1903 the miners of south Wales succeeded in getting rid of the sliding 
scale; the 1892 agreement ceased in 1902 and was replaced by a Conciliation 
Board. According to EW Evans (1959: 73), it still meant that wages moved in line 
with selling prices, but now the “correlation was not so close”. In addition to this, 
the new agreement included a minimum rate, 30 per cent above the standard, 
which the miners took as a cause for celebration. However, to all intents and 
purposes, the agreement was little more than a sliding scale agreement with a 
minimum rate, and the fact that the miners had also agreed to a ‘ceiling’ - a 
maximum rate of 60 per cent above standard, meant that in boom times the 
miners could not demand wages any higher than this, even if the selling price 
warranted it.
The years 1903-1908 saw the south Wales coalfield enjoying a period of 
relative peace; according to EW Evans (1961: 188), the miners were mainly 
concerned with the questions of Parliamentary representation and non-unionists; 
the industry was going through a period of prosperity, wages were rising and not 
perceived to be a problem, and the principle of a minimum rate had been 
established. This, coupled with the fact that by 1908 union membership had 
reached “a record level of 145,579” (EW Evans, 1961: 188), meant that the union 
leaders may well have thought “their troubles were a thing of the past” (Page 
Arnot, 1967: 126).
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D e n b i g h s h i r e
As previously stated, it had finally dawned on some of the miners in Denbighshire 
that they had to combine if they wanted to negotiate with the owners (who had a 
relatively well organised coalwners association) from a position of strength. 
However, in the first years after the 1893 lock-out, little was achieved; there was 
a “lack of enthusiasm for the union” (Rogers, 1928, XIII: 245), not helped by a 
scandal in 1895 involving the financial secretary, and a bitter rift between the 
DFMF and the Rhos section which wanted to create its own union. Such events 
did little to attract new members and, by December 1896, the union had only 
1,885 members (Rogers, 1928, XIII: 246) which was only 16 per cent of the total 
north Wales workforce of 11,536 (Gibson, 1922: 11-12). By the beginning of 
1897, therefore, the situation looked bleak; there was continued disagreement 
between the districts (Denbighshire, Flintshire and Ruabon), and funding was 
poor. A resolution in April 1897 asking whether a contribution of 9d per month to 
a central fund was acceptable, received only 46 votes in favour (Rogers, 1928, 
XIII: 247-8). However, in November 1897 an important event took place. Edward 
Hughes, who was already financial secretary of the DFMF, was also appointed 
general secretary, and he proceeded to “rebuild the union on firm foundations” 
(Rogers, 1928, XIII: 250).
Hughes was to prove to be one of the most influential figures in the labour 
history of north Wales. Born in Llanasa, Flintshire in 1856, by the age of 7 he was 
working in the “washings” (washing the ore so as to prepare it for the smelters) at 
the lead mine in Trelogan. At 12 he began working in the coal mining industry at 
the Old Mostyn colliery and, at the age of 14, he went underground (E Griffiths, 
2000: 131). He became involved in a wage dispute at the age of 17 and was 
sacked. He then worked in Liverpool and Wrexham before moving to Durham in 
1875. There, he became heavily involved in union activity and was involved in the 
long strike of 1879. In 1887 he returned to north Wales and worked at Point of 
Ayr as checkweighman, and came increasingly to be relied upon as the workers’ 
spokesman (D/NM/852). He eventually became the DFMF’s delegate at Point of
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Ayr which, according to him, “was a very sore matter for the manager” who 
continually tried to sack him (D/M/853). In his autobiographical notes, Hughes 
says that he was often before the magistrates at Prestatyn “to show why I should 
not be removed from my position” (D/M/853). It would appear that the chief 
motivating factors in Hughes’ life were religion and a strong belief in the rights of 
the miners to be paid a fair wage for the dangerous work they did. He also 
believed that only by speaking with one voice could the miners ensure that this 
happened; he explained “what made the Point of Ayr workmen a body of union 
men was that they [knew] that if to be union men they had to be ruled by the
union it was the duty of each member to be loyal to [a] resolution...whether it
was wise or unwise” (D/NM/853). It was this cohesion that he strove to achieve 
when he was in a position to influence the union as a whole; with this in mind he 
saw his first task as centralising the DFMF, especially its finances.
In 1897, the DFMF was the only section of the MFGB not to have a central 
fund (D/NM/1, 19 July 1897), and Hughes was determined that this situation 
should not continue. In July 1897 a circular was sent to the men which stated that 
“we have come to the conclusion that the sooner you decide to form your society 
on the same principles as other trades unions in connection with the Federation 
of Great Britain, so soon will you be able to prevent those private reductions 
taken (sic) place, from which you so much suffer at present” (D/NM/1, 19 July 
1897). It continued, “the unreliable state of your funds and the worry and expense 
of getting levies when due has caused us, your representatives to allow thinks 
(sic) to take place at different collieries which we feel to be contrary to all trades 
union principles”. The issue was eventually debated at conference in November 
1899; the Ruabon section protested and seceded from the Federation, but 
agreement was forthcoming from the other districts (Rogers, 1928, XIII: 250). 
Having achieved this, Hughes was determined to eliminate local funds; he 
wanted local officials to be paid by the central fund and, by 1903, had 
successfully achieved his aim.
In August 1898, Hughes had also been elected agent for the union and 
had begun work to increase membership; in a circular to all miners dated 14 May
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1900 (D/NM/2), an emotive appeal was made: “we are appealing to you who are 
outside our ranks not to disgrace your country by being so selfish and to allow 
your fellow workmen in England to fight your battle and pay on your behalf. The 
union was not above intimidation in trying to extend its influence; at the annual 
conference of the DFMF on 1 January 1901, “it was resolved that steps should 
be taken at any colliery were (sic) the members of the Federation are in favour at 
such colliery to enforce all to be members by refusing to work with non-union 
men” (D/NM/2). In March 1901, the union was pushing the NWCOA to make 
membership of “the Federation ... a condition of labour whenever the members 
are in a majority” (D/NM/2). The owners neither acceded to, nor rejected this 
demand, they responded by saying that they felt that “your agent, Mr Hughes 
would be able to perswade (sic) all the men to join without taking drastic steps” 
(D/NM/2), and promised not to put any obstacle in his way as long as he used 
legal means of persuasion. Hughes’ tactics appeared to work; when he became 
agent in 1898, membership stood at 2,212 or 19 per cent of the total north Wales 
workforce; by 1900 (excluding the Union Society of Rhosllanerchrugog) it was 
4,888, or 39 per cent of the workforce; in 1901 it was 7,617, or 57 per cent (the 
Rhos union had returned to the fold), and by the end of 1902 it had risen to 
9,089, or 68 per cent (Rogers, 1928, XIII: 251).
From 1901, one of the main aims of the union was to negotiate a ‘price 
list’12 that would apply across the region. Hughes had realised very early on in his 
tenure that having different ‘standards’ at different collieries was inequitable, and 
wanted to agree a uniform standard wage which he knew was a prerequisite if a 
price list was to be agreed across the region (Rogers, 1928, XIII: 252). The 
prevailing system whereby wages were governed by a Conciliation Board was 
unsatisfactory from his point of view; this was demonstrated by the fact that there 
were disputes at individual collieries over the fact that the owners often withheld 
the rates that had been decided by the Conciliation Board. In the minutes of the 
DFMF (D/NM/2), there are constant references to disputes/grievances at various
12 A price list was a detailed list o f the prices that would be paid for the various tasks carried out by a 
miner, both underground and on the surface.
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collieries over such issues as men being stopped without notice, seams being 
closed or changed without notice and the wrong wages being paid. The 
employers seemed to do everything in their power to put obstacles in the way 
and to drag their feet in implementing any agreement; for example, the minutes 
for 6 December 1901 give details of a dispute at Hafod. Here, the miners had 
agreed, in 1899, “to work in hard and difficult places at the rate of 5s 6d per shift, 
[but] since [then], the wages have gone up 15% and the employer considers that 
the men, being (sic) that they agreed to 5s 6d nett are not entitled to 
the ...advances [decided by the Conciliation Board]”. In his Annual Report for the 
year to December 1901, Hughes told members that “we shall always be troubled 
by this grievance [owners not paying agreed rates] until we shall secure a 
standard rate of wages for all classes of work”.
Hughes was still fighting over this issue in 1904 but the union, renamed 
the North Wales Miners Association (NWMA) as of 21 April 1902, was distracted 
from its campaign by the fact that “this has been an exceptionally bad
year thousands of miners in North Wales have not average (sic) more than
three days per week throughout that year, while hundreds of others have not 
worked for months” (D/NM/65, annual report 1904). However, they remained 
committed to the ideal, the same report stating that “we strictly adhere to our 
previous resolution viz - that nothing will satisfy the members other than the rates 
of 1888 plus ruling percentages, and that such rates be signed by the employers 
and posted on every pit bank in North Wales”. Some success was achieved 
when the coalowners agreed to discuss the issue in February 1905 and, despite 
a total failure at this date to reach agreement, the issue was at least 
acknowledged by the employers. Further unsuccessful meetings took place at 
which the union continued to press the issue, but “they [the coalowners] would 
not agree to the principle of a 4s minimum in hard and difficult places. They also 
objected to a close (sic [clause]) in the price list providing for a scale of wages for 
boys” (D/NM/2, 1906).
Mitchell (1984: 167) explains that the negotiation of a price list was “a 
somewhat tortuous business”, and this is borne out by the fact that it was not until
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1907 that agreement was reached in Denbighshire “thanks largely to the 
negotiating ability of Hughes, and the considerate attitude of the employers” 
(Rogers, 1928, XIII: 253). A meeting was held on 7 October when the North 
Wales Price List Joint Committee agreed to the following minimum rates, which 
would apply to the price lists used in all the association collieries, and would 
come into effect on 1 January 1908:
i) colliers in hard and difficult places - 4/- per day
ii) collier taken out of his place to work for the company - 4/- per day
iii) timbermen and metalmen - 4/- per day
iv) experienced bye-men who had worked underground for more than two 
years - 3/ 4d per day
v) boys 13-16 years -1 / 4d
boys 16 + -1 / 8d
(D/NM/2 , minutes, 7 October 1907).
The collieries covered by the agreement were: Bersham, Vauxhall, Wrexham & 
Acton, Gatewen, Plas Power, Black Park, Wynnstay, Westminster, Brynkinallt, 
Hafod, Llay Hall, New Brynmally, Ffos y Go and Vron. In 1908, these collieries 
employed 10,452 men or 92.5 per cent of the total mining workforce in 
Denbighshire (List of Mines).
The union was jubilant and, in its review of 1908, the first year in which the 
price list operated, it reported that “on the whole the agreement has been 
adhered to considering that the universal price list for the coalfield was a very big 
question” (D/NM/65), but still some coalowners, even those who had signed the 
agreement, refused to recognise the price list in its entirety. This is illustrated by 
an article in the Wrexham Advertiser (11 January 1908, WM), which reported that 
“it was arranged that price lists should come into effect at all collieries on January 
1st, but up to the present, at only three of the collieries belonging to the 
coalowners’ association have lists yet been signed” (for an example of a 1907 
price list see Appendix F). This reluctance on the part of the owners led to an 
increase in grievances and disputes; for example, at some collieries where the
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owners already paid more than the rates agreed in the price list, the owners 
wanted to cut the wages to the minimum level although the lists were supposed 
only to apply to collieries where less than the minimum was being paid (Wrexham 
Advertiser, 11 January 1908, WM). This was only one of the tactics used by the 
owners to avoid their obligations under the agreement, another was to employ 
non-union men, an issue which greatly upset the NWMA.
In 1905, a union pamphlet had appealed for greater unity; “fellow 
workmen, so long as we remain united we will be a match for all of our enemies 
and so prevent the capitalist from being in a position to make slaves of us” 
(D/NM/2, 6 July 1905), but still a small proportion of men remained outside the 
ranks of the union, usually because they perceived the levies to be too high. This 
infuriated the union members because “they [the non-unionists] admit the 
advantages of organisation and are prepared to receive all the benefits - but to 
contribute anything to the funds is out of the question. This I consider to be the 
essence of meanness” (G Rowley, 1903). The issues of non-union men and the 
price list were closely related because “some unscrupulous employers [employ 
non-union men]... to do away with the principle of a standard rate of wages as 
provided in the price list, the legal status of which has been proved beyond 
question” (D/NM/2, 1 July 1908). The union often threatened to use the strike 
weapon, but Hughes, like Mabon in south Wales, was not enamoured of strikes;
they were to be “strictly avoided he advocated patience and tact” (Rogers,
1928, XIII: 255), and was a firm believer in negotiation as the best means of 
settling disputes because he knew from personal experience the hardship that 
strikes created.
Conclusion
The years 1894 to 1908 saw the MFGB begin to establish itself as a strong 
national union but it took almost twenty years, from its creation in 1889, for all the 
unions representing the different regional coalfields to become affiliated with it 
(Howell, 1996: 35). In south Wales the miners finally came to realise that if they
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were to get rid of the unpopular sliding scale they would need to present a strong, 
united front and this resulted in the creation of a single, unifying organisation, the 
SWMF. In north Wales too, the miners, led by the influential Edward Hughes, 
came to see the advantages of a strong union and, finally, as the last district of 
the UK to do so, created a central fund in 1897. The issue that united the miners 
in both regions behind the MFGB was the issue of wages; in south Wales the 
miners’ perceived that the sliding scale gave them lower wages than those paid 
in the ‘Federated area’, while in Denbighshire, the union wanted agreement on a 
local ‘price list’ covering all the tasks undertaken by colliers. Both aims were met; 
in south Wales the sliding scale was abolished in 1903, while in north Wales a 
price list agreement was reached in 1907 and it may well have seemed to the 
miners that “their trade union, the vessel that held the fortunes of the Welsh 
miners, was voyaging happily over untroubled seas” (Page Arnot, 1967: 126). 
The ‘seas’ at that time were indeed calm; they were soon, however, to became 
choppier as storms began to gather on the horizon, storms which would plunge 
all the coalfields of the UK into unparalleled industrial strife.
The Eight Hours Act, 1908
It is ironic that, by achieving legislation which introduced an eight hour day, the 
MFGB was to contribute to the bitter industrial disputes that took place in the 
years leading up to World War I. The MFGB had been agitating for an Eight Hour 
Bill since its foundation; the first attempt at introducing a Bill was in 1889 but it, 
and a subsequent attempt in 1893, failed. The next attempt was in 1907 and, as 
always, the employers raised innumerable objections; in north Wales the 
coalowners articulated their objections to the Wrexham Advertiser (18 January 
1908, WM), in the following manner:
1. “That Parliament ought not to interfere with the question of hours of labour 
because it is an interference with the liberty of the individual.
2. That there is no necessity for the working hours of miners to be reduced.
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3. That a reduction in hours would not lead to any improvement in the health or 
physique of miners.
4. That a reduction of hours would lead to a very large decrease in the output of 
coal.
5. That a large reduction of the output of coal would lead to a considerable 
increase in the price of it for householders and manufacturers”.
It was these final two points that were used by the coalowners as the main 
thrust of their argument against the Bill; in south Wales, where the coalowners 
were far more vehemently against the Bill than in other parts of the country, they 
estimated that the shorter working day would reduce output by at least 15 per 
cent which would increase working costs by 1s 6d per ton, and lead to a 2s 
increase in the price per ton to the consumer (Page Arnot, 1967: 132). The south 
Wales coalowners were so totally against the Bill because the average working 
day in that region was longer than elsewhere, and also their production costs 
were higher. Restricting hours would therefore have a greater impact on their 
profits than on those of coalowners in other regions (Page Arnot, 1967: 132). 
They argued that such restrictions would reduce wages; “this alteration of one of 
the main conditions of employment would necessitate the employers seeking a 
reduction in the basis of the general wage rate of the workmen”, which they felt 
would lead to a “disturbance of the friendly relations between the employers and 
the workmen” (Minutes of SWMF meeting 8 January 1908, cited in Page Arnot, 
1967: 133). This statement was to prove to be prophetic within a very short time.
The pressure put on Parliament by the owners did mean that the miners 
were thwarted in their demand for a eight hour day from ‘bank to bank’, i.e the 
“time spent below ground plus the time taken to wind [all] the men up or down; or 
more strictly, plus the time between the middle man up and the middle man 
down” (Mitchell, 1984: 130) but, on the whole, when the provisions of the Eight 
Hours Act came into effect on 1 July 1909, the miners were delighted, especially 
those in south Wales. However, as mentioned above, the Act, rather than solving
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problems on the coalfields, actually added to them as the coalowners tried to find 
other means of cutting costs.
One of the main problems with the Eight Hours Act was that the eight hour 
limit was interpreted differently by the unions and the owners. According to 
Mitchell (1984: 130) the unions’ interpretation was that the eight hours should 
mean the time ‘bank to bank’. The owners, on the other hand, believed that the 
eight hours should be the time spent at the face, and should exclude all winding 
time. The problems experienced by miners in Denbighshire were outlined by 
Edward Hughes in an interview with the Wrexham Advertiser (10 July 1909, 
WM). He explained that some of the men were concerned because in one colliery 
(unnamed), men who started their shift at 2pm were not allowed up until between 
10.20 and 10.40 pm; this was because the employer ‘allowed’ 20 minutes for the 
cage to descend, and interpreted the eight hours as starting from the moment the 
men reached the pit floor. Others (again unnamed) insisted that the men were 
actually at the face for eight hours, which meant that they were not given the time 
to get from pit floor to face as part of the eight hours; as Hughes pointed out, this 
meant that for some men it took ten hours to get from ‘bank to bank’.
An additional problem arose when the NWMA demanded that the miners 
be given twenty minutes ‘snap time’ (meal break), during which winding and 
haulage should stop. The employers agreed to the ‘snap time’, but would not 
allow winding to stop; this meant that, although entitled to a break, the men would 
not actually get it, the continued winding preventing it. This issue was debated at 
considerable length without success, and eventually the NWMA told its members 
“the terms offered by your employers we could not conceentiously (sic) accept, 
and we decline to be a party to such terms” (D/NM/2/17 July 1909). In protest, on 
19 July the NWMA gave notice of termination of all members’ contracts which led 
to further discussions and eventual agreement on 9 August; it was agreed that 
‘snap time’ would be fifteen minutes in length, and winding would be stopped, 
except on Saturdays (D/NM/2/9 August 1909).
According to Mitchell (1984: 142), after the introduction of the Eight Hours 
Act, the national average ‘bank to bank’ day lasted eight hours thirty nine
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minutes, a reduction of an hour in south Wales and half an hour in north Wales. 
Mitchell (1984: 142) also believes that, apart from these two regions, the Act 
affected only some areas of Lancashire, the Midlands and Shropshire, 
“elsewhere the Act apparently made little difference to the hewers”. It was soon 
apparent that, in north and south Wales, this reduction in hours would cause the 
relations between men and masters to be severely tested.
1909-1914
The main problem that was created by the Eight Hours Act was that, in the face 
of mounting production costs, the owners had to find imaginative ways to reduce 
them. Having, over the years, already reduced many of the unofficial allowances 
given to the men, such as a ban on taking home any waste timber, the owners 
now turned on other allowances, the defence of which would, ultimately, cause 
the most bitter industrial dispute, up to that date, ever experienced in Britain: the 
national miners strike of 1912.
‘Hard and difficult places’
The history of British miners between 1908 and 1914 has become synonymous 
with that of the south Wales miners who were behind the industrial unrest that 
marked this period. Having welcomed the eight hour day, it did not take the 
miners in south Wales long to realise that the wage reductions the owners had 
foreseen were indeed a consequence of shorter hours. When the owners began 
to threaten the removal of the allowance for working a ‘hard and difficult’ place, 
the miners’ attitude began to harden. It is important to note that “the custom of 
abnormal places was not peculiar to south Wales” (Boyns, 1982). It also had a 
tremendous impact in north Wales and, from 1909, there was much agitation in 
both regions for a settlement of the issue. It must be pointed out, however, that 
“abnormal places were prevalent in the [south Wales] coalfield because the 
majority of seams were less consistent in nature than in most other coalfields”
214
(Boyns, 1982), and therefore the problems associated with such places were 
commensurately higher in this region than in others.
A ‘hard and difficult’ or ‘abnormal’ place can be defined as “part of a seam 
where a collier cannot, for reasons beyond his control, produce a normal day’s 
output” (EW Evans, 1961: 191). Generally speaking, if a miner found himself 
working in such a place, it was customary for him to be paid an allowance, 
determined by reference to the ‘place’, and also to his level of skill. There were 
no general norms for these allowances, and they were “determined on a rule of 
thumb basis” (EW Evans, 1961: 191). This is illustrated by an extract from an 
agreement relating to Brynkinallt, Denbighshire, signed 4 October 1894; here it 
was customary “where difficulties such as faults etc. interfere with the production, 
a consideration will be paid, the amount of such consideration to be a matter of 
arrangement between the manager and collier” (D/NM/1424). Until the 
introduction of the eight hour day, any men working in such places could make 
up their daily wage by undertaking overtime. The new Act took away this 
opportunity and, when the owners began to look at the whole issue of 
allowances, the miners could see their already small wage being further eroded.
In 1908 the position of the coalowners had been bolstered by a case in 
Pontypridd, south Wales, where a miner had sued his employer to recover the 
difference in his earnings between working a normal and an abnormal place. The 
judge found in favour of the employer, and stated that such allowances were “a 
matter of gratuity, and could not be recovered by process of law” (EW Evans, 
1961: 192). This left the employers free to reduce allowances, and saw miners 
wages fall, sometimes significantly. According to EW Evans (1959: 84), many 
miners “faced genuine hardship owing to the abolition of overtime, and hauliers, 
riders and trafficmen, the lowest paid workers in the mines were perhaps even 
more severely affected”. By November 1909, unions in south Wales were 
pressing for a minimum wage for those men working in hard and difficult places 
This was a new departure because they were now asking for a specified 
minimum amount - 4s 9d per day (EW Evans, 1961: 193), rather than a minimum 
wage rate. The employers flatly opposed a minimum wage (EW Evans, 1961:
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197); they felt that the miners would put less effort into their working day if they 
knew they would receive the minimum anyway. In addition to this, they were 
determined not to see an increase in wage costs per ton which, in south Wales, 
by 1908 had risen to 7s 4d compared to 6s 7d in 1902 (EW Evans, 1961: 198).
The seeds of conflict in south Wales were being sown; both sides “found 
themselves subjected to economic forces that made it impossible for them to 
compromise or make concessions [and] the atmosphere of mutual respect and
consideration  had given way to fundamental distrust and hostility” (EW
Evans, 1959: 86). Mabon and other leaders of a like mind were being challenged 
by the younger, more militant unionists who were being increasingly supported by 
the men (EW Evans, 1959: 96). This hardening of attitudes on both sides lead to 
many disputes, which were referred to the Conciliation Board, but these often 
remained unresolved, a situation which Evans states “underlined the fundamental 
weakness of the Conciliation Board” (EW Evans, 1961: 200). This failure was 
obvious to all, and the respect for the mechanism was fast disappearing. The 
intransigence of the employers was illustrated by their refusal to accept any form 
of arbitration and, as a consequence of this, the South Wales Conciliation Board 
failed to resolve 70 of 86 disputes referred to it in 1909-1910 (EW Evans, 1961: 
200). The result of this failure was a series of strikes and lock-outs which only 
served to toughen already hardened attitudes.
In north Wales, the issue also caused great unrest; in some cases the 
men were able to successfully argue in court that their wages were being unfairly 
restricted, but in most cases they had to resort to strikes. The main contention of 
the NWMA was that “the employers have failed to keep to the spirit of the 
agreement [1907 Price List Agreement] in regard of the payment of a minimum 
wage for men working in hard and difficult places” (Wrexham Advertiser, 4 
December 1909, WM). Basically, the employers did everything they could to 
thwart the agreement, and had to be forced, by painstaking litigation to face their 
obligations; their lawyers “twisted it [the price list agreement] to mean something 
very different to what we thought we agreed to” (Annual report NWMA, year to 
December 1912, D/NM/65). This non-cooperation, as in south Wales, did little to
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foster decent relations; as Edward Hughes told the Wrexham Advertiser (4 
December 1909, WM), “I am sorry to say that the Coalowners Association have 
not had sufficient courage to acknowledge the principle underlying ....the 
agreement [and] the colliery companies have not treated us fair (sic)”.
Such feelings ran much higher in south Wales, and in 1910 the miners’ 
dissatisfaction boiled over in what was known as the Cambrian Combine dispute, 
which Thomas (1975: 55) describes as “un o’r cwerylon chwerwaf a welwyd 
rhwng cyfalafiaeth a llafur yn maes glo De Cymru” (one of the bitterest quarrels 
between capitalists and labour in the south Wales coalfield).
The Cambrian Combine dispute
According to C Williams (1996: 125), this dispute “heralded the emergence of 
South Wales as a ‘storm centre’ of industrial unrest”, which culminated in the first 
national miners’ strike in 1912, the impetus for which had come solely from south 
Wales. One of the main problems that the men in south Wales faced was the 
determination of the owners to cut costs in whatever way they could; the men, 
although reasonably well organised, faced a formidable foe. The MSWCOA was 
“highly and effectively organised, and could afford to adopt a firm attitude in 
relations with the men” (EW Evans, 1961: 202). In addition to the powerful 
Coalowners Association, the owners, in their attempts to create economies of 
scale and profits, had formed large ‘combines’, which “substantially strengthened 
the already impressive power of the employers” (EW Evans, 1961: 202). It was in 
the face of such opposition that the men entered into negotiations re. a new 
Conciliation Board agreement in early 1910. As mentioned earlier, their demands 
included a minimum wage; a demand that was hardly likely to be accepted given 
the determination of the owners to reduce production costs “by reducing wages, 
by making the work day as long as possible and by adopting new methods” such 
as introducing an afternoon shift (EW Evans, 1961: 197).
In an effort to strengthen their bargaining position, the SWMF urged the 
MFGB to call a national strike; the national union was not interested and advised
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the miners to accept the employers’ terms, feeling that it was a purely local 
dispute. EW Evans (1961: 199) comments that “perhaps the Conference failed to 
appreciate the basic problem in South Wales, namely the serious reduction in 
earnings caused by the eight hours Act”. Without national backing, and facing 
employers who were united, strong and determined, the SWMF had little choice 
but to accept the employers’ terms, and a new agreement was signed on 8 April 
1910 (EW Evans, 1961: 199).
This agreement did nothing to improve wages, no progress had been 
made to resolve the pressing issue of hard and abnormal places and, as the cost 
of living rose, the miners found it increasingly difficult to make ends meet; they 
were very unhappy, and little was needed to ignite the simmering resentment that 
was spreading throughout the coalfield. The spark that lit the flame was the lock­
out, in September 1910, of miners at the Ely pit in the Rhondda (Page Arnot, 
1967: 176), over the miners’ failure to accept particular piece rates. Miners in the 
other collieries in the Cambrian combine, which employed up to 11,000 men, 
gave notice to strike, and after a period of negotiation to prevent this, which 
ultimately failed, they struck on 1 November 1910. Miners in other areas such as 
Aberdare, also struck unofficially, over issues specific to collieries in that area, so 
that by mid-autumn, between 27,000 and 33,000 men had stopped work (Page 
Arnot, 1967: 182). The atmosphere in the region was unsurprisingly tense, 
especially as the coalowners called for extra police and troops to be situated in 
the region.
Violence erupted in Llwynypia on the nights of 7 and 8 November and in 
Tonypandy on the 8 November, as colliers tried “to compel officials and stokers 
to leave work” (Major-General McCready, cited in ID Thomas, 1975: 65). The 
events of the 8 November were described as “serious rioting” by the authorities 
(Page Arnot, 1967: 191), with casualties among both the miners and the 
constables. A report in the Western Mail (9 November 1910, cited in ID Thomas, 
1975, 59-62), described the situation: “Mid-Rhondda is in a state of anarchy. 
Such scenes as these witnessed tonight are almost, if not completely, without 
parallel in any civilised country. It was pandemonium let loose. The strikers seem
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like men possessed, and were obsessed with only one idea and one 
purpose....destruction”. Such inflammatory reports did little to calm an already 
difficult situation and, indeed, according to Major-General McCready (cited in ID 
Thomas, 1975: 67-9), who was in charge of the troops in the region, this factor 
“greatly contributed towards maintaining and developing the atmosphere of 
tension and excitement in the area”. Major-General McCready asserted that 
“original reports regarding the attacks on the mines....had been exaggerated”, 
and he felt that “had the mob been as numerous or so determined as the reports 
implied, there was nothing to have prevented them [from overrunning the 
premises at Llwynypia]. That they did not, was due less to the action of the police 
than to the want of leading or inclination to proceed to extremities on the part of 
the strikers” (cited in ID Thomas, 1975: 67-9).
The tactics of the coalowners, in employing ‘imported labour’ or 
‘blacklegs’, and the employment of troops to quell any disturbances, ensured 
that, except for some trouble on the nights of 21 and 22 November (Page Arnot, 
1967: 211), the coalfield remained relatively peaceful throughout the remainder of 
the strike. Nevertheless, resentment and bitterness ran deep; the SWMF again 
asked for, and failed to get, national support for the idea of a general strike; the 
MFGB still saw the dispute as a purely local one, although it did provide some 
financial assistance (EW Evans, 1961: 204). This attitude convinced the SWMF 
that they had to find an issue that would “associate the Cambrian Combine 
stoppage with some broader problem” (EW Evans, 1961: 204), one which would 
unite all the miners of Britain. That issue was abnormal places, which the SWMF 
pushed to the forefront of the national agenda. This they were able to do with 
such success that “the Cambrian Combine lock-out and strike came to be 
inextricably mingled in the outlook of the strikers with the question of abnormal 
places and [a] minimum wage” (Page Arnot, 1967: 241).
Meanwhile, locally, their most pressing problem was to somehow end the 
Cambrian strike. As EW Evans (1961: 206) explains, by January 1911 “a solution 
was imperative if the organisation was not to be bankrupted by the stoppage”. 
However, dissension among the union officials themselves made this difficult; the
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executive of the SWMF was often at loggerheads with the more militant 
Cambrian Combine Committee (CCC), the strike committee representing the 
miners of the Combine, and while the former might have advised the men to 
come to terms with the employers, the latter was determined that the struggle 
should continue (Page Arnot, 1967: 219). In March 1911, a ballot of the 
Cambrian Combine men was overwhelmingly in favour of continuing the strike, 
and rejecting the employer’s offer “to pay such allowances to men engaged in 
abnormal places as would enable them to earn a fair wage” (Page Arnot, 1967: 
219). The SWMF executive had encouraged the men to accept the offer, 
especially as suffering was widespread. However, the miners supported a more 
militant confrontational policy, and the strike continued. By May 1911 another 
possible agreement had been brokered by the SWMF and the MFGB but, in a 
decision that highlighted the tension between the moderates and the militants, 
this too was rejected by the miners at their Conference on 28 May; the reason 
was that “they felt that the employer’s assurance of fair wages was valueless” 
(EW Evans, 1961: 208). They again called for a national strike, “for [the] purpose 
of securing for all colliery workmen a definite, guaranteed Minimum Wage” (EW 
Evans, 1961: 208). This decision “was of the greatest significance, for it marked 
the overthrow of the older leaders who had advocated moderation” (EW Evans, 
1961: 208); militancy was the policy that now prevailed. However, by now, 
conditions for the miners and their families were becoming desperate, and 
without the practical help of the MFGB (financial help having been withdrawn 
after the Conference decision), they may well have been forced back to work. It 
was at this juncture that the owner of the Cambrian Combine, DA Thomas, with 
possible mischievous intent, announced that the terms offered could not be 
interpreted as guaranteeing a minimum wage (Page Arnot, 1967: 260). “Since 
this was what both the Miners’ Federation and the supporters of the May terms in 
South Wales had assumed, the statement made a return to work impossible” 
(EW Evans, 1961: 209).
By August it was not a case of whether the strike would end with the 
capitulation of the men, but when. They were “impoverished and dispirited” (EW
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Evans, 1961: 210), and given the continued intransigence of the employers “the 
union executive bowed to the inevitable” and accepted the terms which had 
originally been offered in October 1910 (EW Evans, 1961: 210). Thus, the 
Cambrian Combine dispute ended; it had lasted eleven months, cost the union 
£225,000, and caused untold misery in the region (EW Evans, 1961: 211). 
Looked at in terms of whether the men actually achieved anything as regards the 
issue they originally struck over, it would seem that the strike had been a 
complete failure. However, “in the course of their struggle they had raised the 
question of abnormal places to be a national mining issue, and in the later stages 
had carried this still further to the issue of a National Minimum Wage” (Page 
Arnot, 1967: 267). They may have lost their local dispute, “but they had won the 
desired national movement to settle [a] wider question” (Page Arnot, 1967: 267), 
and “it would be difficult to over-estimate its consequences for ....the coal 
industry as a whole” (EW Evans, 1961: 211). In north Wales there was little 
mention of the dispute in the papers of the NWMA or in the press, other than as 
part of the growing agitation for a minimum wage.
The 1912 national strike
The main consequence of the Cambrian Combine dispute was the identification 
of a national issue, namely that of a minimum wage for those working in 
abnormal places, around which all the British miners could rally and, according to
EW Evans (1961: 210), “it was th e  miners’ [of south Wales] determination to
win a universal minimum wage that eventually goaded the Federation into the 
National Strike of 1912”. Throughout the months leading up to the strike, the 
south Wales delegates were “often at the fore in urging a stiff attitude towards the 
employers” (Page Arnot, 1967: 276), possibly because the employers in that 
region showed more intransigence that those in other regions; as Page Arnot 
(1967: 276), points out, the English Conciliation Boards had already (by 1911) 
conceded the principle.
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In north Wales the employers showed almost as much intransigence as 
their counterparts in south Wales; in a letter dated 10 April 1911, to the NWMA, 
the NWCOA stated that “the members do not see what practical result can come 
from discussing the question of Minimum Standard rate of wages for colliers and 
other day wage men....as the coalowners have all along resisted and will 
continue to resist such a demand” (D/NM/2). This attitude merely stiffened the 
resolve of the miners and even Edward Hughes, a man who very much adhered 
to Mabon’s philosophy that “the strike is a disturbing element in trade and 
embitters the relationships between masters and men” (cited in EW Evans, 1959: 
97), was moved to explain in the Wrexham Advertiser (30 September 1911, 
D/DM/506/35) that “there is much to be said in favour of a strike sometimes and a
working man has a perfect right to sell his labour for a reasonable price, and to
live comfortable and decent, failing this he has a right to withdraw his labour and 
wait until a fair price is offered for it”.
Throughout 1911 local discussions between masters and men continued 
throughout Great Britain, but to no avail in either south or north Wales; little 
headway was made in either region. In south Wales there was deadlock, the 
owners remaining obdurate; they would not recognise the principle of a minimum 
wage and were totally intransigent (Page Arnot, 1967: 277). In north Wales the 
minutes of a meeting between the NWMA and the NWCOA, on 13 November 
1911, highlight the extent of the rift between the two sides. On behalf of the 
workmen, Hughes declared that this was one of the most important meetings 
“ever held in connection with this coalfield” (D/NM/1). He went on, “we make an 
earnest appeal that you give us what we are today asking for which is after all not 
more than a bare living wage for the labour they give and the terrible risk they run 
every time they descend into the mine....we believe that the coal trade, which is 
the mainstay of all other trades, can well afford to pay the miners who create the 
wealth of this country, at least a living wage”. He explained to the NWCOA that if 
such a minimum wage was not forthcoming, then a ballot would be held, and 
“gentlemen, you may take it from us, there is only one answer to the ballot, viz: 
STRIKE, STRIKE, therefore we hope that it will be possible even at this eleventh
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hour to avoid what we must all admit is the most brutal and terrible weapon of 
settling our differences” (D/NM/1, 13 November 1911). However, despite such an 
emotive plea, in response the owners said that they “would not even consider the 
wages of the surface hand and neither would they negotiate with the men re 
abnormal places and boys’ wages” (D/NM/1, 13 November 1911).
The ballot that Hughes referred to was a national one that the MFGB had 
determined upon when it became obvious that local discussions in some regions 
were not getting anywhere. The ballot asked miners, “Are you in favour of giving 
notice to establish the principle of an individual minimum wage for every man and 
boy working underground in every district in Great Britain?” (cited in Page Arnot, 
1967: 279). The response was overwhelmingly in favour of a strike; Table 6.2 
illustrates that support for a national strike was almost unanimous, only one 
region, Cleveland, voting against giving notice of a strike. In the other regions the 
percentage in favour of a strike was exceptionally high; the lowest margin in 
favour was 66.7 per cent in Durham, while the highest, 90.1 per cent, was in 
Somerset. In both south and north Wales, unsurprisingly, there were significant 
majorities in favour of the strike, 84.89 per cent and 82.4 per cent respectively. 
The overall average for those regions in favour of the strike was 80.6 per cent; 
the union was therefore confident in the mandate that it had been given by its 
members.
Once the union had ascertained the level of grass roots support for its 
policy, it determined to set an agreed minimum wage for each district, which had 
to be “as near as can be ascertained the present rate of wages” (cited in Page 
Arnot, 1967: 280). This process was more problematic than it had been 
perceived, and caused a rift among the national union leadership. The problem 
was that some districts wanted to incorporate a wage rise into the minimum set, 
while others felt that this was not the time to discuss an advance in wages. The 
latter argument prevailed, but the SWMF was especially unhappy with this as 
their wages were lower than in other regions and they felt they were entitled to 
include an element of increase.
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Table 6.2 District results of the National Strike ballot. 1912
District For Aaainst Total % in 
favour
Yorkshire 63,736 10,477 74,213 85.88
Lancashire & Cheshire 50,517 11,393 61,910 82.59
Midlands federation 26,069 5,275 31,344 83 .17
Derbyshire 17,999 6,816 24,815 72.53
Nottinghamshire 17,086 5,386 22,472 76.00
Leicestershire 3,681 907 4,588 80.23
South Derbyshire 2,178 593 2,771 78.59
North Wales 7,327 1,566 8,893 82.39
Bristol 1,084 342 1,426 76.00
Cumberland 4,918 813 5,731 85.81
Somerset 3,378 370 3,748 90.12
Scotland 60,611 12,035 72,646 83.43
South Wales 103,526 18,419 121,945 84.89
Northumberland 22,595 7,557 30,152 74.93
Durham 57,490 28,504 85,994 66.68
Cleveland 2,021 5,225 7,246 (27.89)
Forest of Dean 1.585 243 1.828 86.65
Total 445.801 115.921 561722 79.36
Note: those figures in itallics are author’s own calculations
(Source: Page Arnot, 1967: 279).
In his study of the British coal industry, Mitchell (1984: 202-5), refutes the 
view of the south Wales miners. Mitchell (1984: 202-5), demonstrates that the 
wages of south Wales’ miners’ did not lag behind those in other regions, in fact, 
wages had increased significantly more in south Wales than in many of the other 
regions. Using 1886 as his ‘base year’, Mitchell (1984: 202-5) calculated an index 
which demonstrated how wages had increased above this level, from 1886-1914, 
for four categories of underground workers. He concluded that, only in north 
Wales and Warwickshire were the increases more significant than in south 
Wales. According to the index, in 1912, the wages of pieceworkers in south 
Wales, north Wales and Warwickshire had increased by 70 per cent, 73 per cent 
and 80 per cent respectively, above the 1886 ‘base’ (Mitchell, 1984: 202-5).
Figures extracted by Rowe (1923: 85) (see Table 6.3) would appear to 
support this premise. Table 6.3 illustrates that between 1888 and 1914 wages in
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south Wales, north Wales and Warwickshire did indeed increase significantly; for 
skilled workers the increases were 93 per cent, 98 per cent and 102 per cent 
respectively. A major problem, however, when considering percentage increases 
is that the different regions were not being measured from the same starting 
position and that, although percentage increases may have been significant, 
absolute increases may have been far lower.
Table 6.3: Average wages 1888 and 1914 for piece-work coal getters and labourers in the 
districts of the UK and percentages changes
District 1888 wages 1914 wages % increase
skilled un-skilled Skilled un-skilled skilled un-skilled
s/d s/d s/d s/d % %
Northumberland 5/1 3/4 9/1 6/- 79 80
Durham 51- 3/9 8/11 5/9 80 54
Cumberland 4/5 3/2 8/2 5/8 85 79
Lancashire 5/2 3/4 8/7 5/10 66 75
North Wales 4/1 2/8 8/- 5/5 98 103
Notts & Derby 5/4 3/5 9/10 5/8 84 66
North Staffs 4/10 31- 9/1 5/7 88 86
South Staffs 4/6 3/4 7/1 5/10 57 75
Cannock Chase 51- 3/- 8/6 5/7 70 86
Warwickshire 51- 3/- 10/1 6/2 102 106
Leicestershire 4/3 3/6 71- 5/1 65 66
Somersetshire 3/3 2/3 5/9 4/4 77 94
Forest of Dean 4/6 2/10 6/9 4/6 51 59
South Wales 4/10 2/10 9/4 5/9 93 103
Lanarkshire 4/7 3/2 8/3 6/6 80 105
UK average 4 /8 3 /6 8/3 5 /6
Note: the figures in italics have been calculated by the author
(Source: Rowe (1923: 85).
This is illustrated by the figures for north Wales in Table 6.3; these show 
that although the percentage increases were high, wages rates remained 
consistently lower than the UK averages and, indeed, only in Somerset were 
wage rates lower. If we compare the wage rates of north Wales in 1888 and 1914 
with the region showing the highest wage rates in that year, Nottinghamshire & 
Derby and Warwickshire respectively, we can see that the north Wales wage 
rate, for skilled workers, was 30.1 per cent lower in 1888 and remained 26 per
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cent lower in 1914. Although the wage rates for skilled workers in south Wales 
were above average in both 1888 and 1914 (see Table 6.3), if the same 
comparison is made with the region with the highest wage rates, we find that in 
south Wales wage rates in 1888 were 10.3 per cent lower than those in 
Nottinghamshire and Derby and were still 8 per cent lower than the rates in 
Warwickshire in 1914.
Whatever the validity of their demands, the south Wales miners were 
forced to reduce their minimum demand from 8s per day to between 7s 01/£ d and 
7s 6d (Page Arnot, 1967: 283). In north Wales the miners had also hoped to 
include an increase in wages within the minimum demanded but, as in south 
Wales, their hopes were dashed. When negotiating what the minimum rate 
should be for north Wales, the NWMA had demanded 7s but, as the ‘present rate 
of wages’ was 6s, they too had to modify their demand so that no increase was 
included (D/NM/2, 5 March 1912). Although there was some support for an 
independent, district dispute in pursuit of the 7s, regardless of the national 
outcome, Hughes was able to prevent this by telling the men “we are not the 
lowest paid minimum, although not satisfactory by far, and we are not the only 
district where the claim has been lowered” (D/NM/2, 5 March 1912).
In south Wales not only were the miners unhappy with events, the 
employers of that region were also making their feelings clear; in early February 
1912 they withdrew from the national discussions, citing their continued belief in 
the Conciliation Board mechanism, and their determination not to concede the 
principle of a minimum wage. This determination remained, even when the 
Government became involved in late February. Despite the fact that practically all 
coalowners in England and north Wales had accepted the fact that the “the 
Government will insist upon the minimum wage being conceded [by the owners]”, 
the MSWCOA, and some owners in Scotland, would not agree. As the MFGB 
would not accept a partial agreement, the prospect of a national strike remained 
(Wrexham Advertiser, 2 March 1912, D/DM/506/37).
Many observers believed that the strike would have been averted had not 
the south Wales owners been so intractable. Page Arnot (1967: 307) quotes Sir
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Arthur Markham, MP, as saying, “I understand that it is said that if Mr DA Thomas 
[owner of collieries in Cambrian Combine]13 ...had not joined the Coalowners 
association we should have had no strike in south Wales at all. The fact is [that] it 
is the South Wales Coalowners who have forced this on, because they wanted a 
fight and were not satisfied until they could get one....in fact South Wales owners 
have built up a stone-wall attitude on this question [minimum wage]; they have 
declared they intend to fight it out and that is the spirit in which the negotiations 
have been carried on”.
The strike in north Wales
In north Wales, on Wednesday 29 February, all members of the NWMA ceased 
work (Wrexham Advertiser, 2 March 1912, D/DM/506/37), and by Friday 1 March 
“the majority of the miners in Great Britain came out on strike” (Page Arnot, 1967: 
290). According to the Wrexham Advertiser (2 March 1912, DD/DM/506/37), “the
position in North Wales among a large number of miners appears to be of the
nature of a sympathetic strike. Whilst to a man they will loyally fight for the 
principles which the national strike is intended to establish, many men have 
ceased work with great reluctance”. The reason for this reluctance was that many 
of the north Wales miners agreed with Hughes who said “we, in North Wales
were ahead of any other district on the minimum wage prior to the strike no
district will gain as much in this agitation as we did in 1905 and 1907 when the 
price list was agreed to” (Pamphlet The strike & an explanation of the Minimum 
Wage’, 5 March 1912, D/NM/2).
The most reluctant of the north Wales miners were those of Brynkinallt 
colliery, Chirk, who were the last to join the strike in Denbighshire. At this colliery 
“relations between [the owners] and men have always been of the pleasantest 
kind. The men have no grievance against their masters here for there is a 
minimum wage of 6s a day for work in abnormal places and it was only with 
reluctance that the men came out” (Oswestry Advertiser, 21 February, 1912,
13 At the time o f the Cambrian Combine dispute, D A  Thomas had not been a member o f the M SW COA, 
due to personal differences with key members o f the Association.
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DD/NTD/944). The owner, WY Craig, made it clear to his men that if they wanted 
to return to work “you shall have every protection at our command”, and 
according to a reporter for the Oswestry Advertiser (21 February 1912, DD/NTD/ 
944) “in conversation one with another, hopes were expressed that it would not 
be long before they were back again, not for their own sakes only but out of 
sympathy for their employers, for no one knows better than the men themselves, 
the expense and loss which the strike will entail upon the owners”.
Throughout Denbighshire, the strike created severe hardship; the 
Wrexham Advertiser (9 March 1912, DD/DM/506/37) described, in dramatic 
terms, the situation in and around Wrexham: “trade is paralized (sic), and every 
minute sees an ever widening disturbance and upheaval in the nation’s life. 
Every branch of industrial life is affected and everywhere there is a dark shadow
of a terrible nemesis killing the country The district which will suffer most if
the strike continues is Brymbo. The great steelworks are now almost closed
down entirely, and 1,000 men out of employment much distress and poverty
will prevail unless they can get to work again very quickly”. By March, the 
Llangollen Advertiser (DD/NTD/944) was reporting that “there has been a 
curtailment of lighting facilities, a rapid rise in the price of coal and the 
appearance of hawkers from Ruabon, Rhos, Cefn etc....and the railway service 
is considerably restricted in Wrexham”. In Wrexham “the effect of the strike is 
being keenly felt....and there is much distress in the town and many houses are
without coal Coal picking has been carried out in earnest [for example] the
spoil banks of the Plas Power colliery were literally covered with coal pickers” 
(Wrexham Advertiser, 16 March 1912, D/DM/506/37).
After three weeks on strike, “How funds are to be raised is the question 
that has been exacting the miners in North Wales” (Daily Telegraph, 21 March 
1912, DD/NTD 944). The NWMA had, at the start of the strike, only enough funds 
to pay for one week’s strike pay. Consequently, by 20 March, “the miners of the 
district are evincing signs of dissatisfaction at there being no funds in existence 
for the payment of strike pay last week” (Morning Advertiser, 20 March 1912, 
DD/NTD 944). The main problem was the fact that the levies raised were mostly
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used up in the payment of unemployment and funeral benefits; “the miners were 
often warned that they could not go on giving these benefits and at the same time 
provide a reserve fund for strike purposes. The warnings were without effect and 
it was only when the strike began that they realised how sparse was their 
provision for a general out-of-work payment” (Daily Telegraph, 21 March 1912, 
DD/NTD 944).
By this time it was noted that “the distress is keen and widespread. A large 
number of families are suffering and help is needed at once. They are bearing up 
bravely, although they are sadly in need of food” (Wrexham Advertiser, 31 March 
1912, D D/D M/506/37). To help alleviate this distress, the mayor of Wrexham 
published an appeal for money to help the miners because “the relief committee 
formed by the mayor finds it impossible with the means at their disposal to cope 
with the poverty of the town by the distribution of coke, bread and soup” (Times, 
26 March 1912, DD/NTD 944). Despite this distress, most of “the miners are 
showing no disposition to resume work” (Daily Telegraph, 21 March 1912, 
DD/NTD 944), and in the many meetings that were held around Wrexham “the 
miners show no indication of a desire to resume work until their cause is 
successful” (Wrexham Advertiser, 23 March 1912, D D/D M/506/37).
However, dissension appeared in the last week of March; after four weeks 
on strike some 300 of the men at Brynkinallt broke the strike and returned to work 
on 25 March. As has been noted, relations between owners and men were very 
good at this colliery and the men were already being paid the amount that the 
union was demanding as a minimum wage; as a result they could see no reason 
why they should prolong the suffering of their families, especially as the NWMA 
had run out of funds. This action obviously angered those miners who remained 
on strike and, in an action that was widely reported in the national press, about 
300 men marched to Brynkinallt to ‘persuade’ the strike-breakers to refrain from 
working. There, they were met by WY Craig who “told them that they were wrong 
in striking [and].... that he was determined to give protection to his own 
men ...and that they had better go home” (Daily Express, 26 March 1912, 
DD/NTD 944). This they did, but only with the promise that they would return.
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Such was the fear of disturbance that the authorities dispatched a detachment of 
infantry to Brynkinallt to protect the colliery. The miners returned as promised, but 
this time “they were larger in numbers...in a more angry mood than yesterday 
[and] well armed. Altogether they were a formidable and menacing spectacle” 
(Times, 28 March 1912, DD/NTD 944). Again Mr Craig spoke to them, and again 
they left peaceably. The Times correspondent (27 March 1912, DD/NTD 944), 
believed that one of the main reasons for the resumption of work at Brynkinallt 
was its position in the county which meant that it was separate from the main 
body of the Denbighshire coalfield and therefore not as much under the influence 
of the union which “tends to give them [the striking miners] courage and cohesion 
in the course they have taken”.
Many observers felt that, with the return to work in Brynkinallt, the 
floodgates would open and other miners would rush back to work. Indeed the 
Daily Telegraph (26 March 1912, DD/NTD 944) reported that “the knowledge [of 
the return to work] has created a feeling of restlessness among the workers” and 
“if it were a matter of free will the strike here would be ended in a very few hours, 
but the men’s leaders have still a big, if waning influence”. The report then 
contended that “as far as can be gathered, we are nearing the end of the strike in
North W ales  in fact the complete collapse of the strike here would surprise
no one”. This was strongly denied by the union, which condemned the coverage 
of the national newspapers and reiterated the determination of the men to remain 
out until a national agreement was reached; this view was backed up by a report 
in the Oswestry Advertiser, 27 March 1912 (DD/NTD 944), which reported that 
“the bulk of the North Wales miners are remaining on strike and so far the men at 
the larger collieries of Hafod, Wynnstay, Plas Power and Wrexham have not 
shown the slightest disposition to follow the Brynkinallt miners in breaking away 
from the Federation”.
By the end of March, the men in north Wales were eagerly awaiting the 
outcome of events in London. Asquith’s government had not wanted to intervene 
in what was, after all, a dispute in a private industry but, due to the importance of 
coal to national life, and the continued obstinacy of the south Wales coalowners,
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ultimately felt it had little choice. “His Majesty’s government came without 
hesitation to the conclusion that Parliament must be asked to intervene and that if 
the parties could not agree to a settlement, the state must provide a settlement
for them we were driven  to propose that which we had always desired to
avoid, namely,....legislation” (Asquith, cited in Wrexham Advertiser, 23 March 
1912, D D/D M/506/37). Asquith was generally sympathetic towards the miners, 
feeling that a minimum wage was “consistent with justice and with the best 
interests of the community” (Page Arnot, 1967: 286); but he insisted that no 
minimum rates were to be included in the Bill, these were to be agreed by Joint 
District Boards for each region, because different conditions prevailed in different 
coalfields (Page Arnot, 1967 307). The MFGB did its utmost to insist that the 
rates had to be included, but despite their pleas, the Bill was pushed through and 
became an Act on 29 June 1912. Once this had happened, a ballot was 
organised asking the question “Are you in favour of a resumption of work pending 
the settlement of the minimum rates of wages in the various grades of work by 
the District Boards to be appointed under the Mines Minimum Wage Act?” (Page 
Arnot, 1967: 308).
After the ballot had been announced, “it had a most tranquilising effect on 
the district [Denbighshire] because of its promise of an early resumption of work” 
(Times, 29 March 1912, DD/NTD 944). Many were more than ready to return to 
work; “the prolongation of the strike [was] making the distress very acute in the 
town [Wrexham] and district, [and] the numbers requiring relief are increasing 
daily” (Wrexham Guardian, 29 March 1912, DD/NTD 944). The knowledge that 
some among them had broken ranks caused cracks to appear in the united front 
hitherto presented by the miners; at some collieries, for example, Plas Power and 
Gatewen, the men voted to resume work before the national result was known, 
while others at, for example, Llay Hall, Westminster and Brynmally, refused to 
return until the results were published (Wrexham Guardian, 29 March 1912, 
DD/NTD 944). The result of the ballot “turned out to be very different from what 
some of the leaders expected, and extremely confounding for those others who 
held that a handful of men had engineered a national strike of men who were all
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looking for a means to return to work”. The overall result was as follows: For - 
201,013 and Against - 244,011; a 9.66 per cent victory for those against the 
resumption of work (Page Arnot, 1967: 310). The vote, unfortunately, did not give 
the required two-thirds majority that was needed for the decision to be fully 
backed by the union. The MFGB therefore found itself in something of a 
quandary, and the question was put to a Conference, which advised the miners 
to return to work.
Table 6.4: Result, bv District, for resumption of work. 1912
District For Aaainst Total
%
Aaainst
Yorkshire 13,267 43914 57,181 76.79
Lancashire & Cheshire 11,334 29,840 41,174 72.47
Midlands federation 18,168 11,278 29,446 38.30
Derbyshire 8,080 13,428 21,508 62.43
Nottinghamshire 8,187 8,213 16,400 50.07
Leicestershire 1,195 2,104 3,299 63.78
South Derbyshire 1,626 1,090 2,716 40.13
North W ales 7,446 1,190 8,636 13.78
Cumberland 2,980 4,877 7,857 62.00
Bristol 772 326 1,098 29.69
Som erset 2,130 1,220 3,350 36.42
Scotland 23,186 30,473 53,659 56.79
South W ales 62,538 31,127 93,665 33.23
Northumberland 10,674 14,195 24,869 57.07
Durham 24,511 48,828 73,339 66.57
Cleveland 4,919 908 5,827 15.58
Forest of Dean no ballot
Total 201.013 243.011 445.0244 54.72
Notes: districts denoted in bold voted for resumption; those figures in italics are the author’s own 
workings.
(Source: Page Arnot, 1967: 311).
The lack of union funds was also one of the main reasons for the vote in 
north Wales, where there was a big majority in favour of a return to work (86 per 
cent to 14 per cent). Here, the benefits paid out were too high a proportion of the 
levies being paid in, but there was another reason; according to a national 
newspaper, some miners in the district had followed the national line only with 
reluctance because “the minimum wage for which they were to put down their
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tools was the wage they were already receiving” (Times, 26 March 1912, 
DD/NTD 944). Although true of Brynkinallt, this judgement may well have been 
an exaggeration by a national newspaper generally hostile to the miners when 
applied to the district as a whole. The general impression given by the more 
sympathetic local papers is that, while it was indeed a strike in support of the 
MFGB’s policy, there were sufficient inequalities and problems within the district 
to warrant the backing given to the national organisation.
By 13 April 1912 the strike was over, but had it been successful? 
According to Edward Hughes (Annual report year to December 1912, D/NM/65), 
“the greatest strike that ever was experienced by this or any other country had
ended in victory for the miners not only have we had a victory, but a victory
with honour. The strike raised the standard of the miners morally and 
intellectually”. This view may well have been tempered with time and the 
knowledge of the full terms of the Act. According to Page Arnot (1967: 315), “the 
Act did little more than lay down in legal terms the principle of the individual 
minimum wage and establish machinery for subsequent settlement”. The 
problem, as Page Arnot saw it, was that “the minimum wage was not absolute 
but conditional” (1967: 315), and some workmen would not be covered, it all 
depended on the district rules which were negotiated between the union and 
local Joint District Boards.
From the miners’ point of view the Act did little to alleviate immediate 
problems; the miner had to prove his right to the minimum wage and some of the 
rules were “harsher than they ought to be” (Page Arnot, 1967: 320); the MFGB 
was especially unhappy with the fact that the minimum, in most cases, was not 
even 5s, and that some owners were “coercing or bribing workmen to contract 
out of the provisions of the Act, either by promising or refusing them work, or by 
offering increases to tonnage rates or percentages” (Page Arnot, 1967: 321).
It would appear that, in its application, the Act was not altogether 
satisfactory to the miners of north Wales; in the same way that cases had to go 
before the courts to deal with the price list, so the miners now had to go to court 
to force certain owners to pay the minimum wage. There were so many cases
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throughout 1913 re. the interpretation of various clauses within the Act that the 
union complained that the owners were not abiding by the spirit of the 
agreement, just as they had failed in their application of the 1907 Price List 
Agreeement. On 24 January 1914, Hughes remarked, “I wish to warn you that we 
shall be very fortunate if we don’t experience another general strike during 1914, 
either on the enforcement question or the Minimum Wage Act” (D/NM/2). 
Whether further strikes would have happened, as foreseen by Hughes above, will 
never be known because the First World War intervened and the mining industry 
embarked on one of the busiest periods in its history.
Conclusion
From the above discussion it can be seen that the process of unionisation 
throughout Wales was a painful one. The main stumbling block, in both north and 
south Wales, was a strong sense of parochialism, which prevented the miners 
from seeing the ‘bigger picture’; they were more interested in the problems of 
their own colliery or village than in the issues that might affect a complete region. 
This problem was more of an issue in south Wales than in Denbighshire due, not 
only to its greater size, which meant that for unity to be achieved many 
thousands of men had to be brought together, but also to the physical nature of 
the region. The topography of the south Wales valleys meant that many mining 
communities were almost wholly self-contained and therefore only interested in 
the issues relevant to their own community. Such factors also operated in other 
coalfields, for example, the isolation of Brynkinallt from the rest of the 
Denbighshire coalfield was a major factor in it being the first colliery in 
Denbighshire to return to work during the 1912 strike. Even where an inter­
regional body had been established, as in the ‘Federated Area’, similar problems 
could arise. While the miners of Denbighshire formed part of this ‘Federated 
Area’, they could not necessarily count on the automatic support of miners from 
other regions within the Federation. If they went on strike there was no incentive
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for the miners of the other regions to join them since their masters could capture 
Denbighshire’s markets and, therefore, protect the jobs of their miners.
An additional problem was one of parsimony on the part of the miner when 
it came to paying his union dues. Either because he did not want to or, more 
likely, because he was unable to, the miner was reluctant to increase his, already 
small, contribution to cover a payment into a central fund. This prevented strong 
centralised unions from being created in both north and south Wales, and it was 
only after a number of bitter conflicts in the 1880s and 1890s that the men 
realised that their most effective weapon was unity, which required the creation of 
a strong union with centralised funds, including strike funds.
Unity was achieved earlier in Denbighshire than in south Wales and 
Edward Hughes was instrumental in persuading the miners that a strong union, 
the DFMF (later NWMA), was needed if their objectives were to be met. In south 
Wales, however, not only were the miners reluctant to unite, but they were also 
faced with two potential leaders, Mabon and Brace, who had differing opinions on 
how the miners’ objectives were to be achieved. It was only when the leaders 
had put aside their differences that the SWMF became a strong centralised 
union.
In both north and south Wales the coalowners also realised that their 
objectives were better served if they presented the men with a united front; with 
this in mind employers’ associations were formed; in north Wales the NWCOA 
(formed in 1870) and in south Wales the MSWCOA (formed in 1873) (LJ 
Williams, 1976: 83). When the miners’ were disorganised these associations 
were successful in thwarting the demands of the men, especially in south Wales 
where the association was particularly strong. Even when the unions achieved 
some success, for example, with the Eight Hours Act, the employers’ 
associations continued to make things as difficult as possible for the unions, 
arguing over the interpretation of clauses etc. and the intransigence of the 
employers, especially in south Wales, was an important contributory factor to the 
1912 national strike.
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Although the unions in both north and south Wales had supported the 
MFGB in its fight for legislation to govern the hours worked in a day, they could 
not have foreseen that their success in achieving the Eight Hours Act was to 
create additional problems for the miners, especially in south Wales. The 
NWCOA and the MSWCOA had fought passionately against the Act, and when it 
was forced upon them they made sure that their interpretation of its clauses 
made it as difficult as possible for the miners to achieve their objectives. The Act 
had more of an inpact in Wales than in other regions, reducing the working day 
by half an hour in north Wales and by an hour in south Wales (Mitchell, 1984: 
142). This inevitably reduced the amount of coal being got and led the owners to 
look at every means possible to reduce costs. The main way in which they did 
this was by taking away the unofficial allowances that, traditionally, the miners 
had received. One such allowance was that given for working in ‘a hard and 
difficult place’.
The issue of ‘hard’ places was an important one in both north and south 
Wales. The regional unions tried to negotiate with the employers but, eventually, 
as Edward Hughes told a meeting of the NWMA on 10 February 1911, “we have 
met our employers so often on this matter [hard and difficult places]....that we 
came to the conclusion that nothing more could be done locally” (Wrexham 
Advertiser, 25 February 1911, D/DM/506/35). It was in 1912 that ‘hard’ places 
became a national issue; as a result of agitation by the SWMF, the MFGB 
demanded a minimum wage for those miners working in such ‘hard’ places. Met 
with nothing but intransigence, especially from employers in south Wales, the 
MFGB balloted for national strike action and Welsh miners voted overwhelmingly 
in favour (north Wales 82.4 per cent; south Wales 84.9 per cent) of the national 
strike in 1912. This strike caused tremendous hardship throughout Wales but it 
did demonstrate how much influence a strong centralised union, the MFGB, 
supported by strong district unions, could have on a national issue.
Rogers (1928, XIII: 257) believes that much of the credit for the 
transformation of the miners’ union in north Wales, belongs to Edward Hughes, 
agent, financial secretary and later General Secretary of the NWMA. He worked
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indefatigably to establish order to the union’s finances and administration, to 
encourage new membership, and to protect the interests of his members. A 
measure of his success is that membership of the NWMA, in Denbighshire and 
Flintshire, in May 1913, was 12,946 or 81 per cent of the total employed in coal 
mines in north Wales (D/NM/1/ 19 May 1913). There were 16 lodges in 
Denbighshire and 10 in Flintshire, with membership numbers of 9,742 and 3,204 
respectively (D/NM/1/ 19 May 1913). Given that the total workforce for 
Denbighshire in 1913 was 12,982, these figures reveal that 75 per cent of miners 
in Denbighshire were members of the NWMA, “a trade union of which they might 
well be proud” (1928, XIII: 257).
Having discussed the relationship between the coalowners and the 
miners, we now move to consider the people who purchased the coal, the 
customers. The next chapter will therefore consider to whom the coal companies 
in Denbighshire sold their coal, and the methods that they used.
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Chapter 7
MARKETS & CUSTOMERS 
Introduction
This chapter will consider another of the major stakeholders in the coal industry 
in Denbighshire: the people who bought the coal, and the ways in which the coal 
was sold to them. Until communications improved within the UK, the coalfields of 
the north east of England had what Buxton (1979: 39) describes as a “quasi­
monopoly” over the coal trade in London. Until roads, canals and, finally, the 
railways opened up the inland coalfields, London, the biggest market for coal, 
was heavily reliant on the coastal coal trade from the north east. However as 
Buxton (1979: 40) has also pointed out, the railway “cracked open the Northern 
monopoly” and “began to revolutionise the fabric of the coal industry” (Buxton, 
1979: 39). Better transport meant cheaper distribution costs and regular 
deliveries (Buxton, 1979: 73) which, coupled with the improvements in 
technology, allowed new industries to be developed in areas not formerly 
associated with industry. This increased demand, "was of major importance in all 
the inland coalfields” (Mitchell, 1984: 33-4), of which Denbighshire was one. The 
first section of this chapter will therefore detail how, after the advent of the 
railways, the markets available to the Denbighshire coalfield were expanded, 
before looking specifically at the methods used to sell the coal, and the 
customers to whom it was sold.
Widening markets
The impact of railway development on external sales
As discussed earlier, in chapter 2, it was only with the improvement in 
communications that industries in Denbighshire saw their markets develop.
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Although, in the early nineteenth century, the Montgomeryshire, and the 
Ellesmere and Llangollen canals had made transportation of coal and iron easier 
than it had been when roads were the only option, due to the fact that the 
proposed extension of the Ellesmere canal to Wrexham never materialised, the 
commodities of Denbighshire faced a difficult journey “by inadequate roads or 
circuitously by canal and river” to reach any ‘external’ markets (Boughan, 1980: 
34). This tortuous journey is described by Christiansen (1976: 21) who explains 
that coal was taken from Wrexham “nearly sixty miles14 by canal to reach 
Chester, being despatched from Pontcysyllte wharf near the famous aquaduct, in 
barges that voyaged via Ellesmere, Whitchurch and Nantwich”.
Such conditions meant that, before the advent of the railways, the markets 
for coal and iron were predominantly local, although coastwise exports from the 
ports of the Dee Estuary were not unknown. The local iron foundries provided the 
collieries with their main customers and there was little opportunity for developing 
a wider market. It was not until the latter half of the 1840s, when the railways 
reached Wrexham (see chapter 1), that the coal industry was able to develop an 
inter-regional, rather than simply a local, market. By 1850 then, Wrexham was 
linked to both Chester and Shrewsbury, but much remained to be done to further 
extend the railway network of the region.
The 1850s were taken up with constructing just such a network to link the 
collieries and other centres of industry with the Great Western Railway (GWR) 
(which took over the Shrewsbury and Chester Railway in 1854) (Turner, 1979: 7). 
The next major development in railway building in Denbighshire was in the 1860s 
when demand for a railway to link Wrexham directly with Connah’s Quay on the 
Dee Estuary began. According to Jenkins & Strange (2004: 11), the genesis of 
the Wrexham, Mold & Connah’s Quay railway (WMCQR) was in 1861, “when a 
group of mineowners, landowners and entrepreneurs met in Wrexham to discuss 
plans for a rail link serving mines and other industries in the Wrexham area”.
The small industrial town of Buckley, “a thriving hub of coalmines, 
brickworks and clay quarries” (Christiansen, 1976: 27), was already linked by rail
14 Wrexham is 12.6 miles from Chester by road (wwAv.aarouteplanner.co.uk).
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to Connah’s Quay via the Buckley Railway, so a railway linking Wrexham to the 
Buckley line would allow “connection to the wharves at Connah’s Quay from 
which coal and minerals could be exported” (Jenkins & Strange, 2004: 11). Such 
a link would also offer Wrexham connection (at Connah’s Quay) with the London 
& North Western Railway (LNWR) main line from Chester to Holyhead (Turner, 
1979: 8), as well as links with other local towns such as Mold.
The plans for such a railway met with a great deal of opposition from the 
GWR; one of the most vociferous local opponents was Sir Watkin Williams Wynn 
in his capacity as a director of the GWR and such was his opposition that not 
only did he become “one of the most unpopular figures in the district” (Boyd, 
1991: 97), but he was instrumental in forcing the setting up of an enquiry by the 
Select Committee of the House of Lords into the proposed WMCQR Bill (Boyd, 
1991: 95).
One of the most important witnesses at this enquiry was Henry 
Robertson, coalowner and “one of the chief backers of the WMCQR” (Jenkins & 
Strange, 2004: 17). In his evidence, Robertson described to Committee members 
the circuitous route by which goods had to travel to Mold via Chester; “it is so 
inconvenient and there are so few trains from Mold to Chester that the district is 
as much separated as it has ever been” (NLW/ HR/78/5, 26 May 1862). 
Robertson explained that between Wrexham and Mold “there is a very 
considerable traffic, and if we had the facility of passing cheaply and rapidly, no 
doubt it would be largely increased” (NLW/ HR/78/5, 26 May 1862). Robertson 
outlined how important the coming of the railways had proved to be for Wrexham;
“when I went into the district in 1842 the town of Wrexham was in a most
distressed state; most of the iron works were stopped., [and] I do not suppose 
that the district exported a tenth part of coal, local sales and all, that it does now. 
There was not 40,000 tons sold out of the district; they now sell upwards of half a 
million tons of coal alone” (NLW/HR/78/5, 26 May 1862). Robertson 
acknowledged the debt owed by Wrexham to the GWR when he said, “I know no 
district that has had the accommodation given by a railway company for the 
benefit of the district that this had had”, but he also suggested that the GWR was
240
not doing enough for the industrialists of the region (NLW/HR/78/5). Additional 
evidence given by William Lowe, “engineer, manager and part-proprietor of Vron 
colliery” (cited by Boyd, 1991: 102), gave the enquiry the following production 
figures for collieries in the Wrexham area in 1861:
Further figures presented to the enquiry show that of this production, 
approximately 350,000 tons was annually being carried by rail (Boyd, 1991: 102).
If this coal was to have access to coastal markets, at that time, it had to go 
via Saltney (near Chester), thus an important aim of the WMCQR was to develop 
the port of Connah’s Quay which had more potential as a port than Saltney and 
which would also, eventually, offer an alternative to Birkenhead, the main port 
from which Denbighshire coal was exported. The LNWR had access to ports at 
Birkenhead, but the GWR, which “up to the present time has had a monopoly of 
this district” (Boyd, 1991: 52), did not. According to Robertson, “there is small 
hope for our Great Western properties and collieries if we do not get a line to a 
better port” (NLW/HR/78/5): Connah’s Quay with its deep waters was seen as the 
best option.
The Select Committee ruled in favour of the Bill, “despite strenuous 
opposition from the GWR” (Jenkins & Strange, 2004: 11) and, in 1862, the 
WMCQR Company was incorporated “to make a railway from Wrexham to join 
the Buckley Railway at Buckley, with branches to Ffrood (sic), Moss and 
Gwersyllt, and junctions with the Shrewsbury - Chester branch of the GWR at or 
near the Wrexham station” (DD/HB/62) (see Map 7.1).
Colliery
Westminster
Vron
Brynmally
Broughton
Brymbo
Ffrwd
Pen y Coed 
Talwyrn(sic) 
Total
Tons
106,526
92,144
91,767
74,077
71,538
30.000 
11,481
15.000 
492.533
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Map 7.1 Railway promotions around Wrexham, 1861-1863
A - O f e V '  tfm ctujrch^iani.
(Source: Boyd, 1991:96)
According to Boyd (1991: 104), the passing of the Bill was greeted with 
“great celebration by the people of Wrexham”, but the company itself was beset 
by problems. As construction of the railway proceeded the initial capital of 
£150,000 (15,000 £10 shares) and a mortgage of £50,000 had to be extended to 
fund construction of the anticipated extension line until, by 1869, the company 
had a mortgage of £116,650, and preference shares of £75,000, in addition to 
issued ordinary capital of £262,556 (DD/HB/62). Despite its attempts at raising
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additional capital the company “remained chronically short of money, and with its 
original line as yet unfinished, it appeared unlikely that these diverse extension 
lines would ever get off the ground” (Jenkins & Strange, 2004: 13). The company 
was severely hit by the banking crisis that followed the failure of Overend, 
Gurney and Co. in May 1866, and “by the 1870s all thought of extension towards 
Whitchurch had been abandoned, and the WMCQR settled down to eke out a 
somewhat impecunious existence” (Jenkins & Strange, 2004: 13).
The opening up of Connah’s Quay did, however, provide an impetus to the 
Denbighshire coalfield; in a report to A Mackintosh, director of the Wrexham & 
Acton colliery, dated 11 August 1882, R Wyatt, the company’s London agent, 
commenting on the state of joint sales with the Westminster colliery, reported that 
“since the collieries have been in a position to ship at Connah’s Quay at 1/- per 
ton less than at Birkenhead, I have been soliciting numerous merchants in the 
Mediterranean trade, and I trust to have some success. Connah’s Quay it 
appears however is scarcely developed sufficiently, as yet, to induce owners to 
send ships there, but as it advances in completeness and becomes better known 
to exporters, trade will undoubtedly be attracted to it” (NLW/HR/50/17).
By the 1880s the main focus for those wanting to improve Wrexham’s rail 
links was to see completion of the Hawarden bridge over the river Dee which 
would allow direct access to the port at Birkenhead from where steam coal was 
shipped. Work on the bridge, which was to be part of the Manchester, Sheffield & 
Lincoln Railway (MSLR) network, started in August 1866, but it was to be more 
than twenty years (August 1889) before the bridge actually carried rail traffic 
(Boyd, 1991: 194). Such was the perceived importance of the bridge to the 
industrialists of Wrexham that, in a petition to Parliament, the mayor, aldermen 
and burgesses of Wrexham pointed out that such a link “will form a new and 
direct competitive route from the said county of Denbigh to the port of 
Birkenhead, and by means of the Mersey Tunnel to Liverpool and other important 
centres of commerce in Lancashire”. The petition added that “the town of 
Wrexham is the principal town in the Denbighshire coalfield and its prosperity is 
absolutely dependent upon the prosperity of the industries of the district ...[and
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the bridge]., will give a great impetus... to the trade and commerce of 
Denbighshire” (DD/C/222).
The extent to which the railways opened up the market for Denbighshire 
coal was alluded to by Henry Robertson in his evidence to the House of Lords in 
1862; to establish the veracity of his statement it is necessary to look at the 
statistics that are available. Hunt’s Mineral Statistics provide figures for the total 
amount of north Wales coal that was ‘exported’ from the region by rail each year. 
As has been explained in Chapter 2 above, Denbighshire constituted by far the 
most important coal producing county in the region and it can therefore be 
assumed that most of the railway borne coal was from Denbighshire. The ‘export’ 
figures for coal carried by rail from north Wales given by Hunt can be found in 
Table 7.1; these show a significant increase in coal carried by rail between 1860 
and 1865. The accuracy of some of these figures must be treated, as should all 
Hunt’s early figures, with a certain degree of caution, but there was undoubtedly 
a big increase in rail traffic in this period. Reasons for this dramatic increase 
include the impact of the completion of key railway links, and the impetus that this 
gave to the sinking of new collieries. Among the railway links completed in this 
period were, for example, the opening of the WMCQR and the completion of 
many of the branch lines and spurs connecting collieries to the main line 
railways. One such branch was that built by the GWR from Croesnewydd to 
Brymbo; this replaced a complex system of tunnels and inclines on the Brymbo- 
Moss section of the Shrewsbury and Chester line, and made the transportation of 
coal much easier (DD/NTD/142). Once the railway network was more or less 
completed, collieries were sunk at locations that were convenient for rail 
transportation, for example, the Hafod and Gwersyllt collieries were sunk in this 
period. The Hafod colliery “was situated a short distance from Johnstown Station 
on the Great Western Railway line between Wrexhan and Ruabon” (Lerry, 1968: 
63), while the Gwersyllt colliery was close to the Wheatsheaf Junction of the 
GWR (DD/NTD/142).
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Tab le  7.1: C oal carried bv rail from  north W a les  1860-1914
‘000 tons
%
increase ‘000 tons
%
increase
1860 122.5 1890 1,369.4 5
1865 930.0 659 1895 1,429.6 4
1870 1,023.0 10 1900 1,474.5 3
1875 1,226.9 20 1905 2,144.3 45
1880 1,265.4 3 1910 2,630.8 23
1885 1,306.5 3 1914 2,360.7 -10
Source: Hunt’s M inera l Statistics  (D /G R /545-1610).
The increase of 807,500 tons in coal carried by rail from Denbighshire 
between 1860 and 1865 cannot be attributed to increased production; the output 
of the coalfield only increased from 1,139,500 tons to 1,395,000 tons, i.e. by 
255,500 tons, over the same period. It would thus appear that, if the figures 
provided by Hunt are accurate, the increase in rail freight must be accounted for 
by producers shifting from their former methods of conveyance to the new 
railways.
Table 7.1 suggests two subsequent periods of important growth in rail- 
borne traffic in north Wales: 1870-75 and 1900-1910, both periods which saw 
booms in the coal trade. In the former, the growth in coal carried reflects two 
factors: the expansion of output by existing collieries and the coming into 
production of new pits. One of the largest collieries in Denbighshire, Hafod, was 
sunk between 1863 and 1866, and it would clearly have been able to take 
advantage of the boom period of the early 1870s. Some other very large 
collieries, for example, the Wrexham, and Bersham collieries, which were sunk in 
1868 and 1869 respectively were just coming into production in the period 1870- 
1875 and would have increased the amount of coal available.
In subsequent years the amounts carried by rail remained relatively 
constant until 1900-1910 and, as most of the major collieries of Denbighshire had 
already been sunk (only Gresford, 1908-1911, and Llay Main, post - 1914, were 
yet to be sunk), the increase recorded in these years must be accounted for by 
the existing collieries taking advantage of the boom conditions. The collieries
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sunk in the 1860s and 1870s (including Plas Power and Brynkinallt) were, by 
1900, ‘mature’ collieries which were able to fully take advantage of the upturn in 
trade, not least by increasing the number of days worked per week and per year. 
Increased demand encouraged producers to increase output, and therefore 
profits, for as long as the boom allowed them to. Another reason for the increase 
in ‘exports’ during a boom period was that the economic expansion in Britain and 
abroad had opened up hitherto inaccessible markets that the companies were 
able to exploit.
Destinations
Where then did the Denbighshire coalfield sell its coal? There are no official 
figures available giving details, either of amounts carried by rail from 
Denbighshire, or its destination, but there are some official figures available for 
north Wales (see Table 7.1 above), and some archival details for individual 
collieries, albeit very scarce, which allow some conclusions to be made. The 
evidence available shows that, for most companies non-local markets were the 
most important. Table 7.2 reveals that, from 1865 to 1900, around half of all the 
output of north Wales was ‘shipped’ out of the region by rail; this increased 
significantly to approximately three quarters of all output from 1905 to 1914.
Table 7.2: Coal carried bv rail from north Wales as a proportion of total output. 1860-1914
% %
1860 7 1890 46
1865 47 1895 50
1870 44 1900 47
1875 52 1905 74
1880 52 1910 77
1885 56 1914 71
(Source: Hunt’s Mineral Statistics, D /GR//1545-1610).
Between 1900 and 1905 the amount of coal carried from north Wales 
increased from 1.47 million tons to 2.14 million tons, an increase of 45 per cent
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(Hunt’s Mineral Statistics) and, between 1905 and 1910 there was a further 
increase of 23 per cent, from 2.14 million tons to 2.63 million tons. It is interesting 
to note that between 1900 and 1905 the output of both north Wales and 
Denbighshire fell, by 7 per cent and 3 per cent respectively. This fall in output 
followed a period of boom, and although the output of Denbighshire rose in 1902 
and 1903, it fell 9 per cent between 1903 and 1905 (Hunt’s Mineral Statistics). It 
is possible that, with local demand falling, the coalowners of Denbighshire were 
forced to look for markets further afield, or it may be that, because Denbighshire 
produced good quality steam coal, it was able to take advantage of the increased 
demand for steam coal. Mitchell (1984: 16-17) explains that, between 1887 and 
1913, the proportion of UK coal output consumed by steamships increased from 
8.9 per cent to 17.5 per cent. Although much of this came from south Wales, 
Denbighshire, with its proximity to the important ports of Birkenhead and 
Liverpool, would have been in a position to take advantage of these 
developments, as was the case with the Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd., 
which supplied coal to shipping companies such as the Cunard Steamship Co. 
and the Pacific Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. (DD/LH/239).
The surviving archival evidence illustrates that local markets were 
relatively unimportant to the larger Denbighshire collieries. For example, in the 
eight months to August 1883, sales classified as local by the Wrexham & Acton 
collieries Co. Ltd. made up only 4.5 per cent of its total turnover, whereas coal 
carried by rail accounted for 67 per cent, and that by ship for 22 per cent 
(NLW/HR/76). The only other figures available that illustrate the split of sales are 
those for the Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. which show a similar pattern; 
in the half years to 31 December 1913 and 30 June 1914 local sales accounted 
for only 6 per cent of its total sales, whereas shipping sales and railway sales 
accounted for 29 per cent and 65 per cent respectively (D/BC/2289).
However, Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. Ltd., and Broughton & Plas 
Power Coal Co. Ltd. were among the largest companies in Denbighshire, and 
they would therefore have had the resources to ensure that they did not have to 
rely on the truly local market as was probably the case with many of the
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collieries. Some of the smaller collieries listed in the List of Mines only produced 
coal as part of another process, for example, the Delph, Erwlwyd and Abernant 
pits raised coal only as part of the process for extracting fireclay for brickmaking. 
Many of the smaller collieries were often among the older collieries, they had 
often been sunk before the advent of technological advances and had not been 
sunk with the railway network in mind; this meant that they did not have the ease 
of access to the railway network that their newer ‘tailor-sunk’ competitors had, 
and many of the mines listed by Hunt in 1854 (D/GR/1545) had disappeared by 
1901 (Lerry, 1968: 40).
Customers
The information available about individual companies and their customers is very 
limited; little has survived, but what there is sheds light onto some of the sales 
methods used by Denbighshire coal companies and also how varied were the 
markets that were being targeted.
As Church explains (1986: 57), there were three main methods of sale 
available to coal companies; they could sell direct to a coal merchant from the 
colliery; they could sell via an agent or factor; or, from the 1880s, they could sell 
coal by the wagon load to customers who had their own rail sidings and/or 
wagons. Mitchell (1984: 10-11) further explains that most customers bought on 
contract; these could last anything from three weeks to three years, but six or 
twelve months were the norm. According to Mitchell (1984: 13), in the early 
nineteenth century, contracts were largely confined to the north east of England 
or other areas where large amounts of coal were shipped to their markets but, by 
the late 1870s, “more than half the output of most companies was sold by 
contract, the scarcities of 1872-3 having induced more customers to adopt the 
practice” when they found themselves unable to access sufficient supplies. Coal 
that was not sold in this way was sold in smaller amounts, on the ‘spot’ market, to 
local customers, other collieries which could not meet their own demand, or 
existing customers who had underestimated demand (Mitchell, 1984: 13). Selling
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by contract, especially a long term contract of over six months, could be a risky 
business for both buyer and seller; although the contract offered security of 
supply to the buyer, and security of demand for the seller, a price was fixed for 
that supply at the start of the contract. This offered benefits to coal producers if 
prices were falling, but the profits to be earned from rising prices were foregone if 
the contract price was agreed just before a period of higher prices.
The only archival records giving a comprehensive overview of an
individual company’s affairs that survive for Denbighshire are those of the
Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. This was one of the largest colliery 
companies in Denbighshire; in 1901 it employed 1,789 men at its Gatewen and 
Plas Power collieries (Lerry, 1968: 40), and its output for the year to 31 
December 1901 was approximately 438,000 tons (D/DM/309/4). The main 
method of selling coal at Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. was by long term 
contract: anything from 6 months to 3 years. The contracts were usually settled in 
the summer “as the circumstances of the north Wales coal trade compel the
owners to make contracts in or about the month of June in each year for the
greater portion of their output for the ensuing 12 months” (D/DM/309/4, 28 
November 1888). This often caused problems for the company because the price 
at which coal was supplied was fixed, and if the general market for coal 
improved, wages tended to increase which meant that profits were squeezed. As 
was pointed out in the minutes of a meeting in November 1888, “the advance in 
wages and cost of stores during the past year rendered many contracts expiring 
in July quite unremunerative” (D/DM/309/4, 28 November).
The price charged for coal depended on whether the coal was delivered in 
the company’s own wagons or in those of the customer, and from the list of 
agreed contracts available (see Appendix B) it would appear that one of the main 
customers for coal delivered in the company’s wagons, in May 1888, was the 
Birmingham Corporation, which contracted for 50,000 tons (27 per cent) from a 
total of 184,815 tons. There are no details given as to what this coal was to be 
used for, but it is likely that it was used to power the city’s gas works; an undated 
brochure for the company (DD/LH/239) maintaining that “this well known and
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I
widely used Gas Coal is supplied to a great number of Gas works”. Indeed
gas companies contracted for 48,670 tons or 26.3 per cent of the supplies 
detailed in the sample, covering contracts entered into in June, July and 
September 1888, and if it is assumed that the supplies ordered by the 
Birmingham and West Bromwich Corporations were also to produce gas, these 
figures rise to 82,670 and 44.7 per cent respectively. Some of these companies 
were located at quite a distance from Wrexham, for example, Taunton and 
Northampton, but the majority tended to be concentrated in the north west and 
the Midlands.
Other significant corporate customers included the railway companies; of 
the total tonnage contracted for in the 1888 sample, 40,400 tons (21.9 per cent) 
was taken by railway companies, 30,000 tons being supplied to the LNWR, and 
10,400 tons to the GWR. The remainder of the contracts relate to smaller 
businesses, sole traders or partnerships, who possibly traded as coal merchants 
or agents. These contracts included some for substantial amounts. For example, 
the contract with F Chubb of Hereford was for 15,000 tons or 8.1 per cent of the 
total sample, but the majority of the remaining contracts were for much smaller 
amounts; many customers, e.g. Edward Jones & Son, Coal Merchants of Corwen 
(Slaters Trade Directory, 1895), agreed to buy what would appear to have been 
the minimum amount, namely, 100 tons.
The terms of the contracts varied from customer to customer; the larger 
customers, the railway companies and some of the gas companies, received a 
‘heavier’ ton (21 cwt as opposed to 20 cwt) than the other customers, and prices 
often varied significantly. The price of coal delivered to the customer varied from 
6/1 d per ton (2,000 tons - Bilston gas Co.) to 7/6d (100 tons - Cricklade Gas Co.), 
and the price of coal supplied at the pit varied from 5/6d (5,000 tons - 
Wolverhampton Gas Co.) to 7/4d (100 tons - Coward & Co.). The prices varied 
not only according to the amount purchased but the length of the contract; most 
were for 12 months or less, to 30 June 1889, but some were for longer, for 
example, the contract with Northampton Gas Co. (4,000 tons (21 cwt) @ 6/3d) 
was for 2 years (to 30 June 1890), and the one with F Chubb (15,000 tons
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(20cwt) @ 6/-) ran for 3 years (to 30 June 1891). These customers were given 
good terms either for the price, the weight or, in the case of the former, both.
Some customers were also offered discounts ranging from 1% per cent to 
21/£ per cent, but those customers who were given favourable terms in the first 
instance were not usually offered any discount. The minutes of 15 May 1889 
(D/DM/309/4) also reveal that the company was considering offering a reduction 
of 3d per ton to those gas companies that took supply of equal quantities all year 
round, which would help equalise revenue throughout the year.
A number of Denbighshire coal companies entered into ‘special 
relationships’ to expand their markets. One example of such a relationship is that 
between Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. Ltd. and Westminster, Brymbo Coal & 
Coke Co. Ltd. (and later Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd.). These 
companies’ collieries joined together to sell their coal via agents in Birkenhead 
and London. The bulk of the coal that these companies sold via their joint 
arrangement was for ‘shipping’ and thus of the best quality. The price the 
companies were able to charge for this coal was therefore higher than the 
average price the coal companies of Denbighshire received for their coal. If the 
prices illustrated in Table 7.4 (p.255), for Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. Ltd. 
and Westminster, Brymbo Coal & Coke Co. Ltd., are compared with the average 
Denbighshire selling prices (see Table 8.11 in Chapter 8 below, p.309) we can 
see that the former are significantly higher than the latter. For example, the 
average price of 9/9d received by Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. Ltd. and 
Westminster, Brymbo Coal & Coke Co. Ltd. for shipping sales in 1883 (see Table 
7.4) was 82.8 per cent higher than the average selling price of 5/4d for 
Denbighshire in that year (see Table 8.11).
A different type of venture was undertaken by the Broughton & Plas Power 
Coal Co. Ltd. to ensure a market for its coal. In January 1897 the company’s 
minutes report that “your directors have long desired to open up a new market for 
slack as the supply is often in excess of the demand and very low prices have 
ruled in consequence”. The directors therefore decided to invest in the by-product 
industry and established a coke company, The Broughton Solvay Coke Company
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Ltd. The company invested £4,000 and, by the end of 1898, it was reported that 
the investment “has yielded a fair dividend and the advantage of the outlet for the 
disposal of slack has been marked in the busy season” (D/DM/309/4, 22 
February 1899).
Selling techniques
The Broughton & Plas Power Colliery Co. Ltd., like other coal companies 
throughout Britain, used adverts and brochures to bring its products to the notice 
of potential customers. In a brochure produced in the late nineteenth century, it 
advertised itself as “producers of the Brymbo Main coal - a well known steam 
coal of high quality; also of best Gas and House coals” (DD/LH/239). The 
brochure also illustrates the company’s reliance on agents or ‘representatives’ 
listing the following agents: ‘shipping’ - Rogers & Bright (Liverpool and 
Birkenhead); London and Birmingham -  F Brown; Cheshire and North Wales -  
FL Rawlins, and Simon Roberts; and Birkenhead - The Mersey Coal Co.
The terms offered varied between agents as follows:
• The Mersey Coal Company was appointed the agent for the company’s coal 
in July 1883 (D/DM/309/3, 16 July 1883); it was paid a percentage of the nett 
price realised at the pit after paying expenses and wagon hire. In September 
1884, this percentage was set at 2d per ton after paying expenses and 9d per 
ton wagon hire; from this time, the salary of a clerk and the rent of offices at 
Birkenhead was now to be paid by the company.
• FL Rawlins became an agent in October 1889, initially for 12 months, working 
exclusively for the Brymbo Company, the Brymbo Steel Company, and the 
Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. The terms of the agreement gave the 
agent 21/4 per cent on the pit price after deduction of wagon hire and carriage 
costs of coal and slack sold in his ‘district’. This covered “North Wales,
Cheshire, and Shropshire (including Shrewsbury); but excluding
Birkenhead shipping, Gas works, locomotive coal, Brymbo Steelworks, coal 
supplied to directors and Mr Fitzhugh [a major mineral owner], Birkenhead 
local with Wirral peninsula as far east as Hooton, and retail trade at pits”.
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The company was to pay three quarters of his expenses, to include second 
class rail fares and 5/- per day for other expenses - up to 246 days in the year 
(D/DM/309/4, 27 November 1889).
• Rogers & Bright were appointed in January 1890 as sole shipping agents at 
Liverpool and Birkenhead for the sale of all coal for shipping and export 
(except Ireland). The salary to be paid depended on the quantity shipped, 
according to the following scale:-
tons £
up to 55,000 400
55,000-65,000 480
65,000-75,000 560
75,000-85,000 640
85,000-95,000 720
95,000-105,000 800
All Dock Board charges were to be advanced by the company, and payment 
on account was to be made on half-yearly sales to be made every September 
with full settlement in March.
• Simon Roberts was appointed in charge of the ‘Dolgelly’ (sic) agency in April 
1890; no further details of his terms are available apart from the fact that they 
would be fixed after a trial period (D/DM/309/4, 16 April 1890).
The Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. also involved itself in one-off 
selling ‘speculations’; in November 1885 it decided “to pay half [no details are 
available of the other contributor(s)] the expenses of sending a traveller to India 
to push the sale of our coal in the Indian market”, the contribution not to exceed 
£70 (D/DM/309/3, 6 November 1885). In March 1886 it decided not to appoint 
Thomas Hudson as its agent in Rio de Janeiro (he had earlier sold a cargo of the 
company’s coal there) “as all the information obtained proves this kind of 
business to be hazardous” (D/DM/309/3, 4 March 1886). However, in July 1886 it 
resolved to continue an agreement with JD Spreckels Brothers in San Francisco, 
whereby the agents confined their purchases of north Wales coal exclusively to 
the company, and the company continued to ship coal only to the agents 
(D/DM/309/3, 4 March 1886).
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The company was also keen to open up new markets closer to home; in 
January 1886 it outlined plans to apply to the GWR for a special rate to 
Aberdovey (sic) for shipment to see whether an avenue for trade could be 
opened up (D/DM/309/3, 26 January 1886). It also decided, in December 1894, 
to rent an office on the quay in Belfast and, in March 1895, it agreed to an 
agency in Ulster run by Mr JB Cooper; this was subject to the fact that the Gas 
Coal trade was to be left in the hands of F Brown (London & Birmingham) and 
that commission was to be paid at three and one third per cent on the pit price.
Joint selling agreements
Throughout the period under review, the Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. 
was also involved in some ‘combined’ ventures with its local competitors, the 
Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. Ltd. and the Westminster, Brymbo Coal & Coke 
Co. Ltd. From 1873, these two companies had worked together to sell coal from 
Birkenhead; in May 1876 a London agent was appointed and, in February 1887, 
the ‘joint committee’ was extended to include the Broughton & Plas Power Coal 
Co. Ltd. This agreement guaranteed that the coal shipped on behalf of the 
companies would come from each colliery company in agreed proportions. The 
relationship between Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. Ltd. and Westminster, 
Brymbo Coal & Coke Co. Ltd. appears to have been successful; the amounts 
sold for the years 31 December 1876 to 1888 fluctuated between 155,500 and 
208,800 tons (see Table 7.3).
Table 7.3: Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. Ltd. and Westminster. Brymbo Coal & Coke Co. Ltd. 
- joint sales 1876-1888
Tons Tons Tons
1876 155,572 1880 176,548 1884 190,732
1877 225,206 1881 192,218 1885 197,956
1878 235,194 1882 155,344 1886 208,800
1879 185,109 1883 204,337 1887 206,432
1888 205,023
(Source: NLW /HR/74/28-57).
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Figures showing how the Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. Ltd. and 
Westminster, Brymbo Coal & Coke Co. Ltd. sales were split between ‘shipping’, 
and ‘gas and rail’ sales are available for the years 1881-1888 and are detailed in 
Table 7.4. These figures illustrate that for this joint venture the most significant 
sales were those for shipping, which were conducted at Birkenhead. During the 
years illustrated, the proportion of sales which was categorised as ‘shipping 
sales’ fluctuated between 70 per cent and 87 per cent of total joint sales and the 
annual average price per ton achieved fluctuated between 7/1 Od per ton and 
9/9d. While these annual variations are significant (there is a 28 per cent 
fluctuation), they are not as volatile as the underlying quarterly figures for price 
per ton from which they have been extracted. If the quarterly figures are 
examined (see Table 7.5), more volatile figures are apparent. For example, in 
March 1876 the average price received was 12/3d per ton, but by December 
1886 this had fallen to 7/4d, an overall variation of 67 per cent.
Table 7.4: Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. Ltd.& Westminster. Brymbo Coal & Coke Co. Ltd. - 
joint sales 1881-1888. split between shipping, gas and rail sales
Shipping
-tons
Shipping 
sales £
Average
annual
price
Gas &
Rail
-tons
Gas &
Rail
sales-£
Average
annual
price
Total
sales-
tons
1881 148,966 65,857 8/10 43,252 13,267 6/1 192,218
1882 118,706 52,844 8/11 36,638 11,446 6/3 155,344
1883 154,353 75,033 9/9 49,984 16,019 6/5 204,337
1884 143,302 69,757 9/0 47,430 15,081 6/4 190,732
1885 172,308 79,577 9/3 26,548 8,885 6/8 197,956
1886 174,863 71,561 8/2 33,937 11,333 6/8 208,800
1887 165,436 65,589 7/10 40,996 12,526 6/1 206,432
1888 143,901 57,772 8/0 61,122 19,118 6/3 205,023
Note: These figures exclude Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. even though they relate to 
the period after it joined the ‘committee’.
(Source: NLW /HR/74/28-57).
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Table 7.5: Average quarterly selling prices fo r coal sold jointly bv the W rexham & Acton Collieries
Co. Ltd. and Westminster, Brymbo Coal & Coke Co. Ltd.. March 1876-December 1888
Quarter to ‘shipping’ ‘aas & rail’ ‘shioDina’ ‘aas & rail’
s/d s/d Quarter to s/d s/d
Mar 1876 12/3 Sep 1884 9/2 6/4
Jun 1876 11/0 Dec 1884 9/1 6/4
Sept 1876 10/3 Mar 1885 9/0 6/4
Dec 1876 10/0 Jun 1885 9/0 6/4
Sep 1885 8/9 6/10
Mar 1881 9/4 6/3 Dec 1885 8/6 7/0
Jun 1881 8/5 5/11 Mar 1886 8/2 6/10
Sep 1881 8/5 6/1 Jun 1886 8/0 6/7
Dec 1881 8/5 6/3 Sep 1886 7/4 6/3
Mar 1882 8/7 6/2 Dec 1886 7/4 6/9
Jun 1882 8/2 6/0 Mar 1887 7/5 6/8
Sep 1882 8/3 6/3 Jun 1887 7/6 6/5
Dec 1882 8/6 6/5 Sep 1887 7/7 5/10
Mar 1883 8/11 6/5 Dec 1887 7/6 5/11
Jun 1883 8/11 6/2 Mar 1888 7/10 6/0
Sep 1883 9/5 6/6 Jun 1888 8/0 5/10
Dec 1883 9/2 6/6 Sep 1888 8/0 6/8
Mar 1884 9/2 6/4 Dec 1888 8/3 6/10
Jun 1884 9/4 6/5
(Source; NLW /HR/74/28-57)
The prices received for ‘gas and rail’ sales were lower than those for 
‘shipping’ for a number of reasons. First, the coal used for gas and rail purposes 
was of a lower quality than the steam coal used by shipping. Second, it is likely 
that the railway companies used their own wagons to collect the coal from the 
collieries and, thirdly, the contracts were for longer periods. It is also evident, 
from Table 7.5 that the prices for ‘gas and rail’ sales fluctuated far less than those 
for ‘shipping’ indicating the greater volatility / competition in the latter market.
The joint scheme between the Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. Ltd. and 
Westminster, Brymbo Coal & Coke Co. Ltd. appears to have progressed 
smoothly. However, problems were encountered almost immediately following 
the inclusion of the Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. into the agreement. As 
early as July 1887 the amount of Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. coal to 
be included in joint shipments from Birkenhead was much less than agreed. 
Although the company was producing sufficient output, its coal was not being
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‘chosen’ for sale and, as early as 23 July in fact, the company needed to ship 
10,190 tons to make up their ‘share’ (D/DM/309/3, 29 July 1887). In discussions 
with the Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. Ltd. and Westminster, Brymbo Coal & 
Coke Co. Ltd. it was decided that, in August 1887, those companies would only 
ship 3,000 tons from their collieries to meet a contract with a customer, GJP, 
leaving the balance to Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. (D/DM/309/3, 31 
August 1887).
Following the resolution of this disagreement, problems continued; in June 
1888, Broughton and Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd.’s share of shipping sales was 
4,440 tons in arrears, a problem that had “arisen from the Westminster 
Company’s practice of stipulating for delivery of coal from their pits. It was 
resolved to insist upon all orders being taken henceforth for coal to be delivered 
from any of the union collieries” (D/DM/309/3, 13 June 1888). It would appear 
that it took Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. Ltd. and Westminster, Brymbo Coal 
& Coke Co. Ltd. a long time to get used to the inclusion of Broughton & Plas 
Power Coal Co. Ltd., perhaps because of their previous, long established 
relationship; this is illustrated by the breakdown of union sales for 1889 shown in 
Table 7.6.
As is revealed in Table 7.6, in 1889, the Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. 
Ltd.’s coal was ‘undersold’ by 19.7 per cent, and such a discrepancy does not 
appear to have been unusual. Indeed, the minutes of the Broughton & Plas 
Power Coal Co. Ltd. (D/DM/309/3-4) contain many references to the 
disagreements that occurred between the three companies. In November 1889 it 
was reported that “wagons belonging to the Ruabon Coal Company had been 
loaded up at the Wrexham & Westminster collieries with coal... for Swan Village 
for the Birmingham Corporation, the Wolverhampton Gas Co., and the Bilston 
Gas Co. contrary to the agreement. It was resolved that having regard to the 
importance to all parties in the union that the agreement should be fairly and 
honourably carried out; this Board failing a satisfactory explanation of the above, 
withdraw from the union at the expiration of 3 months from this date” 
(D/DM/309/4, 27 November 1889). The representatives from the other union
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collieries acknowledged that they were in the wrong, and the company decided to 
remain in the union (D/DM/309/4, 27 November 1889).
Table 7.6: Sales bv the joint union of the Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. Ltd.. Westminster. 
Brymbo Coal & Coke Co. Ltd. and Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd.. 1889
Quarter to Shipments by: in tons)
Westminster Wrexham Plas Power TOTAL Over/(under) 
agreed 
amount for 
PP
30 March 21,444 14,960 6,256 42,660 (6,542)
29 June 21,504 19,840 12,850 54,194 (3,408)
28 Sept 22,304 15,134 11,029 48,467 (3,510)
9 Nov 12.480 7.251 12.646 32.377 2.932
77.732 57.185 42.781 177.698 (10,528)
Aareed amounts per Aareement
30 March 16,574 13,288 12,798 42,660
29 June 19,900 18,036 16,258 54,194
28 Sept 17,797 16,131 14,539 48,467
9 Nov 12.185 10.478 9,714 32.377
66.456 57.933 53.309 177.698
Over/ (under)
11,276 (748) (10,528)
%
over/(under) 17 (1.2) (19.7)
(Source: NLW /HR/ 74/28-57).
Additional agreements with other companies were made by the Broughton 
& Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd.; in 1894 a proposal for joint shipping of sales with the 
Wynnstay Collieries Ltd. was “considered and deemed advantageous” 
(D/DM/309/4, 26 January 1894). In the following year, Sir HB Robertson, of the 
Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd., was invited to join the Board of Wynnstay 
Collieries Ltd., an invitation which the company accepted because “it was 
considered that his doing so would promote the interests of both companies” 
(D/DM/309/4, 18 December 1895).
In addition to sales agreements with individual companies, there were 
attempts by all the collieries in the region to agree various sales and pricing
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policies. In September 1891 a meeting in Chester was called by Messrs Barnes 
(Bersham), and Butler (Ruabon) with a view to appointing a committee of the 
Denbighshire Coalowners “to control the sales of coal for shipment at 
Birkenhead” (D/DM/309/4, 24 September 1891). It would appear that while willing 
to enter into sales agreements with other companies, the Broughton & Plas 
Power Coal Co. Ltd. would not allow prices to be fixed. The minutes state “that 
we could submit to no control in fixing the prices of cargoes for America [and] that 
this must be clearly understood if we joined the shipping sales committee” 
(D/DM/309/4, 23 December 1891). This same reluctance to commit the company 
to fixed price agreements was revealed when an initiative by the ‘Ruabon 
Committee’, in November 1891, attempted to fix the price of landsale coal; the 
company felt that this move was “imprudent”, and despite “All the other members 
of the Ruabon Committee [being] in favour of advancing the price of landsale 
coal by 10d per ton...[the Board] ...decided that we would make no advance, as
an advance might be likely to cause difficulty with the men about wages”
(D/DM/309/4, 5 November 1891). The other members of the Ruabon Committee 
continued to press for price-fixing, but the Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. 
continued to withhold its approval, because “any advance is wholly unwarranted 
by the state of the markets and possibly dangerous in its effect upon wages” 
(D/DM/309/3, 23 December 1891). it would appear that this reluctance to fix 
prices had been overcome by November 1896; “the secretary reported that 
shipping sales were now under the control of a committee representing the 
Denbighshire Coalowners - the first committee of the kind which has included all 
the Denbighshire Coalowners and that all had worked smoothly since the 
committee was formed in November” (D/DM/309/4, 27 January 1897).
Additional, more national, initiatives were considered by the directors of 
the Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd.; in March 1894 a scheme was 
proposed by the Yorkshire Coalowners for a gas coal syndicate to fix prices, but 
“it was decided not to join in any event unless the Ruabon Coal Co. and the 
Wynnstay Colliery Co. also did so” (D/DM/309/4, 21 March 1894). Further 
meetings on this issue took place in 1895, but the company decided that “as the
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greater part of the Yorkshire and Derbyshire trade lies in districts where the North 
Wales coal cannot compete, anything partaking of the nature of a common fund 
must be more or less of a speculation for North Wales coalowners, so it was 
decided not to join the scheme which was regarded however as admirable for the 
purpose” (D/DM/309/4, 1 May 1895). Again, however, the company eventually 
succumbed to the price-fixing proposals of the larger coal districts; by May 1900 
it could be stated that “the Yorkshire, Lancashire and North Wales districts are 
acting together with regard to contracts for the coming season, and there is 
reason to expect an advance of at least 5/- per ton” (D/DM/309/6, 2 May 1900).
Conclusion
From the above discussion it can be seen that, although it was a small coalfield, 
Denbighshire was not restricted to merely supplying its immediate environs and 
indeed had a wide and varied market. The main impetus to the creation of a non­
local market, which allowed the coalfield to expand rapidly in the 1860s and 
1870s, was the further development of the railway infrastructure. The building of 
the WMCQR to link Wrexham with the newly developed port at Connah’s Quay, 
considerably extended the market for Denbighshire coal. Not only did it allow 
access to Connah’s Quay’s dock facilities but, when the Hawarden Bridge, which 
linked Connah’s Quay and Birkenhead by rail, was opened in 1889, this allowed 
the Denbighshire companies far quicker and easier access to the significant port 
of Birkenhead.
Despite the paucity of primary records, those that do survive establish that 
the larger companies in Denbighshire were pro-active in their approach to 
expanding markets, and would try many different approaches. Rather than 
relying solely on the traditional agency system, companies such as Broughton & 
Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. became involved in more varied methods; these 
included sending out travellers to different parts of the world, joining local selling 
agencies/'cartels’, and investing in the by-product industry. Such was the 
success of the first two methods that the Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd.
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counted among its customers not only some of the biggest railway companies in 
Britain, such as the GWR and LNWR, but some of the biggest shipping 
companies in the world such as the National Steamship Co., Cunard Steamship 
Co. and the Pacific Steam Navigation Co. Ltd, as well as companies across the 
world, such as the Great Indian Peninsular Railway Co. and the South Indian 
Railway Co. (DD/LH/239).
Having examined how, and to whom, the coal companies of Denbighshire 
sold its coal, we have completed our survey of the stakeholders in the 
Denbighshire coal companies. We now turn our attention to trying to establish 
how successful the companies were. The next chapter will therefore examine the 
productivity and profitability of the Denbighshire coal companies.
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PERFORMANCE
Chapter 8
Introduction
Earlier chapters have shown us that the coal industry in Denbighshire grew 
considerably between 1850 and 1914 and this required considerable investment 
by the stakeholders in the coal companies. None of the stakeholders would have 
‘invested’ in the companies if they did not anticipate receiving a return; the 
shareholders anticipated dividends, the mineral owners expected royalties and 
the employees required wages. None of these could be paid if the companies did 
not perform well and dividends, in particular, depended on the companies making 
profits. It was therefore important, if the companies wished to keep their 
shareholders happy, to make sufficient profits to pay dividends. It was also 
important for a company to be profitable if it was to achieve any sort of longevity; 
if a company did not perform well then the investment that it might need to 
become successful was not likely to be forthcoming, whereas a successful 
company could either generate funds internally or would find it easier to attract 
the outside investment it needed to expand. Profitability was therefore an 
extremely important issue for coal companies. However, ultimately, the 
companies could not make profits if they were not getting coal efficiently and, 
therefore, labour productivity was of vital importance; this chapter will therefore 
consider the performance, in terms of both productivity and profitability, of the 
coal companies of Denbighshire.
To assess the performance of a nineteenth century coal company, either 
in terms of labour productivity or profitability, is, however, not without its 
problems. According to Church (1986: 472), measuring labour productivity is 
problematic. The preferred measure of ‘Output per Man Shift’ (OMS) is often 
impossible to calculate due to the lack of primary material and, therefore, “the 
historian, for want of a more satisfactory indicator, is thrown back upon the 
returns of ‘Output per Man Year’ (OMY)” (Taylor, 1960: 48), as these are often
262
the only figures that can be derived from historical statistics. This means that, as 
Walters (1977: 280) explains, “any discussion of labour productivity is seriously 
handicapped by use of such [a] crude global measurement”.
Given the shortcomings of labour productivity as a measure of coal 
companies’ performance, it might be thought better to rely on profitability, 
however, this too, is beset by problems. In the context of the twenty first century, 
performance is synonymous with profitability and, for public limited companies in 
particular, profitability goes hand in hand not only with the ability of the company 
to keep its shareholders happy, but with maintaining the market’s confidence in 
the company’s performance. A slight downturn in profits can wipe thousands, if 
not millions, of pounds off a company’s value as shareholders sell their shares 
and analysts transfer their allegiance elsewhere. However, when attempting to 
assess the performance of nineteenth century companies, it is important to 
establish what performance meant in a nineteenth century context. It would 
appear that, “[nineteenth century] coalowners were inclined to measure the 
efficiency of their industry ...in terms of...financial success” (Taylor, 1960: 66) 
which meant that the directors of the coal companies were usually profit driven, 
and especially keen to pay the shareholders (of which they themselves often 
constituted a large proportion!) dividends. The problem with ‘profit’ is that, 
especially in the nineteenth century, there were no strict accounting conventions 
determining the definition of profit, and companies were therefore able to 
establish a subjective definition. This lack of standardisation meant that assets 
and liabilities which, by modern accounting conventions would be deemed to 
have been ‘misstated’, were included in nineteenth century accounts because 
companies “individually adopted general accounting conventions to suit the 
circumstances of their particular concern” (Wale, 1990: 253).
Despite the highlighted shortcomings of both profit and productivity as 
measures of performance, they remain the only real measures at our disposal; 
this chapter will therefore review the performance of the companies on the 
Denbighshire coalfield first in terms of productivity and then in terms of
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profitability. Before looking at the available data on productivity we first examine 
the problems associated with trying to measure productivity in the coal industry.
Labour Productivity
Measures of labour productivity
If labour input was measured simply in terms of whether the numbers employed 
increased over time, then one look at the employment figures for the UK coal 
industry reveals a significant increase in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century. During this period the numbers employed grew from 510,523 in 1875 to 
1,124,326 in 1914, an increase of 120 per cent (see Table 2.3) (FA Gibson, 
1922: 11 and 29-30). In simple terms, if one assumes a close correlation 
between the amount of coal raised and the numbers employed, it is to be 
expected that, as employee numbers increase, so will output. However, 
“employment figures alone are misleading as a measure of the input to the 
industry of labour as a factor of production” (Church, 1986: 258) in that they are 
not an accurate reflection of the actual amount of labour effort put in over a year. 
Although more workers meant more output, the correlation between the average 
number of workers and output will never be 100 per cent, either due to a decline 
in the effort put in by each worker or to other factors such as differences in shift 
lengths and the working week. While various measurements can be used to 
assess the overall efficiency of labour (see below) they do little to measure the 
efficiency of individual workers. It is almost impossible to measure the efficiency 
of one hewer against another; even if both produced the same amount of coal 
during a shift, one may have had to work as hard as he possibly could, while the 
other, possibly physically stronger, or working a better seam, may have only 
worked to seventy five per cent of his capabilities.
Nonetheless, some form of measurement of the output achieved by the 
hewers is needed if we are to assess labour productivity, and those available 
include Output per Man Hour (OMH), Output per Man Shift (OMS), or Output per
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Man Year (OMY). Each of these measures is closely linked; the output achieved 
by a hewer per hour obviously helps to determine the output he achieved in a 
shift, while the output per shift, when multiplied by the number of shifts worked 
per year, gives the output for the year. As all the measures are averages, per 
hour, per shift or per year, the figures are more meaningful when less averaging 
is involved. This means that the best measure, according to Church (1986: 474) 
is OMH, calculated by dividing daily output by the man- hours worked. 
Unfortunately the information required to make such OMH calculations is very 
difficult to find. Even if one was able to find such information for a single colliery, 
as a tool for comparison it would be almost useless, due to the lack of 
comparable information for other collieries.
OMS is therefore the second choice measure; this divides output by the 
number of shifts worked. This is obviously easier to calculate than OMH because 
annual, rather than daily output figures can be used. However, although annual 
output figures are readily available for officially designated regions, they are far 
more difficult to obtain for individual collieries. More importantly, to calculate 
OMS, the number of man-shifts or man-days worked by a colliery or coalfield, are 
needed. Given the disparities, not only between, but within, coalfields of the 
numbers of days worked by collieries, and the fact that much of the underlying 
data have been lost, OMS is often difficult to calculate. However, statistics for 
OMS were only officially required to be compiled after 1920 and can be affected 
by length of shifts. Thus, for our study period, Church (1986: 473) believes that 
OMS is “not truly accurate as it disregards variations in the duration of shifts 
which altered considerably between 1830 and 1914”.
This leaves OMY, or output divided by the average number of men 
working during the year, which has become the measure most commonly used 
by historians. Despite this, it is generally agreed by historians that OMY is the 
least useful of the measures discussed; Taylor (1960: 48), explained that “for 
purposes of historical comparison....the statistics of output per man shift ...are a 
more sensitive measurement of labour productivity than are those of output per 
man year” but, given that the information to calculate OMY is readily available, at
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least on a coalfield to coalfield basis, it has, by default, become the measure of 
productivity on which historians have relied.
Although OMS figures are not readily available, when discussing the 
factors that affected the overall output of a colliery, given that, in simple terms, 
OMS multiplied by the number of man-days worked equals OMY, these factors 
can be split between those that impacted on OMS, such as the age of a pit, 
legislation or the length of shift, and those affecting OMY such as short working 
and absenteesim. With this in mind, the next section of this chapter will consider 
first those factors affecting OMS before looking at those that affect OMY.
Factors affecting OMS
Geology and Age
The productivity of a coal mine depends on two main things, the accessibility of 
the coal and the efficiency of the hewer in extracting the coal. Geological 
conditions and the age of the pit are the main factors affecting the accessibility of 
the coal; if geological conditions are good, for example, the seams are thick, the 
coal is much easier to get than if the seams are thin or the ‘roof is liable to 
‘crushing’, or ‘squeezing’, as it was in south Wales (Morris & Williams, 1958: 55).
In general, as a pit ages, the coal becomes less accessible; the most 
easily available coal is often worked first, which means that any remaining coal is 
more difficult to access. Not only this, but, unless a technique such as ‘longwall 
retreating’15 is being used, as a colliery ‘spreads out’ underground, the face being 
worked gets further away and the hewers have to spend more and more time 
travelling from the shaft to the face, which obviously reduces their OMS (Mitchell, 
1986: 322). Church (1986: 489) believes that the geological conditions within a 
coalfield or colliery were an important factor determining productivity in the 
nineteenth century coal industry; if seams were accessible and faults were not 
prevalent, the easier access to the coal inevitably meant that productivity was 
higher than in collieries where faults or water made the coal less accessible.
15 This involves going out ot the boundary o f a pit and working back towards the shaft.
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Mitchell (1984: 307) believes that the age of the coalfield or colliery was the most 
important factor affecting productivity. The longer established collieries had been 
able to access the coal that was easiest to work, and therefore newer collieries 
invariably had to be sunk in less convenient spots where the coal was usually 
deeper and harder to access. Church (1986: 482) believes that mines were often 
sunk with a view to simply accessing coal; little thought being given to issues of 
efficiency, output being put above productivity.
The older the colliery, the less likely it was that the owners would invest in 
new technological advances as they became available, for example, advances in 
ventilation and haulage (Church, 1986: 482). There was often a reluctance to 
invest the capital required given that, generally, it took such a long time to 
generate profits and therefore a return on investment in the form of dividends. 
This meant that many of the older collieries were using outdated, less efficient 
working methods, which obviously affected productivity. In addition to this, Taylor 
(1960: 58) believes that, as the nineteenth century advanced, technological 
changes were not “by nature or consequence of a revolutionary character”, and 
were not as likely to have had as significant an impact on output and productivity 
as earlier advances. Church (1986: 393) believes that even if a colliery did invest 
in new equipment, etc, it did not necessarily increase productivity, as the benefit 
of the new technology was often offset by poor and/or declining geological 
conditions.
The traditional assumptions relating to a colliery’s age and productivity 
were questioned by Boyns (1982). Boyns (1982) argued that collieries did not 
necessarily suffer from reduced productivity as they aged and that 
generalisations such as those put forward by Taylor (1960) should be challenged. 
Although Boyns (1982: 112) accepts that, in theory, as a colliery ages and the 
face retreats then the ratio of hewers to oncost workers will fall and so will 
productivity, he challenges the view that this is automatically what will happen. 
Traditionally it has been assumed that a colliery will work the coal in the best, 
thickest seams first and then that in the thinner, less accessible seams; as a 
consequence productivity would fall. Boyns (1982: 115) points out that for this to
267
happen the colliery owner would need “perfect geological knowledge of all the 
coal seams under his leased area” and would then rank them “according to their 
potential yield in terms of labour productivity” and then work them accordingly. 
This is an unrealistic assumption because coalowners “would rank them [the 
seams] not in terms of labour productivity but in terms of their respective 
profitably, and there can be no presumption that these two rankings will be 
identical” (Boyns, 1982: 115). If a thick, and therefore more productive seam lies 
at a greater depth than other thinner seams, in terms of profitability, the thinner 
seams will be worked first because of the costs involved in accessing the deeper 
coal, “thus it does not follow that the second seam to be mined will necessarily 
yield a lower return in terms of labour productivity than the one currently being 
mined” (Boyns, 1982: 115). However, Boyns (1982: 104) acknowledged that 
even if, in the short term, a colliery’s productivity levels could be boosted by, for 
example, labour saving technological changes, “labour productivity could not be 
offset forever, and eventually productivity would decline”.
The hewer and his effort.
According to Mitchell (1984: 100), “few will quarrel with the statement that the 
hewer was the most important man; the man whom all the others were, in effect, 
employed to serve”. Before attempting to assess his efficiency and, therefore, his 
productivity, it is essential to know what the hewer’s remit was. Did he simply 
work the coalface and nothing else, or did his duties involve additional tasks? 
According to Church (1986: 207-8), in some regions hewers did constitute “an 
easily identifiable group performing specialised tasks [but] such a marked division 
of labour was not characteristic of colliery workers in all coalmining regions”. 
Church (1986: 208), further explains that the division of labour in, for example, 
the north east of England, was very strict and therefore, in this region the hewer 
did simply extract the coal. This contrasts with other regions, such as south 
Wales, or the Midlands, where the hewers not only got the coal, but “did all the 
face work including timbering and stone work”.
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Given the lack of uniformity in the definition of a hewer and the merging of 
roles, it is difficult to measure the performance of hewers in one region against 
those in another. Table 8.1 illustrates this difficulty; the proportion of hewers as a 
percentage of the total underground workforce in the north east of England was 
only 49.9 per cent, (but these were likely to be the most accurate in terms of 
categorisations given the strict division of labour in the region), whereas in 
Scotland 68 per cent of underground workers were described as hewers. In north 
Wales, in 1889, the proportion of hewers was 60.3 per cent, which suggests that 
there was more blurring of responsibilities here than in the regions where tasks 
were more strictly delineated; workmen might be classified as hewers even 
though they spent little time actually working the face. By 1905, when more 
detailed job categories were being used, the proportion of hewers in Scotland 
was still higher than in any other region, but it had fallen to 59.4 per cent while in 
north Wales it had fallen to 49.8 per cent. This suggests that workmen were more 
strictly classified but, even so, the spread between regions still varied from 44.4 
per cent to 59.4 per cent.
Table 8.1: proportion of workers described as hewers in 1889 and 1905
Reaion 1889 1905
% %
Scotland 68.0 59.4
North east 49.9
North east & Cumberland 47.5
Cumberland 67.1
Lancashire & Cheshire 61.5 46.1
North Wales 60.3 49.8
Yorkshire 61.6 48.4
East Midlands 68.1
West Midlands 61.1
East & West Midlands 44.4
South Wales 60.5 55.6
South west 53.9 45.0
(Source: Church, 1986: 212).
An additional problem with the figures in Table 8.1 is that while they split 
the workers into categories of what they do, they give no indication of how long
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they spend doing this, which is the most important factor when looking at the 
productivity of the individual hewer. It is easy to assume that merely employing 
more men to work the face would increase the output of a colliery, because more 
men would be able to get more coal. However, this assumption pre-supposes 
that not only could each hewer work at the same pace as another but that the 
hours worked would be the same. When considering labour productivity over 
time, there is no reason for hours worked per shift to have remained identical. 
Indeed the Eight Hours Act reduced it in north Wales by half an hour (see 
Chapter 6).
Apart from the hewer’s physical capabilities the most important influence 
on his work rate was his attitude towards his work and what he wanted to achieve 
from it. As Walters (1975: 288) explains, the “productivity of labour does not 
depend simply on [the] time spent by a man at his work; it also depends on the 
intensity with which he works”, and also the numbers of days he decides to work. 
Although the numbers of days worked is a factor directly affecting OMY rather 
than OMS, if a hewer ‘chose’ not to work every day, he might well have chosen 
to work harder during the days he did attend so as to attain whatever level of 
income he considered acceptable. This would obviously have had an impact on 
OMS.
Hours worked
According to Mitchell (1984: 130), when trying to assess a normal working day, 
“there was an immense range of experience even within each coalfield”. The 
number of hours worked obviously had a direct impact on the miner’s 
productivity, and this was affected not only by the state of the coal industry, but 
by legislation. Until legislation in 1872 and 1908, the hours worked by miners 
were largely dictated by the mine owner and prevailing conditions in the industry, 
and twelve hour shifts were commonplace before 1872. The 1872 Mines 
Regulation Act restricted the hours that could be worked by boys under 16 to 54 
hours a week which had “the effect of reducing hours of labour for other workers 
to this level too” (Walters, 1975: 286). According to Walters (1975: 286), this Act
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did little to affect productivity because “the reduction in working time was not 
likely to have been of sufficient significance to have affected production”.
The 1908 Eight Hours Act, in restricting the number of hours of winding, 
had the potential to further reduce productivity, but because the eight hour 
restriction related to winding time, and not the hours ‘bank to bank’, if the hewer 
wished to maintain his efficiency he “could intensify his efforts in order to 
maximise tonnage” (Walters, 1975: 287). This increased effort was unlikely to be 
sustained for extended periods; given the arduous nature of his job, the hewer 
could work harder to make up for any shortfall in his wages in the short term, but 
was unlikely to be able to sustain this effort over the long term. Further 
disagreement about how the eight hours of winding should be measured and 
what contituted ‘bank to bank’, meant that there was still no “common definition 
of the working day” (Church, 1986: 248) even after the 1908 Act.
Mitchell (1984: 157) believes that “coalowners did not expect their men to 
work every possible shift [in fact] it is unlikely that many employers viewed one or 
two shifts missed with much disfavour”. It would thus appear that a certain 
amount of ‘absenteeism’ was condoned by the employers, who, according to 
Mitchell (1984: 157), would have found it difficult to “accommodate a one 
hundred per cent attendance of their workforce”. One of the main factors behind 
the absenteeism of an individual miner was likely to be his view of what 
constituted an acceptable level of income. If he was paid by piece-work he could 
increase or reduce his level of effort depending on the prevailing conditions in the 
industry, and still achieve what he considered a decent wage (Church, 1986: 
488). Walters (1975: 288) believes that in south Wales this was the main reason 
why miners worked less efficiently, but it is difficult to make generalisations about 
wages because “wages have always varied enormously between different 
pits....and the general level of wages as greatly between districts” (Rowe, 1923: 
4) (see Table 6.3 in Chapter 6).
Walters (1975; 289) believes that “the collier’s productivity might certainly 
have been very sensitive to fluctuations in wages for the simple reason that he 
was his own master, and paid by the ton of coal hewn, could determine his own
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rate of exertion”. Consequently, if wage rates were low, he could work harder 
than in periods when wages were higher, and still maintain an adequate income.
Wage levels
The wages paid to miners were largely based on the selling price of coal. Indeed, 
in south Wales (and in north Wales for a short period -  see Chapter 6) a sliding 
scale meant that wages moved directly in proportion to the selling price; it is 
difficult to find actual selling prices and wage rates for either individual pits or a 
region such as Denbighshire that cover a sufficiently long period to show this 
correlation, but a statement showing how wages and selling prices moved 
between 1889 and 1904 shows the extent to which wages fluctuated in 
Denbighshire (see Table 8.2). The wage rate movements in Table 8.2 have all 
been calculated using 1888 as the ‘base’ year because, in Denbighshire, that 
year was considered ‘the standard year’ for wage negotiations. Table 8.2 
demonstrates that, between 1889 and 1904, wages were between 30 per cent 
and 75 per cent higher than the wages being paid in 1888. However, from 1901 
the trend in wage rates was down; between February 1901 and August 1904 
miners saw their wage rates fall by 20 per cent. To ensure comparability, 
movements in the selling price have also been measured against the average 
price per ton for 1888, of 5/4d. Table 8.2 reveals that the movements in selling 
prices were much more violent than the movements in wages, for example, the 
selling price in January 1900 was a full 116 per cent higher than the 1888 price, 
but only four years later this had fallen to only 40 per cent higher. It can be seen 
that wages and selling prices clearly followed the same general path. It is also 
apparent that there was a time-lag between the movement in selling prices and 
the corresponding increase or reduction in wage rates; due to the volatility of 
selling prices the coalowners waited until a definite trend in prices could be 
discerned before re-negotiating wages.
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Table 8.2: Percentage m ovem ents in wage rates above the 1888 standard in Denbighshire 1889-
1904. and the corresponding movement in selling prices
Date % movement in % movement in
waaes sellina price
1 July 1889 +30
12 Oct 1889 +35
11 Jan 1890 +45 +17
5 Apr 1890 +50 +55
16 Aug 1890 +55
4 Aug 1894 +45 +20
8 Oct 1898 +47.5 +26
8 Apr 1899 +52.5 +45
14 Oct 1899 +55
13 Jan 1900 +60 +116
13 Oct 1900 +65 +73
9 Jan 1901 +70 +59
13 Feb 1901 +75
9 Jul 1902 +65 +59
30 Dec 1903 +60 +45
24 Aug 1904 +55 +40
(Sources: wages D/NM/261; selling prices- Hunt’s M ineral Statistics D /GR/1545-1610).
The coalowners would also have wanted to delay any increases so as to 
benefit from the increased prices for as long as possible. Where a sliding scale 
was used the time lag between an increase in selling prices and an increase in 
wages was due to the fact that an average selling price had to be ascertained 
before wage rates were altered, and this average was calculated based on 
figures for the previous accounting period. This was also a feature of the 
Conciliation Boards that were increasingly responsible for wage negotiations 
especially in north Wales. It must be pointed out that the figures for selling prices 
used in Table 8.2 are the average annual prices; these therefore do not show 
how significantly prices and wages moved within the year, but they do help give 
an indication of the close relationship between the two.
From the previous discussion we can see that OMS was affected by a 
number of factors. The age of a pit and the geological conditions therein had a 
significant impact on the accessibility of coal which directly affected the amount 
of coal raised in a shift. Another important factor was the attitude of the hewer to 
his work; this determined not only how hard he worked while on shift but also
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how many shifts he worked. If wage rates were high the hewer might decide to 
work fewer shifts and still achieve what he considered to be an adequate income; 
this level of income would be harder to achieve, and require more effort, and 
more shifts, if wage rates were lower. Having considered OMS we can now turn 
our attention to the most widely used measure of productivity, OMY.
Factors affecting OMY
Short working
The attitude of the miner to his work and, therefore, his ability to alter the intensity 
of his work rate, was not the only factor which affected his individual performance 
in each year. He could only work, hard or otherwise, if the mine was actually 
open and, therefore, the length of the working year and the number of days 
worked, were also crucial to the measurement of a mine’s OMY. Not only did the 
length of the working day vary from pit to pit and region to region, especially 
before 1908, but the length of the working week also differed. According to 
Mitchell (1984: 146), a six day week was almost universal until 1870 but, 
thereafter, it varied considerably. Church (1986: 239) explains that some regions 
continued to work a six day week, while others worked a five or five and a half 
day week, or even an eleven day fortnight (six days one week and five the next).
Looking at the number of days worked as a guide to the OMY of the 
hewers, however, assumes that they were either able, or willing to work all these 
days. Mitchell (1986: 149) points out that “whatever the length of the working 
week, one can say with a good deal of confidence that at no time anywhere was 
it worked by all, or even a majority of miners”. The willingness of the miner to 
work, or not, on a particular day was not always “a conscious leisure preference” 
(Church, 1986: 238). Church (1986: 234) explains that the seasonal character 
and cyclical nature of the sale of coal “meant that a policy of engaging sufficient 
labour to meet the needs of a colliery at times of maximum demand” was often 
employed. This, however, meant that during periods of reduced demand, there 
was a surplus of labour. Rather than reduce the number of men working, in case
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demand picked up in the short term, the mine owner would reduce the number of 
days worked (Labour Gazette, October 1895: 308, cited by Mitchell, 1984: 150), 
and three or four day weeks were not uncommon. It was only when the demand 
remained depressed that coalowners actually ‘let go’ some of their men (Boyns, 
1982: 346).
These ‘short’ weeks were sometimes the result of necessity, i.e. a 
downturn in the coal trade, but sometimes they were a deliberate ploy by the 
mineowner to manipulate the market, “to reduce output until [there was] an 
improvement in prices” (Church, 1986: 237). According to Taylor (1955: 52), 
“restriction of output...by masters...was a practice well known in the coalfields”, 
especially before the railway age. Once the railways arrived, it was not as easy to 
maintain the monopoly over supply that was needed if this restriction of output 
was to succeed in a price increase. Short working did not necessarily affect the 
output of individual miners because “if anything hewers’ output was likely to 
increase in an attempt to earn as much as possible within the shorter time 
allowed” (Walters, 1975: 292). It did, however, affect the output of the colliery as 
a whole.
Even short periods lost were worthy of mention in the minute books of 
companies; on 2 June 1882 the manager’s report to the directors of the 
Broughton and Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. explained that the loss of three days in 
May 1882 had meant that the cost per ton of coal in May was higher than it 
should have been because wages of maintenance men, etc., had still had to be 
paid (D/DM/309/3, 2 June 1882). Longer periods obviously had a more profound 
impact; at the Annual General Meeting (AGM) of the Broughton & Plas Power 
Coal Co. Ltd. in November 1883, it was reported that “during the spring and 
summer of 1883 the coal trade has been in a very depressed state” and out of a 
potential working year of 306 days, only 218 had been worked due to a lack of 
orders; this obviously had a detrimental impact on trading results (D/DM/309/3, 
29 November 1882). A similar report to the 1885 AGM revealed that out of the 
309 potential working days only 235.5 days were worked, and in 1886 the 
situation was even worse, only 204.5 days from 309 days were worked. It was
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unfortunate for both miners and coalowners that the latter were sometimes forced 
to curtail working in this way but they often had little option, the economic 
conditions in the coal trade being out of their control.
Absenteeism
A major reason for absenteeism has already been discussed above; if the wage 
rates were low miners could increase their effort, but if wage rates were high, 
absenteeism often increased; the miner no longer had to exert himself so much 
to achieve his target income and took more time off as a result. According to 
Taylor (1960: 48), there was “a close correlation between declining productivity 
on the one hand and rising wages and absenteeism on the other”, and Church 
(1986: 242) also believes that it was “not surprising ...[that] absenteeism was 
cyclical, increasing when piece-rates and the demand for labour was high”.
Absenteeism was not simply influenced by the wage rates offered; 
mining, especially hewing, was an extremely physical and arduous job and 
sometimes days were taken off simply because the miner needed a rest from 
“the relentlessly difficult work” (Church, 1986: 240). An additional factor 
influencing absenteeism was the prevailing custom in a coalfield. Customarily, in 
most coalfields, miners worked hardest in the days immediately before pay day 
or times of high expense such as Christmas, and often decided to take a holiday 
on pay day or the day after. Mondays were notoriously poorly worked, to such an 
extent that, in south Wales, an official holiday on the first Monday of every month 
was introduced (this became known as Mabon’s day) (EW Evans, 1959: 49).
According to both Mitchell (1984: 161), and Church (1986: 247), an 
additional influence on voluntary absenteeism was the location of a colliery. 
Mitchell (1986; 161) believes that absence was lower in rural than in urban 
collieries because, in the latter, the collieries were more integrated into the towns. 
This may have provided the miners with more opportunities to ‘play’ than in rural 
areas. Church (1986; 247), on the other hand, believes that the men in urban 
areas did not have to work as hard to achieve their desired income because 
there were greater opportunities for their wives to work and supplement the 
family income.
276
Proportion of underground to surface workers
As we have already said, ideally, OMY should be calculated by reference to OMS 
and the number of man-days worked. However, the lack of relevant information 
means that OMY is usually calculated by reference to annual output and the 
average annual number of workers. OMY, calculated in this way, can be criticised 
for two main reasons; firstly, it can be calculated by reference to either total 
workforce, i.e underground and surface workers combined, or total underground 
employment figures only, but not with respect to the number of hewers, since 
these are not separately identified in official returns. Secondly, if it is used for 
comparative purposes, it assumes that every employee worked at the same rate 
and for the same length of time in each coalfield and in each year. Furthermore, 
coalfield OMY figures could only be used for comparative purposes if the 
proportion of hewers within the workforce was comparable from region to region 
but, as has already been explained (see Table 8.1 above), the proportion of 
hewers varied considerably between and within coalfields and therefore this is 
not the case.
Given that OMY figures based on total employment (underground and 
surface) are often used as a series to establish trends over time, to be 
meaningful, the proportion of underground to total workers should not have 
changed. According to Church (1986: 209), the proportion of workers who 
worked above ground in the UK remained at around 20 per cent throughout the 
period after 1873. This is borne out by the statistics of Gibson (1922: 11-12), 
which show that between 1874 and 1914 the proportion fluctuated between 18 
and 20.5 per cent (see Table 8.3). Such a small degree of variation means that 
the difference between OMY based on total workforce and that based on 
underground workers only, was not significant. Indeed, Table 8.4 shows that, for 
the UK as a whole, the proportional difference between OMY based on 
underground workers and OMY based on total workers remained fairly constant 
over the period 1874-1914, fluctuating within the narrow margin of 21 to 26 per 
cent.
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Table 8.3: Proportion o f underground and surface workers in the UK. 1874-1914
Year u/g above Year u/g Above Year u/g above
% % % % % %
1874 79.5 20.5 1888 82 18 1902 81 19
1875 80 20 1889 82 18 1903 80 20
1876 79.5 20.5 1890 81 19 1904 80 20
1877 80 20 1891 83 17 1905 80.5 19.5
1878 80 20 1892 83 17 1906 80 20
1879 81 19 1893 82 18 1907 80.5 19.5
1880 81 19 1894 81.5 18.5 1908 80 20
1881 80 20 1895 81 19 1909 81 19
1882 80 20 1896 80.5 19.5 1910 81 19
1883 81 19 1897 80 20 1911 81 19
1884 81 19 1898 80 20 1912 81 19
1885 81 19 1899 80 20 1913 81 19
1886 81 19 1900 80 20 1914 81 19
1887 81 19 1901 80 20
Key: u/g - underground workers; above - surface workers
(Source: FA Gibson, 1922: 11)
The UK figures for OMY, however, are obviously an average of all the 
regions, and hide variations in the regional figures. If one looks at the OMY 
figures for north Wales (see Table 8.4), in the earlier years, the difference 
between the two OMY figures was higher and more volatile than the national 
difference, but by the early 1880s, not only did the difference remain more or less 
constant but it was generally lower than the UK difference. The same can be said 
for the Denbighshire figures which can only be calculated for the period 1894 to 
1914 due to an absence of any breakdown between the total workforce and 
those employed underground before 1894. With the exception of a small variation 
in 1901, the difference between the two OMY figures in Denbighshire ranges 
between 20 and 22 per cent. It would therefore appear that, when looking at 
trends in OMY figures, especially for Denbighshire, it makes little difference 
whether one looks at those based on the total or underground employment 
figures.
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Table 8.4: OMY per person underground, and per total workforce in UK. north Wales and 
Denbighshire, and percentage difference. 1874-1914
UK u/g UK
total
% N.W
u/g
N.W
total
% Denb
u/g
Denb
total
%
1874 310 246 26 219 171 28
1875 327 261 25 219 172 28
1876 344 274 26 256 201 27
1877 357 285 25 297 229 30
1878 363 292 24 291 230 26
1879 364 293 24 273 219 25
1880 394 318 24 291 231 26
1881 405 326 24 323 262 23
1882 403 325 24 290 239 21
1883 411 332 24 331 272 22
1884 396 321 23 308 255 21
1885 391 318 23 300 248 21
1886 383 312 23 332 274 21
1887 390 317 23 334 277 21
1888 399 327 22 326 269 20
1889 389 320 22 323 269 20
1890 362 299 21 293 242 21
1891 349 288 21 296 246 20
1892 333 275 21 280 232 21
1893 301 247 22 212 174 22
1894 333 271 23 305 252 21
1895 338 273 24 302 248 22
1896 354 284 25 304 250 22 304 251 21
1897 365 293 25 304 250 22 307 254 21
1898 359 288 25 337 277 22 328 272 21
1899 381 304 25 325 266 22 322 264 22
1900 364 291 25 302 246 23 306 250 22
1901 340 273 25 282 229 23 283 239 18
1902 345 277 25 291 237 23 294 240 22
1903 343 275 25 292 240 22 294 243 21
1904 344 276 25 281 231 22 288 239 21
1905 344 277 24 279 227 23 295 241 22
1906 357 287 24 299 244 22 292 242 21
1907 356 287 24 295 241 22 314 261 20
1908 331 267 24 275 226 22 283 235 20
1909 325 262 24 270 220 23 271 222 22
1910 314 254 24 274 224 22 271 223 22
1911 317 257 23 271 223 22 272 225 21
1912 298 241 24 252 207 22 251 207 21
1913 318 256 24 268 219 22 266 219 21
1914 293 236 24 249 203 23 248 204 21
Key: u/g - underground workers; above - surface workers; UK -  United Kingdom; N.W -  north 
Wales; Denb -  Denbighshire.
(Sources: UK and N. W ales -  FA Gibson, 1922: 11 and 29-30; Denbighshire extracted from List 
o f Mines (BL/BS/27/1) and Hunt’s M ineral Statistics (D /G R /1545-1610)).
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Validity of OMY as a measure of productivity
Looking at all the figures available for OMY, if one takes them at face value then 
it would appear that productivity within the coal industry was definitely falling from 
1881 onwards (see Table 8.5). Taylor (1960: 50) believed that this was inevitable 
because “in the long run, coalmining, like every other extractive industry, has an 
inherent tendency to diminishing returns”. Among the reasons given for this are 
many of the issues discussed above; the age of pits, the length of the working 
week, absenteeism, the increase in oncost workers and legislation.
However, the problems associated with using OMY have already been 
outlined, so is it not dangerous to rely on them to underpin a premise of falling 
productivity? Boyns (1982) certainly thinks so. In his study of the British coal 
industry, Boyns (1982: 31) refutes Taylor’s (1960) thesis that there was a decline 
in both the rate of growth of output and productivity in the period 1850-1914. 
Boyns (1982: 72) believes that “for almost half of the 1874-1914 period, i.e. from 
1890 to 1907, most of the coalfields show either a constant or upward 
productivity trend in contrast to the generally held picture of the period from 1883 
to 1914 representing a continuous decline in productivity”. Boyns (1982: 72-3) 
acknowledges that productivity fell in the years after 1907 but, due to “several 
traumatic experiences” in this period, including the introduction of the eight hour 
day in 1908, and the first national strike in 1912, he considers that “it is difficult to 
determine what the underlying trend, if any, was”.
It is important, when trying to make generalisations about ‘the British coal 
industry,’ to remember that the industry is made up of many coalfields, all subject 
to different conditions and performing differently, a point which is well highlighted 
if one looks at the average OMY figures for the different coalfields in Table 8.6. 
Church (1986: 477) points out that the decline in productivity in the period after 
1894 “was mainly the result of trends peculiar to two of the largest coal mining 
regions - south Wales and the north east”. Boyns (1982: 80) also points out that 
“the different paths of productivity noted for different coalfields is sufficient to 
suggest that the forces affecting productivity in the coal industry were
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complicated, and that they varied from coalfield to coalfield”. Given such 
differences, it is now time to examine more fully the course of OMY in north 
Wales and Denbighshire.
Table 8.5: Productivity averages and percentage movements. 1874-1913
Coalfield 1874-
1880
% » /  
i<< !
1881-
1889
% » /  
(<<i
1890-
1907
% » /  
( « )
1908-
1913
Scotland 331 11.5 369 (15.0) 310 (5.8) 293
Northumberland 261 12.6 294 (2.7) 286 (14.3) 245
Durham 346 8.9 377 (18.3) 308 (15.3) 261
Yorkshire 260 16.1 302 (11.9) 266 (2.3) 260
Derbyshire 255 20.0 306 (3.6) 295 1.0 298
Nottinghamshire 285 18.9 339 (10.6) 303 (2.3) 296
Leicestershire 228 14.5 261 - 261 6.8 279
Warwickshire 217 37.3 298 - 299 (5.3) 283
S. Wales & Monmouthshire 253 17.3 297 (11.1) 264 (10.6) 236
North Wales 206 27.7 263 (9.6) 240 (9.1) 220
Cumberland 232 16.4 270 (11.1) 240 (10.8) 214
Staffordshire & 
Worcestershire
287 25.8 361 (18.3) 295 (16.6) 246
Lancashire 315 0.6 317 (14.5) 271 (15.5) 229
Cheshire 253 15.4 292 (5.8) 275 (1.4) 271
Shropshire 161 27.3 205 (3.4) 198 15.1 228
Ireland 100 26.0 126 2.3 129 (13.2) 112
Gloucestershire, Devon & 
Somerset
159 15.1 183 - 182 (1.1) 180
(Source; Boyns, 1982; 64).
Output per Man Year in north Wales and Denbighshire
Despite all the reservations already discussed, the OMY figures for each coalfield 
are the most comprehensive figures available and will, therefore, be analysed to 
establish the trends within the UK as a whole and within north Wales and 
Denbighshire. Table 8.4 above reveals that the UK trend was for OMY (based on 
total employees) to rise until 1883 and then to fall steadily in the years to 1914 
with a peak of 332 tons being reached in 1883. In north Wales a peak of 277 tons 
was achieved in both 1887 and 1898, while in Denbighshire the peak year was
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1898 (272 tons), but thereafter the local figures follow the downward trend shown 
by the national figures, as demonstrated in Figure 8.1.
Figure 8.1: OMY (total employees). UK. north Wales and Denbighshire, 1894-1914
OMY 1894-1914
350
300
250
200 - -
5
O 150
100 - North Wales 
UK
Denbighshire
50 -
Year
(Source: UK and N. Wales - FA Gibson, 1922: 11 and 29-30; Denbighshire extracted from List of 
Mines (BL/BS/27/1) and Hunt’s Mineral Statistics (D/GR/1545-1610)).
In Chapter 2 we established that Denbighshire, although never 
categorised for statistical purposes as a coalfield in its own right, ranked 
alongside other, officially recognised, ‘small’ coalfields in terms of its output and 
employment figures. With this in mind, a comparison of the OMY figures for these 
regions (Leicestershire, Warwickshire, Cumberland, Cheshire, Shropshire and 
Gloucestershire) and those of Denbighshire has been carried out to shed some 
light on the comparative efficiency of Denbighshire. Unfortunately, as was 
explained earlier in this chapter, OMY for Denbighshire can only be calculated 
from 1894 and thus comparisons are restricted to the period 1894-1914.
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Table 8.6: Output per Man Year (total employees) of Denbighshire and other ‘small’ UK 
coalfields. 1894-1914
Denbs Leics Warwick Cumb Chesh Shrop Gloc
Tons Tons Tons Tons Tons Tons Tons
1894 252 231 278 248 281 180 166
1895 248 226 286 243 289 175 171
1896 251 233 312 248 281 189 174
1897 254 257 316 254 270 191 188
1898 272 276 312 263 278 195 204
1899 264 286 322 265 281 202 206
1900 250 295 312 236 264 208 200
1901 239 266 293 237 208 192 184
1902 240 262 290 240 285 200 185
1903 243 243 292 236 313 202 181
1904 239 268 300 236 291 214 186
1905 241 276 300 238 293 212 178
1906 242 273 298 243 310 227 189
1907 261 304 312 237 318 238 200
1908 251 283 308 222 283 242 184
1909 227 265 290 231 269 238 176
1910 229 264 296 206 290 228 181
1911 230 277 288 217 287 220 170
1912 207 278 259 198 247 210 176
1913 219 302 264 210 247 227 190
1914 204 286 263 206 222 212 182
Note: peak year of productivity for each coalfield in bold
(Sources: FA Gibson, 1922; Denbighshire extracted from List o f M ines (BL/BS/27/1) and Hunt’s 
Mineral Statistics (D /G R /1545-1610)).
According to Boyns (1982: 131) “it has been argued that the United 
Kingdom coal industry was over-burdened with small mines [i.e. those employing 
small numbers of colliers]” in the period up to 1914 which, Taylor believes (1960: 
64-5), had a direct impact on the productivity of the coal industry. If we assume 
that smaller mines have lower productivity than their larger counterparts we 
would therefore expect a region with a high proportion of small collieries to have 
lower OMY figures than those regions where there was a higher proportion of 
collieries employing large numbers. It would therefore follow that regions with 
higher OMY figures should also have higher average colliery sizes. This 
assumption is based, not on the belief that small collieries will, per se, have lower
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productivity levels than larger collieries, but rather that the process of aggregating 
a larger number of collieries will reduce the overall average colliery size.
Looking at the sample coalfields, if the assumption outlined above is 
correct, we would expect to see Warwickshire, which consistently has the highest 
OMY until 1912, also having the highest average colliery size. Table 2.19 (see p. 
69 above) reveals that in 1913 the average colliery size in Warwickshire was 
662.2 workers while that of Leicestershire, Cumberland, Cheshire, Shropshire 
and Gloucestershire was 348.6, 283.0, 62.5, 55.5 and 174.6 workers 
respectively. It would thus appear that in the most ‘efficient’ coalfields, 
Warwickshire and Leicestershire, the correlation between OMY and average 
colliery size is highly positive and we would, therefore, expect to see those 
coalfields with the smallest average colliery size, Shropshire and Cheshire, 
displaying the lowest OMY figures. However while Table 8.6 reveals that this is 
certainly true of Shropshire, Cheshire, which has a significantly lower average 
colliery size than Cumberland and Gloucestershire, has a higher OMY figure.
If we consider the proportion of small collieries (those employing fewer 
than 100 persons) in each coalfield, we find that, as we might expect, in 
Warwickshire, only 14 per cent of collieries fell into this category while in 
Shropshire the proportion was 85 per cent. The proportions in Denbighshire and 
Leicestershire were very similar at 32 per cent and 33 per cent respectively, while 
the figures for Gloucestershire, Cumberland and Cheshire were 62 per cent, 41 
per cent and 75 per cent. The OMY figures for each coalfield would appear to 
correspond to the hypothesis above except for Cheshire which, despite the high 
proportion of small collieries, had higher than expected OMY figures. The 
explanation lies in the very small total number of collieries in Cheshire. In 1908 
there were only 18 collieries in Cheshire of which just 5 (28 per cent) employed 
more than 100 persons (List of Mines). However, these 5 collieries employed 86 
per cent of the total Cheshire workforce and, if the average colliery size is 
calculated for these collieries only, it works out at 210.8 workers, a far higher 
figure than the 67.9 workers which is the aggregate figure for all 18 collieries. It 
would thus appear that the higher than expected OMY figures arise because the
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Cheshire coalfield was dominated by these 5 collieries which were much more 
efficient than the other collieries which averaged a mere 12.7 workers each.
If we examine the OMY figures detailed in Table 8.6 we find that the peak 
years, in terms of OMY, for the selected coalfields fall into two distinct periods; 
those of Denbighshire, Warwickshire, Cumberland and Gloucestershire fall in 
1898-99, while those of Leicestershire, Cheshire and Shropshire fall in 1907-08 
(see Table 8.6 and Figure 8.2). The 1898-99 and 1907-08 peaks can be 
explained by the fact that, according to Taylor (1960: 52), after being at a low ebb 
in 1896 the fortunes of the coal industry began to revive and “before the end of 
1899...boom conditions were clearly developing” while “at least among those 
coalfields most heavily involved in the the home trade during the early-1900s, 
there was another boom in 1907” (Boyns, 1982: 69). These peak years contrast 
with the overall peak in the UK coal industry, 332 tons, which was achieved in 
1883 and, indeed, contrasts with the peak year of productivity in all the other 
coalfields reviewed by Boyns (1982). Boyns (1982: 64) demonstrates that the 
peak year of activity for the remaining UK coalfields occurred between 1880 and 
1891, and that for many of the major coalfields, including Durham and south 
Wales, “productivity was more than 10 per cent lower in the period 1890-1907” 
than in the period 1881-1889.
Figure 8.2 reveals that productivity for each of the ‘small’ coalfields 
fluctuated quite considerably in the period under review. The ferocity of these 
fluctuations, which clearly illustrate the volatility of the coal trade can, perhaps, be 
more easily demonstrated if one looks at the difference between the highest and 
lowest levels of productivity for each coalfield (see Table 8.7). Table 8.7 reveals 
that the range in OMY over the period 1894-1914 was almost 35 per cent for 
Cheshire; Denbighshire, Leicestershire, Cumberland and Shropshire showed a 
range of between 25 and 28 per cent while Warwickshire and Gloucerstershire’s 
OMY exhibited a range of approximately 20 per cent. These ‘swings’ in 
productivity, which occurred over the twenty year period, show how similar was 
the experience of each of the coalfields.
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Figure 8.2: OMY (total employees) for Denbighshire and other ‘small’ coalfields* 1894-1914
OMY for Denbighshire and other 'small' coalfields 1894-1914
Leicestershire
Warwickshire
Cumberland
Cheshire
Shropshire
Gloucestershire
Denbighshire
(Source: as for Table 8.6).
Table 8.7: Highest and lowest OMY figures for Denbighshire and other ‘small’ UK coalfields 1894- 
1914.
Coalfield Highest OMY 
(tons)
LQWQSt QMY 
(tons)
F^ M .in QMY Percentage
difference
Denbighshire 272 204 68 25.0
Leicestershire 304 226 78 25.7
Warwickshire 322 259 63 19.6
Cumberland 265 198 67 25.3
Cheshire 318 208 110 34.6
Shropshire 242 175 67 27.7
Gloucestershire 206 166 40 19.4
(Sources: FA Gibson, 1922; Denbighshire extracted from List of Mines (BL/BS/27/1) and Hunt’s 
Mineral Statistics (D/GR/1545-1610)).
The most likely explanation, certainly for Denbighshire, for the peak year 
in terms of productivity being later than for other coalfields, is the fact that 
Denbighshire was a relatively ‘new1 coalfield where most of the collieries were not 
sunk until after 1860 (see Chapter 2). In 1898, the peak year for OMY, of the five 
biggest collieries, in terms of employment, only one had been sunk before 1850, 
and the collieries belonging to the Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd.
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(Gatewen and Plas Power), the biggest employer in the Denbighshire coalfield, 
had not been sunk until after 1875. Sinking could often take a long time (see 
details re the sinking of the Bersham and Wrexham collieries in Chapter 3), 
especially if problems such as water were encountered. During the period of 
sinking and opening out of a colliery large numbers of men were needed but 
there was little or no output of coal, consequently if these individuals were 
included in the calculations of OMY they would have a negative impact (Boyns, 
1982: 101).
According to Church (1986: 104) it would often take five to ten years from 
the start of sinking for a pit to become fully functional and it would still need a 
period of development before it reached ‘“full capacity’ working” (Boyns, 1982: 
102). This meant that, in Denbighshire, some of the bigger collieries would not 
have been fully working until the 1880s and this would, inevitably, have ‘pushed 
back' the peak period which could only be achieved when all the big collieries 
were working at full capacity. Another factor which might have ‘pushed back’ the 
peak year for productivity was that, by the end of the nineteenth century, 
production was concentrated in fewer, larger collieries. This is illustrated by the 
fact that, in 1894, 76 per cent of the Denbighshire coalfield workforce was 
employed by seven collieries (see Chapter 2). As older, less efficient pits closed, 
the coalfield’s OMY figures would rise, being influenced more heavily by the 
higher OMY levels of the newer, modern, more productive collieries.
An additional factor affecting OMY throughout the UK was the increasing 
power of the MFGB whose policies, for example, to reduce the number of hours 
worked, had a direct impact on the productivity of its members. If we examine 
Denbighshire’s OMY from 1899 to 1906 the fall from 264 tons to 242 tons might 
well be due to pressure from the NWMA, which was trying to increase its 
influence over ‘coalfield politics’. The union encouraged the miners to engage in 
more militant action than previously which meant more man-days were lost. The 
boom of 1905-6 would have accounted for the overall increase in OMY for 1907, 
and the implementation of the 1908 Eight Hours Act would have helped to reduce 
OMY in 1909 and thereafter while the bitter national strike in 1912 would account
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for the 10 per cent fall in Denbighshire’s overall OMY from 230 in 1911 to 207 in 
1912 (see Table 8.6).
According to Boyns (1982: 79), the Eight Hours Act had a “long term 
effect” on productivity in the UK and he concludes that “the average level of 
productivity in most coalfields over the 1908-1913 period was somewhat below 
that of 1890-1907” (Boyns, 1982: 73). However, some coalfields were affected 
more than others, for example, in south Wales the average number of hours 
worked per day were considerably higher before the Act than in other coalfields. 
While the new Act was greeted with enthusiasm in south Wales (EW Evans, 
1959: 79) “there can be no doubt that the decrease in working hours hit the 
labour productivity of hewers in the South Wales coal industry hard” (Walters 
1975: 287). This contrasted with areas such as Yorkshire which saw a slight 
increase in productivity after 1908 (Boyns, 1982: 73). Indirectly, the 1908 Eight 
Hours Act was a major cause of the 1912 strike; once working hours were 
restricted the miners began to demand a guaranteed minimum wage. This, as 
was discussed in Chapter 6, led to deteriorating industrial relations; strikes were 
increasingly common and these, inevitably, had an impact on productivity as an 
increasing number of man-days were lost. Taylor (1960: 55), while 
acknowledging that time was increasingly lost through disputes, believes that the 
reduction in hours worked was “more pervasively significant in its effect on 
productivity” than the time lost through strikes.
OMY for individual Denbighshire coal companies
The OMY figures for each coalfield, since they represent an average of all the 
individual colliery statistics ‘smooth’ out any significant variations in 
company/individual company figures. To determine the productivity performance 
of individual companies/collieries requires therefore data at this micro level. 
However, although the List of Mines gives employment figures for each colliery 
within a coalfield, the output figures for an individual colliery are needed to 
establish its OMY and, unfortunately, this information is not readily available on a 
comprehensive basis for the coal industry. Nevertheless, it has been possible to
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!calculate OMY for three Denbighshire companies (see Table 8.8). Despite the 
shortcomings of such a small sample (too few companies; periods covered too 
short and insufficient overlap) these figures (see Table 8.8) reveal that, unlike the 
regional and national statistics, the OMY figures for individual companies 
fluctuated significantly. It should be noted, however, that the Broughton & Plas 
Power Coal Co. Ltd. figures given in Table 8.8 above are themselves an average 
of the figures for the two collieries owned by the company, Plas Power and 
Gatewen. Figure 8.3 (page 292) reveals the way in which the coalfield’s statistics 
mask the fluctuations in the companies’ figures.
Given the cyclical nature of the coal industry, one would expect the OMY 
figures for individual companies to fluctuate significantly over the economic cycle 
and, if one looks at the company figures for Denbighshire, the peaks and troughs 
in productivity become apparent. For example, Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. 
Ltd.’s OMY fluctuates from a low of 217 tons in 1894 to a high of 314 tons in 
1896, a variation of 45 per cent while that of Brynkinallt shows an even bigger 
fluctuation, from a high of 330 in 1898 to a low of 202 tons in 1914, a variation of 
63 per cent. The peak year for Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. was 1896, 
when OMY was 314 tons, and for Brynkinallt it was 1898, when an OMY of 330 
tons was recorded. At Llay Hall, the peak year appears to have been 1906 when 
an OMY of 333 tons was recorded. However, since this figure reflects a fall in the 
recorded level of employment of 20% between 1905 and 1906, there must be 
some doubt over the accuracy of the 1906 employment figure of 429 given that of 
510 for 1907; the figures have been extracted from the List of Mines and it is 
difficult to verify their accuracy by reference to another source.16
l6Errors or differences in colliery/coal industry employment figures are not unusual. FA Gibson (1922) gives employment 
figures only for north Wales, while the figures given by Hunt in his Mineral Statistics often disagree with those per the List 
of Mines. For example, per Hunt, the 1900 employment figure for north Wales was 9,802, whereas adding up the 
individual totals per the List o f Mines, gives a total 9,774. Given that the totals used in this chapter have been arrived at by 
adding up the individual totals for each of the collieries in Denbighshire, per the List of Mines, it is possible that a 
transposition error was made when the original information was collected in 1906; it is possible that the employment figure 
should have been 529 which would make OMY 270, a figure which would be a more ‘sensible’ total. If the peak in 1906 for 
Llay Hall is ignored, the trend for this colliery follows, more or less, the trend displayed by the other collieries, which, from 
1906, despite a brief upturn in 1907, is generally downwards.
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TTable 8.8: Output and OMY fo r three Denbighshire coal companies 1894-1914
Broughton & Plas 
Power Coal Co. Ltd.
Brynkinallt (a) Llay Hall Denb
Year Tons Men OMY Tons Men OMY Tons Men OMY OMY
000 000 000
1894 299 1380 217 252
1895 363 1409 258 248
1896 438 1394 314 103 459 224 251
1897 445 1440 309 119 427 279 254
1898 521 1676 311 152 461 330 130 445 292 272
1899 470 1637 287 141 460 307 130 426 305 264
1900 498 1722 289 122 477 256 120 411 292 250
1901 438 1749 250 130 503 258 129 460 280 239
1902 462 1802 256 128 508 252 136 465 292 240
1903 139 520 267 135 514 263 243
1904 138 531 260 144 582 247 239
1905 154 572 269 145 533 272 241
1906 158 662 239 143 429 333 242
1907 164 622 264 129 510 253 261
1908 153 678 226 251
1909 156 693 225 227
(b)
1910 150 700 214 229
1911 173 770 225 230
1912 491 1855 265 194 831 233 207
(c)
1913 495 1828 271 208 906 230 219
1914 471 1880 250 188 930 202 204
Notes:
(a) these figures are based on actual amounts of coal sold as opposed to the amount raised; 
this is likely to give a lower OMY as the amount raised was usually higher than that sold.
(b) This fall is likely to be as a result of the implementation of the Eight Hours Act
(c) The productivity of 1912 was severely affected by the national strike
(Sources: Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. - D /DM/309/3-6; Brynkinallt - D/CB/1/2; Llay Hall 
- D/BC/1/6; Denbighshire extracted from List o f M ines  (BL/BS/27/1)).
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It would appear that Llay Hall fell into the category of what Taylor (1960) 
described as a ‘mature’ colliery; although its output remained fairly constant, the 
number of men required to maintain the levels of output had to increase at a 
faster rate (there was a 20 per cent movement in output, but a 42 per cent 
movement in men between 1898 and 1907), which would suggest that the 
colliery was suffering from diminishing returns. In his study of the south Wales 
coalfield, Boyns (1982) challenged Taylor’s theory. He examined 64 collieries to 
determine whether there was any truth in Taylor’s (1960) assertion that, as a 
colliery aged it, inevitably, suffered from ‘diminishing returns’ i.e. a fall in 
productivity. Boyns found that there was no overwhelming support for Taylor’s 
thesis. No significant downward trends in OMY were found for these collieries for 
the period 1894-1908/9 (i.e. prior to the effect of the Eight Hours Act) and Boyns 
concluded that by introducing new technology “collieries are able to counter 
diminishing returns for many years” (Boyns, 1982: 117). A further conclusion that 
Boyns (1982) was able to make, after examining the output per man-day (OMD) 
data for 15 collieries, owned by the Powell Duffryn Company and the Ocean Coal 
Company was that the main factor which affected OMY was the number of days 
worked in any given year. He also, perhaps surprisingly, found that there was no 
evidence of an observable relationship between movements in wage rates and 
movements in productivity, within the 15 collieries (Boyns, 1982).
In Denbighshire, while Llay Hall may have been displaying ‘symptoms’ of 
diminishing returns, Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd.’s output and 
employment figures had not altered substantially between 1902 and 1912. Given 
that the Plas Power and Gatewen collieries (run by the Broughton & Plas Power 
Coal Co. Ltd.) were the same age as Llay Hall, this might suggest that the 
company was using technology more effectively to counter the threat of 
diminishing returns. Indeed, Lerry (1968: 135) describes the company as being a 
“pioneer in the use of electricity underground” and as running “two of the most 
modern collieries [which were] inspected....from as far afield as Japan”.
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These variations in OMY figures would have been affected by all the 
factors discussed above in the previous sections but, especially, by the number 
of days worked. No records of the number of days worked by individual collieries 
are available, but extracts from Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd.’s minute 
books reveal that as many as 105 days could be lost in a year, while the annual 
report of the NWMA for 1904 states that “[this] has been an exceptionally bad
year Thousands of miners .... have not average (sic) more than 3 days per
week throughout the year, while hundreds of others have not worked for months” 
(D/NM/65). This might go some way to explain why Llay Hall, despite an increase 
in output of 9,000 tons and an increase of 68 in the number of men employed, 
recorded a drop in OMY of 16 tons between 1903 and 1904 (see Table 8.8). At 
Brynkinallt and in Denbighshire as a whole this reduction was not so marked 
which might suggest that the miners, when given the opportunity to work, worked 
harder in order to ensure a decent pay packet (see Table 8.8).
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Isolated disputes between coalowner and men could significantly affect 
OMY at a particular colliery in a year when another colliery was unaffected. In the 
early years of the twentieth century, the minutes of the NWMA are full of 
references to disputes at individual collieries over issues such as men being 
stopped without notice, seams being closed or changed or the wrong wages paid 
(D/NM/1). These disputes escalated in 1905-6 as the NWMA pressed for an 
agreed ‘price list’ for each colliery, and culminated in September 1907 with the 
NWMA giving notice of a strike to start on 7 October (D/NM/1, 9 September 
1907). The strike was averted because agreement over price lists was reached in 
January 1908. Nevertheless, the impact of this dispute can be seen if we 
consider the figures for Brynkinallt and Denbighshire as a whole in Table 8.8. At 
Brynkinallt OMY fell from 264 tons in 1907 to 226 tons in 1908, a fall of 14 per 
cent. For Denbighshire as a whole the fall was less severe; OMY falling from 261 
tons in 1907 to 251 tons in 1908, a reduction of just 4 per cent.
Conclusion re productivity
When trying to assess the productivity performance of a colliery or individual 
coalfield some form of measure is needed and, despite the shortcomings 
discussed in this chapter, the measure most readily available to historians is 
Output per Man Year (OMY). If one looks at OMY for the UK as a whole, 
historians, such as Taylor (1960), have held that productivity in the coal industry 
fell from the early 1880s. According to Taylor (1960: 49), 1883 “proved to be the 
industry’s high water mark [and although] over the next thirty years the tide of 
productivity ebbed and flowed,....each recovery was less pronounced than its 
predecessor”. This assessment, however, fails to take into account the many 
changes that took place within this period which had an impact on the OMY 
figures. Boyns (1982: 79) refutes Taylor’s thesis and explains that “to talk of 
productivity in the coal industry as simply rising to 1883 and then falling thereafter 
is too simplistic”, mainly due to the fact that the performance of the various 
coalfields within the UK did not always mirror that of each of the others. Indeed, it
293
must be remembered that the UK figures are an average of all the individual 
coalfields and are therefore liable to mask some fairly significant differences 
between coalfields.
In Denbighshire, OMY reached its highest level of 272 tons in 1898, a full 
15 years after the UK’s peak (1883), but Denbighshire was a ‘new’ coalfield, 
developed largely after 1850, and it is thus to be expected that its peak would be 
achieved later. If Denbighshire’s OMY is compared with that of other ‘small’ 
coalfields it would appear that Denbighshire was not as efficient as coalfields 
such as Warwickshire (peak OMY of 322 tons), Leicestershire (304 tons) or 
Cheshire (318), but was more efficient than Cumberland (265 tons), Shropshire 
(242 tons) and Gloucestershire (206 tons). In 1914, Denbighshire had fewer 
small collieries than Cumberland, Shropshire and Gloucestershire, which is likely 
to account for these regions being less efficient, but Cheshire, which had far 
more small collieries than Denbighshire, managed to achieve a higher OMY than 
Denbighshire. This can be explained by the fact that the largest collieries in 
Cheshire, which in 1908 employed 86 per cent of the workforce, skewed the 
statistics relating to OMY but the smaller collieries, which averaged only 13 
workers per colliery, skewed the average colliery size statistics. In Warwickshire, 
another ‘new’ coalfield, only 14 per cent of the collieries employed fewer than 100 
persons, and it can thus be assumed that collieries were larger, more modern 
and, therefore, more efficient. Other factors affecting OMY were geological 
conditions, the length of the working day, wage rates, coal prices and local 
customs; these could differ significantly from coalfield to coalfield and therefore 
‘like with like’ comparisons are difficult to make.
Unfortunately, due to the paucity of the archival material available, little 
analysis of individual Denbighshire companies has been possible. Some OMY 
figures exist for three companies but, of these, figures only exist for more than 
ten years for one company. For the three companies analysed, OMY fluctuates 
significantly. This is to be expected given that the OMY figures are directly 
affected by the number of days worked by a colliery and, in ‘bad’ years, a colliery 
could lose many days through short working. In addition to this, agitation by the
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NWMA, which had grown significantly by the early 1900s, might have made the 
miners more conducive to walk outs than previously, which would also have 
caused man-days to be lost.
The peak years for these three companies examined, if one ignores Llay 
Hall’s 1906 figure due to possible source error, fall in the latter years of the 
1890s, and therefore fit into the pattern displayed when the OMY figures for 
Denbighshire and some of the other ‘small’ coalfields are analysed. After 
reaching these heights, OMY for these companies then fluctuated at significantly 
lower levels through to 1914 reflecting not only potential long-term influences but 
also the impact of legislation in the form of the Eight Hours Act, and the national 
strike of 1912.
From the above we can conclude that, in terms of OMY, Denbighshire’s 
performance was comparable to other small coalfields; it was neither significantly 
better nor worse than its competitors. However, this has been measured using 
overall output and employment figures for the coalfields which, due to the 
significant aggregation involved, is likely to mask the ‘true’ efficiency of coalfields 
because it does not allow OMY for individual collieries to be calculated. Where it 
has been possible to calculate individual OMY figures for companies in 
Denbighshire we see that, for the most part, they were higher than the overall 
figures for Denbighshire which would lead us to believe that the OMY figures 
have been skewed by the preponderance of small collieries.
Traditionally, productivity has been considered by historians to be the 
most important measure of performance in the coal industry, whether assessing 
the industry as a whole or an individual coalfield or colliery. However, to the 
owners of the coal companies, success was measured in terms of profitability, 
and thus, when assessing the performance of a colliery company, we can, 
perhaps, more legitimately, examine the financial rather then the ‘physical’ 
performance of a colliery. With this in mind the next section will consider the 
profitability of the coal companies in Denbighshire.
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Profitability
Background
Before discussing the profitability of individual companies in Denbighshire it is 
important to point out the shortcomings of some of the source material. The 
source material consists of both ‘management’ and ‘financial’ figures; 
‘management’ figures, in this context, are those that have been generated for 
internal management use, such as revenue and cost per ton figures, while 
‘financial’ figures are those presented in the published financial statements. The 
problem with such sources, especially the latter, is the extent to which they can 
be trusted. According to Brief (1965: 12), the “standards of financial disclosure 
were so ill-defined [that] financial reports from this period [the nineteenth century] 
are at best ambiguous and at worst unreliable”. Wale (1990: 266), in her study of 
the coal industry, agrees; she asserts that “asset and profit figures in the coal 
industry are in most cases highly unreliable”.
Marriner (1980: 203), too, has warned of the dangers of taking nineteenth 
century financial statements at face value: “the battery of criticism against their 
accuracy, reliability and consistency is so intense that one might be tempted to 
conclude that they contain no useful information at all”. However, as long as “the 
historian fully acknowledges their many serious defects” (Marriner, 1980: 203), 
they can shed a great deal of light on how businesses performed. This caveat 
was reinforced by Parker (1991: 2) who argued that although nineteenth century 
accounts can “be of immense benefit to historians, [they should] be approached 
with caution”. Mason (cited by Arnold, 1995: 40) also believes that “provided their 
limitations are acknowledged, accounting records can be an extremely valuable 
source of evidence for the business historian”. Arnold (1995: 49), further asserts 
that “although accounting practices were highly inconsistent, levels of disclosure 
in published statements were far better than they were to become in, say, the 
second quarter of the twentieth century”; this, he believes, means that “business
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historians may find the published financial statements of the latter half of the 
nineteenth century more reliable than they have supposed, although some 
caution on their part is still clearly advisable” (Arnold, 1995: 50).
In addition to the issues discussed above, a further problem exists when 
trying to assess the performance of an individual coalfield such as Denbighshire, 
and that is the lack of primary records. Very little information relating to output, 
costs or profits exists prior to 1870 and, even for the period after this, 
comprehensive records have only been found for one company, the Broughton & 
Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. Periodic information has been found for various other 
companies which will be used to illustrate various issues, but it has proved 
impossible to undertake case studies of the various companies, which is ideally 
what the author would have liked to have done. This analysis will consequently 
concentrate on the period 1870-1914, and will draw on information found for the 
following collieries (and the companies that owned them):
Plas Power and Gatewen (Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd.)
Wynnstay (Wynnstay Collieries Co.Ltd.)
Westminster and Gwersyllt (Westminster, Brymbo Coke and Coal Co. Ltd.) 
Wrexham (Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. Ltd.)
Bersham (Bersham Colliery Co. Ltd.)
Llay Hall (ES Clarke)
Brynkinallt (WY Craig & Sons).
Almost all of these collieries were significant players in the Denbighshire 
coalfield, only Llay Hall employed fewer than 500 employees (438) in 1914, and 
collectively the collieries employed 43 per cent, 62 per cent and 61 per cent of 
those employed in the coalfield in 1894, 1900 and 1914 respectively. Indeed, four 
of the collieries, Plas Power, Westminster, Wynnstay and Bersham, were in the 
top five of the largest collieries in Denbighshire (in terms of employment) in both 
1900 and 1914. Unfortunately the ‘missing’ member of the top five collieries, the 
Hafod colliery, owned by the Ruabon Coal & Coke Co. Ltd., is not represented by 
surviving records.
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The risks and rewards of coal mining
In a lecture to mining students in 1881, Mr M Littlewood of Rockingham Colliery, 
Barnsley, explained that “few occupations followed by man are so uncertain and 
enigmatical, so full of risks and losses as mining” (1881: 3). Littlewood (1881: 3) 
added that “there are great prizes to be gained [but] such prizes are rare and fall 
to the lot of the few”. Although this is a rather pessimistic view of coal mining, it 
would appear to be a fair appraisal of the industry; many mines were sunk by 
investors in boom periods in anticipation of profits but, as trade slumped and/or 
unanticipated problems were encountered during sinking and working, there were 
many colliery companies that “struggled on for years and never earned a 
dividend for their unfortunate shareholders” (Dron, 1928: 8). As Mitchell (1984: 
306) explains, “this was the speculative element which always remained in the 
industry”.
In Denbighshire the problems and costs associated with unforeseen 
obstacles during sinking are illustrated by the cases of both the Bersham and 
Wrexham collieries. The Bersham Colliery Co. Ltd. began sinking in 1870 but did 
not reach the Main Coal seam until 1878, and a profit was not reported until the 
year ended 30 June 1881, a full twelve and a half years after the company was 
incorporated (D/DM/309). The Wrexham Colliery Co. Ltd. began sinking in 1869 
and was initially successful: the Main Coal was reached in October 1870 
(NLW/HR/76/79) but, in January 1871, the pit was flooded and the water caused 
such a problem that it was not until April 1874 that the directors were able to 
report “the entire clearance of [the] colliery from water” (D/DM/424/1). Such 
delays were extremely costly and did little to endear the directors to the 
shareholders; indeed letters from shareholders to the company in 1883 complain 
that there had been “ten years without any return to shareholders” 
(NLW/HR/76/98).
Keeping the shareholders happy was important in the late nineteenth 
century, especially if a significant number of shares were held by those other
298
than the directors and their nominees. Pitts (1998: 39) explains that as “the 
proportion of passive shareholders....increased...these investors came to rely on 
the dividends as an important guide to the prosperity of the enterprise”. This 
meant that the ability to pay dividends was of paramount importance to the 
directors. The nineteenth century Table A (the model Articles of Association 
contained in Company Law) “specified ... that dividends were to be paid from the 
profits of trade, [but] without defining profit in any way” (Pitts, 1998: 39). This 
meant that as long as profits were reported, dividends could be paid which “led to 
great flexibility in determining the profit figure” (Pitts, 1998: 39). Pitts (1998: 40) 
further believes “that dividends were regarded by directors as the most important 
use of trade surpluses”.
The pressure put on directors by shareholders is illustrated by surviving 
letters to the directors of the Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. Ltd. In 1883, a Mr A 
Dougall of Inverness, who owned 184 shares in the company, wrote a series of 
letters to the Secretary of the company. He was particularly scathing of the 
management skills of the directors: on 5 April 1883 he wrote that he “[is] much 
disappointed with the state of the collieries” (NLW/HR/76/98) and that 
performance “[is] without any prospect of being better, unless a radical 
improvement in the management is carried out without delay”. He was angry that 
in the year to 31 December 1882 the company had spent a total of £2,364 on 
new boilers, underground haulage and stables (£1,020, £1,041 and £303 
respectively). “I have no hesitation in saying that these works should have been 
postponed until the shareholders got some return on their capital, and I and the 
other shareholders in this locality object in the strongest manner to any more 
money being spent in this way or on capital account”. He continued, “it seems to 
me to be extraordinary that year after year we are selling to the public nearly 
200,000 tons of coal without a single penny of return, while a large sum is yearly 
spent on general expenses [and the shareholders] will not submit to it much 
longer” (NLW/HR/76/98). Mr Dougall persisted with his demand for a change in 
management; on 16 April 1883, in another letter, he stated that “the present 
management having existed ten years without any return to the shareholders it is
299
desireable to make a change” (NLW/HR/76/98). This criticism of the 
management was also a theme of the letters from Stewart, Rule & Burns, the 
solicitors for another group of Scottish shareholders. According to a letter dated 
20 September 1883, “the directors have spent of the shareholders’ money 
between £40,000 and £50,000 on the Acton pit which is perfectly useless. This 
was a serious blunder on the part of the engineer and the Board and cannot be 
reconciled with the credit you take for the good management of the undertaking”. 
The letter further states that “the only people who appear to have benefited from 
the concern during the last ten years are the directors and the officials who 
received during the last year no less than 6% of the gross income of the 
company which we venture to say is monstrous and much beyond what it should 
be” (NLW/HR/76/98).
When dividends were paid they fluctuated significantly, as can be seen 
from Table 8.9. The fluctuations in the dividend payments of the Broughton & 
Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. and the Bersham Colliery Co. Ltd. coincide with the 
fluctuations in the general performance of the coal trade. Wale (1990: 254) 
explains that “apart from 1890 virtually every year between 1880 and 1897 
witnessed low profits. There was then a violent upswing to an enormous boom in 
1900”.
The dividends of Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. and Bersham 
Colliery Co. Ltd. (as far as figures are available) would appear to conform to 
Wale’s pattern. Between 1882 and 1889 no dividend was declared by the 
Broughton and Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd., while the dividend for the Bersham 
Colliery Co. Ltd. remained at less than 2.5 per cent from 1882 until 1888. In 1890 
and 1891, dividends of 8 and 10 per cent were paid by Broughton & Plas Power 
Coal Co. Ltd. while Bersham Colliery Co. Ltd. paid 6 and 10 per cent 
respectively. The years 1895 to 1898 saw Bersham Colliery Co. Ltd. fail to pay a 
dividend while those paid by Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. did not 
exceed 3.5 per cent in the years 1894-1897. Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. 
Ltd. then began to increase its dividend payments until, in 1900, they reached a 
high of 15 per cent.
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Table 8.9: D ividends paid bv the Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. and the Bersham Colliery
Co. Ltd. 1882-1914
Year Bersham Collierv Co. 
Ltd.
Brouahton & Plas 
Power Coal Co. Ltd.
Dividend
Daid
% of 
capital
Dividend
paid
% of 
capital
£ £
1882 888 2.5 0
1883 0 0
1884 1,776 2.5 0
1885 888 1.25 0
1886 888 1.25 0
1887 888 1.25 0
1888 1,420 2.0 0
1889 3,551 5.0 0
1890 4,261 6.0 13,500 8
1891 7,102 10.0 16,875 10.0
1892 7,102 10.0 10,125 6.5
1893 2,841 4.0 0
1894 1,776 2.5 5,062 3.0
1895 0 5,906 3.5
1896 0 4,219 2.5
1897 0 5,062 3.0
1898 0 10,125 6.5
1899 a 13,500 8.0
1900 a 25,312 15.0
1901 a 16,875 10.0
1902 a 9,281 5.5
1903 a a
1904 1,065 1.5 a
1905 0 a
1906 0 a
1907 1,776 2.5 a
1908 1,420 2.0 a
1909 a a
1910 a 3375 1.8
1911 b 3700 2.0
1912 3700 2.0
1913 5550 3.0
1914 1850 1.0
Notes:
a: no information available for these years;
b: Bersham was purchased by the Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd in 1911;
All the dividends were paid in arrears and therefore relate to the previous year’s performance. 
Bershams’s year end was June, while Plas Power’s was December.
(Sources: Minute Books, Bersham - D/DM/309/1-2; Plas Power - D/DM/309/3-5)
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It would thus appear that the directors of these companies were either not 
able to, or did not even try, to ‘smooth’ profits so that steady dividends could be 
paid. JR Edwards (1989: 116), in his review of nineteenth century accounting 
practices, points out that many railway company managers believed that steady 
dividends were so desirable that many of them employed “procedures designed 
principally to produce a pattern of reported profit sufficient to cover the planned 
level of dividend”. This was more likely to apply to companies with higher 
proportions of ‘detached’ shareholders, what we would now call public companies 
i.e those companies that raised capital with a general ‘offer’ to the public rather 
than from a ‘pool’ of family and acquaintances. The coal companies in 
Denbighshire were not public companies and were often controlled either solely 
by the directors, or by the directors and their nominees. Thus, this consideration 
would not have been as important as for a public company, although it was 
certainly a consideration when Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. decided to 
change its year end from 30 September to 31 December. The minutes of the 
AGM on November 30 1892 (D/DM/309/4) explain that “the extreme depression 
which prevailed during the last few months has been intensified by the summer 
season, and has forced upon the consideration of your Board, the desirability for 
closing the accounts from March and September to June and December, so that 
both half years may share in the advantages of the winter trade and thereby tend 
to equalize dividends”.
Methods of manipulating reported profits
One of the main methods adopted by companies in the nineteenth century to 
manipulate their profits was the use (or misuse!) of provisions for depreciation. 
JR Edwards (1989: 115) explains that the modern aim of depreciation is to 
ensure that the revenue earned by fixed assets is matched by a cost for the use 
of the asset. However, in the nineteenth century, “the term depreciation was often 
used to describe the difference between fixed asset valuations at two different 
dates - but later the percentage deduction for wear and tear became the norm”
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(JR Edwards, 1989: 115). The problem was that there was neither any 
compulsion on companies to provide for depreciation, nor any guidelines on the 
methods to be adopted if they did. According to Marriner (1980: 219) ’’even within 
one firm’s accounts depreciation can be treated differently from one year to 
another [and] there is no uniformity”. JR Edwards (1989: 116) believes “this was 
partly the result of ignorance, and partly because accounting practices had to be 
coordinated with management’s desire to keep its options open regarding the 
level of reported profit”.
It was this ability to vary depreciation provisions that gives rise to what 
Marriner (1980: 219) describes as “the largest single factor distorting the 
accuracy of financial statements”. In their study of the iron and steel industry, 
1865-1914, Edwards and Boyns (cited by Arnold, 1995: 467) refute this view 
because they found “no real evidence that any systematic attempt was made to 
mislead external users by manipulating the trend of reported profit”. Whatever the 
main impetus behind depreciation policies, it is true that individual companies 
had a less than consistent approach to depreciation. As early as 1875 and 1876, 
the balance sheets of the Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. Ltd. show an amount 
under liabilities for a “freehold depreciation fund” (D/DM/424/2) but, given that 
there was a great deal of aggregation under one heading, and little additional 
information was given, it is difficult to assess what the entry actually meant 
(Marriner, 1980: 216). More meaningful information can be found in audit reports, 
directors’ reports and trade accounts, if they are available, but unfortunately this 
is often not the case. The surviving balance sheets for the Broughton & Plas 
Power Coal Co. Ltd. covering the years between 1891 and 1904, show a 
depreciation provision for freehold property as follows:
£ £
1891 745 1895 994
1892 848 1897 5,238
1893 918 1901 5,677
1894 978 1904 6,191
Note: no balance sheets are available for the years 1896, 1898-1900 and 1902-1903 
Source: (D/BC addnl: 36/1)
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It is impossible to establish whether these figures represent a fixed 
percentage of the freehold cost without a breakdown of the balance sheet totals. 
In 1910 (the balance sheets for 1905-1909 are not available), the company 
included an ‘appropriation from profits for the purchase of property and plant, and 
for depreciation’ of £136,144 (DD/PP/619). According to JR Edwards (1989: 
116), it was “common for depreciation to be accounted for as an appropriation of 
profit rather than a charge against profit, and for the amount deducted to vary 
depending on the desired level of reported profit”. Where audit reports are 
available for the company, they reveal that a deduction for the depreciation of 
horses was made, but no details are given as to how the large appropriations 
from profits were arrived at. Such appropriations had long been a feature of 
Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd.’s accounts; although not disclosed on the 
balance sheet, details are revealed in the minutes of directors meetings. The 
company began to transfer amounts to capital in 1890 when, due to the fact that 
the accumulated profit figure was £68,299, “the auditors suggest that £54,250.... 
should be transferred to a separate account as representing the profits 
appropriated from time to time to capital purposes in the purchase of wagons and 
other property” (D/DM/309/4/ 26 November 1890). This would suggest that the 
company was rather lax in its allocation of capital and revenue costs, and there is 
no evidence to suggest that the amount transferred is anything other than an 
arbitrary figure devised by the auditor and the directors. Such practices led to 
“asset and profit figures in the coal industry [that] are in most cases highly 
unreliable” (Wale. 1990: 266). Throughout the records of Broughton & Plas 
Power Coal Co. Ltd. there are examples of the inconsistency of the treatment of 
capital expenditure (as defined in the twenty first century). In February 1898 the 
minutes record that “the following items [have been] charged to revenue:
£
slack conveyor 
spoil bridge 
boilers
wagons (part cost)
1,221
155
470
817
2,663........ ” (D/DM/309/5, 22 February 1898).
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Such items would now be treated as additions to fixed assets, capitalised and 
depreciated. An important factor in this unreliability was “the failure to 
systematically distinguish between capital and revenue expenditure” (Brief, 1965: 
14), although, during the sinking of a mine, all costs were allocated to capital, and 
it was only thereafter, once the capital account had been ‘closed off, that this 
problem arose. There were no statutory requirements, neither as to what should 
be categorised as capital, nor as to when the capital account should be closed 
off, or indeed whether it should be closed off and, according to Wale (1990: 254), 
it was common for what would now be defined as capital expenditure to be 
“charged entirely against profits of the year in which it was incurred, even though 
the benefits of such [costs]... .might be felt for several years”.
It would appear that the debate regarding capital versus revenue and what 
constituted profit, was exercising the minds of even the Broughton & Plas Power 
Coal Co. Ltd. directors for, in 1899, FA Sturge, the company secretary, pointed 
out that “it would not have been difficult to make our revenue accounts look 
considerably better without making an entry which an auditor could refuse to 
sanction, for the following sums charged to the trade account were for things 
which might have been charged to plant -
£
electric lighting 584
new lamp room 86
new pit tubs 536
spoil bridge(1/2) 172
boilers 220
wagons 1.602
3,200” (D/DM/309/5, 22 February 1899)
He goes on to state that,
“as regards our general system of accounts - I wish to point out that the 
word profit is misleading unless we bear steadily in mind that nothing is 
allowed for the exhaustion of our minerals, never more rapid than in a 
good time like the present. It is impossible to estimate this exactly but 
probably 21/4d per ton would not be too much to allow. As the Share
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Capital of the company was not enough to meet the needful expenditure 
on plant we have transferred from the profit & loss account in aid of capital 
a very large sum which is to all intents and purposes a depreciation fund. I 
am strongly of the opinion that we ought to have had a regular and 
systematic charge for depreciation, but the directors, acting upon the 
advice of the auditors decided otherwise long ago, and it is now probably 
too late to adopt a new plan” (D/DM/309/5, 22 February 1899).
This extract from the minutes shows that the whole concept of systematic 
depreciation was contentious, even at company level. If Mr Sturge’s 21/kJ per ton 
depreciation had been applied throughout the period studied, the profits per ton 
being reported, which in some years were marginal at best, would have been 
markedly worse, or even negative (see the discussion on profits on pp. 317-323 
below).
Revenue
According to Church (1986: 496) “in the production of coal for sale it was revenue 
rather than the physical productivity which in the economics of colliery enterprise 
was the critical factor”. However, as Boyns (1993: 345) explains, “for most 
colliery companies....market prices were largely outside their control”. Indeed 
“the coal industry was notorious as one in which prices could be extremely 
volatile” (Mitchell, 1984: 272). A further problem was that the price of coal was 
not homogenous; “both between, and even within, different varieties of the major 
kinds of coal....prices varied according to quality and between and within 
different regions” (Church, 1986: 48). This means “it is very difficult to make 
generalisations and comparisons between different companies and regions” 
(Mitchell, 1984: 266).
For much of the nineteenth century the market price for coal was closely 
related to the market price of iron. This is certainly true of the first 60 years of the 
nineteenth century because, according to Jevons (1865: 295), a quarter to a third
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of the total yield of coal was used by the iron industry (see Table 8.10). However, 
the last quarter of the century saw a huge increase in the amount of coal 
exported, and prices became less reliant on the iron industry as the proportion of 
coal used by it fell. Hull (1897: 20) elaborates further on the impact of the iron 
trade on coal prices, explaining that the years 1879/80 to 1883 saw “a period of 
extraordinary prosperity in the iron trade; such as it never attained before or 
since”. Vast amounts of coal were required for smelting and as people thought 
that this situation would go on and on, they invested in new collieries “generally 
on a large scale, as the coal had to be reached at ever increasing depths” (Hull, 
1897: 20). Unfortunately for them, the mid to late 1880s saw a collapse in the 
demand for iron; the new pits could not be closed without vast sums being lost 
and so production of coal continued at high levels, even though demand had 
fallen off considerably; prices inevitably fell (see Table 8.11) (Hull,1897: 20).
Table 8.10: The proportion of coal used in the iron industry and exported. 1830-1913
% of coal 
used by iron 
industry
% of coal 
exported
1830 18.5 1.6
1840 22.5 3.8
1855 24.9 6.8
1869 24.3 9.8
1887 16.3 15.3
1903 13.2 20.4
1913 11.6 26.8
(Source: Church, 1980: 19).
Factors affecting the price of coal
Apart from the prevailing macro-economic conditions there were micro-economic 
factors causing short-term fluctuations in the demand, and therefore the price of 
coal. According to Walters (1977: 331), these included: movement of freight 
charges; customers’ ‘bearing’ tactics; and war and the rumour of war. The price 
charged by collieries varied according to the type of coal, whether the coal was
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delivered in wagons belonging to the colliery itself, to the customer or to the 
railway companies (Mann & Judd, 1909: 31). Church (1986: 82) explains that the 
management of wagon stock had important commercial implications because the 
"ownership and control of wagons was a major advantage in competition" at 
times when the demand for coal, and therefore wagons, was high. An additional 
competitive ‘edge’ was gained by those collieries that had good links to the 
railways; the shorter the distances involved, the lower the freight charges 
(Mitchell, 1984: 282).
According to Walters (1977: 334), some customers used ‘bear’ 
tactics to try to influence the price of coal; they would use a temporary real or 
threatened withdrawal of demand, in the hope of causing prices to fall, a tactic 
that was “a common and much resented feature of the south Wales coal trade” 
(Walters, 1977: 334). Foreign wars could have a positive impact on prices, for 
example, the Franco-Prussian war, 1871-1875, significantly increased the 
demand for iron and therefore coal (Kirby, 1977: 6) but, conversely, wars in 
countries that were either customers of UK exporters or were en route to those 
countries, could have a detrimental impact on demand and price (Walters, 1980: 
335).
The colliery companies themselves were not averse to trying to influence 
the price of coal by restricting supply, in the hope that prices would rise or 
entering into a ‘cartel’ with other local companies to fix prices. If such a strategy 
was adopted by an individual colliery, it was unlikely to be successful due to the 
availability of other supplies. However, if collieries combined with each other, 
then, in theory, they would be able to fix prices. This strategy was tried in 1893-4 
by collieries in south west Lancashire and Cheshire, but failed when owners 
outside the scheme undercut the ‘cartel’ (Kirby, 1977: 9). A variety of similar 
schemes, which involved coalfield-wide agreements, were also mooted in 
Denbighshire but were unsuccessful for the same reason (see Chapter 7).
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Table 8.11: Average price obtained - UK . north W ales and Denbighshire. 1878-1914
UK
north Wales Denbigh­
shire
Year price s/d price s/d price s/d
1878 9/6
1879 10/0
1880 10/6
1881
1882 5/0 5/3 5/3
1883 5/8 5/4 5/4
1884 5/5 5/4 5/4
1885 5/2 5/2 5/2
1886 4/10.5 5/6 5/0
1887 4/9.87 5/5 4/11
1888 5/4 5/4
1889 6/4.25 6/3 6/3
1890 8/3 8/3 8/3
1891 8/0 8/0 8/0
1892 7/3 7/0 7/0
1893 6/9.51 6/10 6/10
1894 6/7.43 6/5 6/5
1895 6/0.42 6/2 6/2
1896 5/10.26 5/9 6/2
1897 5/10.93 5/9 5/9
1898 6/4.22 6/9 6/9
1899 7/7.03 7/9 7/9
1900 10/9.66 11/6 11/6
1901 9/4.29 9/3 9/3
1902 8/2.84 8/6 8/6
1903 7/7.93 7/7 7/9
1904 7/2.58 7/5 7/6
1905 6/11.38 7/5 7/6
1906 7/3.5 7/5 7/6
1907 9/0.01 7/11 8/0
1908 8/11 8/5 8/6
1909 8/0.7 8/0 8/0
1910 8/2.37 8/2 8/2
1911 8/1.79 8/4 8/4
1912 9/0.65 8/11 8/10.97
1913 10/1.52 10/0 10/1.79
1914 9/11.79 9/7 9/8.17
(Sources: Denbighshire and UK - Hunt’s M ineral Statistics D /G R/1545-1610: North Wales-D/gesf 
o f Welsh Historical Statistics, SN4095: 337).
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It would thus appear that the price of coal, although largely determined by 
the state of the coal trade, could, in the short term, be manipulated slightly by 
coal companies. Such strategies were only successful if all the coal companies in 
a coalfield collaborated otherwise undercutting by non-members rendered 
agreements unenforceable and, even if all the collieries in a coalfield were able to 
come to such an agreement, this was rendered ineffective if companies in 
competitor coalfields were able to offer lower prices.
The volatility of the coal trade
It is understandable that, given their inability to control the external factors 
affecting their industry, the coalowners were so preoccupied with the price of coal 
and the prevailing conditions in the industry. The surviving records are full of 
references which illustrate the volatility of the coal trade; these include comments 
such as, “during the year (1875) the coal trade was (and still continues) seriously 
affected by the depressed condition of the iron manufacture and its dependent 
industries” (D/DM/424/1); or “the coal trade has remained very depressed, and 
orders were only obtainable at prices which left a very bare margin” (D/DM/309/3, 
30 November 1887). The directors’ reports to shareholders that accompanied the 
annual financial statements often give a fairly detailed review of the state of the 
coal trade and demonstrate its volatility. The reports to the Broughton & Plas 
Power Coal Co. Ltd. shareholders, for the period 1890-1902, reveal a trade with 
marked ups and downs. The 1880s had been difficult for the company; its pits 
were sunk in the late 1870s, in the period immediately after a major boom, and 
throughout the 1880s the directors were lamenting the state of trade. By 1890, 
however, the first glimmer of optimism becomes apparent in the Annual Report; it 
being noted that the directors “have pleasure in stating that the results of the 
year’s trade have been much better than for a long time past and there is reason 
to look forward to a profitable trade through the winter and spring” (D/DM/309/4, 
26 November 1890). In 1891 it was reported that “the collieries have been kept at
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full work, but the serious fall in the price of slack has made the trade less 
profitable than it was a year ago” (D/DM/309/4, 5 November 1891).
Unfortunately by 1892-93, despite the fact that the price of gas coal at
“slightly over 9/- per ton at the pit., [was]..highly satisfactory, ...[during] the
second half of the year the depression in the shipping trade caused a heavy fall 
in prices at Liverpool”, and thus had an impact on the company’s profitability 
(D/DM/309/4, 30 November 1892). In 1893 there was a substantial downturn in 
performance, sales were down by 44 per cent and the coal raised was 38 per 
cent less than in 1892. According to the minutes, “this result is due to the bad 
state of trade in the first half of the year and the prolonged strike in the second 
half’ (D/DM/309/4, 21 February 1994). These views are substantiated if one 
looks at the average profits per ton reported by the company for the years 1891- 
93 (see Table 8.17 below, p.319); in 1891 profit was 1/2.1 d per ton, this fell to 
11.3d in 1892 and there was then a significant drop in 1893 when the company 
made a loss of 0.2d per ton. Although trade picked up in 1894, there was no 
significant improvement until 1898 when, according to the directors’ report, “the 
increase in profit was mainly due to the strike in South Wales and the consequent 
demand for North Wales coal at high prices for shipment at Birkenhead” 
(D/DM/309/5, 22 February 1899).
The great fluctuations that can take place in the coal trade are clearly 
demonstrated by events at Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. in 1900-01. At 
the beginning of 1900 it was stated that “there is reason to expect that the 
contracts made in the coming season will be at higher prices and fully cover the 
great increase there has been and will be in wages and the cost of materials” 
(D/DM/309/6, 7 February 1900) and yet, by July 1901, the directors were 
reporting “a great change for the worse in our trade” (D/DM/309/6, 30 July 1901). 
This can be better illustrated by a comparison of the company’s trade accounts in 
Table 8.12.
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Table 8.12: Broughton &Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd.. trade accounts December 1900- June 1902
Half year to: December
1900
June1901 December
1901
June 1902
Profit - £ 48,839 33,020 9,256 2,663
Coal raised -  Tons
240,983 229,815 227,888 229,686
Profit per ton 4/ 6d 2/1 Od 9.7d 2 .8d
% movement- profit -32% -72% -71%
%movement- coal -4.6% -0 .8% 0 .8%
(Source: D /DM/309/6)
These figures reveal that, despite coal raised falling by 4.6 per cent 
between December 1900 and June 1901 and only a marginal movement 
between December 1901 and June 1902, the internally reported profits, and the 
profits per ton raised, fell significantly. In the eighteen month period between 
December 1900 and June 1902, profits fell from £48,839, or 4/6d per ton, to 
£2,663 or 2.8d per ton, a dramatic fall of 94.2 per cent. The year 1900 was, 
admittedly, a boom year, but the figures clearly illustrate the impact that changing 
selling prices could have on the performance of a company, and the speed with 
which a boom could be reversed.
Expenditure
Before looking at the profits earned by coal companies the costs that they 
incurred will be reviewed. In this context it is the working costs that will be 
discussed since it was these that influenced reported profits; although the cost of 
sinking was the main cost associated with a colliery, this was a capital cost, and 
has already been discussed in Chapter 3 above.
According to Church (1986: 497) making generalisations about working 
costs is difficult because “marked regional variations and diversities within 
regions, localities and even within colliery companies” meant that the conditions 
met when working coal could vary considerably. Mitchell (1984: 497) agrees that 
generalisations are difficult because "the costs of each colliery were peculiar to
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itself, but while it might be difficult to generalise about what an average cost per 
ton should be, the components of this cost are more easily identifiable.
“The first and largest item of cost in the production of coal is wages” 
(Lloyd, 1921: 479), and these can be split into productive and non-productive 
wages (Mann & Judd, 1909: 5). Productive wages were paid according to the 
“weight of mineral gotten” (Lawn, 1904: 16), but other underground work, such as 
driving levels and securing roads, was often paid according to “linear 
measurement” and is described as “deadwork” or ‘oncost’ because it is a non­
productive occupation (Lawn, 1904: 14). Most surface men were paid by the day, 
as were some underground workers such as haulage attendants and onsetters 
(Lawn, 1904: 12).
According to Church (1986: 502) wages could account for between 50 
and 75 per cent of total cost, and this proportion increased from the 1880s as 
coal became more difficult, and therefore more expensive, to get and as miners 
were able to obtain higher wages (Mitchell, 1984: 288). One of the reasons for 
this increase in wages was the increasing ability of the miners to associate and 
achieve concessions from the coalowners, an issue which was fully discussed in 
Chapter 6. This meant that owners were unable to ‘control’ wages as they had 
once done and, as the unions grew in strength, the coalowners found themselves 
having to concede wage increases (Taylor, 1960: 53) which, unlike in earlier 
years, they were unable to ‘claw back’. This meant that wages increased as a 
proportion of the total cost per ton and margins were squeezed further and even 
small fluctuations in the selling price of coal could have a serious impact on the 
profitability of coal companies.
To assess the veracity of Church’s assertion as regards coal companies 
in Denbighshire, a review of costing information is needed. However, as Boyns & 
Wale (1995: 55) explain, “the problem for all historians ....is the lack of surviving 
evidence”, and in Denbighshire the evidence is minimal and very patchy. 
However, although Boyns & Wale (1995: 55) assert that “cost information was 
rare prior to the dawn of the twentieth century”, some cost sheets for Wrexham & 
Acton Collieries Co. Ltd. have survived (see Table 8.13). These show that very
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detailed costing information was available. The trade accounts of some of the 
colliery companies survive and these also give an analysis of cost but limited to a 
much smaller number of cost categories (see Tables 8.14 and 8.15).
Table 8.13: Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. Ltd. extract from monthly costing sheets. January to 
September 1883
1883 4-Jan 4-Feb 5-Mar 4-Aor 5-Mav 4-Jun 4-Jul 1-Seo
s/d
per ton
s/d
per ton
s/d
per ton
s/d
per ton
s/d
per ton
s/d
per ton
s/d
per ton
s/d
per ton
Getting 1/6.08 1/6.11 1/6.05 1/5.76 1/5.81 1/5.93 1/5.63 1/6.03
Driving in coal? 1.36d 1.39d 1.42d 1.67d 1.53d 1.49d 1.49d 1.27d
Hauling & hooking 4.69d 4.9d 4.83d 4.78d 4.82d 4.95d 4.8d 4.69d
Shift work & deputies 8.3d 10.69d 10.06d 9.35d 9.13d 10.66d 9.52d 8.23d
Pumping & filling water 0.4d 0.61d 0 .6d 0 .66d 0.55d 0.57d 0.51d 0.52d
Driving in metal 1.03d 0.42d 0.77d 0.87d 0.94d 1.45d 2.24d 1.89d
Raising & ventilating 0.96d 1.22d 1.49d 1.62d 1.41d 1.44d 1.19d 1.16d
Banking & putting into 
trucks
1.75d 1.93d 2 .11d 2.15d 2 .22d 2.3d 2.18d 2 .22d
General surface labour 1.8d 1.93d 1.91d 2.48d 2.18d 2 .21d 1.71 d 1.8d
Mechanics 1.72d 1.76d 2 .21d 2.43d 2.3d 2 .12d 1.67d 1.52d
Total wages 3/ 4.09 3/6.96 3/7.45 3/7.77 3/6.89 3/9.12 3/6.94 3/5.33
Labour for horses 0 .19d 0.24d 0.26d 0.29d 0.28d 0.28d 0.22d 0.22d
Provender for horses 0.63d 0.87d 0.93d 1.15d 1.1 d 0.96d 0.87d 0 .66d
Stores for horses 0.08d 0.14d 0.14d 0 .1d 0.07d 0.07d 0.1d 0.05d
Depreciation on horses 0.9d 0 .12d 0.13d 0.15d 0.13d 0.14d 0.11d 0 .1d
Timber 3.07d 3.16d 3.62d 3.24d 3.73d 4.22d 4.61d 3.87d
Coal & slack to engines 1.97d 2.03d 1.97d 2 .0d 2.07d 1.98d 2.09d 1.53d
General stores 1.44d 1.41d 1.47d 2 .02d 1.27d 1.2d 1.01d 1.08d
Bricks, lime & mortar 0 .15d 0 .12d 0.3d 0.39d 0 .2d 0.24d 0.18d 0.15d
Iron, steel & castings 0.97d 1.64d 1.36d 1.12d 1.05d 1.87d 1.38d 1.01 d
Wire, ropes & chains 0.5d 0.5d 0.5d 0 .6d 0.5d 0.5d 0.5d 0.5d
Water 0 .1d 0 .1d 0.17d 0.05d 0.05d
Directors, officials & 
clerks
2.59d 3.13d 3.36d 3.46d 3.39d 3.26d 2.77d 2.65d
Surface rent & way leave 0.55d 0.57d 0.45d 0.54d 0 .6d 0.73d 0.62d 0.57d
Rates & taxes 1.28d 1.33d 1.35d 1.44d 1.49d 1.36d 1.2d 1.16d
Miscellaneous expenses 0.73d 0.86d 0.89d 1.66d 2 .01d 1.8d 1.41d 1.33d
Royalty 5.47d 5.6d 4.5d 4.54d 5.46d 4.9d 6.06d 5.4d
Total expenses 4/11.8 5/4.78 5/4.78 5/6.37 5/6.24 5/8.8 5/6.12 5/1.66
Wages as % of costs 67 66 66 67 65 65 65 67
(Source: NLW /HR/76).
A review of the figures in Tables 8.13, 8.14 and 8.15 reveals that the 
proportion of wages to total costs does indeed fall within the parameters, and 
follows the trends, outlined by Church; in the 1880s wages at Wrexham and
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Acton Collieries Co. Ltd. account for 63-66 per cent of cost (see Table 8.14), 
while in 1911-1914, for Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. the proportions 
are 72-76 per cent (see Table 8.15). Additional information for the Brynkinallt 
colliery is available for the years 1896-1914 (see Table 8.16). The figures in 
Table 8.16, extracted from the detailed trading accounts, reveal that the 
proportion of wages to total cost fluctuated between 72 per cent and 81 per cent, 
slightly higher than Church’s figures would lead us to expect. These figures 
would appear to tie in with Church’s view that wages began to account for a 
greater proportion of the total cost after the 1880s but, unfortunately, as no 
complete series of figures is available covering this whole period for a single 
company, no further conclusions can be drawn. It is also important to note that 
the wages figures prepared by each company might not have been prepared in 
exactly the same way so, strictly speaking, like with like comparisons may not be 
being made.
Table 8.14: Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. Ltd. breakdown of costs per trade accounts 1884- 
1889
Years to 30 
June:
(note 1)
1884 % of 
total
1886 % 0f
total
1887 % o f
total
1888 % o f
total
6m to 
June 
1889
% o f
total
£ £ £ £ £
Costs-
Labour 32,015 63.0 33,083 65.0 32,285 66.0 32,484 65.0 19,545 66.0
Materials 7,928 15.5 7,046 14.0 6,411 13.0 6,605 13 3,896 13.0
Stables 3,217 6.5 3,494 6.5 3,191 6.5 3,120 6.5 1,590 5.5
General 4,380 8.5 4,026 8.0 3,703 7.5 3,820 7.5 1,857 6.5
Mineral
rentals
3,403 6.5 3,421 6.5 3,315 7.0 4,122 8.0 2,001 7.0
Wagon
repairs
550 Z 0
Total cost 50,943 100.0 51,070 100.0 48,905 100.0 50,151 100.0 29,439 100.0
Cost per ton 
s/d
5/7.73 5/3.92 [5/2.4] 
note 2
5/2.44 5/4.31
Notes:1 - No information is available for the year to 30 June 1885
2 - This figure has been calculated from information given elsewhere in the table.
(Source: NLW HR/76/1356-1372)
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Table 8.15: Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. breakdown of costs per ton per trade accounts
1911-1914
1/4 Year to 31.12.11 30.6.12 31.12.12 30.6.13 31.12.13 30.6.14
s/d % s/d % s/d % s/d % s/d % s/d %
Labour 6/3 76.0 6/6.1 73.0 6/8.2 74 7/2.2 72.0 7/7.3 74.0 7/7.9 73.0
Materials 10.7 11.0 1/0.8 12.0 1/2.0 13 1/5.6 15.0 1/4.4 13.0 1/6.4 14.0
Stables 1.4 1.5 1.75 1.5 1.83 2 1.73 1.5 1.53 1.5 1.67 1.5
Pumping 0.63 0.5 1.12 1.0 0.64 0.5 0.82 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.59 0.5
Mineral
rents
4.38 4.5 5.05 5.0 4.68 4 5.05 4.0 4.84 4.0 5.24 4.0
General
charges
6.45 6J> 7.81 L 5 7.10 6J5 8.43 LQ 8.72 LQ 9.22 LQ
Total cost 
per ton
8/2.7 100.0 7/11 100.0 9/0.5 100 10/0 100.0 10/3 100.0 10/7 100.0
(Sources: 1911-1912 D/BC/2289  
1913-1914 DD/PP/620)
Table 8.16: Brvnkinallt colliery, wages as proportion of total costs 1896-1914
Total
costs
£
Wages
£
Wages as 
% total 
costs
Total
costs
£
Wages
£
Wages as 
% total 
costs
1896 37,644 29167 77.5 1906 64,880 49,044 75.6
1897 32,956 24,293 73.7 1907 69,138 49,857 72.1
1898 42,988 32,458 75.5 1908 73,049 55,322 75.7
1899 44,924 34,505 76.8 1909 74,075 54,321 73.3
1900 43,267 32,921 76.1 1910 65,129 49,248 75.6
1901 58,855 46,532 79.0 1911 73,981 54,132 73.2
1902 53,845 43,382 80.6 1912 84,685 62,156 73.3
1903 55,556 44,191 79.5 1913 100,669 74,625 74.1
1904 58,449 44,918 76.8 1914 103,699 76,873 74.1
1905 63,085 46,808 74.2
Note: in the years 1901 and 1902, wages includes directors’ remuneration which, in 1900, had 
amounted to approximately £ 1100.
(Source: D/CB/1/2)
According to Church (1986: 505), the second most important cost after 
labour was stores, which are defined by Lawn (1904: 530) as “the numerous and 
very various articles which it is necessary for a mining company to buy in order to 
carry on operations”. These included pit timber, rails, castings, ropes, candles, oil 
and grease (Church, 1986: 505). Church (1986: 505) cites an 1871 survey by the
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Colliery Guardian which said that it was usual for stores to account for 5-18 per 
cent of total costs, and that the costs of keeping horses and stables should be 
between 1 and 7 per cent of total cost. Tables 8.14 and 8.15 reveal that for 
Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co. Ltd., and Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. 
the proportions of these costs did indeed fall within these parameters.
Of all the costs, other than wages, that companies had to pay, the most 
controversial would appear to be royalties or mineral rents. Although these only 
account for a small percentage of total cost, 4-5 per cent in the case of 
Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. and 6.5-8 per cent for Wrexham & Acton 
Collieries Co. Ltd., from the records available for Denbighshire it would appear, 
as noted above in Chapter 5, that the management of companies accorded an 
importance to royalties that was disproportionate to their importance in total 
costs. While it is true that royalties may not have seemed unduly significant in 
absolute terms, given the often very marginal profits per ton, any movement in 
royalties per ton could mean the difference between a company reporting a profit 
and a loss (see below).
Profits
The minute books of Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. reveal that detailed 
financial information was prepared on a regular basis; the company preparing, on 
a monthly basis, a statement outlining the following: sales, debtors, coal raised, 
profit and bank balance. The figures for profit, coal raised and sales were also 
calculated on a cumulative basis from the start of the financial year to the end of 
that particular month. Each month, figures were prepared comparing the profit 
figure for the month with that of the corresponding month in the previous year, 
and an analysis of the difference was calculated. This analysis covered the 
movements in quantities sold, costs per ton for the two main pits, selling prices 
and profits from the use of wagons. On a six monthly basis the company 
prepared a detailed trading account which gave a breakdown of sales, both 
quantities and values, for shipping, railway and local sales, which were further 
categorised into the various types of coal and slack sold. A breakdown of costs
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into labour, materials, stables and ‘general’ was also calculated. Each cost was 
broken down for each colliery, Plas Power, Gatewen and Vron, and a cost per 
ton for each expense, for each colliery, was calculated (see Appendix A). This 
enabled the company to work out a ‘profit per ton’ (see Table 8.17) but this was a 
rather arbitrary figure given that the actual selling prices of the different types of 
coal were averaged over the year, and these final figures were in turn averaged 
to give an overall selling price per ton. Church (1986: 521) believes that such 
profit figures per ton should be seen as “little more than a rough guide to the level 
and chronology of [a company’s] profitability”. However, it would appear that, 
inexact or not, these figures formed an extremely important element of the 
management information used for decision making, because they allowed 
comparisons, however crude, to be made.
The profit figures that are available for Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. 
Ltd. and Brynkinallt (see Table 8.17), reveal that colliery companies were usually 
working with very small margins of profit, and they also reveal the volatile nature 
of the industry. For example, if we look at Brynkinallt’s profits per ton (see Table 
8.17) we see the profits plunge from 3/1.6d in 1901 to 2.3d in 1902, a fall of 94 
per cent. Furthermore, the company suffered four consecutive years of losses 
from 1903 to 1906 and suffered its biggest loss of 11.7d per ton in 1906, a figure 
which is a full 131 per cent lower than the high of only five years previously.
As has already been discussed, the selling price of coal was subject to 
significant fluctuations, and given that many of the elements of cost were difficult 
to alter significantly, a very small downward movement in selling price could wipe 
out profits very quickly. If we look at the profits and losses recorded by Brynkinallt 
in the years 1903-1910 and compare them with the average price obtained in 
Denbighshire for the same period (see Table 8.11, p.309) we see that the 9 per 
cent fall in the selling price between 1902 and 1903 caused profits per ton to drop 
by 126 per cent and these profits, like prices, did not recover until 1907 when 
prices increased by 7 per cent and corresponding profits per ton increased by 
121 per cent.
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Table 8.17: Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd.and Brynkinallt. average profits per ton 1896-
1914
Broughton & Plas Power Coal 
Co. Ltd.
Brynkinallt
Coal
Raised
Profit Profit per 
ton
Coal Sold Profit Profit per 
ton
Tons £ s/d Tons £ s/d
1884 313,485 15,286 0/11.7
1885 297,691 11,564 0/9.3
1886 339,459 13,943 0/9.8
1887 386,849 14,569 0/9.0
1888 362,826 7,180 0/4.7
*1889 309,969 1,352 0/ 1.0
1890 344,519 22,101 0/4.0
1891 347,141 20,468 1/2.1
1892 367,863 17,334 0/11.3
1893 226,547 -179 -0/0.2
*1894 299,190 6,651 0/5.3
*1895 363,038 9,948 0/6.6
1896 438,026 8,661 0/4.7 103,482 -8,289 -1/7.2
1897 444,994 9,213 0/5.0 119,218 2,309 0/4.6
*1898 457,786 21,418 0/ 11.2 151,995 4,661 0/7.3
1899 470,245 22,890 0/11.7 141,547 6,824 0/ 11.6
1900 498,060 63,663 2/6.7 124,420 11,718 1/ 10.6
1901 438,068 38,636 1/9.2 130,411 20,412 3/1.6
1902 462,220 8,613 0/4.5 128,065 1,219 0/2.3
1903 139,890 -342 -0/0.6
1904 138,274 -3,475 -0/6.0
1905 153,654 -4,008 -0/6.3
1906 158,394 -7,709 -0/11.7
1907 163,845 2,348 0/3.4
1908 153,182 8,403 1/ 1.2
1909 155,593 -4,524 -0/7.0
1910 150,160 -9,568 -1/3.3
1911 173,064 1,039 0/1.4
*1912 491,541 1379 0/0.7 194,146 12,952 1/4.0
1913 495,456 1802 0/0.9 207,829 8,543 0/9.9
1914 470,599 1726 0/0.9 187,671 4,275 0/5.5
Notes:
a) Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd.’s financial year end was December, while Brynkinallt’s 
was June.
b) Profits per ton have been calculated as follows: profits/tons * 240d
C) No information is available for Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. for 1903-1911 inclusive 
d) Information for years marked * is incomplete
(Sources: Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. D/DM/309/3-6; Brynkinallt D/CB/1/2)
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Such wild fluctuations meant that some collieries continued working, 
despite making losses, in some cases, for many years because the possibility of 
a quick reversal of fortune always existed. Boyns (1993: 345-6) explains that if a 
colliery closed it would involve writing off large amounts of capital investment; not 
only this, but reopening collieries was often impossible or very expensive, so 
loss-making companies often continued to operate “in the hope that the coal 
market would improve, prices would rise and large profits could be made which 
would more than offset previous losses”. It was not therefore profitability, or lack 
of it, that was the overriding reason for closing a colliery; it was usually 
exhaustion, geological problems or problems finding markets for a particular type 
of coal that was the decisive factor (Boyns, 1993: 345-6).
The figures in Table 8.17 do little other than indicate the trends of the 
profits for the two companies involved; they cannot be compared directly 
because they have been prepared differently. The figures for Brynkinallt have 
been calculated from the annual profit & loss accounts, and the net profit figures 
per the financial statements have simply been divided by the amount of coal sold 
to give a profit per ton figure. The figures for Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. 
Ltd. have been derived from internally prepared data; on a monthly basis the 
minutes of the directors’ meetings listed the amount of coal raised and a profit 
figure, which is assumed to be the gross or trading profit. These monthly figures 
have been aggregated into annual figures and the profit per ton is the profit figure 
divided by the amount of coal raised. Given that the shortcomings discussed 
above in relation to the two companies in Denbighshire would be repeated if 
comparisons with other coalfields were attempted, no systematic, comparative 
analysis of levels of profit per ton with those in other regions has been attempted.
Nonetheless the figures do give an indication of the highs and lows of the 
coal trade and also illustrate the marginal nature of the profits earned by the coal 
companies. Small changes in costs could eliminate profits; if we take, for 
example, the profit per ton for Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. for the 
years 1912-1914 (see Table 8.17) we see that a penny increase in, for example, 
royalties per ton or wages per ton would have wiped out these profits completely.
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If the 2!4 d depreciation charge advocated by FA Sturge (see p. 306 above) had 
been applied then not only would the profits for 1912-1914 have disappeared 
then so too would the profits for 1889, and the profits of 1888, 1894, 1896 and 
1897 would, more or less, have been halved.
Figure 8.4: profits per ton for Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd.. Brynkinallt. the Main Colliery 
Co. Ltd.. Cardiff Steam Coal Collieries Co. Ltd. and the Powell Duffrvn Steam Coal Co. Ltd. 1887- 
1914
 Br&PP
 BK
Main
 CSCCL
 PD
Profits per ton 1887-1914
Year
Key: Key: BR & PP -  Broughton & Plas Power Colliery Co. Ltd; BK -  Brynkinallt; Main - the Main 
Colliery Co. Ltd; PD - the Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Co. Ltd and CSCCL - the Cardiff Steam 
Coal Collieries Ltd.
(Sources: Plas Power - D/DM/309/3-6; Brynkinallt - D/CB/1/2; Main, CSCCL & PD - Walters, 
(1977): 291-2)
To discover whether trends in north W ales tied in with those elsewhere, 
Figure 8.4 plots the profit per ton figures for Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. 
Ltd. and Brynkinallt, presented in Table 8.17, alongside those for three south 
Wales companies, the Main Colliery Co. Ltd., the Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Co. 
Ltd. and the Cardiff Steam Coal Collieries Ltd. (see Table 8.18). Despite the fact 
that the south Wales companies’ profits are generally much higher than those of 
the north W ales companies, which is to be expected given the demand for south
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Wales steam coal in this period, the graph clearly shows that the trends in profits, 
for the period for which information is available, with only a few exceptions, 
followed the same basic patterns, with profits experiencing peaks, in south Wales 
at least, in the boom periods of 1890, 1898-1901 and 1908. Figure 8.4 also 
clearly demonstrates, especially if we look at Brynkinallt, the sheer volatility of 
profits per ton in this period.
Table 8.18: Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd.. Brynkinallt. Main Colliery Co. Ltd.. Powell 
Duffryn Steam Coal Co. Ltd.. and the Cardiff Steam Coal Collieries Ltd.average profits per ton 
1884-1914
Br & PP BK Main PD CSCCL
s/d s/d s/d s/d s/d
1884 0/11.7
1885 0/9.3
1886 0/9.8
1887 0/9.0 0/4.3
1888 0/4.7 1/6.3 1/6.9
1889 0/ 1.0 1/ 10.0 2/3.6
1890 0/4.0 0/7.0 1/10.3
1891 1/2.1 0/ 11.1 0/9.0
1892 0/11.3 0/3.5 0/5.1
1893 -0/0.2 0/6.3 1/2.5
1894 0/5.3 0/6.2 0/0.5 0/7.9
1895 0/6.6 0/ 1.8 0/8.6 0/8.3
1896 0/4.7 -1/7.2 0/5.0 0/ 11.0 0/9.6
1897 0/5.0 0/4.6 0/ 10.1 1/ 10.0 0/5.2
1898 0/ 11.2 0/7.3 2/ 1.0 0/9.0 1/7.7
1899 0/11.7 0/ 11.6 3/2.0 0/8.3 3/6.1
1900 2/6.7 1/ 10.6 5/2.1 0/3.9 2/4.2
1901 1/9.2 3/1.6 2/ 11.2 0/7.9 1/7.6
1902 0/4.5 0/2.3 2/9.0 0/5.3 1/4.4
1903 0/0.6 1 /4 .5 1/2.6 1/8.3
1904 0/6.0 1/3.6 2/7.1 1/2.7
1905 -0/6.3 1/3.0 2/9.1 1/6.0
1906 -0/11/7 1/1.4 1/9.1
1907 0/3.4 1/2.9 0/ 1.0
1908 1/ 1.2 0/4.0 2/4.0
1909 -0/7.0 0/8.2 1/4.7
1910 -1/3.3 0/4.9 1/9.6
1911 0/1.4 0/0.7 1/5.1
1912 0/0.7 1/4.0 0/8.3
1913 0/0.9 0/9.9 0/11.9
1914 0/0.9 0/5.5
(Sources: as per Figure 8.4)
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The peaks experienced by coal companies in both north and south Wales 
correspond to the booms experienced by the British coal industry as a whole with 
two of the three south Wales companies achieving their highest profits per ton in 
1899 and 1900 while in north Wales the peak years were 1900 and 1901 (see 
Table 8.18). For example the profit of the Main Colliery Co. Ltd. in 1900 was 
5/2.1 per ton a full 102 per cent higher than the profit for Broughton & Plas Power 
Coal Co. Ltd. for the same year (2/6.7).
While the south Wales companies experienced a fairly significant increase 
in profits in the iate 1880s/early 1890s, in Denbighshire, the same period saw a 
slump in the performance of the Broughton & Plas Power Co. Ltd. According to 
the minutes of a meeting held on 27 November 1889 (D/DM/309/4), increases in 
wages (“since November 1st 1888, the colliers have received an advance of 20 
per cent in their wages”) and “unremunerative” contracts meant that there was 
insufficient profit to declare a dividend. Although Broughton & Plas Power Coal 
Co. Ltd.’s performance improved in 1891 with profits per ton reaching 1/2.1 d per 
ton, profits per ton fell in 1892, and the company made a loss of 0.2d per ton in 
1893 (see Table 8.17). In 1891, despite making profits, the company’s minutes 
note that although “the collieries have been kept at full work throughout the 
summer,...the serious fall in the price of slack has made the trade less profitable” 
(D/DM/309/4, 5 November 1891). The year 1892 saw a fall in profits because 
“during the second half of the year, the depression in the shipping trade caused a 
heavy fall in prices at Liverpool” (D/DM/309/4, 30 November 1892). As was 
discussed in Chapter 6, 1893 saw a prolonged strike in Denbighshire which, 
along with “the bad state of trade in the first half of the year”, contributed to 
Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. making a loss (D/DM/309/4, 21 February 
1894). These poor performance figures were reflected in the lower dividend 
payments made by Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. after the boom years 
of 1891 and 1892 (see pp. 298-302 above).
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Conclusion re profitability
When looking at the profitability of nineteenth century coal companies, the 
most important consideration to take into account is the fact that accounting 
practices at that time could differ considerably from company to company, which 
means that the analyses that can be carried out are limited, and the conclusions 
drawn therefrom must be treated with a certain amount of scepticism. Church 
(1986: 517) believes that “any figures, especially of net, but even of gross profit 
[must be seen] as less than completely reliable”. This having been said it is 
therefore difficult, even if the source material is available, to measure the 
performance of one company against another. It is easier, therefore, to conclude 
that, during their lifetimes, the coal companies of Denbighshire, like those in other 
coalfields, rode the roller coaster that was the coal trade. When times were good, 
returns could be very good, for example, in 1900 the profits of the Broughton & 
Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. were over 2 shillings per ton, while those of the 
Brynkinallt colliery were over 3 shillings per ton in 1901. However, boom periods 
did not last for long and, in most years, the companies struggled to return a profit, 
indeed, Brynkinallt colliery suffered a loss in 6 of the 10 years between 1901 and 
1910 (see Table 8.17). Average annual profit margins were small and subject to 
the vagaries of the coal markets with movements in profits or losses closely 
matching movements in the price of coal. This meant that the most important 
factor in determining whether the company was going to make a profit or not was, 
to a great extent, out of the control of the company. This lack of control over price 
manifested itself in an obsession with controlling costs, especially wages and 
royalties as both these costs were deemed more ‘controllable’ than many of the 
other costs. As a consequence, relations with employees and royalty owners 
were often marred by disagreements. While, on the face of the evidence 
presented in Chapters 5 and 6, the willingness of coal companies to get involved 
in litigation or disagreements with their landlords and in lengthy, disruptive 
disputes with their workmen, might seem irrational, the low levels of profits, their
324
volatile nature and their sheer ‘marginality’, helps us to understand why coal 
companies took what might otherwise be seen to be an illogical position.
When compared with the profits of companies from south Wales it was 
demonstrated that, while the profits of Denbighshire coal companies followed the 
same general trends as those of the south Wales coal companies, the profits of 
the latter were significantly higher than for the Denbighshire companies probably 
due to the ‘desirability’ of south Wales steam coal.
Overall conclusions re performance
The productivity of Denbighshire coal companies demonstrates specific 
trends that can be tied in with the overall performance of the coal industry, and 
we have demonstrated that the productivity of Denbighshire was comparable to 
that of other small coalfields. However, in terms of profitability, the companies for 
which we have information demonstrate very volatile profits. Furthermore, profits 
appear to have been marginal for Denbighshire coal companies in most years 
and significant profits were unusual.
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Chapter 9
CONCLUSIONS
Having examined each of the issues discussed in the foregoing chapters, this 
chapter brings together the main conclusions of the research. In the Introduction 
the aims of this thesis were outlined and the conclusions will be addressed 
against each of those aims in turn.
Can Denbighshire be considered as a coalfield in its own right?
During the third quarter of the nineteenth century Denbighshire came to dominate 
the north Wales coalfield; by 1880 it accounted for over 60 per cent of the total 
output of north Wales and, by 1914, this proportion had increased to 82 per cent. 
In terms of output, Denbighshire, which has never been seen as anything other 
than an area within a ‘small’ coalfield was, in fact, comparable with many of those 
coalfields that were, officially, considered ‘small’, for example, Leicestershire 
Cumberland and Gloucester. In addition, throughout the period 1875-1914, 
Denbighshire was able to keep pace with the growth of the coal industry as a 
whole. It was able to maintain its production as a proportion of the UK’s output at 
around 1 per cent, and this, at a time when the UK coal industry’s output was 
increasing significantly.
In numerical terms the Denbighshire coalfield was dominated by small 
collieries, however between 1894 and 1914 the proportion of collieries employing 
more than 500 men increased from 24 per cent to 42 per cent of the total (see 
table 2.14). This increase in colliery size is reinforced if we consider the fact that 
the average size of a Denbighshire colliery rose from 274 employees in 1894 to 
447.7 in 1914, a figure which was significantly higher than the national average. 
Further, if the proportion of the workforce which was employed by the larger 
collieries is considered, they clearly employed the majority of the workforce. In 
1914 84 per cent of the total workforce was employed by collieries employing
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more than 500 persons, and of these 15 per cent were employed by collieries 
employing more than 1,500 men (see Table 2.16).
These statistics show us that Denbighshire grew significantly in the period 
1875-1914 and the research undertaken demonstrates that Denbighshire 
dominated the north Wales coalfield. Its performance in terms of OMY was found 
to be comparable to other ‘small’ coalfields and, in terms of colliery size, the 
collieries of Denbighshire were often far larger than those in the other ‘small’ 
coalfields, indeed, 62 per cent of the total workforce was employed by only 7 
collieries. A possible explanation for this is the relative ‘newness’ of the 
Denbighshire collieries; of these 7 collieries, only one, the Westminster colliery 
was sunk before 1850 (1846), another, the Wynnstay colliery was sunk in 1856 
while the remainder were all sunk between 1863 and 1875. As was explained in 
Chapter 2, due to geological conditions in Denbighshire, the newer collieries had 
to be sunk to greater depths which inevitably meant that the collieries had to be 
much bigger concerns than previously.
Although, for official, statistical purposes Denbighshire was often included 
within the north Wales ‘coalfield’, geologically speaking, the coalfield is quite a 
distinct entity which suggests that it is worthy of study in its own right. The 
statistical information which was collected and analysed for the purpose of this 
thesis reinforces this view; Denbighshire, if treated as a separate coalfield, was 
comparable to other, officially designated ‘coalfields’. It has, therefore, been 
contended that Denbighshire can be considered a coalfield in its own right and 
hence a legitimate focus of study.
What were the obstacles to economic & industrial development that faced the 
Denbighshire coalfield at the turn of the nineteenth century and how were these 
overcome?
The main obstacle facing the Denbighshire coalfield was that it was a landbound 
coalfield with a poor transport infrastructure which strictly limited the markets that
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were available for the county’s coal. The improvements to the road network in the 
late eighteenth century, and the building of the Ellesmere canal in 1805, went 
some way to opening up markets for Denbighshire but not to the extent that had 
been anticipated. When the Ellesmere canal was first planned it was to have 
extended as far as Wrexham, but problems of geography and finance meant that 
this never transpired. It was, therefore, only when the railway infrastructure was 
built that Denbighshire was able to look beyond its local market and expand.
The opening of a railway line from Chester to Shrewsbury, via Wrexham 
and Ruabon, in 1848 was a major step towards opening up Denbighshire to 
external markets as was the connection to the GWR in the 1850s. By the 1860s 
the industrialists of Wrexham were fierce proponents of a direct railway to the 
port of Connah’s Quay which would link Wrexham with the LNWR main line from 
Chester to Holyhead and allow direct access to an export facility. The railway 
was completed in the mid-1860s and provided a significant boost to the 
Denbighshire coalfield; not only did ‘exports’ by rail increase, but the improved 
rail links provided entrepreneurs with the impetus to sink collieries now that they 
had access to outside markets.
Who were the coalowners and shareholders who invested in the coalfield and 
were they similar in background to shareholders in coal companies elsewhere?
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the parallel experience in south Wales, we find that 
the main coalowners in Denbighshire were ‘immigrants’ to the county; men such 
as Robert Roy and Henry Robertson, who arrived as the ‘first wave’ of 
immigrants, were both Scottish, while Henry Dennis, the most important ‘second 
wave’ immigrant, was Cornish. Given the ‘unimportance’ of north Wales, and 
consequently Denbighshire, in coalmining terms, it is therefore perhaps 
surprising to discover that some of the major shareholders in Denbighshire coal 
companies were important national figures, for example, Thomas Brassey, Sir 
Daniel Gooch and Sir Theodore Martin.
When the background of the Denbighshire shareholders was analysed 
(excluding Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. due to the disparity in the
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number of shares issued), the most prominent category was ‘gentleman’ who 
made up 43.1 per cent of the total (see Table 4.5). However, given the desire for 
‘upward mobility’ within Victorian society, this might reveal more about the social 
aspirations of the men concerned rather than their actual occupation. For 
example, Henry Dennis began his shareholding career by describing himself as a 
‘mining engineer’ and ended it as a ‘gentleman’. Another, perhaps unusual, 
feature of shareholders in Denbighshire, was that women made up a surprisingly 
high proportion of the total shareholders, 18.6 per cent of the total and, in one 
company, the Westminster, Brymbo Coal & Coke Co. Ltd., women constituted 
the most important category at 44.4 per cent (see Table 4.5).
According to research undertaken by historians such as Church (1986), if 
Denbighshire had followed the pattern typical in the UK coal industry, most of 
Denbighshire’s capital should have come from local sources but, when 
shareholder addresses were analysed it was found that most shareholders lived 
outside the county, indeed, outside Wales. The highest proportion of 
shareholders (excluding Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd. from the 
analysis), 33 per cent, was found to live in London and the south east of 
England, while there was a sizeable proportion, 21 per cent, living in Scotland 
(see Table 4.7). This latter finding reflects the strong ties which Roy and 
Robertson retained with Scotland. It may be that the Scottish ‘element’ is so 
significant in Denbighshire because, unlike in other, larger coalfields, the 
investment from a specific region has not been ‘lost’ in the sheer scale of 
investment. With a small number of shareholders in total, it is obviously easier for 
one regional group to dominate, reflecting personal and other network ties.
Who were the other major stakeholders in the coal industry in Denbighshire and 
what were the relationships between these stakeholders and the coal companies 
like?
The other main stakeholders in the Denbighshire coalfield were mineral owners, 
employees and customers. Relations between the coal companies and their
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mineral owners were often fraught, as was illustrated by the three case studies 
examined in Chapter 5. Mineral ownership was far from being a straight forward 
guarantee of ‘easy money’; mineral owners were often involved in protracted 
negotiations, even disputes, with their lessees and often had to make significant 
concessions. The marginal nature of coal industry profits meant that coal 
companies were constantly looking for ways to cut costs, and royalties were 
deemed an ‘easy’ target compared to other costs. The coal companies of 
Denbighshire, like their counterparts in other coalfields, considered royalty rates 
to be onerous and indeed small changes in royalties per ton could have a severe 
impact on profits. However, if royalty rates are considered on a national level 
(see Table 5.3), those of north Wales appear to have been one of the lowest and 
therefore we might assume that the coal companies of Denbighshire were not 
disadvantaged by the royalty system that prevailed at the time. This, however, 
assumes that the coal companies of Denbighshire earned comparable profits to 
those in other companies which our research leads us to conclude that they did 
not.
The only other cost that was deemed an ‘easier’ target to cut than royalties 
was wages and until the miners succeded in creating strong, centralised unions 
on a local and national level, they had to put up with severe fluctuations in their 
wage rates. Unlike the miners, the coalowners were able to present a united 
front. For example, in Denbighshire, the NWCOA represented the coalowners 
against the miners from 1870 and, given that it was not until the 1890s that the 
miners in Denbighshire, under the leadership of Edward Hughes, began to work 
collectively, the owners were able to thwart the demands of the miners time and 
again during the second half of the nineteenth century.
By the start of the twentieth century, however, the miners of the UK were 
unified under the MFGB and Denbighshire had a strong, local union in the 
NWMA. The MFGB began to agitate for a restriction in working hours and 
achieved success when the 1908 Eight Hours Act was passed. However this Act 
created unforeseen problems, especially in south Wales. Here, the issue of ‘hard 
and difficult’ places festered until, in 1912, it became a national issue that
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culminated in a national strike which caused tremendous hardship throughout the 
UK and heralded decades of bitter industrial relations between coalowners and 
miners.
In Denbighshire, the issue of ‘hard and difficult’ places had long been 
important; in 1907 a ‘price list’ had been agreed that was supposed to address 
this issue but, dissembling by the employers meant that, by the time of the 1912 
strike, there was strong support for the MFGB stance. The strike caused severe 
hardship in Denbighshire and when the vote to return to work was held there was 
an overwhelming vote in favour. Despite the distress caused by the strike, the 
NWMA remained strong, a testament to the influence of its inspirational leader, 
Edward Hughes, who had worked indefatigably since 1897 to create a strong, 
regional union.
Turning to customers, once Wrexham was linked to the important GWR 
and LNWR railways the infrastructure was in place for Denbighshire coal 
companies to take advantage of national and, via the docks in Birkenhead and, 
later, Connah’s Quay, international markets. The records that survive show that 
the coal companies used a variety of methods to expand these markets which 
included employing ‘travelling salesmen’, joining local ‘cartels’ and investing in 
the by-product industry. The records also show that, despite being a small 
coalfield, Denbighshire’s coal was purchased by some very prestigious 
companies, for example, the Cunard Steamship Co. and the Pacific Steam 
Navigation Co. Ltd.
How did the coal companies of Denbighshire perform?
In terms of productivity, Denbighshire’s OMY was comparable with that of other 
‘small’ coalfields. The highest recorded OMY for Denbighshire was in 1898, a full 
15 years after the UK peak. This, however, is not surprising given that 
Denbighshire was a ‘new’ coalfield, developed largely after 1850. Little analysis 
of OMY figures for individual companies was possible, but those figures that are 
available demonstrate the volatility of OMY. This, again, is not unexpected; OMY
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figures are affected by the number of days worked by a colliery in a year and, if 
conditions in the coal industry were not favourable, many days could be lost 
consequently lowering OMY greatly. The OMY figures, for the companies 
examined, exhibited similar trends reaching a high in the late 1890s and then 
taking a downward trend. As a result the OMY figure for Denbighshire peaks at 
272 tons in 1898 and then decline to reach its lowest level, 204 tons, in 1914 
(see Table 8.6).
In terms of profitability, coal company profits were not only very volatile but 
precarious; small movements in the selling price of coal and/or costs could 
severely affect a company’s profits and therefore the dividends it was able to pay 
its shareholders. In Denbighshire the coal companies earned extremely narrow 
profit margins even in ‘good’ years (see Table 8.17), which meant that they were 
always searching for ways to cut costs. For this reason, coal companies 
appeared obsessively preoccupied with labour and royalty costs (despite the 
latter being low compared to those in other coalfields), a preoccupation which 
often manifested itself in disputes with the mineral owners and increasingly bitter 
industrial relations.
Does examining a small coalfield offer different insights into issues that might not 
be revealed by studying a larger coalfield and were these issues different to 
those being raised in larger coalfields?
The studies that have been carried out on the UK coal industry have, logically, 
concentrated on the larger coalfields such as Durham and Northumberland or 
south Wales when attempting to determine the issues that affected the coal 
industry at a national level. Likewise, studies of individual coalfields have tended 
to focus on the same large coalfields rather than smaller, ‘insignificant’ coalfields. 
These studies do consider issues specific to individual coalfields, for example, 
the issue of ‘hard and difficult’ places in south Wales but often only in the context 
of how it affected the national industry. National studies often only touch on 
issues that the study of Denbighshire has shown were extremely important at a
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local level. One such issue was royalties. While important enough to warrant a 
Parliamentary Commission in 1890, very little has been written about the impact 
of royalties on individual companies. Examining the detailed correspondence 
between companies and their mineral owners, and the actual financial records of 
these companies, has allowed a deeper understanding of the reasons behind the 
coal companies’ attitude to royalties to be developed. Similarly, the problems that 
individual companies faced when sinking mines, in terms of geological and 
financial problems, explains why so many companies were forced to raise far 
more finance than had originally been anticipated.
It would appear from the study of the Denbighshire coalfield that the 
issues that dominated the region, for example, wage rates and royalty rates, 
were not specific to the region; these were universal issues that were also 
causing problems in other coalfields as coalowners did everything in their power 
to maximise their returns. Even if a dispute was confined to a specific coalfield, 
for example, the 1882 strike in Denbighshire, it was usually related to the 
coalowners’ desire to cut costs.
Further Research
This thesis has attempted to compile a comprehensive study of a relatively 
understudied area -  the small coalfield. While large coalfields such as south 
Wales have been extensively researched the small coalfields have tended to be 
ignored. National histories of the coal industry tend to concentrate on the 
‘influential’ and therefore large coalfields while local studies tend to concentrate 
on specific collieries, towns, areas or events rather than on the coalfield as a 
whole. Various authors have examined specific aspects of the Denbighshire 
coalfield, for example, Lerry (1968) gives details of individual collieries, Rogers 
(1928) examines the development of trade unionism and Gildart (2001) looks at 
post nationalisation but this thesis is the first time that an attempt has been made 
to examine the development of the coalfield in the Victorian era.
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While this study has not been able to establish that the Denbighshire 
coalfield was ‘different’ to other coalfields it has allowed us to gain an insight into 
issues, for example, ‘non indigenous’ investors and women shareholders in coal 
companies that might be ‘subsumed’ in the sheer volume of detail associated 
with larger companies and larger coalfields. This opens up possibilities for further 
research into small coalfields to discover whether the findings of this thesis are 
replicated in other small coalfields. Further research into Denbighshire is also 
possible; no comprehensive study of the inter-war period has been carried out to 
date. Such a study would, given Gildart’s (2001) post-war contribution, allow us 
to ‘close off the study of the Denbighshire coalfield and would enable us to 
examine, in detail the ‘life and death’ of a small coalfield.
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Appendix A
Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd
Example of detailed trading account for the half vear ending 3111 December 1913
Expenditure Plas
Power
Gatewen Vron Total Receipts Weight Value Total
Cost of eettinp 118.571
tons
Cost oer 92.215
tons
Cost
vs.
1SQ
34.122
tons
Cost per 244.908 Cost OCT A& 
Price 
per ton
ton ton tons ton
To Labour costs £ s/d £ s/d s/d £ s/d Bv shinning Tons £ £
sales
Coal getting 17,934 3/0.3 15,835 3/5.2 6,231 3/7.8 40,000 3/3.2 Steam coal 11/7.4 58,878 34,134
Driving in coal 769 136 1,156 3.01 105 0.74 2,031 1.99 Slack 6/6.2 1348 422
Haulage & 
hooking
8348 1/4.9 4,481 11.66 1329 10.76 14358 1/2.1 Bv Railway 
sales
60326 34373
Shiftwork 10,477 1/9.21 8378 1/10 2,055 1/2.5 21,110 1/8.7
Deputies 480 0.97 343 0.89 278 1.96 1,101 1.08 Main 4ft & 
powell
11/8.3 93,184 54,479
Pumping & 
filling water
841 1.7 892 2.32 135 0.95 1,868 1.83 Crank 13/6.6 6,889 4,668
Driving in metal 1,781 3.6 556 1.45 210 1.47 2347 2.5 Nuts 11/5.7 13,041 7,483
Raising & 
ventilating
794 1.61 764 1.99 130 0.91 1,688 1.65 Slack 6/7.9 3 12,1?7 78,817
Banking & 
screening
1349 3.14 1,494 3.89' 551 3.87 3394 3.52 149.734
Surface labour 823 1.66 519 1.35 394 2.77 1,736 1.7 Bv local sales
Mechanics 1374 3.19 1,036 2.69 159 1.12 2,769 2.71 Main 4ft & 
powell
12/4.4 7343 4,541
Pump 258 0.67 258 0.25 Crank 13/7 2,828 1,921
Fan alterations 20 0.04 571 0.15 77 0.08 Nuts 12/1.7 86 52
Overwind
preventers
6 0.01 11 0.03 1 1& m Slack 8/11 674 300 6.814
Carried forward 41396 7/7.89 31980 7/9.6 11,778 6/10.8 93,154 7/7.3 10,931
Expenditure Plas Gatewen Vron Total Receipt^ Weight Value Total
Power
tost of getting: 118.571 Costner 92.215 Costner 24122 Cost OCT 244.908 Costner AYi
Price
Isos
tons ton tons tpn tons ten tons ton
£ s/d £ s/d £ s/d £ s/d s/d £/s/d £
Brought forward 453% 7/7.89 35,980 7/9.6 11,778 6/10.8 93,154 7/7.3 10,931
Xo Materials Total sales 10/11 220,891 120505
General stores 633 1.28 292 0.76 145 1.02 1,070 less selling 
charges & 
discounts
1.68 (1548)
Water 89 0.18 9 0.02 29 0.21 127 Net sales 10/9 118,657
Timber 3370 6.82 2,707 7.05 714 5.02 6,792
Bricks, lime & 
sand
21 0.04 50 0.13 71
Rails &  Rail 
iron
132 0.27 152 0.4 42 0.3 326 Bvown
consumntion
Iron, steel & 
castings
224 0.45 177 0.46 78 0.55 479 Coal &  nuts 9/8.6 1,147 557
Chains & wire 
rope
290 0.59 68 0.18 71 0.5 429 Slack from 
screens
5/11 21519 6424
Coal & slack 2,919 5.91 2,745 7.14 972 6.83 6,635 Pit slack 61- 428 128
Boilers 116 0.24 116 23.094 7,109
Pit tubs 81 0.16 57 0.15 138
Pump 131 0.34 131 By Stock at 3.1 
Dec.1913
Fan alterations 6 0.01 21 0.05 27 Coal 12/- 539 325
Overwind
preventers
187 0.38 141 032 21 222 Nuts 11/6 14 8
8.068 1/4.3 6550 111 2103 1/2.8 16.720 1/4.38 Slack 6/6 1.743 566
To stables 2*296 899
Provender 361 0.73 320 0.83 113 0.8 794 0.78
wages 225 0.45 184 0.48 45 0.31 454 0.44 Less stock at 30 
June 1913
Stores 98 0.2 90 0.24 22 0.16 210 0.21 Coal & nuts
Depreciation 22 0.06 44 0.11 16 0.11 89 009 Slack (1573) (616)
112 L44 638 1.66 196 L2S 1547 1.52
715 1.45 715 0.7 Total 10/4 244,908 126,049
Carried forward 54,892 43,169 14,076 112,137 126,049
Exnenditure 
Cost of getting
244908
tons
Receipts Av.
Price per 
ton
Weight Value Total
£ s/d s/d £ £
To Rovaltv & 2,586 5.24 2047 5.33 303 2.13 4,936 4.84
dead rent
57,478 9/8.35 45,216 9/9.68 14379 8/5.15 117,073 10/3.5 126,049
IiLgsneral
charees
By balance in 
wagon hire ac
4.49 4374
Directors & 
officials
2372 2.32
Surface rents & 
wayleave
280 0.27 Sundry credits 
viz:
233
Rates & taxes 1455 1.43 On stores ac 11 246
Travelling
expenses
41 0.04 On form ac
Telephone, 
Telegrams 
stationery etc
127 0.13
Workmen’s 
compensation ac
3003 2.94
Incidental
expenses
' 884 0.87
State insurance 740 0.72
Total cost 8.902 8.72
125,975 10/3.4
To profit 4.894
130.869 i m 1Q&2 130.869
Source: DD/PP/620
Appendix B
Extract from Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd.minutes illustrating contract types and customers. Mav- 
September 1888
(the dates relate to the minute book entries)
2 Mav 1888
Purchasers name Quantity-
tons
Price for 
coal & 
wagon 
s. d
Period of 
contract
20 cwt or 21 
cwt
Terms
LNWR 30,000 5/7 21
Birmingham Corporation 50,000 8/11 21
G Dunlop & son 500 6/- summer/ 
6/3 winter
20 21/4 %
80.500
13 June 1888 “for delivery in our waqons”
Newport Pagnall Gas Co. 500 6/9 -71- 30 June 
1889
20
Stroud Gas Co 2,000 6/6 do do
John T ruscott 200 6/9 do do
A Cannon 100 71- do do
West Bromwich Corporation 4,000 6/3 30 June 
1890
do
Rugby Gas Co. 500 6/4 30 June 
1889
21
Cricklade Gas Co. 100 7/6 do do
Swindon Gas & Coke Co. 700 71- do 20
Tetbury Gas & Coke Co. 300 7/2 do do
Swindon New Gas Co. 1.200 71- do do
9.600 do
“for delivery in customers’ waaons" do
Underwood & son 500-1000 5/9 31 March 
1889
20
Northampton Gas Co 12,000 6/5 30 June 
1890
do
Worcester Gas Co. 2,000 61- 30 June 
1889
do
Radford & Co. 5.000 5/6 do do
20.000
11 July 1888 “for delivery in our own wagons”:
Purchasers name Quantity Price for 
coal & 
wagon 
s. d
Period of 
delivery
20 cwt or 21 
cwt
Terms
Charles Jones & son 200 6/9 To 30 June 
1889
20 2/4 %
Ledbury Gas Co. 140 6/8 do 20 nett
Marlborouqh Gas Co. 1,000 7/0 do 20 do
Taunton Gas Co. 1,500 6/6 do 20 do
Lloyd & Lloyd 500 6/4 do 21 do
Hiqh Wycombe Gas Co. 600 6/7 do 20 do
Betws y Coed Gas Co. 100 6/8 do 20 do
Leominster Gas Co. 1,300 6/6 do 20 do
Whitchurch Gas Co. 1,250 6/4 do 20 do
Mary Evans 225 7/0 do 20 2/4 %
Peter Wooler 200 6/8 do 20 21/4 %
Henry Roberts 100 7/0 do 20 2/4 %
Frank Povey 100 7/3 do 20 21/4 %
Thomas Chetwood 150 7/3 do 20 2/4 %
Llanfyllin Coal & Lime Co. 150 7/3 do 20 21/4 %
JD Roberts 100 7/0 do 20 21/4 %
Builth Gas Works 200 6/6 do 20 nett
James Tomlins 400 6/8 do 20 21/4 %
8.215
354
11 July 1888 “for delivery in customers’ wagons":
Jones & Wynne 4,000 6/3 30 June 
1889
20 21/2 %
A D Howell 100 6/6 do 20 TA  %
Maurice Thomas 100 6/5 do 20 21/2 %
W Gilman 250 6/9 do 20 21/2 %
John Price & Co. 500 6/3 - 6/9 do 20 2Vz %
Jonathan Oldfield & Co. 4,500 6/3 do 20 214 %
CR Cowap & Co. 500 6/5 do 20 2/4 %
James Rigby & Co. Chester 2,000 6/5 do 20 2/4 %
Radford & Co. 900 6/0 do 20 2/4 %
GWR 10,400 6/3 15 July 1889 20 Nett
John Walker & Co 100 6/5 30 June 
1889
20 2/4 %
Charles Bowen & son 100 6/6 do 20 2!4 %
R Pugh 100 6/6 do 20 2/4 %
Hugh Lumler 100 6/6 do 20 2/4 %
Edward Jones, Corwen 100 6/21 do 20 21/2 %
W Roberts 500 6/5 do 20 21/2 %
Thomas Evans 250 6/3 do 20 214 %
Samuel Powell 150 6/3 do 20 2'A %
CJ Huxley & Co. 350 6/9-7/6 do 20 21/2 %
Coward & Co. 100 7/4 do 2!4 %
Wolverhampton Gas Co. 6.000 5/6 do nett
31.100
5 September 1888 “for delivery in our waaons”
Wellinborough Gas Light Co. 2,500 6/8 30.June
1890
21 Nett
Ratcliff & sons, Birmingham 250 6/4 30 June 
1889
20 do
Cirencester Gas Co. 500 6/6 do do do
Bilston Gas Co. 2,000 6/1 30 Sept 
1889
do do
S Cann, Birkenhead 200 6/9 30 June 
1890
do 2/4 %
Beaconsfield Gas Co. 150 6/5 do do do
Gloucester Gas Co. 3,000 6/2 30 June 
1891
do do
Smethwick gas Co. 7,000 6/4 31 Dec 1889 21 do
Bloxham Gas Co. 100 6/11 30 June 
1889
20 do
WC Arkell, Fairford Gas Works 130 6/6 do do do
Princes Risborough Gas Co. 150 6/9 do do do
Dursley Gas Co. 300 71- do do do
Sharpness New Docks Co 200 71- do do do
J Lane, Saltney 600 6/11 do do do
Farringdon Gas Co. 450 71- do do Nett
F Chubb, Aberystwyth 1.500 6/7
30 Sept 
1889 do 1V*%
19.030
5 September 1888- “ for delivery in customers’
waaons”
F Chubb, Hereford 15,000 61- 30 June 
1891
20 VA%
A Boulton & Co., Church Stretton 170 61- 30 June 
1889
do 2Yz %
T Parry & Co., Mold 1.200 612 - 6/9 do do do
16,370
355
Appendix C: Details of all the collieries of Denbighshire in existence after 1850. showing whether 
colliery being worked in 1854. 1870. 1901 and 1910
Collieries in existence in Denbighshire 1854 -  1914
Colliery Year
sunk
1854 1870 1888 1900 1914
Aberderyn, Ponkey; constituted 2 old pit shafts, owned by 
Thomas Williams & Co in 1854.
£
Abernant, a clay pit in Ruabon where coal raised as an 
ancillary to main occupation of making of terra cotta. 1894- 
1914 was owned by Messrs JC Edwards (Ruabon) Ltd.
£
Acrefair, a clay pit where coal was raised as part of main 
operation to get fireclay. 1888 owned by New British Iron Co. 
Not worked 1889-1899.1901-1914 owned and worked by JC 
Edwards as part of terra cotta works.
£ £
Afoneitha, Ruabon owned in 1854 by R Williams, W  Hughes 
& John Lloyd, and in 1870 by R Williams & Co. Not listed from 
1888 in the List o f Mines.
£ £
Bersham , owned by Barnes family of Liverpool. In 1911 it was 
bought by the Broughton & Plas Power Collieries Co. Ltd.
1870 £ £ £
Black Lane, opened 1898 by E Cunnah, owned by R 
Williamson in 1904, thereafter by E Cunnah again.
£ £
Black Park, Chirk, one of oldest mines in north Wales; owned 
in 1854 by Representatives of TE Ward; 1877 owned by the 
Black Park Colliery Co. Ltd; Mr James Darlington, Chairman of 
NWCOA was a director. Still owned by this company in 1914.
pre
1653
£ £ £ £ £
Broughton Hall or Old Broughton, sunk by Messrs Pierce & 
Gough who failed in 1853. In 1855 bought by H Robertson & 
Darby brothers who formed the Old Broughton Coal Co. Used 
as a pumping pit until 1893.
£
Brymbo, made up of numerous pits, owned by Wilkinson 
family in late 18th century/ early 19th century. Later owned by 
Robert Roy who in 1842 joined forces with Henry Robertson, 
W  Betts & AM Ross to form Brymbo Mineral & Railway Co. 
1888 onwards owned by Brymbo Co. (Includes Bye pit)
pre
1620
£ £ £ £ £
Brynkinallt, Chirk, sunk by Mr Bakewell; in 1893 it was 
purchased by W Y Craig and sons; still owned and run by them 
in 1914.
1870-
71
£ £ £ £
Brynmally, Broughton, Wrexham; started by Charles Roe & 
James Venables. 1849 bought by T Clayton and owned by 
him until 1896 when the Brynmally Colliery Co. Ltd formed; 
this company was still running the pit in 1914.
1770 £ £ £ £ £
Bryn y Felin, Ruabon; owned in 1854 by Daniel Owen & 
Sons. No mention of this pit in List o f Mines 1888 -1914.
£
Bryn yr Owen, owned in 1854 by John Taylor & Sons. 
Managed 1850-1867 by Henry Dennis; closed around 1880.
c.
1715
£ £
Caello level, worked by the Brymbo Co. 1893-1894. 1893
Christionydd, two collieries of this name in 1854, one owned 
by TE Ward and one by E Morris. No mention in List o f Mines 
1888-1914.
£ £
Cefn y Bedd,owned by Cefn y Bedd Colliery Co. Ltd. 1913 £
356
Colliery Year
sunk
1854 1870 1888 1900 1914
Coedpoeth, also known as Grosvenor. Coal worked here 
since 17th century but ‘new’ colliery owned by W  Lowe; in 
1881 it was owned by New Grosvenor Colliery Co. Ltd. and in 
1883 it was taken over by Brymbo Steel Co for use in its own 
works.
£ £
Cope, owned by JC Edwards, worked as part of terra cotta 
works, closed in 1889
£
Delph, Acrefair a clay pit where coal was raised as part of 
main operation to get fireclay. Owned 1888- 1914 by Mr H 
Wyndham
£ £
Dolydd, Llangollen, owned in 1854 by the Dolydd Co. Not 
listed in list of mines 1888-1914.
£
Erwlwyd, owned by Ruabon Glazed Brick & Fireclay. Ltd., its 
main function was to access the underclay for use in the Pant 
Brickworks. From 1904 owned by Ruabon Coal & Coke Co. 
Ltd.
£ £ £
Ffos y Go, nr Ffrwd, Wrexham, owned by T Clayton in 1854. 
Not working 1888-1901. Worked 1901-1903 by Miss M 
Corkling; from 1904 was owned by Ffosygo Colliery Colliery 
Co. Ltd.
1849 £ £ £
Ffrith or Glascoed, Brymbo; worked 1870-72. Reopened 
1900 by Ffrith Coal & Fireclay Co. Ltd; worked until 1905. Also 
listed (as Glascoed) in 1913 and 1914.
£ £ £
Ffrwd, Wrexham; worked until 1815 by Richard Kirk owned in 
1854 by Ffrwd Iron Co., bought by James Sparrow in 1855, 
still owned by J Sparrow & Sons in 1904 when it was closed.
pre
1815
£ £ £ £
Gardden Lodge, Ruabon; owned in 1854 by G Walmesley 
and in 1870 by the Gardden Lodge Colliery Co. By 1888 it was 
owned by Ruabon Glazed Brick & Terra Cotta Co. Ltd who 
worked it until 1893 when it was closed
£ £
Gatewen, Wrexham; owned by Broughton Coal Co, later by 
Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd.
1875
1877
£ £ £
Grango, owned by E Griffiths in 1888, not listed after 1889 £
Gresford, Actor; Grange, Wrexham. Owned by United, 
Westminster & Wrexham Collieries Ltd.
1908
1911
£
Groes, Ruabon owned by Jonathan Davis & Co in 1854. £
Gwersyllt. Sunk by T Clayton. In 1887 was taken over by 
Westminster, Brymbo Coal & Coke Co. Ltd.
1862
1869
£
Hafod (y bwch), originally known as Ruabon New Colliery,
Johnstown. Sunk by Ruabon Coal Co Ltd and later owned by 
Ruabon Coal & Coke Co. Ltd.
1863
1866
£ £ £ £*2 £
Llay Hall, Cefn y Bedd, sunk by Llay Hall Coal Iron & Fireclay 
Co Ltd.; this company went into liquidation in 1885 and colliery 
was subsequently run as a sole trader by ES Clarke and from 
1901 by the Executors of his estate.
1873
1877
£ £
Llay Hall Drift; sunk and worked by ES Clarke 1896-1899. 1896
Llay Main, Llay; sinking started in 1914. Owned by joint 
venture between Hickleton Main Colliery Co. Ltd., Thurscoe, 
Yorkshire, and Messrs Rea, coal exporters, Liverpool.
1914
1917
£
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Colliery Year
sunk
1854 1870 1888 1900 1914
Mill, Christionydd; owned in 1854 by RCM Wright. Not 
included in List of Mines 1888-1914.
£
Minera, two old shafts in Minera. Not in List o f Mines 1888- 
1914.
£
Mountain level, owned 1899-1902 by E Griffiths & Co.; not 
worked after 1902.
£
New Broughton, sunk by T Clayton and owned by him until 
1900; purchased by Mitchell & Butler of Birmingham who ran it 
as the New Broughton Colliery Co. Ltd. Abandoned 1911, 
although listed as a pumping pit in 1912. Not listed after this 
date.
1883 £ £
Old Furnace Rock, owned by Ruabon Brick & Terra Cotta 
Co. Ltd., listed 1900-1901; not listed thereafter.
£
Pant, Pentre Christionydd; owned in 1854 by RCM Wright. 
Not included in List o f Mines 1888-1914.
£
Penbedw, owned by HR Bowers 1888-1910; listed with no 
employees 1911-1912, not listed thereafter
£ £
Pendwll, listed 1888-1893, owned by T Clayton. £
Penrhos, owned by Brymbo Co., listed 1888-1892. £
Pentre Bychan, owned in 1854 by Gomer Roberts & Co. Not 
included in List o f Mines 1888-1914.
£
Pentre Mawr; owned in 1854 by Daniel Owen. Not included in 
List of Mines 1888-1914.
£
Pentre Saeson, Brymbo; was working in 1863, but in 
liquidation in 1871.
£ £
Pentre Vron, listed 1894- 1897, owned by Jones & Williams.
Plas Isa; owned in 1854 by Samuel Giller and in 1870 by the 
Plas Isa Coal Co. Not included in List o f Mines 1888-1914.
pre
1820
£ £
Plas Kynaston, Ruabon; owned in 1854 by TE Ward; coal 
production ceased in 1897; thereafter it was used as a 
pumping station for the Wynnstay colliery.
£ £ £ £ £
Plas Power, sunk by Old Broughton Coal Co; taken over by 
Broughton & Plas Power Coal Co. Ltd in 1881.
1875
1877
£ £ £
Ponkey, listed 1895-1896, owned by William Hughes.
Rhos, a clay pit owned by JC Edwards (Ruabon) Ltd. £ £
Ruabon or Brandie Pits listed as being owned in 1854 by 
New British Iron Co.- coal raised for own use.
Pre
1800
£ £ £
Smelt, Brymbo; coal raised alongside fireclay. £ £ £
Southsea, owned in 1812 by Richard Kirk. In 1854 was 
owned by Southsea Co., and in 1855 was bought by Old 
Broughton Coal Co. (Henry Robertson, W H & CE Darby). Not 
included in List of Mines 1888-1914.
pre
1812
£
Street Elas or Las, listed 1889-1893, owned by Ruabon 
Glazed Brick & Fireclay Ltd.
Talwrn, owned by Mr JR Burton from 1844 to 1870s, and later 
by Vron Colliery Co. Ltd. Listed as Old Talwrn from 1905. 
Abandoned 1911.
£ £ £ £
Trefachan, owned by C Valentine, listed 1888-1893. £
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Colliery Year
sunk
1854 1870 1888 1900 1914
Trefynant, a clay pit owned by JC Edwards (Ruabon) Ltd. 
Abandoned 1912 but listed. Not listed 1913 onwards.
£ £
Trevor, or Garth, a clay pit owned by JC Edwards (Ruabon) 
Ltd.
£ £
Vauxhall, originally known as Kenyon colliery; sunk by RCM 
Wright. Owned from 1871 by Vauxhall Colliery Co. Ltd.
1857 £ £ £
Vron; in 1850 was owned by Messrs Maurice & Lowe. By 
1872 was owned by a company which went into liquidation in 
1882. In 1884 the Vron Colliery Ltd. was formed and in 1907 
the colliery was purchased by the Broughton & Plas Power 
Coal Co. Ltd.
1806 £ £ £ © £
Vron Tunnel, owned by Vron Brick Co., listed from 1906; 
abandoned in 1912, not listed thereafter.
Westminster, Moss, Wrexham; owned in 1854 by Brymbo 
Co. - a partnership between R Roy, H Robertson et al. The 
partnership split in 1856 and Ruabon Coal Co. was created. 
The colliery was later owned by the Westminster, Brymbo 
Coal & Coke Co. Ltd.
1846 £ £ £ £*2 £
Wrexham & Acton, Rhosddu; owned by Wrexham Colliery 
Co. Ltd. and then Wrexham & Acton Collieries Co Ltd
1869
1871
£ £ 0*2 £*2
Wynn Hall, Penycae, owned by W  Kendrick in 1854. Not 
included in List o f Mines 1888-1914.
£
Wynnstay, sunk by New British Iron Co. and owned by them 
until 1866. when taken over by Wynnstay Collieries Ltd.
1856 £ £ £*2 £
Total number of collieries 26 22 28 38 26
Key:
*2 -  these were listed as two collieries in the List o f Mines
(Sources:
1854 Hunt’s M ineral Statistics D/GR/1545 
1870 Hunt’s Mineral Statistics D/GR/1563  
1888, 1900 & 1914 List o f M ines BL/BS/27/1)
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m TBSB" ...1899
Above Total y/g above total u/g above total y/g above total u/a above total u/a above total
Abernant (c) 7 3 10 7 2 9 8 3 11 8 3 11 8 3 11 8 3 11
Bersham *2 638 93 731 631 88 719 627 84 711 618 86 704 570 86 656 609 87 696
Black Lane 0 10 3 13 18 9 27
Black Park 441 58 499 148 22 170 410 50 460 426 58 484 411 59 470 397 63 460
Brymbo- Bye 188 26 214 148 22 170 157 28 185 116 22 138 97 23 120 110 23 133
Brynkinallt 196 43 239 344 77 421 381 78 459 358 69 427 383 78 461 386 74 460
Brynmally 202 36 238 200 36 236 210 45 255 215 37 252 222 32 254 233 37 270Caello Level 6 1 7
Delph (c) 15 3 18 19 3 22 18 3 21 18 3 2l l 23 4 27 23 4 27
Erwlwyd (c) 25 7 32 22 6 28 26 6 32 26 6 32 30 7 37 30 7 37
Ffrwd 222 50 272 237 24 261 220 26 246 201 26 227 140 21 161 152 46 198
Gatewen 443 96 539 448 96 544 427 95 522 479 97 576 562 97 659 575 110 685
Gwersyllt 194 36 230 177 35 212 0 0 0
Hafod *2 1,012 255 1,267 1,053 278 1,331 996 270 1,266 1,001 259 1,260 1,016 265 1,281 1,029 267 1,296
Llay Hall 346 91 437 381 107 488 276 84 360 330 85 415 349 96 445 337 89 426
Llay Hall Drift 5 2 7 5 11 16 4 2 6 4 2 6
Mountain level 2 1 3
New Broughton 242 38 280 246 32 278 223 33 256 232 39 271 150 30 180 169 31 200
Penbedw 16 5 21 15 5 r  20 14 5 19 15 5 20 13 5 18 12 5 r 17
Ponkey 2 2 4 2 2 4 -
Plas Kynaston 166 48 214 148 41 189 143 37 180 122 35 157 0 4 4 0 4 h 4
Plas Power 711 130 841 736 129 865 734 138 872 723 141 864 850 167 1017 767 185 952
Pentre Vram 3 2 5 3 2 5 3 2 5 3 2 5
Rhos (c) 15 5 20 19 5 24 19 4 23 20 4 24 19 4 23 22 4 26
Smelt (c) 6 1 7 3 1 4 10 2 12 10 2 12 12 2 14 11 2 13
Talwrn 82 17 99 78 24 102 26 9 35 40 9 49 52 13 65 63 16 79
Trefynant (c) 11 4 15 12 3 15 12 3 15 14 4 18 14 3 17 14 3 17
Trevor -  Garth (c) 4 1 5 4 1 5
Vauxhall 328 66 394 344 64 408 361 64 425 362 71 433 339 67 406 351 76 427
Vron 172 68 240 182 63 245 198 68 266 161 65 226 190 59 249 224 87 311
Westminster *2 663 168 831 574 157 731 655 155 810 659 139 798 672 149 821 842 175 1017
Wrexham *2 621 111 732 637 114 751 528 106 634 608 99 707 601 109 710 623 136 759
Wynnstay *2 740 171 911 649 144 793 660 153 734 150 884 796 165 961 794 165 959
Total employees 7.713 1.634 9.347 7.751 1.615 9.365 7.347 1.553 8.900 7.504 1.527 9.031 7.537 1.554 9.091 7.809 1.712 9.521
Total Collieries 34 34 34 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 35 35 35
Average per colliery 227 48 275 235 49 284 223 47 270 227 46 273 228 47 275 223 49 272
Employed in clav pits 102 102 114 118 134 136
No. of clay pits 6 6 6 6 7 7
Key: *2 -  listed as 2 collieries in the List o f Mines until 1906; from 1907 listed as single collieries 
(c) -  clay pits that raised coal only as part of the clay getting process
Note: Those collieries that have a 0 as the total number o f employees have been included as a colliery by the List o f Mines and must be included when calculating the total number of
collieries for that year.
19pp 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905
U/g Above total u/g above total y/g above total u/g above total u/g above total u/a above total
Abemant (c) 8 3 11 10 3 13 8 3 11 12 3 15 13 4 17 14 4 18
Acrefair (c) 6 5 11 9 6 15 10 7 17 8 3 11 9 3 12 10 3 13
Bersham *2 (1907) 638 91 729 675 94 769 650 98 748 667 92 759 633 91 724 656 93 749
Black Lane 16 5 21 15 5 20 15 5 20 0 0 0 9 4 13 19 6 25
Black Park 397 63 460 411 64 475 468 67 535 512 70 582 512 67 579 506 63 569
Brymbo- Bye 130 24 154 108 23 131 146 25 171 117 32 149 165 26 191 181 31 212
Brynkinallt 404 73 477 412 91 503 405 103 508 424 96 520 438 93 531 482 90 572
Brynmally 152 34 186 185 37 222 201 40 241 219 42 261 200 38 238 207 38 245
Delph (c) 21 3 24 23 3 26 25 3 28 21 3 24 21 3 24 16 3 19
Erwlwyd (c) 30 8 38 28 6 34 30 9 39 28 6 34 29 5 34 26 7 33
Ffos y Go 6 2 8 17 7 24 12 12 24 12 9 21 23 8 31
Ffrith 38 17 55 82 18 100 60 6 66 38 6 44 8 5 13 3 3 6
Ffrwd 220 24 244 241 24 265 220 24 244 109 18 127 100 30 130 0 0 0
Gatewen 564 110 674 557 133 690 570 132 702 624 117 741 634 110 744 626 149 775
Gwersyllt 0 181 40 221 194 40 234 133 0 133 144 0 144 0
Hafod *2 (1913) 1,029 279 1,308 1,079 312 1,391 1,221 360 1,581 1,139 329 1,468 1,193 342 1,535 1,209 344 1,553
Llav Hall 331 80 411 374 86 460 384 81 465 426 88 514 492 90 582 439 94 533
Mountain level 2 2 4 3 2 5 2 1 3 0 0 0
New Brouahton 233 37 270 310 43 353 250 30 280 262 29 291 245 32 277 177 25 202
Old Furnace Rock (c) 7 1 8 6 2 8 0 O' 0 0
Penbedw 10 5 15 12 5 17 13 5 18 12 5 17 7 3 10 10 7 17
Plas Kynaston 5 7 12 1 4 r  5 0 9 9 0 4 4 0 4 4 0 6 6
Plas Power 842 206 1,048 877 222 1,099 875 225 1,100 853 143 996 884 171 1,055 863 190 1,053
Rhos (c) 19 5 24 22 4 26 22 4 26 23 4 27 23 4 27 21 4 25
Smelt (c) 12 2 14 12 2 14 19 2 21 17 2 19 11 2 13 13 2 15
Talwrn 96 10 106 105 14 119 97 17 114 87 16 103 4 4 8 10 5 15
Trefynant (c) 17 3 20 17 3 20 19 3 22 11 2 13 11 2 13 10 2 12
Trevor-Garth (c) 4 25 29 6 8 14 6 2 8 5 4 9 5 1 6 6 1 7
Vauxhall 360 69 429 353 76 429 386 76 462 395 78 473 409 84 493 405 88 493
Vron 163 87 250 165 80 245 222 73 295 242 77 319 0 0
Westminster *2 (1913) 839 216 1,055 690 185 875 787 195 982 890 225 1,115 774 216 990 590 239 829
Wrexham*2 (1913) 618 129 747 721 134 855 707 149 856 7 33 138 871 712 156 868 686 142 828
Wvnnstav *2 (1907) 786 165 951 866 167 1033 832 143 975 903 188 1091 903 160 1063 820 168 988
Total employees 7.997 1.788 9.785 8.562 1.898 10.460 8.861 1.944 10.805 8.922 1.832 10.754 8.600 1.759 10.359 8,191 1,915 10.006
Total Collieries 37 37 37 38 38 38 37 37 37 35 35 35 35 35 35 33 33 33
Average per colliery 216 48 264 225 50 275 240 52 290 254 53 307 245 50 295 248 55 303
Employed in clay pits 171 162 172 152 146 142
No. of clay pits 8 8 8 8 8 8
Key: *2 -  listed as 2 collieries in the List o f Mines until 1906; from 1907 listed as single collieries
*2 (1913) -  listed as 2 collieries in the List o f Moines until 1912; from 1913 listed as single collieries 
(c) -  clay pits that raised coal only as part of the clay getting process
Note: Those collieries that have a 0 as the total number o f employees have been included as a colliery by the List o f Mines and must be included when calculating the total number o f
collieries for that year.
i w 1807 1908 1909 191(r 1911
u/g Above total u/a above total u/g above total u/g above total u/g above total u/a above total
Abernant (c) 9 3 12 16 4 20 9 3 12 9 3 12 9 3 12 9 3 12
Acrefair (c) 8 3 11 8 3 11 8 2 10 8 3 11 9 3 12
Bersham *2 (1907) 754 95 849 685 100 785 745 103 848 733 105 838 703 97 800 773 110 883
Black Lane 48 10 58 25 6 31 46 10 56 47 11 58 52 9 61 60 12 72
Black Park 454 76 530 467 80 547 429 74 503 399 81 480 416 69 485 452 78 530
Brvmbo- Bye 38 13 51 1 1 2 56 15 71 106 25 131 153 31 184 151 30 181
Brvnkinallt 549 113 662 528 94 622 549 129 678 567 126 693 570 130 700 628 142 770
Brvnmally 200 37 237 157 37 194 238 58 296 290 58 348 3071 67 374 346 63 409
Cefn y Bedd 0 0 0 0
Delph (c) 20 5 25 22 3 25 25 5 30 25 5 30 20 5 25 25 5 30
Erwlwyd (c) 14 3 17 26 6 32 16 3 19 12 3 15 13l 3 16 14 4 18
Ffos v Go 73 14 87 50 11 61 66 9 75 42 13 55 40 9 49 70 13 83
Gatewen 677 131 808 655 120 775 695 108 803 647 133 780 736 130 866 638 133 771
Gresford 101 98 199 129 98 227 131 116 247
Gwersyllt 244 0 244 217 0 217 266 0 266 254 254 350 350 297 297
Hafod *2 (1913) 1,249 319 1,568 1,192 320 1,512 1,330 326 1,656 1,369 364 1,733 1,460 364 1,824 1,449 351 1,800
Llay Hall 351 78 429 425 85 510 374 72 446 382 76 458 427 96 523 428 86 514
New Broughton 228 47 275 184 33 217 270 58 328 285 54 339 182 39 221 18 11 29
Penbedw 4 3 7 13 7 20 4 3 7 5 3 8 4 3 7 0
Plas Kynaston 0 8 8 0 7 7 0 9 9 0 7 7 0 5 5 0 5 5
Plas Power 941 216 1,157 918 196 1,114 932 189 1,121 915 184 1,099 917 202 1,119 919 188 1,107
Rhos (c) 25 4 29 25 4 29 30 4 34 30 4 34 24 4 28 25 4 29
Smelt (c) 23 3 26 19 3 22 24 3 27 18 2 20 17 2 19 20 3 23
Talwrn 6 3 9 13 3 16 10 3 13 8 3 11 6 3 9 0
Trefynant (c) 2 1 3 10 2 12 2 1 3 6 2 8 8 2 10 8 2 10
Trevor-Garth (c) 5 1 6 5 1 6 6 4 10 4 2 6 4 2 6 4 2 6
Vauxhal! 375 87 462 394 86 480 366 87 453 279 75 354 291 76 367 332 73 405
Vron 163 43 206 178 44 222 186 48 234 226 53 279 247 51 298
Vron Tunnel 27 6 33 8 1 9 44 9 53 54 10 64 60 11 71 55 7 62
Westminster *2 (1913) 798 247 1,045 834 229 1,063 739 224 963 755 225 980 616 196 812 702 193 895
Wrexham *2 (1913) 7421 143 885 691 140 831 828 150 978 862 156 1,018 806 158 964 848 160 1,008
Wynnstay *2 (1907) 1,020 186 1,206 972 176 1,148 1,080 230 1,310 1,020 217 1,237 1,030 218 1,248 1,217 223 1,440
Total employees 8,884 1,855 10.739 8,723 1,801 10,524 9,365 1,935 11,300 9,418 2,096 11,514 9,585 2,088 11,673 9,866 2,068 11,934
Total Collieries 34 34 64 33 33 33 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 34 34 34
Average per colliery 261 55 316 264 55 319 268 55 323 269 60 329 274 60 334 290 61 351
Employed in clay pits 129 157 145 136 128 128
No. of clay pits 8 8 8 8 8 7
Key: *2 (1907) -  listed as 2 collieres in the List o f Mines_ until 1906; from 1907 listed as single collieries 
*2 (1913) -  listed as 2 collieries in the List o f Moines until 1912; from 1913 listed as single collieries 
(c) -  clay pits that raised coal only as part of the clay getting process
Note: Those collieries that have a 0 as the total number of employees have been included as a colliery by the List o f Mines and must be included when calculating the total number of
collieries for that year
1912 1913 1914
u/a Above total u/a above total u/a above total
Abernant (c) 9 3 12
Bersham *2 (1907) 817 112 929 834 112 946 862 117 979
Black Lane 52 10 62 45 7 52 79 10 89
Black Park 444 79 523 440 75 515 460 86 546
Brymbo- Bye 168 35 203 155 32 187 153 32 185
Brynkinallt 681 150 831 742 164 906 741 189 930
Brynmally 432 82 514 346 84 430 421 79 500
Cefn y Bedd 0 12 9 21 25 18 43
Delph (c) 29 6 35 29 5 34 29 5 34
Erwlwyd (c) 11 3 14 13 3 16 14 3 17
Ffos y Go 74 15 89 74 11 85 85 11 96
Ffrith 67 24 91 83 23 106
Gatewen 613 130 743 641 118 759 696 120 816
Gresford 375 126 501 626 210 836 689 210 899
Gwersyllt 319 319 315 315 306 306
Hafod *2 (1913) 1,439 351 1,790 1,448 343 1,791 1,561 361 1,922
Llay Hall 386 101 487 350 100 450 340 98 438
New Brouqhton 9 8 17
Penbedw 0
Plas Kynaston 2 9 11 2 5 7 0 5 5
Plas Power 908 204 1,112 900 169 1,069 901 163 1,064
Rhos (c) 30 6 36 22 4 26 22 4 26
Smelt (c) 23 3 26 25 3 28 28 3 31
Trevor-Garth (c) 5 2 7 5 2 7 5 1 6
Vauxhall 322 78 400 305 81 386 313 82 395
Vron 261 61 322 267 66 333 268 62 330
Vron Tunnel 55 7 62
Westminster *2 (1913) 712 225 937 694 196 890 663 219 882
Wrexham *2 (1913) 848 145 993 834 164 998 813 163 976
Wynnstav *2 (1907) 1,189 230 1,419 1,158 241 1,399 1,127 234 1,361
Total employees 10,158 2,174 12,332 10,349 2,228 12,577 10,684 2,298 12,982
Total Collieries 32 32 *32 26 26 26 26 26 26
Average per colliery 317 68 385 398 86 484 411 88 499
Employed in clay pits 118 111 114
No. of clay pits 5 5 5
Key: *2 (1907) -  listed as 2 collieres in the List o f Mines_ until 1906; from 1907 listed as single collieries 
*2 (1913) -  listed as 2 collieries in the List o f Moines until 1912; from 1913 listed as single collieries 
(c) -  clay pits that raised coal only as part of the clay getting process
Note: Those collieries that have a 0 as the total number o f  employees have been included as a colliery by the List o f Mines and must be included when calculating the total number of
collieries for that year.
Appendix E: Details of the 'Cinder hill Riots*
By 1830, some of the ideas advocated by the ‘FACU had begun to filter through 
to Denbighshire. The birthplace of the union had been in Lancashire, a place to 
which the miners of north Wales migrated when employment was scarce 
(Rogers, 1928, III: 221). The union found north Wales, and especially Flintshire, 
quite open to its views; the major reason for this being the fact that wages in 
north Wales “remained exceptionally low”, possibly no more than eight to nine 
shillings a week (Rogers, 1928, II: 221). With this as a backdrop, in December 
1830, some colliers in Hawarden went on strike demanding three shillings per 
shift for the most skilled miners. They were determined to bring out the miners of 
Flintshire and Denbighshire, the first time an attempt had been made to organise 
a strike on more than a strictly local level. The miners determined to march to 
other collieries in Flintshire and then on to Denbighshire to stop them working 
(Rogers, 1928, III: 223). The men were not averse to using intimidation and not 
surprisingly met with great success as they ‘swore in’ miners to support their 
cause.
Again, not surprisingly, such events frightened the coalowners who 
demanded that the troops be mustered to quell the ‘disturbance’. In a letter to 
Thomas Fitzhugh, owner of Plas Power Hall, dated 26 December 1830 (cited by 
Rogers, 1928, II: 224), W Eyton of Leeswood, “a prominent landowner and 
colliery proprietor”, demanded that “he send directly to Sir Watkin, and come 
what may, get a force together to stop this outbreak [because]... if we cannot get 
military assistance it will all be mob law directly”. The militia were mobilised, and 
the Flintshire miners were confronted in Rhos on 28 December; they showed no 
signs of disorder and, when asked, told Sir Watkin Williams Wynn that all they 
wanted was an increase in wages (Rogers, III: 225). Sir Watkin tried hard to 
disperse the miners, but when they refused he ordered the arrest of three of the 
leaders, who were locked in a farmhouse. These three men were soon ‘liberated’ 
by the miners who went en masse to Cinder Hill, situated between Rhos and 
Ruabon, where Sir Watkin was reduced to reading the Riot Act, but the men
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again refused to disperse. The miners and soldiers were becoming increasingly 
restive, and when the miners began to pelt them with stones, the soldiers 
charged the hill and captured a single man, who was promptly released by Sir 
Watkin (Rogers, 1928, III: 226-7).
One of the main grievances of the men at this time, in addition to their 
demand for higher wages, was the ‘Tommy’ shop at Acrefair, where “conditions
for the workers  were probably worse than in any other district of the
coalfield” (Rogers, 1928, III; 227). This truck shop was operated by the British 
Iron Company, whose agent, Mr Wood, refused, despite public protests, to have 
it closed. At a meeting between owners and men held on 30 December 1830, the 
owners refused to concede any of the men’s demands, and in the ensuing fracas 
Mr Wood was struck and captured; he eventually escaped, “disguised in a 
petticoat, a cloak and an old white straw hat” (Rogers, 1928, II: 230). Over the 
next couple of days, discussions, mediated by Sir Watkin, took place and the 
masters conceded 3s per day for the cutters; this was viewed as a great victory, 
especially as the Acrefair tommy shop was also closed (Rogers, 1928, III: 233).
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W REXHAM  AHD ACTON.
Wrexham and Acton 
Collieries.
M A IN  CO A 1(0 
N o r th  S id e . »• d.
L Getting G o a l............................. .. pert oaf 1 6f
2 Slack   O H
3 Pillars Coal  * 1 7
4 Pillars Driving ................. ..............per yd. 4 6f* 5>
So u th  S id e . n
5 -Getting C o a l................................. per ton 1 6j
6 Slack   „ 0 6 |
7 Pillars Coal.......................................... * „ 1 7
8 Driving nine feet roads...  per yd, 5 Of
9 Driving seven feet roads,  ,, 4 9f
10 Ripping Bind Coal if blown down
without eufcWtg ", . . .  ,, 0 6 |
11 Ripping Bind Coal if cut one side
.and arched   „  1 1
12 Taking Side Coal on R o a d .............  ' 1 14
13 Rounding Pillars for first five yards „ 4 5f
14 Opening or re-opening Wickets • ^  ‘
when down 6yds. on each side of
road with a limit of 12 yards  „ 1 7f
15 For ^crossing old roads, thrillings,
&c., thickness of Cjpal o n ly   „ 4 5f
A
cn
W R E XH A M  AND ACTON.
16 Extras to be agreed upon between
the Contractor and the Manager.
17 Pulling Props ou t in  working place
when finished ......................   each
B R A 8 S E Y  SE AM .
„  2 
„ 0 
per yd. 4 
4
1 Getting Coal. Proin a few inches 
under to a fewanches over four
’ - fs fa t' thick ......... *....................
Coal. Where the Coal is 
about three feet thick or under, 
and the Coal has to be loaded on a 
trolhift and brought out qf the 
WicKote into the gateway pr road- 
$nd, and refilled intstt the tubs .
[•ok . . . ■ ................. •'#.
*  ’ ..........
jping tons to iron stone ..........
5 Bipping up^o the Ironstone next
“V tothelashs.................t ......................  .. 4
E xtra  R ip p in g   per inch 0
8 First Ripping (tShrst lash or abo«t
18ins.g  per yd. 2
9 Manholes (One Yard)  ...........................
10 Opejgpte or re-opening Wickets
whencfown six yards on each side 
of road with a lj.mit of 12 yards.. „
.41 Timbering, 9 U & f  per pah;
12« Do,, 7 f e ^ / - • ; ........................... .»
13 'Pftllhogf in working place
w h m fin ^ d  . . . . t in , ................  each 0
5 
1
2£ 
4 5
7fH
W K E X H A M  A N D  A O T O N .
CRANK COAL.
%
1 G etting Coal (new sys te m ).. . . .  per ton 3
2 G etting Coal (old system) 4
3 Slack .....................................   -  0
4 T im bering. ...................... ............ P®r  Pa ir 1
6 R ipp ing Tops (Main Roads). . . .  per yard  4 
6 R ipping Tops (Branch R oads).. „  2
. ’ ROWELL SffSttL
#  Getting Coal, fillin g  through w ith
-0  sh o v e l.........................................
, j 2 D riv ing  ■ •   ...............................
% - '3  R ipp ing Tops (Main Roads).. . - 
4 RippingaTops ( Bra|w;h Roads^- •
(Th e  fo llo w ing  pR X Q ^I'^dn  a l l
T im b e rin g .. . .  vr >r*-V • ;
' 2 Setting or removing props on r
3 Changing bar leg (i.e., taking 
one ou t and p u tting  new one in
4 Stretchers ............... ...................
5 Draw ing tim ber ou t when w<|iki 
places ace tth ished.................  • ■ • „  *
6 Raising rails, single road, when 
'  place is finished    per y<L () ° l
7 F illin g  d i r t   per td lfO  2J
8 E m p ty  ing d ir t  , ............................  ,, 0
9 Road cu tting  (double r o a d ) . . per inch 0 
*10 Road cu ttin g  (three rai l s) . . . . . .  • n
11 Road C utting  (sipgle rpad) ..
12 Di&ance waggonihg, /g&yarda.
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4 WREXHAM AND AOTON.
13^01 each additional 10 ynpls or fractional part 
thereof, one penny per ton extra.
14 Fillers working in hard or difficult places, or 
when takeq, out of their places to work for the 
Company, to be paid a t .current rates, as per the 
basis of 1888.
415 Blocking or Wedging Coal; Setting Chocks 
under extraordinary circumstances ; Fast end 
when required ; or any other ex tra  labour not 
inserted in Price List, for which consideration 
has been previously paid, subject to  contract.
f t  is agreed th a t the fallowing shall be the mini­
mum standard rates of wages at the Wrexham and 
Aoton CoJJieries :—
(1) For Colliers working in hard or difficult 
places 4/- per day. '
(2) A Collier taken out of his place to work 
for the Company, 4/- per day (but for clear­
ing obstructions to his own place, he shall 
receive the day tiers rate a t present in vogue 
a t the Colliery).
(3) For Tirabermen and Metalmen, 4/- per day.
(4) For experienced byeinen who have been 
emjdoyed not less than 2 years underground 
3/4 per day.
(5) For boys starting to work between 13 and
J6 years of age, 1/4 per day. For boys 
starting a t 16 years of age and upwards, 
1/8 per day.
All the above rates are subject to the ruling per­
centages.
W R E X H A M  A ND ACTON.
Boys to receive a ne tt advance of 2d. per day every 
six months until they reach a wage equal to 2/4 
per day, plus the current percentages.
The advances to boys to be made from the first 
making-up day in March and the first making-up day 
in September in each year.
The Price L ist to come into operation on the first 
January, 1208.
Signed on behalf of the Wrexham and Acton Collieries 
Company,
H . D y k e  D e n n is  
S. J . E l l is  
J o h n  N e w t o n .
fl
Signed on behalf of the Workmen,
G eo r g e  D a v ie s
R o b e r t  J o n es
E d w a r d  J o h n  W il l ia m s
J o h n  J e n k in  E v a n s
J o h n  H u g h es , Secretary
E d w a rd  H u g h es , M in ers ’ Agent.
L
